LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER 


THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
NEW YORK - BOSTON - CHICAGO - DALLAS 
ATLANTA : SAN FRANCISCO 


MACMILLAN & CO., LimrtED 
LONDON - BOMBAY = CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 


THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Lt». 
TORONTO 


LIFE OF 
LORD KITCHENER 


BY 
Sir GEORGE ARTHUR 


IN THREE VOLUMES 
VOL. II 


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G6IGY 
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THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
1920 


All rights reserved 


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CONTENTS 

CHAPTER XLII 
Commander-in-Chief—Blockhouse and Drive—Rlockhouse tien 
The first Drive . ; 1 


CHAPTER XLIII 


Concentration Camps—De La Rey and De Wet—De Wet headed 
eC Keanna aa aie mee Hier) eeoen hall ahs ya dueheiis) savy) @hMristr ae 


CHAPTER XLIV 


Interview with Botha—Botha’s Terms—British Terms—Negotia- 
tions broken off RANE ooh awn eats: Vie 


CHAPTER XLV 
Acting High Commissioner—State of Cape Colony. . .. . 


CHAPTER XLVI 


Boer Depression—Vlakfontein—Another Year of War. . . 


CHAPTER XLVII 


Free Staters obstinate—J. C. Smuts—Elliot’s Drive—The Seven- 
teenth Lancers . SOI ee Mis wee eae te pO st ees 


CHAPTER XLVIII 


Blockhouses extended—Botha’s Campaign—Death of Benson—A 
Chief of the Staff—Groen Kop . 
v 


Gol 64 


ll 


18 


27 


32 


38 


46 


Vi LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER 


CHAPTER XLIX 
PAGE 
Foretelling the End—Botha and the Viljoens—The Boers jaded . 56 


CHAPTER L 
A moving Wall of Troop—At the ne River—Tweebosch— 
Carelessness of Officers . . . MPM SG LE 
CHAPTER LI 
Peace Proposals—Local Unity of Command. . .... . 70 


CHAPTER LII 
Kitchener’s Methods—Treatment of Officers. . .. . . . 9 


CHAPTER LIII 
Financial Adviser—Roberts and Brodrick . . ... . . 81 


CHAPTER LIV 


The six Points—Armistice refused—Boer Differences—British 


Differences =. 6) 6 0 ww a 
CHAPTER LV 
Botha’s Arguments—Peace Terms drafted—Policy of Reconcilia- 
tion eee eh Seley e eee a) rrr 


CHAPTER LVI 


The Boer Submission—Peace signed—Fusing Briton and Boer . 102 


CHAPTER LVII 
Arrival in London—To Khartum and India. . . . . . .« 109 


CONTENTS vii 


CHAPTER LVIII 
PAGE 


The Indian Command—tThe Call to the War Office—The Attrac- 
PIDTMOL PETES ooo, og. ee fe re ee cae Be eo CORON ee BES 


CHAPTER LIX 
Arrival in India—Re-numbering Regiments—Regimental Titles . 122 


CHAPTER LX 
Tour of the Frontier—Hospitalities at Simla . . . . . . 128 


CHAPTER LXI 


Redistribution Scheme—Internal Defence—Reorganisation ap- 
TRICE Mig uC TaN SSRMET BaP oR NIST OOS iy Sora er Ciaoameram F - 


CHAPTER LXIT 
A serious Accident—Grouping of Divisions—System at Work . 138 


CHAPTER LXIII 
Frontier Railways—Rival Routes . . . . . . . . «. 145 


CHAPTER LXIV 


Relations with the Amir—A Frontier eevee and Mah- 
suds—The Mahsuds . ... . oe Alene OhegS, ns ae eee 


CHAPTER LXV 
Frontier Militia—Samana—aA Militia Reserve. . . . . . 160 


vill LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER 


CHAPTER LXVI 


Mixed Brigades—The Division as War Unit—Training of 
TYOOpS ee a ae 


AGE 


CHAPTER LXVII 
A Staff College 06. 65 i rr 


CHAPTER LXVIII 


Native Commissions—A delicate Question—Courtesy to Natives 177 


CHAPTER LXIX 
British Officers’ Pay—The young Officer. . . ... . . 184 


CHAPTER LXX 


Army Institutes—The British Soldier’s Well- eae le 
Well-being—Native Soldiers’ Pay . .. . . 189 


CHAPTER LXXI 
The Dual Control—Waste of Money . . . . .. . . . 198 


CHAPTER LXXII 


“Divide et impera’”—The Military ae and Trans- 
port—The Civil Supremacy ... . . 203 


CHAPTER LXXIII 


The Viceroy’s Opinion—Sir Edmond Elles—Lord Curzon’s Min- 
ute—The Viceroy’s Council—Decision of the Cabinet—The 
Viceroy resigns) 23) )0 0) teeta sy a 


CONTENTS ix 


CHAPTER LXXIV 
Mr. Morley—The Army Secretary—The Supply Department . . 284 


CHAPTER LXXV 
Morley’s Hconomies—Infantry Reductions—The Capitation Rate 231 


CHAPTER LXXVI 
Japan’s Example—Dangers to India—No Reduction of the Army 238 


CHAPTER LXXVII 


Economy at all costs—Military Works ci aie Anir— ~— 
Habibullah’s Friendship . . . Le ae Cea. Pa Dey ee 


CHAPTER LXXVIII 


Sedition in India—Treasonable Journals—Loyalty of Indian 
EECOPS MEAG een OL eas CUR ie emt ied 1S ae he LOS 


CHAPTER LXXIxX 


Sanatorium for Aden—Extension of Command—Application for 
Leave—Application withdrawn—A new Decoration . . . 260 


CHAPTER LXxxX 


Venereal Diseases—An Appeal to ete for Self-con- 
GEOL Ta huey Geer era vel areata MICENMAIN eta MN WNW anAaS Mite 4¢ (8) 


CHAPTER LXXXI 
Farewell to the Army—The German Menace—The Indian Army . 277 


~~ 


x LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER 


CHAPTER LXXXII 


To China and Japan—Arrival in Australia—Sidney and Mel- 
Dourme ea ee ear rr 


CHAPTER LXXXIII 


~ The Australian Report—Military Areas—New Zealand—Visit to 
America 2003. 6 ee ce ee 2 


CHAPTER LXXXIV 
The Indian Viceroyalty—Imperial Defence. . . . . . . 301 


CHAPTER LXXXV 


In British East Africa—King George’s Coronation—British 
Agent in Hgypt® 2.0020. oe ss 


CHAPTER LXXXVI 


Egypt and ad sen ark Fellahin—The Five Feddan 2 
culture. . . F aT aaa ena ap ccta ee PM) gic 


CHAPTER LXXXVII 
Cotton—The Cotton Area—The Sudanese Loan. . .. . . 322 


CHAPTER LXXXVIII 


The Public Health—A Legislative Assembly—The King at Port 
Sudan—Kitchener’s life threatened . . . . . . . . 828 


CHAPTER LXXXIX 


Mediterranean Fleet—Germany and a a Khedive—The 
Wakfs—Leaves Egypt. . . : oso) Re 


ILLUSTRATIONS 


General Lord Kitchener, Commander-in-Chief in India, and his 
Staff. From a Photograph by Bourne & Shepherd. (From 
right to left, Lord Kitchener; Captain Basset, Rifle Brigade; 
Major-General Birdwood; Captain FitzGerald, 18th Bengal 
Lancers; Captain Nigel L. Learmonth, 15th Hussars; Lieu- 


tenant Wylly, V.C., The Guides) . . . . . . Frontispiece 
3 FACE PAGE 

Map showing the Northern and Southern Armies and the Nine 
Divisions as established 1907. . . . . . . . . . 140 


Proposed strategic Railways, India . . ..... =. =. 148 


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CHAPTER XLIT 


KitcHENER, on taking over the command in December 
1900, could approximately estimate the number of 
Boers actually fighting at 20,000. The precise figure 
could not be ascertained at the time, but at the end of 
the war it became known that, though the greatest 
number ever mobilised at one time was not more than 
25,000, the total then at the disposal of the Boer 
Commanders, all armed and most of them mounted, 
was close upon 60,000. Against these the British 
were able to range a force that, on paper, was over- 
whelming. The appeal made for reinforcements in 
December 1900 was followed in the first four months 
of 1901 by a steady stream of troops flowing into 
South Africa, strengthened by local levies. 

In May 1901 the new Mounted Army was com- 
plete. It included 14,000 Cavalry, about 12,000 
Mounted Infantry, 7500 South African Constabulary, 
and a second contingent of Imperial Yeomanry 
17,000 strong. Besides these, there were 5000 fresh 
Australasian troops and 24,000 irregular troops 
raised locally, and also some Militia. The total 
strength of the Mounted Force—more than half of 
them from overseas—was about 80,000 officers and 
men, who in riding and marksmanship, as well as in 


the tactics which the nature of the country imposed, 
VOL. II 1 B 


2 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


had something to learn from the enemy. In addition 
to the Mounted Riflemen there were in South Africa 
about 85,000 Regular Infantry, 20,000 Militia, 
13,000 Gunners, 4000 Engineers, and 11,500 of the 
Auxiliary Corps, bringing the grand total nearly to 
240,000, with 100 heavy guns, 420 horse and field- 
guns, and 60 ‘‘pom-poms.’’ But these figures were 
nominal only; the net fighting strength,, which fiuc- 
tuated a good deal, stood on June 19, 1901, at under 
164,000 men, of whom, however, nearly 100,000 were 
scattered along the lines of rail, and were almost 
wholly upon the defensive. Thousands were em- 
ployed on detached duties, such as escorts and 
guards, as well as at the coast towns and depots. 
Wastage from casualties and sickness, as well as 
from the straggling caused by long and rapid 
marches, was a constant drain upon man-power. 

The question of the future leadership of the vari- 
ous columns was an anxious one. Jan Hamilton had 
gone home with Roberts; Lyttelton! was to have 
leave in view of future command; Blood had not 
arrived from India; French, Methuen, Bruce Hamil- 
ton, Rawlinson, Clements, Rundle, Plumer, Byng,? 
Broadwood, were still in the field and at the top 
of their form. But some of the senior regimental 
officers, on whom independent command might de- 
volve, were a little stale? prone to over-caution, 
and probably unequal to the pace likely to be set. 
On the other hand, many of the younger leaders who 

1 Later Lieut.-General Sir N. Lyttelton. 

2 Lieut.-General Sir Bindon Blood; Sir Leslie Rundle; Major-General 
Plumer; General Sir Henry Rawlinson; Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. Sir Julian 
Byng. The three last were raised to the peerage in 1919. 


3 “Kitchener is almost the only G.O. in whom some staleness is not 
apparent.” (Letter from a Regimental Officer at the end of 1900.) 


XLII COMMANDER-IN-CHIBF 3 


later distinguished themselves had yet to be dis- 
covered.! 

The Artillery and Infantry were still in full vig- 
our; but under the new conditions the functions of 
the former were largely in abeyance, while the latter 
had become, in a sense, ancillary to the insufficient 
Cavalry. And even if horsemen had sufficed, horses 
were lacking, although the country was swept for 
remounts.? 

The wastage in horses had been large—larger 
indeed than it need have been; and shortly before 
the outgoing Commander-in-Chief left for England 
orders were given to the Remount Department to 
suspend further purchases, with the unhappy conse- 
quence that his successor’s earlier requisitions for 
horses and mules could only be met with a blank non 
possumus. 

Nor was the Mounted Branch quite happily 
equipped or well adapted for its functions. The 
Regular Cavalry had not yet been armed with the 
long-range magazine rifle, and were thus on uneven 
terms with an enemy whose marksmanship with a 
Mauser was almost faultless. The Mounted Infan- 
try, drawn from infantry regiments, with a sprin- 
kling of Colonial Irregulars and Yeomanry, were, if 
a makeshift, a most valuable adjunct to the regular 
horsemen, their infantry training giving them a con- 
siderable start both in proficiency with the rifle and in 
ground skirmishing. But in point of strength they 

1“I hope you will remove some incompetent C.O.’s. I could then 
use regiments that are comparatively fresh, but have now to be kept on 
garrison duty, owing to the impossibility of trusting their C.O.’s in the 
field.”” (Kitchener to Roberts, 14.12.00.) 

2“T recently raided the racing stables at Johannesburg in order to fit 


out our mobile columns with the best horses. The result has been that they 
have caught up Boers galloping.” (Kitchener to Roberts.) 


+ LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


were strictly limited. Reserves were not available, 
and commanding officers of infantry regiments were 
naturally shy of parting with their best men. The 
position of the Yeomanry and Colonials was even 
worse. Not only had they no reserves, but for the 
most part they were nearly time-expired. 

Kitchener persistently pleaded for fresh and 
further mounted troops, to which he pinned his faith. 
Almost his first telegram was a prayer for Yeomanry 
drafts to replenish the very weak battalions. He 
then reminded Mr. Brodrick that many of the Yeo- 
men—whom he commended as a most useful body of 
men—had important business at home, and could 
not be held to indefinitely prolonged engagements, 
and he suggested that their cup might be sweet- 
ened by raising their pay to the level of Colonial 
rates. 

In December Colonel Alderson was put in com- 
mand of the Mounted Infantry, with a depot and 
training base at Pretoria, and all infantry regiments 
were asked to send him every man they could spare. 
The answer was immediate and generous, though 
most of the new troops could not be ready before 
April. 

Roberts, on his arrival in England, had spoken no 
fair words to the Cabinet,! and under his earnest 
advice two cavalry regiments and 1000 trained 
mounted infantry were promptly shipped to South 
Africa, arrangements being also made to despatch 
3000 more mounted infantry during the ensuing two 
months. Finally it was decided to raise a new force 


1“Almost the first thing I did was to submit a memorandum pointing 
out the necessity of sending you more mounted troops. This was accepted 
by the Cabinet; indeed I feel sure they will let me send as many as can be 
collected.”” (Roberts to Kitchener, 18.1.01.) 


xLI BLOCKHOUSE AND DRIVE 5 


of Yeomanry; by the end of March! 1901 a total of 
506 officers and 16,431 men had been enrolled, and, as 
soon as ready, were sent to the theatre of war, there 
to be equipped and trained. But efficiency had often 
to yield to emergency, and captures of ‘‘green’’ Yeo- 
manry, with a valuable haul of rifles and ammunition, 
were not rare occurrences. Somehow the War Office 
did not take the lesson to heart, or was unwilling to 
institute a cut-and-dried programme of reinforce- 
ments, and so late as the end of 1901 a brand new 
force of Yeomanry had to be raised and sent over 
sea. 


The twin military measures which Kitchener 
instituted for the confusion of the enemy are remem- 
bered as ‘‘the Blockhouse’’ and ‘‘the Drive.’’ The 
structurally weak point in the blockhouses was vul- 
nerability to shell-fire. But even before they began 
to take shape in January 1901 there was little need to 
reckon with, and no cause to fear, the Boer artillery. 
The blockhouses were intended in the first instance to 
defend the railways against Boer raids—of late 
increasingly audacious and mischievous—and inci- 
dentally to release some of the vast number of men 
ineffectively employed in patrolling the lines. A 
few of the earlier specimens were substantial stone 
forts; the majority were loop-holed structures made 
of two skins of corrugated iron nailed on to wooden 
frames, and filled in with gravel and earth. The 
design was modified by successive alterations making 
for simplicity and cheapness; the iron skins were 
brought nearer together, so that both could be nailed 

1In January Roberts had written: “The Yeomanry are coming on well. 


I hope we shall be able to despatch the first lot ere long. I am forwarding 
them in companies, instead of sending them out as drafts.” 


6 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP, 


to a single wooden frame; the filling was less bulky 
but of hard shingle, and the octagonal form was 
abandoned for a cylindrical one. 

As defensive works the blockhouses were of first- 
rate value, and combined admirably with the ar- 
moured patrol trains in protecting the railway. 
Such protection had become imperative; wrecking 
trains, destroying bridges, and damaging lines had 
been for many months a highly favoured method of 
Boer warfare. But in December 1900 the ever-swell- 
ing audacity of the burghers reached its high-water 
mark. This brought about an important enlarge- 
ment of the protective plan. The well-guarded and 
fortified railway lines were themselves to be utilised 
as barriers against the Boer commandos—an exten- 
sion of purpose which reacted on the blockhouse sys- 
tem. Originally few in number and planted only at 
vulnerable points, the blockhouses were multiplied 
liberally and placed at regular intervals—first of one 
and a half miles, and ultimately of 400 yards, and 
even in certain cases of 200 yards—along the entire 
line of railway. The barrier was strengthened by a 
continuous fence of barbed wire, with entanglements 
round each blockhouse; and telephonic communica- 
tion was laid throughout. Kitchener was at first 
fairly well pleased: 


By fortifying and increasing our posts on the railway lines, 
they form barriers which the Boers cannot cross without 
being engaged. I am getting blockhouses at every 2500 
yards, and at night parties from each meet and sleep out 
between, waiting for any attempt to cross. This has proved 
successful. 


The expedient was not to be confined to the railway 


xi BLOCKHOUSE LINES 7 


but was to reinforce other protective arrangements. 
Six months earlier a line of small posts had been 
established on the Bloemfontein—Thaba ’Nchu— 
Ladybrand road; but the entrenched posts were far 
apart and their garrisons numbered forty or fifty. 
As a protection to the line of communication the 
posts had their value, but as a cordon for barring the 
passage of Boers they were void of effect. Kitch- 
ener, for all that, would not abandon the cordon sys- 
tem, but rather decided to extend it from Bloemfon- 
tein westwards—only in a greatly improved shape, 
more elaborate in plan and wider in scope. 

His first care was to fence in a protected area 
round each of the capitals, so as to secure their civil 
life. Asa police measure this work was entrusted to 
the South African Constabulary. Bloemfontein was 
at once secured by an impenetrable screen of posts 
defended by Boer farmers who had surrendered to 
the British Government, and enclosing an area of 
25-mile radius. The line of police posts sometimes 
served, not merely as a defence against attacks and 
a barrier to Boer movements, but as a base for of- 
fensive operations to clear the country. 

In July Kitchener explains to Brodrick that 
“‘there is no doubt these flying columns, on extended 
operations in this vast country, only in great measure 
beat the air, as the mobile Boers clear off the mo- 
ment they hear of the column being sometimes 20 
miles away. My project has been, with a number of 
troops economised off the lines, to divide the country 
up into paddocks by lines of blockhouses, and so re- 
strict the area in which the Boers could operate.’’ 

A month later he was able to pronounce a definite © 
verdict on the merits of the new system: 


8 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


The lines of blockhouses have been successful. The dis- 
trict west of this—as far as the line of blockhouses which 
extend from the railway along the Mooi River north to 
Naauwpoort, and thence to Breeds Nek, and along the 
Magaliesberg to Commando Nek—is now quite clear; the 
proof is that the few Boers who have got through our lines 
into the area enclosed have been obliged to come in and 
surrender, or are at once caught. 

I should like to extend this system by running a line of 
posts from Potchefstroom to Vredefort Road Station, and 
thus clear the Losberg area, which is always infested by 
small parties. Two battalions would be necessary for this, 
but I am not quite sure where I can find them. 

We are now doing all we can to prevent Kritzinger and 
Malan and a party of Transvaalers under Smuts, the late 
Attorney-General, from getting back into Cape Colony. 
Our blockhouse lines are almost complete, and I have moved 
down a considerable number of troops to guard the frontier. 
I hope we shall frustrate them and drive them north again. 
The area between the Orange River and the Ladybrand— 
Modder River line has been so thoroughly cleared of supplies 
that I doubt the enemy’s being able to exist there for any 
length of time. (Kitchener to Brodrick, 23.8.01.) 


Four months later Ian Hamilton, on returning to 
South Africa, telegraphed to Lord Roberts: 


Although I had read much of blockhouses, I never could 
have imagined such a gigantic system of fortifications, bar- 
‘iers, traps, and garrisons as actually exists. This forms the 
principal characteristic of the present operations, supplying 
them with a solid backbone and involving permanent loss of 
territory to the enemy, which former operations did not. 


Drives, though embodying no new principle, were 
a novelty in modern tactics. They suggested them- 
selves as a natural expedient for dealing with an 


XLII THE FIRST DRIVE 9 


enemy few in number but almost superhumanly alert 
and scattered over a vast stretch of country. Our 
scheme was not so much to catch and crush in detail 
an agile and ubiquitous adversary, as to denude the 
entire country of all combatant Boers, herding them 
more and more closely towards an enclosure formed 
either by natural features or by artificial barriers— 
corralling and rounding them up into an angle or 
pocket—forcing them, as it were, through a closed 
funnel into its blind end. 

Kitchener perceived that some such thorough and 
exact measure, which might be slow but would be 
sure, was necessary for anything like finality. The 
more the Boer forces were disintegrated the more 
must his own be consolidated. To fight scattered 
commandos with scattered columns would have been 
a tactical error. Granted that to sweep up a huge 
expanse of territory with long and continuous lines 
of troops might seem a primitive and prodigal de- 
vice ; yet it presented fewer difficulties than the alter- 
native course which had been tried and found want- 
ing. The principle of the drive was believed to be 
sound; for its successful application a compound of 
skill and luck was required. 

The first of the drives, which served afterwards as 
a rough model, was put through by French in the 
Eastern Transvaal in February 1901. His general 
idea was to push forward his centre as the apex of a 
wedge, then gradually to extend his wings till the 
whole force was aligned, and with a sweep eastwards 
to compress the Boer commandos towards and 

against the Zululand frontier. French had all the 
skill but lacked the luck. Jan Hamilton had both 
when in the Western Transvaal he carried out the 


10 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER car. x0 


last drive of the war, and scored so heavily as to turn 
the scale in favour of peace. The drives vindicated 
themselves in time, though only after patient perse- 
verance against initial failure. It had been easy to 
gibe at the numerous instances in which the Boers 
laughed at locksmiths, but experience was witness 
that, for a rather leisurely force pitted against a 
very lively foe, the Drive-cum-Blockhouse expedient 
was a military happy thought. 


CHAPTER XLIII 


To make these methods of fighting even workable, 
it was necessary to blend them with some adminis- 
trative measures of a drastic character. 

The prime necessity of striking at enemy sources 
of supply was the clear justification—as it was the 
compelling motive—of our treatment of the civil 
population. British public opinion has always been 
sensitive as to the rights of non-combatants. 
Kitchener shared the sentiment, but had to reconcile 
it with the dire requirements of war. The question 
was acute; the farmstead and its belongings had 
become the Boer base of supply, and every farm was 
both an intelligence agency and a stores department. 
Already in September Roberts had adopted in prin- 
ciple the policy of destroying the Boer resources; 
it fell to Kitchener to carry this out on a large scale 
by depopulating the country and stripping it. 
Thousands of flocks and herds were appropriated, 
huge loads of grain seized or destroyed, standing 
crops burnt, mills and farm-buildings gutted. The 
farms, however, being inhabited by women and chil- 
dren, humanity dictated the wholesale removal of 
families to a place of safety where they could be fed, 
sheltered, and cared for at our expense. There was 


an additional reason for this precaution. ‘‘The 
11 


12 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER cur. 


women question,’’ Kitchener noted in his first letter 
to Roberts, ‘‘is always cropping up, and is most 
difficult ; there is no doubt the women are keeping up 
the war, and are far more bitter than the men.’’? 
Camps were established for the Boer families and 
were located near the railway to facilitate their 
proper supply and supervision. A distinction was 
drawn between the merely destitute women, who 
were to be fed and looked after, and the actively 
hostile women, who had to be removed for inciting 
the men to continue the war; and orders were given 
that the two classes should be kept apart. In May 
1901 the number of those roped in was 77,000 white 
people and 21,000 coloured—the figures rising in 
October to 118,000 and 43,000 respectively. 

So far from proving efficacious in coercing the 
Boers into submission, the plan was something more 
than a failure, for it acted as an encouragement to 
them to fight on. The burghers chuckled at being 
relieved of the trouble of maintaining their families 
—the more so as the embarrassing charge was trans- 
ferred to us. 

Unhappily, too, the sickness and mortality in the 
Concentration Camps soon afforded good cause for 
uneasiness. The unhealthiness of the Camps was 
attributed—for the most part unjustly—to neglect 
of sanitation, the fact being that the inmates were 
not very refined in their habits and refused medical 
advice, so that they fell an easy prey to the visitation 
of measles and pneumonia which at this time spread 
all over the Boer territories. No remedial measure 


1 This was more generally true of the women of the Free State than of 
those of the Transvaal. Milner, writing to Kitchener (3.10.01), cites one 
of the latter as having said to him that they knew better than the men can 
“the state of affairs all round, and see that it is no use going on.” 


xLUI CONCENTRATION CAMPS 13 


was neglected, and it is beyond doubt that a far 
greater amount of misery and a far higher rate of 
mortality would have been the lot of these unfor- 
tunates if they had been left unprotected and unpro- 
vided for on the veldt. In England, while the earlier 
condition of the interned people attracted much legit- 
imate sympathy, the woeful tales of the Concentra- 
tion Camps, enriched with much imaginative detail, 
afforded delectable material for sensation-mongers 
and were fully exploited in anti-British propaganda. 

Brodrick, when telling Kitchener that even some 
of the Ministerialist Members of Parliament were 
‘hot on the humanitarian tack,’’ added: ‘‘It is a 
mystery to me how, with so many people on a single 
line, and with your own troops to feed, you have 
managed to cope with the difficulty as you have.”’ 

Botha asked that greater care might be taken in 
bringing in the women. ‘‘I told him,’’ Kitchener 
informed Roberts, ‘‘I had issued special instructions 
that, when sufficient transport was not available, 
they were to be left on their farms until transport 
could be provided. He made no complaint about 
burning farms’’ (28.2.01). 

Eventually a Commission of ladies * was eaaniieed 
by the War Office to investigate the facts. After a 
four months’ tour they made a number of useful 
criticisms and suggestions, they reported that some 
of the causes of the high death-rate were unavoid- 
able, and warmly praised the efforts made by a 
scanty staff of overworked officials to cope with an 
impossible task. 


1A lady named Hobhouse, whose — a her sense of propriety. was 
forbidden to land at Cape Town. “‘I see,” wrote Kitchener to Mr. Ralli, 
“Miss Hobhouse has taken action against me, and I shall probably be put 
in prison on my arrival in England.” 


14 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


As a result of reforms and remedial measures the 
death-rate was steadily lessened, and early in 1902 
had fallen nearly to vanishing point. 

Kitchener wrote to Lady Cranborne: 


What a hard time Brodrick has had in Parliament with 
these refugee camps. I wish you would come out and see 
them; the inmates are far better looked after in every way 
than they are in their homes, ov than the British refugees 
are, for whom no one now seems to care. The doctors’ re- 
ports of the dirt and filth in which the Boer ladies from the 
wilds revel are very unpleasant reading, and I am consid- 
ering whether some of the worst cases should not be tried 
for manslaughter. (2.8.01.) 


The best and truest witness to what was done 
was that borne by Botha himself: ‘‘ We are only too 
glad to know that our women and children are under 
British protection.’’ 


The early days of Kitchener’s command were 
harassed by an outbreak of activities of which De 
Wet, Beyers, and De la Rey were the chief pro- 
moters, and on December 19 he had to mention his 
first reverse: 


Yesterday I had bad news from Clements. He was at- 
tacked at dawn by De la Rey !—reinforced by Beyers with 
the Waterberg commando—making up a total of 2500 men, 
with 4 to 8 guns. Broadwood was on the north side of the 
Magaliesberg looking out for Beyers’s commanda, but he let 
them slip by. (Kitchener to Roberts, 19.12.00.) 


On December 28 Kitchener, anxious that Roberts 
should have the latest report before embarking, sent 
a message from Pretoria: 


1Ten days earlier De la Rey had grabbed a fairly large convoy near 
Rustenburg. 


XLUI DE LA REY AND DE WET 15 


I have put off writing to the last moment in the hopes of 
receiving good news from the Colony. The operations there 
drag on, and it seems as if our troops cannot catch the very 
mobile party of Boers now out there. I greatly fear De Wet 
will give us the slip and dash south. I went down to 
Naauwpoort and De Aar and arranged all I could. I had to 
hurry back, as my absence might have given cause for exag- 
gerated reports here of how affairs were going in Cape Col- 
ony. Very few people knew I had been away. 


A week later: 


A most astounding blow came on us last Sunday when we 
heard that Viljoen’s men had surprised and rushed Helvetia 
at 2.30 a.M. on Saturday, and captured the 4.7 gun without 
a shot being fired. The sentries must have been all fast 
asleep, and as there have been many cases lately of men 
sleeping at their posts I issued a warning that I will confirm 
death-sentences in such cases. 

The attack on Vrieheid is of precisely similar nature, 
though there, fortunately, it was driven off. 

I had reiterated the orders for barbed wire entanglements 
everywhere, particularly round positions of guns; there 
seems to be contradictory evidence about a wire entangle- 
ment at Helvetia, but this shall be cleared up. 

Cape Colony continues to be unsatisfactory. I have sent 
down Douglas Haig?* with local rank of Colonel to see what 
can be done and take charge of the field. Though our efforts 
have not been decisively successful, we have prevented the 
raiders from doing any harm. These have been cleared 
everywhere, and have not obtained recruits or support in the 
Colony. 

Milner has been quite calm, and I have had to wake up 
Chowder with some rather strong telegrams. Of course, 
having 4000 mounted men in the Colony hampers my action 
considerably both in the Orange River and here; at the same 


1 Later Field-Marshal Earl Haig. 


16 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER cHaP. 


time I am acting as vigorously as possible against the enemy 
everywhere, and am trying, by working up Peace Commit- 
tees and giving good terms, to induce burghers to leave the 
commandos and surrender. If only the Cape Colony dis- 
turbance would end I could do more. Louis Botha is some- 
where near Bethel, and there are reports that he talks of 
peace, but I do not put much eredit in it. 


In December De Wet, by diverting to himself the 
attention of the British columns, had enabled Kritz- 
inger and Hertzog to cross the Orange River. The 
former moved towards the middle districts of Cape 
Colony; the latter made for the west, and, hunted 
for 400 miles, succeeded in reaching Lambart’s Bay 
on the Atlantic coast, where he hoped to find a ship 
bearing munitions and European mercenaries. To 
many of his men this was their first sight of the 
sea; to all of them it was a novel experience, for 
they were immediately shelled by a British eruiser 
lying at anchor. Meanwhile Kritzinger, heading 
south, had reached Willowmore, almost within sight 
of the Indian Ocean; and the two adventurers, having 
in the course of their sprint to the sea escaped pun- 
ishment, returned to the south of the Orange River 
to await orders. 

The Boer Governments for the moment were sati- 
ated with fighting in the Republics, and resolved to 
make their next démarche in Natal and Cape Colony 
—Botha to move on Pietermaritzburg from the 
Transvaal, and De Wet to pick up Hertzog and 
Kritzinger and advance boldly on Cape Town. On 
January 25 De Wet and Steyn assembled over 2000 
men at the Dornberg and, eluding Knox and Hamil- 
ton, made for the Orange River. 

Kitchener wrote to Roberts: 


XLII DE WET HEADED BACK 17 


De Wet has got through our Thaba ’Nchu line at night 
without damage. I still hope to head him by training Knox 
and Hamilton’s men to Bethulie. French’s move to sweep 
up the high veldt is going on well. The Boers are flying in 
front of him and centring about Ermelo. If we could only 
catch De Wet about the time we get to Ermelo I believe it 
might finish the war. 

I am sending Lyttelton to Naauwpoort to direct operations 
there with Chowder. I am glad to say that at last the Col- 
ony is showing a little more energy; I have been impressing 
the necessity of preparation for De Wet’s invasion for a long 
time without much effect; now they are waking up, but I 
fear too late to do all that should have been done. 

I have seen your speech on landing; it was very kind of 
you to use such terms about me, and I can assure you it gave 
me the keenest pleasure to know that you are satisfied with 
what I did in the campaign. (1.2.01.) 


To catch De Wet, who crossed into the Colony on 
February 10 by Zand Rift, troops were hurried from 
the Transvaal, Kimberley, and Cape Town, Kitch- 
ener himself going to De Aar to direct the hunt. 
Mainly through the energy of Plumer, De Wet, who 
soon saw he could play no pranks in the Colony, was 
headed back. His disappointed burghers had to turn 
and twist in every direction to shake off their pur- 
suers and follow their leader who, re-crossing the 
Orange at Botha’s Drift on February 28, succeeded 
by the skin of his teeth in regaining his own country 
and reached the Dornberg just six weeks after he 
had left it. 


VOL. II 9 


CHAPTER XLIV 


In a proclamation of December 20, 1900, Kitchener 
promised that all burghers who surrendered should 
be allowed to live with their families in Government 
laagers, and to return to their homes as soon as the 
guerilla warfare was at an end, their stock and other 
property being meanwhile respected. A meeting of 
surrendered Boers was at once held at Pretoria, 
Kitchener addressing them in a candid but kindly 
speech, which was afterwards translated into Dutch 
and circulated with copies of the proclamation among 
the various commandos. But the burghers were not 
to be wooed; they regarded the emissaries, not only 
as cowardly shirkers, but as traitors to their coun- 
try; and those who did not show a clean pair of heels 
were treated to fines, imprisonment, and flogging, 
and in at least one case to summary execution. The 
failure of the proclamation was discouraging, but 
not without its object-lesson; Kitchener turned him- 
self wholly to military considerations and awaited 
overtures from his opponents. These within a 
couple of months took form in a peace tentative from 
Botha! himself, to which the British General was 
ready to respond. 


Mrs. Botha [he told Brodrick] has just brought in a letter 
from her husband ? stating that he desires to meet me with 


1He had caused a verbal intimation to be conveyed to Botha that he 
was willing to meet him on the understanding that the question of Boer 
independence must be ruled out of discussion. 

2To Roberts he wrote: “Mrs. L. Botha has just come in with a letter 
from ‘\er husband to say he wishes to meet me. It may mean a great deal, 


cnar.xtiv INTERVIEW WITH BOTHA 19 


a view to bringing the war to an end. I think a personal 
meeting may end the war if we are prepared not to be too 
hard on the Boers. It will no doubt be settled one way or 
the other before you get this letter. 

I expect our move sweeping the high veldt has changed the 
idea of the Boers, and made them far more peacefully in- 
clined than they were a few days ago. It will be good policy 
for the future of this country to treat them fairly well; and 
I hope I may be allowed to do away with anything humiliat- 
ing to them in the surrender, if it comes off. 

I believe Botha can make complete peace, and that De Wet 
and De la Rey and others will all give in if matters are 
settled at our meeting. (22.2.01.) 


The interview, which took place at Middelburg on 
the last day of February 1901, was quite of a friendly 
nature, Kitchener entertaining Botha and his four 
staff officers at luncheon. The same evening he 
wrote to Brodrick: 


MippELzBurG, February 28, 1901. 


I have had a long day with Louis Botha; he came in at 
10 a.m. and left at about 3 p.m. He brought four staff offi- 
cers with him, and they lunched with us. Botha has a nice 
unassuming manner, and seemed desirous of finishing the 
war, but somewhat doubtful of being able to induce his men 
to accept peace without independence in some form or other. 
I told him that independence in any form was impossible, 
and that any modified independence would be extremely 
dangerous, considering the mixed population, the effects of 
the war, and previous experience. This he agreed in, with 
evidently some regret. 

He came prepared with a list of points which he consid- 
ered should be answered before he could lay the matter of 
and at any rate it can do no harm.” To a private friend: “At last there 
looks some chance of finishing the war. I have just had a letter from 
Louis Botha asking me to meet him, to consider any means of bringing the 


war to a close. I shall of course meet him, and I hope the result may be 
satisfactory.” 


20 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER cmap. 


peace before his Government and the people. I have tele- 
graphed the ten points to you, and will only now add my 
impressions during the conversation. 

He seemed to think that representative government might 
be granted at once on cessation of hostilities, but did not 
press the matter. He spoke very strongly as to the feeling 
of his burghers about Milner’s appointment, and at one time 
seemed to think it would entirely prevent any chance of 
their giving in. I assured him that Milner was a first-rate 
man, and that, in a short time, they would all agree, and that 
I thought there was no chance of a change... . 

When the Kaffir question was brought up, it at once 
turned on the question of franchise for Kaffirs, to which they 
are greatly opposed. He stated it would be most dangerous 
for the burghers on their distant farms. I suggested it 
should be left open for a representative Government to 
decide upon later; this he thought satisfactory. 

He was anxious that legal debts of the Republic should be 
paid out of revenue; he says that under the law they were 
allowed to issue notes for a million—these have not all been 
issued, but if they are repudiated it will entail great loss on 
farmers. In conversation it was suggested that such claims 
might be equitably considered by a judge, but I gave no 
opinion on the point. He, however, considered it one of 
great importance, and said he felt personally responsible, 
and hoped that the admission of these debts as valid against 
the Transvaal would not be refused. 

The next important point which he spoke strongly about 
was amnesty to all for bona fide acts in the war; he men- 
tioned Cape and Natal rebels, and said they could not desert 
them to be severely punished; he did not see much objection 
to their being disfranchised. 

The minor points he referred to were: 


Church property to remain untouched; 

Public trusts and orphans’ funds to remain untouched ; 
Languages, English and Dutch, to be equal in schools; 
War tax on farms; 


XLIV BOTHA’S TERMS On 


Government assistance to rebuild and restock farms; 
Date of return of prisoners of war. 


He had notes on the above points, and evidently came 
prepared. 

I asked him, if he agreed in the settlement of the points 
raised, whether he could be certain that all commandos or 
bands would submit and lay down their arms. 

He said he was more or less bound to the Free State, but 
he felt sure he could influence De Wet (if terms were the 
same for the Orange River Colony), and in that case he 
could guarantee complete cessation of hostilities and a gen- 
eral laying down of arms, and Briton and Burgher would 
then be friends again, and he and his officers would give the 
best assistance to the Government. 

We talked about the conduct of the war without any bit- 
terness. He promised not to take our ambulances again, 
and I agreed to let him have some medicines. He repeated 
that he and his people felt bitterly losing their independ- 
ence, but he evidently did not think it impossible for them to 
agree to do so. He said, incidentally, that he could carry 
on for some time. I pointed out the hopelessness of the 
struggle on their part, and that they had no right to ruin the 
country further. He was very bitter about those that had 
surrendered, and did not like the peace committees, but he 
eould not justify De Wet’s murder of the peace envoy with- 
out trial—he said he feared it was the result of demoralisa- 
tion caused by the war. 

L. Botha is a quiet, capable man, and I have no doubt 
carries considerable weight with the burghers; he will be, I 
should think, a valuable assistance to the future good of the 
country in an official capacity. 

It seems a pity that the war should go on for the points 
raised by Botha, which appear to me all capable of adjust- 
ment ; and, supposing it cost two millions—that is to say, one 
million for notes issued by the Transvaal Government, and 
one million for rebuilding and restocking farms, which is the 


22 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


most possible—it would only represent one month’s expen- 
diture out here on the war. I promised to write to Botha 
when I received the reply of the Government on the points 
raised, and he will then at once take steps in the matter. 


By the same mail went a letter to Roberts: 


I have written to Brodrick about my meeting with Botha 
and hope you will see my letter. If the Government wish to 
end the war, I do not see any difficulty in doing so, but I 
think it will go on for some time if the points raised by 
Botha cannot be answered. I do not think Botha is likely to 
be unreasonable; there is a good deal of sentiment about it— 
particularly as regards giving up their independence, which 
they feel very much. 


Kitchener believed, and said, that all the points 
raised by Botha were capable of adjustment; that 
the amount of money involved could not exceed the 
two millions; and that a continuance of the war could 
not be other than a matter for regret. After Botha’s 
departure the proposed terms of settlement were em- 
bodied in a draft letter from the British to the Boer 
General, which was submitted to Milner and by him 
forwarded to the Home Government.: The condi- 
tions were for the most part approved, but modifica- 
tions were introduced on several important points— 
an amnesty for bona fide belligerents and Colonial 
rebels; the future form of government; the debts of 
the Transvaal Republic; pecuniary aid to farmers; 
and the status of Kaffirs.. On March 7 Kitchener 
conveyed to Botha the decision of the British Gov- 
ernment: 


1On the same day Roberts was writing to Kitchener: “The posters 
all over London to-day announce the surrender of Louis Botha to you at 
9 A.M. at Middelburg. I sincerely hope it may be true, but no telegram 
has been received from you, and the F.O. and C.O. know nothing.” 


XLIV BRITISH TERMS 23 


With reference to our conversation at Middelburg on 
February 28, I have the honour to inform you that, in the 
event of a general and complete cessation of hostilities, and 
the surrender of all rifles, ammunition, cannon, and other 
munitions of war in the hands of the burghers, or in Govern- 
ment depots, or elsewhere, His Majesty’s government is 
prepared to adopt the following measures :— 

His Majesty’s Government will at once grant an amnesty 
in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony for all bona fide 
acts of war committed during the recent hostilities. British 
subjects belonging to Natal and Cape Colony, while they 
will not be compelled to return to these colonies, will, if they 
do so, be liable to be dealt with by the laws of those colonies 
specially passed to meet the circumstances arising out of the 
present war. As you are doubtless aware, the special law in 
the Cape Colony has greatly mitigated the ordinary penal- 
ties for High Treason in the present case. All prisoners of 
war, now in St. Helena, Ceylon, or elsewhere, being burghers 
or colonists, will, on the completion of the surrender, be 
brought back to their country as quickly as arrangements 
can be made for their transport. 

At the earliest practicable date military administration 
will cease, and will be replaced by civil administration in the 
form of Crown Colony government. There will therefore 
be, in the first instance, in each of the new colonies, a Gover- 
nor and an Executive Council, composed of the principal of- 
ficials, with a Legislative Council, consisting of a certain 
number of official members to whom a nominated unofficial 
element will be added. But it is the desire of His Majesty’s 
Government, as soon as circumstances permit, to introduce a 
representative element, and ultimately to concede to the new 
Colonies the privilege of self-government. Moreover, on the 
cessation of hostilities a High Court will be established in 
each of the new Colonies to administer the laws of the land, 
and this Court will be independent of the Executive. 

Church property, public trusts, and orphan funds will be 
respected. Both the English and Dutch languages will be 


24 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


used and taught in public schools when the parents of the 
children desire it, and allowed in Courts of Law. 

As regards the debts of the late Republican Governments, 
His Majesty’s Government cannot undertake any liability. 
It is, however, proposed, as an act of grace, to set aside a 
sum not exceeding one million pounds sterling to repay 
inhabitants of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony for 
goods requisitioned from them by the late Republican Gov- 
ernments, or subsequent to annexation, by Commandants in 
the field, being in a position to enforce such requisitions. 
But such claims will have to be established to the satisfaction 
of a Judge or Judicial Commission appointed by the Govern- 
ment to investigate and assess them; and, if exceeding in 
the aggregate one million pounds, they will be liable to 
reduction pro rata. 

I also beg to inform your Honour that the new Govern- 
ment will take into immediate consideration the possibility 
of assisting by loan the occupants of farms, who will take the 
oath of allegiance, to repair any injuries sustained by de- 
struction of buildings or loss of stock during the war; and 
that no special war tax will be imposed upon farms to defray 
the expense of the war. 

When burghers require the protection of fire-arms, such 
will be allowed to them by licence, and, on due registration, 
provided they take the oath of allegiance. Licences will also 
be issued for sporting rifles, guns, ete., but military fire- 
arms will only be allowed for purposes of protection. 

As regards the extension of the franchise to Kaffirs in the 
Transvaal and Orange River Colony, it is not the intention 
of His Majesty’s Government to give such franchise before 
representative government is granted to those Colonies, and 
if then given it will be so limited as to secure the just 
predominance of the white race. The legal position of 
coloured persons will, however, be similar to that which they 
hold in the Cape Colony. 

In conclusion, I must inform your Honour that, if the 
terms now offered are not accepted after a reasonable delay 
for consideration, they must be regarded as cancelled. 


XLIV NEGOTIATIONS BROKEN OFF 25 


Kitchener was doubtful whether the amendments 
made at the Colonial Office—particularly those refer- 
ring to assistance to be given only in the shape of 
loans, and the question of the enfranchisement of 
natives—would be accepted by the Boers, and warned 
Brodrick that Botha might fail to win over the rep- 
resentatives of the Orange Colony. His misgivings 
were justified, for De Wet and Steyn remained deaf to 
all arguments, and ten days later Botha abruptly, and 
without giving any reason, broke off the negotiations. 

Kitchener was avowedly disappointed, and was 
at no pains either to conceal his chagrin or to mask 
his efforts towards a just peace. 


I was afraid [he wrote to Brodrick on March 22] Botha 
could hardly accept the terms offered. The Boers have a 
good deal of sentiment of honour amongst them—particu- 
larly the leaders—and leaving those that had helped them 
to go to prison for six years, as has been done in Natal, 
would, I felt sure, make it almost impossible for them to 
accept. I, therefore, insisted on my views being sent home 
in Milner’s telegram to the Colonial Secretary. I hardly 
expected, however, after Milner’s strongly worded objec- 
tion to my proposition, that the Government would de- 
cide differently to what they did. 

TI did all in my power to urge Milner to change his views, 
which on this subject seem to me very narrow. I feel cer- 
tain, and have good grounds for knowing, that an amnesty 
or King’s pardon for the two or three hundred rebels in 
question (carrying with it disfranchisement, which Botha 
willingly accepted) would be extremely popular amongst the 
majority of the British and all the Dutch in South Africa; 
but there no doubt exists a small section in both Colonies 
who are opposed to any conciliatory measures being taken 
to end the war, and I fear their influence is paramount ; they 
want extermination, and I suppose will get it. 

My views were that once the Boers gave up their inde- 


26 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER cmap. x11v 


pendence and laid down their arms, the main object of the 
Government was attained, and that the future Civil Admin- 
istration would soon heal old sores and bring the people 
together again. After the lesson they have had, they are 
not likely to break out again. Milner’s views may be 
strictly just, but they are to my mind vindictive, and I do 
not know of a case in history when, under similar cireum- 
stances, an amnesty has not been granted. 

We are now carrying the war on to put two or three 
hundred Dutchmen in prison at the end of it. It seems to 
me absurd and wrong, and I wonder the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer did not have a fit. 

Mrs. Botha has written to ask her husband if the amnesty 
question is the only one they are now fighting for; if he 
replies in the affirmative, could anything be done if Botha 
were induced to ask for better terms for the rebels, and for 
a reconsideration of their case? Should this be possible 
please wire me. 


On the very day that Kitchener was making this 
appeal for judicious clemency towards an opponent 
with his back to the wall, Brodrick was writing: 


We are all very much opposed to a complete amnesty to 
Cape and Natal rebels. The feeling is that it will be a sur- 
viving reproach on us. The loyalists at least have surely a 
right to see the very moderate Cape punishments inflicted on 
rebels. . . . Is it not likely that with one more turn of the 
military screw, they will be ready for submission? We | 
shall be glad in any case when the time arrives. (22.3.01.) 


But the screw was to be turned ad nauseam before 
that time came—if, indeed, it ever fully came at all. 
Meanwhile the Man on the Spot had justifiable mis- 
givings as to whether the war—with all its misery 
and all its waste—was being continued merely ‘‘to 
put two or three hundred Dutchmen in prison at the 
end of it.’’ 


CHAPTER XLV 


It was not until May 1901 that Kitchener, though 
his hands were as ready to strike as his head was 
to treat, could assume any initiative. The whole 
position, ranging over a vast area, bristled with diffi- 
culty. The policy of concentration had not produced 
the intended effect. De Wet, hunted up and down, 
and in and out of, the Orange Colony, was still at 
large. French’s drive had depressed but had not 
subdued Eastern Transvaal, and Blood’s operations 
in Northern Transvaal had just fallen short of their 
expected success. The Cape Colony rebellion had 
been stifled, but was not extinct.1 

Meanwhile military exigencies had not been al- 
lowed to over-ride the need of an early revival of 
civil industries. 


I am sure [Kitchener told Roberts early in March] you 
will be glad to hear I am making a start at opening the 
Johannesburg Mines. I am allowing 350 stamps to start 
under the supervision of the Chamber of Mines and safe- 
guarding our interests as regards the men on service with 
our troops. I have no doubt it will have a good effect, and I 


1In a private letter Kitchener alluded to the efforts, happily unsuccessful, 
of a notorious journalist to make further bad blood in the Colony: ‘“‘S "3 
lieg were distributed all through Cape Colony. Our troops found them in 
almost every house. The result has been the reverse of what was antici- 
pated. Instead of the Dutch being excited to take up arms against us the 
exactly contrary effect has been produced, as they do not want the same 
‘horrors’ near them! Out of evil sometimes good comes, and the Dutch 
have remained very quietly at home, showing plenty of sympathy, but giving 
no help” (25.1.01). 


27 


28 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


am now well off for supplies here and can afford the extra 
railway accommodation they will want for this project. It 
has not definitely started yet, but will I expect in a few 
days. I am also arranging to move the troops out of the 
town of Johannesburg, leaving interior defence to the vol- 
unteers, Rand Rifles, and Mine Guards. 


And a month later: 


The mines at Johannesburg are now starting work, and 
we shall soon be turning out a certain amount of gold. I 
expect this will have a depressing effect on the Boers. 


Moreover, a nominated Town Council had now 
taken over the municipal business of Johannesburg, 
while in both the new Colonies civil departments 
were organised, and military officials were by degrees 
giving place to civilians. 

Sir Alfred Milner, after four years’ continuous 
strain, felt that the framework of reconstruction was 
sufficiently strong to permit of his going on leave, 
and wrote to Kitchener: 


H.M.’s Government is willing I should clear for three 
months at an early date, but rather puzzled how to provide 
for my work in my absence. The simplest thing is to let 
matters take their course under the existing Commission. 
By the terms of my commission as H.C. in case of my absence 
all my powers pass if no special provision is made to the sen- 
ior Military Officer in South Africa, and these powers include 
at present the Administratorship of the two new Colonies. 
Therefore if nothing is done you would, on my leaving, wpso 
facto, succeed to all my powers while I was away. H.M.’s 
Government would, I know, be agreeable to this, if you were, 
and I ne demande pas mieux. The only difficulty is that the 
mass of work is enormous, and you have your hands more 
than full already. The only way in which you could live 
would be to tell all the principal men under you to earry on 


XLV ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER 29 


as quietly as possible, shelve all questions which required 
long consideration, and only come to you in matters of quite 
first-rate importance and requiring immediate decision. In 
that case you might get on without demands on your time 
which, with your existing heavy responsibilities, you could 
not possibly submit to. But I would not suggest even this if 
you objected. (9.4.01.) 


Kitchener was quite willing to ‘‘double’’ for a 
while the duties of Commander-in-Chief and High 
Commissioner, and a little later on told Brodrick, 
‘‘Milner’s work, as left for me, is not excessive. I 
can manage it all right, and I think his affairs are 
going on smoothly. He has a very good legal ad- 
viser in Solomon. I am of course sending all civil 
matters to Mr. Chamberlain.’’ 

The arrival of the South African winter gave rise 
at home to a sanguine expectation that its hardships 
for man and beast on the veldt would effectually 
damp the Boers’ ardour, and might effectively dam- 
age their cause. Animated by this bright idea, the 
Government suggested a reduction of the troops in 
the field, and this just when it might have seemed 
desirable to strengthen the Commander-in-Chief’s 
hands for pressing his own rigours with those of the 
season. 

Kitchener did not immediately turn down the pro- 
posal. On July 5 he wrote to Brodrick: 


Considering the enormous expenditure going on, Lord 
Roberts’s telegram on the subject of reduction of the forces 
in South Africa was not a surprise. I have been for some 
time fortifying the railway lines with blockhouses, so as to 
reduce the numbers employed in defending the lines, which 
duty takes up by far the greater number of the troops in 
South Africa, and I am glad to say these works are now so 


30 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


far forward that, to my mind (though in this some of my 
generals do not willingly agree), a reduction of the forces 
can be safely carried out. . . . Out of the 140,000 men pro- 
posed by Lord Roberts, I think I may calculate on having 
100,000 Infantry and Mounted troops, leaving 40,000 for 
Artillery, Engineers, Departmental Corps, and sick. 


But a fortnight later he plainly intimated that, 
whereas any reduction of his forces must depend 
entirely on Cape Colony being clear and quiet, a 
doleful letter just received pictured its present condi- 
tion as confused and turbulent: 


According to the intelligence and other reports which have 
been communicated to me [wrote the Governor] more than 
five-sixths of that portion of Cape Colony which is south of 
the Orange River is now more or less harassed by the guerilla 
operations of the enemy. We hold the towns and most of 
the villages and the railways; but, except within a strip 
varying from about 50 to 100 miles along the coast, travel- 
ling without an escort is unsafe. Even the railways are oc- 
casionally broken and trains derailed. . . . Murraysburg is 
altogether unguarded, and has lately been made use of by 
the Boers as a kind of base. To-day news comes that the 
Boers have burnt down the public buildings and the houses 
of the loyalists there. . 

Speaking generally, the state of affairs is considerably 
worse than it was when I arrived in the Colony four months 
ago, and it is now more than six months since this second in- 
vasion of the Colony commenced. . . . There seems no doubt 
that something like 50 per cent of the white inhabitants of 
Cape Colony are more or less in sympathy with the Boers. 
. . . I venture to press very earnestly on your Lordship the 
desirability of making a determined effort to clear the 
Colony of the guerilla bands as soon as possible. 


Kitchener replied that the Government of Cape 
Colony might in several ways do more to cope with 


XLY STATE OF CAPE COLONY 31 


the situation: (1) by rendering assistance in collect- 
ing horses; (2) by extending martial law—as the 
General Officer Commanding had, so far in vain, 
requested; (3) by insisting on more energetic action 
on the part of the local authorities throughout the 
Colony; (4) by taking better precautions against 
the leakage to the enemy of arms and ammunition 
now in the hands of local defence forces. 

Evidently the condition expressly laid down as an 
essential preliminary to any reduction in the 
strength of his Army was at present far from fulfil- 
ment. At the end of July Kitchener stated that in 
the present temper of Cape Colony he could not see 
his way to meet the wishes of the Government; and 
on September 8 he wrote bluntly: ‘‘I enclose corre- 
spondence about martial law in Cape Ports, which 
shows the attitude taken up by the Cape Govern- 
ment. It is nothing less than one of actual hostility 
to His Majesty’s forces, and the same is going on 
throughout the Colony.”’ 

The difficulties of the whole situation, exacerbated 
as they were by the internal condition of the Colony, 
seemed for a moment to have had effect even on 
Kitchener’s iron nerves. For once, a confession of 
the weakness of the flesh was wrung from him. ‘‘I 
am not well,’’ he wrote to a friend, ‘‘and feel terribly 
disheartened.’’ But his physical resilience quickly 
asserted itself. ‘‘I was very seedy last mail,’’ he 
wrote to the same correspondent, ‘‘but I am all right 
again, and feel there is still hope of ending this 
miserable business before very long.’’ 


CHAPTER XLVI 


Tue Boers, on their side, had not been without their 
share of trouble. A council of war, held early in 
May near Ermelo, was attended by the members of 
the late Transvaal Government, together with Botha, 
J. C. Smuts, Ben Viljoen, and Chris Botha. It was 
but dismal fare which they met to discuss. Viljoen 
with his account of the devastation in the north-east, 
and Smuts with his story of the defeats of Wild- 
fontein and Goldwoorintzicht, did little to cheer up 
a gloomy gathering. Even the imperturbable Botha 
was a little worried by the prospect of the high veldt, 
where he had so long disported himself, being over- 
run by British columns. 

The growing record of surrenders, the failing sup- 
ply of ammunition, the improbability of foreign in- 
terference, the already waning authority of the lead- 
ers, had a depressing effect on the meeting. With- 
out consulting the Free Staters, the Council resolved 
that Kitchener should be asked to let the Trans- 
vaalers send a representative to Europe to confer 
with Kruger as to the prosecution of the war; Presi- 
dent Steyn was to be informed of this decision, and 
in the event of Kitchener’s refusal, an armistice was 
to be asked for so that the Governments of the two 
Republics might take counsel as to their future 


course. 
32 


CHAP. XLVI BOER DEPRESSION 33 


A letter was accordingly sent to Steyn, broadly 
hinting that the time for further resistance had 
passed; to this he dashed off a furious reply de- 
nouncing both the application to Kitchener and the 
bare idea of an armistice. Steyn, however, could 
only speak for himself, and a general council of war 
—very difficult to convene—would be required to 
register anything like a binding decision. 

By this time the winter campaign had opened and 
Kitchener, on May 9, 1901, could write to Brodrick: 


Last month we took 2000 Boers out of the field, a good 
many rifles, and over half a million rounds of ammunition. 
Clearing up the north has done a great deal of good and, as 
far as I can make out, the enemy have no plans. There is 
a large and, I hope, growing party amongst them who think 
the terms offered should have been accepted, and that their 
leaders are betraying the people, possibly for personal rea- 
sons. The number of surrenders has greatly increased in 
the Transvaal, which does not look as if the burgher camps 
were so very bad. 

Things are not quite so satisfactory in the Orange River 
Colony. De Wet, Brand, and Hertzog seem to be able to 
keep up the irreconcilable feeling and suppress all moderate 
counsels. Steyn’s influence seems to have decreased. I 
cannot make out what they intend to do beyond keeping up 
a hostile attitude, and taking advantage of any slips we may 
make. ... 

I started the mines working at Johannesburg last Satur- 
day, and I hope this will have a depressing effect on the Boer 
enthusiasts. Our being able to do it shows that the country 
is getting slowly settled. Attacks on railway lines have 
greatly decreased owing to our improved blockhouses, and the 
lines are now gradually forming barriers through the country 
which hostile forces cannot cross; this breaks them up into 
areas which we will gradually clear. Having cleared the 
Roos-Senekal district a good many columns will now be avail- 

VOL. II D 


34 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


able to clear the country east of Carolina, which has not been 
touched and is a Boer stronghold. Vigorous operations are 
also going against De la Rey in the west, and an expedition 
has started for Louis Trichardt in the north. 

In the Orange River Colony Elliot is sweeping the country 
along the Vaal, moving east until he reaches the Natal fron- 
tier. Rundle is in Fouriesburg and operating from there. 
C. Knox will in a day or two move west of the line on Botha- 
ville, and Bruce Hamilton is clearing up the southern por- 
tion along the Orange River. In the Colony small bands are 
being cleared up everywhere, and the Colonial Defence 
Force is now taking a greater part and is useful... . 

I have had no further communication with Botha. I send 
you some letters caught on the enemy’s despatch riders. 
You will see the absurd lies spread by the leaders to keep 
their men in the field. It seems impossible to believe the 
credulity of the Boers. A large party were coming in yes- 
terday to surrender, when they were told from Johannes- 
burg that war had broken out between Russia and England, 
and so they all went back. 


On the same date he confides to Roberts his fear 
that a lost opportunity may mean a long bill: 


I wish I could tell you when the end of the war would 
come. . . . I much dread its degenerating into uncontrolla- 
ble brigandage, which might take a very long time to sup- 
press, and cause incalculable damage to the country and 
enormous expense. Hence my desire for terms with Botha, 
who could control the enemy’s force. However, that is 
probably all over now, and how it will end I cannot see. 
That they are being visibly weakened there is no doubt, 
but the end is khadu jaunta [‘‘very uncertain’’]. 


The prospect for the ensuing months presented 
little that was roseate to either side. The saner and 
more moderate Boers could no longer hug themselves 
with hopes of ultimate success. The British troops 


XLVI VLAKFONTEIN 30 


had no doubt on this point, but saw nothing as yet 
to indicate finality, and were well aware that ‘‘hide- 
and-seek’’ played in the winter is bound to be a grim 
war game. . 

In addition to the columns quoted by Kitchener, 
Haig was operating in Cape Colony, and Colonel 
Harold Grenfell and Colenbrander were in the north 
of the Transvaal; while Plumer and Bindon Blood, 
after a breather in the north-east, were on the move 
in the south-east against Botha and Viljoen. 

Methuen, having toiled hard and caught little in 
Western Transvaal, had retired with Rawlinson to 
the Kimberley-Mafeking railway; Babington and 
Ingouville-Williams had repaired to Klerksdorp; 
Dixon‘ had gone to his camp at Naauwpoort, south 
of the Magaliesberg. The redoubtable De la Rey 
was thought to have stowed himself away in the 
south near Wolmaranstadt, and Methuen was de- 
tailed to look him up. Dixon, all unaware that his 
was the path in which the real danger lurked, left his 
camp on May 26, proposing to clear farms and search 
for hidden guns and ammunition? among the hills 
west of Naauwpoort. On May 29, near Vlakfontein, 
his rearguard was attacked and broken up by Kemp 
under cover of a veldt fire. Dixon at once retorted, 
and at some cost retrieved the position, but was 
forced by sheer weakness to retire to his base. 
Every available man was rushed up to the rescue, but 
only to find that the Boers had performed the usual 
vanishing trick. 


1 Major-General James Babington; Major-General Edward Ingouville- 
Williams; Col. Sir Henry Dixon. 

2The Boers sometimes over-reached themselves in burying ammunition. 
On one occasion they confided the job to two men, so that the place should 
be kept secret; but these trusted agents being killed directly after, the 
secret died with them. 


36 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


Kitchener, remembering the disabilities of untried 
troops, was content to say, ‘‘As far as I can see, our 
troops behaved well and no blame attaches to any 
one. I am afraid some of the new Yeomanry were 
somewhat wild, but that must be expected at first.’’ 

Early in June the Free Staters held a conclave, 
De la Rey, De Wet, and Steyn conferring at Reitz as 
to the Transvaalers’ proposal of overtures for peace. 
Steyn was particularly anxious to be backed by De 
la Rey in negativing the proposal, and it was ar- 
ranged that the trio should go north and meet Botha 
at Ermelo. 

Kitchener could only report in very qualified 
terms an improvement in the outlook: 


There is no doubt the Boers are thoroughly tired of fight- 
ing, but are still kept at it by their officers, in hopes that 
something will turn up. We have heard the same story so 
often that it has to be taken with misgiving; still everything 
seems to point to an end coming before very long. De Wet’s 
influence is the doubtful point; he is greatly against giving 
in, and is now trying to join Botha. De la Rey is also going 
to join Botha; his influence, although better than De Wet’s, 
would not be for general surrender. I therefore fear that 
De Wet and De la Rey combined will induce Botha to go on 
through the winter. (Kitchener to Roberts, 7.6.01.) 


Unfortunately, events conspired to hearten the 
Boers. Vlakfontein, which they magnified into a 
signal success, had for its sequel on June 12 Muller’s 
attack at Wilmansrust on the Victorian Mounted 
Rifles. The Colonial horsemen failed alike in vigi- 
lance and discipline, and Muller was able to rush 
their camp at dusk. The Regular officers in vain 
attempted to rally their men, and the Boers, though 
inferior in numbers, trekked defiantly off with their 


XLVI ANOTHER YEAR OF WAR 37 


prize of pom-poms, rifles, ammunition, and stores. 
This untoward incident, in itself petty enough, was 
highly inopportune and had an effect wholly dispro- 
portionate to its military importance. 

A week later the two Boer Governments held their 
long-deferred meeting on June 20, at Waterval, near 
Standerton. Their reply to the main question—to 
fight or not to fight—was now hardly in doubt. 
Steyn and De Wet plumped for war; Kruger! had 
cabled a vehement exhortation ‘to hold out; and any 
inclination which the other leaders might have had 
toward a settlement was dispelled by the success 
snatched at Wilmansrust. They knew well enough 
that they were hopelessly outnumbered and must 
surely be out-manceuvred; but this last ‘‘scrap’’ had 
enhanced their reliance on their almost uncanny mo- 
bility, and encouraged the hope that they might 
either wear down their opponents or that foreign in- 
tervention would somehow and from somewhere be 
forthcoming. Both surmises were doomed to disap- 
pointment, but they sufficed to beguile desperate men 
into a desperate decision, which was to entail another 
twelve months’ devastation of their own land, with, 
as a set-off, an increase of a hundred millions sterling 
to the British National Debt. 


1 Kitchener had granted special permission for Kruger to be consulted 
by telegraph. 


CHAPTER XLVII 


THE condition of Cape Colony at the moment acted 
on the Transvaal leaders as an exhilarating, but un- 
sustaining, stimulant. To the brilliant young Cam- 
bridge graduate, J. C. Smuts,! late Attorney-General 
at Pretoria, was allotted the task of cultivating and 
spreading the germ of disaffection in the Colony, 
where operations promised well, inasmuch as the 
land had not been molested and the inhabitants were 
largely, if latently, in sympathy with the Boers. 
Smuts repaired with De la Rey to the Western 
Transvaal to mature plans, while Viljoen and Muller 
betook themselves to the Middelburg district. 

In a manifesto just then published, Kruger ex- 
pressed the comfortable belief that all would be well 
in the end, adding a complacent assurance that 
proper division should be made for the women and 
children in the Concentration Camps, and for the 
prisoners of war. Asa corollary, a stubborn decla- 
ration, inspired by the venerable refugee in Holland, 
was signed by Steyn and Schalk Burger: 


No peace will be made, and no peace conditions accepted, 
by which our independence and national existence, or the 


1 Smuts’s maiden effort had been to immolate a British detachment at 
Modderfontein Nek in January, and a few weeks later in a brush with 
Cunningham at Krugersdorp he had startled and worsted the British 
General. 


38 


cnar.xtvn FREE STATERS OBSTINATE 39 


interests of our Colonial brothers, shall be the price paid; 
~ and the war will be vigorously prosecuted by taking all 
measures necessary for the maintenance of our independence 
and interests. 


Kitchener’s lingering hopes of an early peace were 
sadly dashed, but Brodrick tactfully wrote to him: 


I would only beg you to understand that the telegraphing 
to and fro does not indicate the slightest want of confidence 
of the Government in your administration and conduct of 
the very difficult task you have resting upon you. We are 
prepared to back you to the full, and shall believe in your 
efforts, however long drawn out the war may be; and the 
public here have complete confidence in you. (13.7.01.) 


Steyn, at this juncture, had to reconstitute his 
Government, for on his return with his colleagues to 
the Free State they fell across Elliot,! whose sub- 
ordinate, Broadwood, dropped on the confederates at 
Reitz, and took the whole party prisoners except 
Steyn, the President making a somewhat undignified 
exit as he galloped off in his night-shirt. 

Broadwood had secured, besides the persons of the 
notables, some valuable information, and the letters 
found in Steyn’s baggage showed afresh that to 
the obstinacy of the Free Staters was chargeable 
the continuance of hostilities. Among the papers 
seized was a letter written by Smuts to Steyn stating 
that, if they had to give up now, it would be with the 
intention of fighting again when England might be 
in difficulties. 

But just as the Sikhs, whom we fought and whose 
territory we annexed in 1849, were amongst our 
staunchest supporters in arms in the Indian Mutiny 
in 1857, so the Transvaal patriots were a dozen years 

1 Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Locke Elliot, 


40 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER cHaP. 


later to be our doughty comrades in the war which 
convulsed the world. 

For his audacious adventure into the Colony 
Smuts was endued with the heart of a dare-devil sol- 
dier and the head of a shrewd lawyer. Asa start, he 
had to collect an adequate force under the very nose 
of several British columns, and then to thread his 
way through the whole length of the Orange River 
Colony, evading the attentions of four British Com- 
manders. What he contrived to do would fill a spicy 
chapter in any story of guerilla warfare. 

By the middle of July he had assembled 340 reso- 
lute spirits divided into four parties—under Van der 
Venter, Kirster, Bouwer, and Dreyer—whose ren- 
dezvous was fixed at a spot on the Vet River, near 
Hoopstadt. Kitchener ordered two columns to 
make for the Hoopstadt district, while three others 
converged on different points of the Vaal. Elliot 
was moving on the Modder River, by way of Vrede- 
fort and Klerksdorp, to join hands with Bruce Ham- 
ilton; and Smuts, wriggling round to Elliot’s rear, 
just saved his neck from the noose set for him by 
the drive which was to clear South-Western Trans- 
vaal and the Orange River Colony. But some nasty 
surprises awaited him. Besides seven columns . 
rapidly approaching him from the north, another 
bevy seemed to bar his road in every direction. 
Smuts was in fact up against a drive which was to 
eclipse its predecessor, and for which Kitchener had 
impressed most of the columns in the Transvaal and 
the Orange Colony. 

Much as in the Indian kheddahs elephants are 
driven up rapidly narrowing jungle lanes and com- 
pelled into a stockade, Kitchener’s far-stretching 


xiv J. C. SMUTS 41 


columns were set to sweep in all the outlying Boer 
commandos, and chase them right up to the north- 
western portion of the Orange Colony, bounded by 
the Vaal River on the north, the Modder on the south, 
and the two main railways with their forbidding line 
of blockhouses on the east and west. Here was, so 
fo speak, the stockade into which the quarry was to 
be rushed and then demolished by the inner circle 
of columns. The final impetus was to be given from 
the north. In the south, besides the Modder River, 
a barrier was presented by the line of posts manned 
by the South African Constabulary, which ran from 
Bloemfontein to Petrusberg, and thence on to 
Jacobsdal. 

In the second week of July Bruce Hamilton had 
moved his force to the west of the line, and stationed 
half of them under Rochfort,’ Williams, and Byng 
behind the Constabulary cordon, with their flanks on 
the Wegdraai Drift of the Riet River to Emmaus. 
This line was prolonged eastward to the railway by 
Knox, who lined the Fauresmith—EHEdenburg road. 
The rest of Hamilton’s men guarded the Orange 
River from Norval’s Point to Ramah, thus forming 
a third line of beaters. Elliot meanwhile was sweep- 
ing on from the east, and, coasting along the Vaal, 
reached Klerksdorp, just north of the culminating 
point of the drive. 

Towards the end of July the troops which had been 
on Smuts’s immediate track were poised for a fresh 
swoop. Elhot now commanded the seven columns 
which were to form the main line of beaters, and be- 
hind this a column under Garratt? was detailed to 

12 Majer-General Sir A. Hochfort. 

2 Brigadier-General Frameis Garrait. 


42 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


worry any of the enemy who might break back. In 
addition to these, ‘‘stops’’ were provided on both 
flanks, and Plumer, summoned from a distant part 
of the Transvaal, was posted at the south-western 
angle of the Boer fastness. In the middle of July 
Plumer was on the Delagoa railway, far from the 
scene of operations, but Kitchener rushed him south 
by rail, refitted him at Bloemfontein on July 18, and 
landed him on the 30th at Modder River Station. 

The moves of the various columns were co- 
ordinated from the Commander-in-Chief’s office, like 
those of trains in a time-table. The beaters were 
now ready, the ‘‘stops’’ were posted, and—in sports- 
man’s parlance—everything turned on what game 
would be brought up to the guns. It was known that 
a number of local commandos were inside the cordon, 
and that there were many hitherto untouched laagers 
and farms, as well as countless hordes of cattle and 
sheep. 

On July 29 the drive proper commenced, Elliot’s 
columns moving southwards in parallel lines, the 
others falling in and conforming to the movement as 
the line reached them. On August 10 Elliot reached 
the Modder River and the drive was over. The bag 
as regards men was meagre; only seventeen Boers 
were killed or wounded, and the 259 prisoners were 
generally of a poor type. In the south Bruce Hamil- 
ton, Knox, and the Constabulary had taken during 
the month about 300 prisoners, and had given to the 
country between the Modder and Orange Rivers the 
complexion of a wilderness. Many wagons, 186,000 
sheep, and 21,000 cattle had been seized; but the 
principal quarry still roamed at large, as Hlliot’s 
lines had been perforated at night. 


XLII ELLIOT’S DRIVE 43 


The leaders of the local commandos had been able 
to choose between eluding their pursuers and engag- 
ing them: Smuts had his own offensive to carry out, 
and had enjoyed the personal experience of being 
ringed in by 15,000 British troops, and headed off by 
lines of railway blockhouses manned by a formidable 
force of Constabulary. On August 3, having slipped 
behind the British line, he sent Van der Venter with 
a part of his force to the Cape Colony border, where 
his heutenant pierced the Bloemfontein—Thaba 
’Nchu line of Constabulary. Smuts himself, hang- 
ing on Elliot’s rear, crossed the Modder and went 
through the Constabulary posts—only to find a clus- 
ter of little columns around him. He tiptoed south 
to Springfontein, but then had to turn about and 
sprint seventy miles towards Bloemfontein. Then 
he made another dash southwards and worked his 
way over the railroad. At Reddersburg he lost a 
handful of prisoners to Rawlinson; he was then bit- 
ten at by Major Damant, but on August 27 he man- 
aged, with his jaded residue of 250 men, to join Van 
der Venter at Zastron. Here he also met Kritzinger 
—fresh from his fifteen weeks’ incursion into Cape 
Colony and exulting over his successful evasion of 
the constant and pressing attentions of French. 

The presence of the three fiery spirits so near the 
Cape Colony frontier was not to be tolerated: to 
eatch them at all costs was the order of the day. 
Plumer, Rawlinson, Thorneycroft, and Pilcher * were 
hurried up; the Orange River from Bethulie to the 
Basuto border was held by Fitzroy Hart *; and a new 
line of blockhouses between Bethulie and the Her- 


1 Major-General A. Thorneycroft; Major-General T. Pilcher. 
2 Major-General Sir Fitzroy Hart. 


44 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


schel border was occupied by the Highland Light In- 
fantry, with a reserve of Connaught Rangers at 
Lemoenfontein. 

To all appearances Smuts and Kritzinger were 
once more engirdled. Kitchener wrote to Brodrick: 


We are now doing all we can to prevent Kritzinger and 
Malan and a party of Transvaalers under Smuts, the late 
Attorney-General, from getting back into Cape Colony. 
Our blockhouse lines are almost complete, and I have moved 
down a considerable number of troops to guard the frontier. 
I hope we shall frustrate them and drive them north again. 
The area between the Orange River and the Ladybrand— 
Modder River line has been so thoroughly cleared of sup- 
plies that I doubt the enemy’s being able to exist there for. 
any length of time. (23.8.01.) 


The position of the Boer leaders seemed sufficiently 
parlous; but this kind of crisis had by now become 
second nature to them, and they carried on in happy 
ignorance, and complete defiance, of all recognised 
military tactics. 

Kritzinger and Brand joined hands for a time and 
then separated. While the former snapped up some 
of Hart’s force near the Orange River, the latter 
near Saunalisport accounted for a party of Mounted 
Infantry with a couple of guns. 

Smuts, with French thundering at his heels, started 
southwards, and on September 17 actually ambushed 
and got the better of a detachment of Regular Cav- 
alry. Kitchener telegraphed: 


The squadron 17th Lancers in Cape Colony, severely 
mauled by Smuts’s commando, fought well. The Boers 
were surrounded and determined to get through at all 
costs, which they did with severe loss. The only mistake 


avr THE SEVENTEENTH LANCERS 45 


was that the Boers, being dressed in khaki, were allowed to 
get to close quarters before they were fired on. 


Smuts then turned aside to join Schupers, who had 
been active for some time in the south-western dis- 
tricts near the sea. Finding, however, that Schupers 
had just been ‘‘scuppered,’’ he boldly proceeded to 
invade the Ceres district—less than a hundred miles 
from Cape Town—where he arrived at the beginning 
of November. Since June he had trekked 1100 miles, 
kept clear of the far-flung net, and ridden the coun- 
try from the Transvaal to the far end of the Colony. 


CHAPTER XLVIII 


On August 7 was issued a not very succulent proc- 
lamation penned in London. Opening with a legal 
preamble descriptive of the situation, it assured the 
Boers that their numbers were insignificant, their 
guns and munitions all but exhausted, and their pros- 
pects hopeless. In minatory terms their uncondi- 
tional surrender was demanded before September 15, 
the penalty for non-compliance being—for Govern- 
ment officials, commandants, field cornets, and lead- 
ers—perpetual banishment; while recalcitrant bur- 
ghers were warned that the cost of maintaining their 
families in the Concentration Camps was to be recov- 
erable by a levy on their property, real or personal. 

The Downing Street composition read much like 
a lawyer’s writ,! and was about as popular. Botha, 
Steyn, and De Wet replied with curled lip; the bur- 
ghers generally treated it with contemptuous silence. 

Kitchener, while willing to give the civilian pre- 
scription for ending the war every chance, was put- 
ting into effect a more practical plan. Hitherto the 
blockhouses had been confined to the railway. But 
the beginning of the end may perhaps be traced to 
their more extensive and more vigorous use. The 
blockhouses were now to stretch themselves relent- 


1 Kitchener wished that there were ‘‘not so many preliminary ‘paras’ 
beginning ‘whereas,’ which only puzzle the Boers.” ‘If,’ he said, “they 
can argue over any one of them, they do so, and think they can upset the 
proclamation in consequence’”’ (Kitchener to Brodrick, 2.8.01). 

46 


cx.xitvr BLOCKHOUSES EXTENDED 47 


lessly across the country and to create fenced areas 
within which the Boers could be accounted for in 
detail. The blockhouse lines, following those of the 
roads, would themselves be immune from danger, 
and would handsomely contribute fresh means of 
communication and facilities for dealing powerful 
offensive strokes. It was also recognised that the 
posts had attempted to combine dual functions; they 
had been useful for active clearing work and for pro- 
tecting lines of communication, but, when called 
upon, offered a very flabby barrier. It was decided 
that the posts should be limited to their proper 
sphere; the Constabulary were to be employed in 
manning interior sets of posts within areas enclosed 
by blockhouses; the duty of sweeping clean enclosed 
areas was to devolve on really mobile columns. 

These preparations were not allowed to slacken 
work in the field. Elliot’s drive in August and 
September through the eastern part of the Orange 
River Colony effected little. Kritzinger could not 
be lured out of his retreat between the Orange and 
Caledon Rivers, and De Wet was still on the war- 
path. In Eastern Transvaal the Boers were quies- 
cent, but in Western Transvaal De la Rey and Kemp 
were brisk as ever. The latter, after nonplussing 
several endeavours to encircle him in the Zwart- 
ruggens, gave a hand to his friend in attacking 
Methuen near the Marico River on September 5, 
but Methuen’s spirit had fired his Yeomanry, who 
put up a capital and wholly successful fight. 

No serious attempt had yet been made to deal 
with Botha in the Ermelo district. Early in Sep- 
tember the Boer General made a dash for Piet 
Retief with a commando a thousand strong. 


48 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


Lyttelton, who directed the pursuit against him, 
was badly misinformed as to his real objective, 
which was Dundee, about forty miles due north of 
Ladysmith. On September 17 a mounted column 
under Gough, which had been sent out from Dundee 
to escort an incoming convoy, stumbled on Botha 
at Blood River Poort. Seeing a number-of horses 
turned out to graze, Gough congratulated himself on 
the rare chance of surprising dismounted Boers. 
But he reckoned without Botha’s main body, which 
galloped up and rolled over the British line from 
right to left in ten minutes. Six officers and 38 men 
of the Mounted Infantry were killed or wounded, 
and 6 officers and 235 men taken prisoners. After 
searching inquiry, the Commander-in-Chief exoner- 
ated Gough: ‘‘Gough’s affair might happen to any 
one. He fell into a carefully-prepared trap in very 
difficult ground. The bait was 200 men of the 
enemy off-saddled, and the whole force of the 
enemy carefully concealed’’ (Kitchener to Brodrick, 
20.9.01). 

But the Blood River Poort surprise was taken 
very seriously. Troops were bustled up from every 
quarter, and a force of 16,000 British with 40 guns 
was pitted against a raiding commando of 2000 men. 
Botha must anyhow be headed back and every door 
shut against him, especially that by which he had 
entered the southern corner of the Transvaal. 

Curiously enough, the Boer General, who might 
well have been flushed by his success, failed to play 
it up, and as he was hesitating the Buffalo River rose 
in flood in front of him, and denied him Dundee. 
He then made up his mind to enter Natal through 


1 Colonel Hubert Gough. 


XLVI BOTHA’S CAMPAIGN 49 


Zululand at a point just below the confluence of the 
Tugela and Buffalo Rivers, and on September 24 
arrived at Babanago Mountain, close to the Zulu 
frontier, with 2000 men. Before him lay the Itala 
Mountain, at the base of which stood a fortified 
British post, and ten miles to the west a smaller 
post at Prospect. Botha determined to rush both 
these posts. He had begun to realise that his dash 
on Natal had no chance of success, and that if 
he hung about there too long he would certainly 
be caught. He understood that the posts were 
weakly held, and thought by bringing off a cheap 
coup to create a diversion which would cover his 
retreat. 

Emmett and Grobler were told off to take Pros- 
pect, and Chris Botha was thrown against Itala, 
where Major Chapman against heavy odds put up a 
fine fight that lasted for 23 hours. Both sides lost 
heavily, but the Boers were the first beaten, and 
Chapman took his battered but undaunted little 
force to Nkandhle. At Prospect, the position being 
entirely tenable, the assailants received much and 
inflicted little punishment. 

The two assaults having failed, Botha renounced 
all further idea of a campaign on the Tugela, sent off 
a rather stiff letter to the Transvaal Government, 
and turned his mind, and his men, to retreat. 
Lyttelton was not made aware of this till four days 
later, and Bruce Hamilton, after a fine march of 
48 miles in 23 hours, reached Itala on the 28th, to 
find he had been trudging along parallel to Botha, 
but in the opposite direction. 

Walter Kitchener was ordered by his brother to 


block Botha’s retreat in the north by occupying the 
VOL. II 


50 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


passes in the Pondwana Mountains. Bruce Hamil- 
ton was to move up from the south towards Walter 
Kitchener, and Clements was directed to operate 
from the west. But Botha secured a start of three 
days, and with the British columns ponderously 
plodding on in step with their ox-transport, Hamil- 
ton could only on October 5 reach the Inklayatic 
Mountain, Botha having fetched up in the neighbour- 
hood six days earlier. Unable to force the pass at 
Vaalkranz Nek, he shed his transport and sat astride 
the road to Pivaen Bridge, where Walter Kitchener 
found him. He then fought a clever rearguard ac- 
tion, forded the Pivaen, and, dismissing his local ad- 
herents, passed with the relict of his commando 
through Piet Retief, the gate by which he had orig- 
inally entered. The story of the pursuit of Botha is 
that of the hare and the tortoise, with the difference 
that the hare won the race. 

Kitchener was sorely disappointed, but, loyal to a 
subordinate who had honestly, if heavily, done his 
best, he wrote home on October 18: 


Botha has escaped from Natal by passing through Swazi- 
land. I am sorry we were not able to stop him, but I think 
he has lost considerably both in prestige as a leader, and 
materially in the numbers of wounded and loss of transport. 

Lyttelton did all he could, I think, but bad weather made 
the movement of troops very slow, and enabled the Boers to 
get away by abandoning their transport. (Kitchener to 
Brodrick. ) 


Botha had enjoined Viljoen to carry on in his 
absence, but the deputy was cowed by the assiduous 
attentions of Benson,’ whose raids on the high veldt 
had provoked terror and resentment. Moreover, 


1 Colonel Benson, R.A. 


XLVI DEATH OF BENSON dl 


the steady contraction of Kitchener’s great ring- 
fence had sensibly diminished Botha’s practicable 
area of operations. The return of the Boer General 
put new life into the commandos, and a ery of wrath 
went up from his stalwarts, the men of Ermelo and 
Carolina, who found that during their absence their 
homes had been ruined or raided. Their hot desire 
for revenge was voiced in a fierce demand for re- 
prisals on Benson. 

The latter had found it necessary to return to the 
Delagoa Bay railway to refit, and set out on October 
30. The weather was bad, and Grobler continually 
pressed the rearguard, which in the afternoon was 
halted on Gun Hill with two field-guns. Grobler 
with his main force overwhelmed the infantry 
detachment between the hill and an adjacent ridge 
on which Botha was perched, silenced the guns, 
charged Gun Hill, and in half-an-hour the troops on 
the hill were cut to pieces, the officers all billed or 
wounded, and Benson himself mortally hurt. The 
British main body, encamped a short distance off, 
was itself awkwardly attacked, and could offer little 
help. The Boers failed, as usual, to follow up their 
success, and Colonel Wools-Sampson,' who took over 
Benson’s command, was able to form an inner circle 
of entrenchments and maintain himself until relieved 
on November 1. 

Benson’s death was a genuine grief to Kitchener: 


I am very much upset at this most sad affair of Benson’s 
column. I have just heard that he has died of his wounds. 
What can be done to prevent this sort of occurrence? 

I have not got full details yet, but it is the usual thing. 
The Boers observe the movements of a column from a long 


1 Colonel Sir Aubrey Wools-Sampson. 


52 “LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


way off, only showing a very few men; then having chosen 
some advantage—in this case it was the weather—they 
charge in with great boldness, and the result is a serious cas- 
ualty list. Benson’s was one of my best columns, and had a 
most excellent and efficient intelligence run by - Wools- 
Sampson. He knew every inch of the ground, having been 
constantly in that part of the country, and my last telegram 
from him on the 29th was to the effect that the country was 
clear, and that he thought the time had come to move the 
line of posts forward from the Wilge River. 

This is only to show you how difficult it is to prevent these 
occurrences. I have tried all I can to keep columns safe, 
and yet vigorously to push the war; but some risks must 
be run, and if a column like Benson’s, operating 20 miles 
outside our lines, is not fairly safe, it is a very serious mat- 
ter, and will require a large addition to our forces to carry 
on the war. (Kitchener to Brodrick, 1.11.01.) 


Just at this time a proposal was rather gingerly 
made by Roberts, who asked Kitchener whether a 
Chief of the Staff in the person of Sir Jan Hamilton 
would be welcome. The offer was accepted with un- 
expected alacrity: 


Nov. 5, 1901.—I am extremely grateful; there is nothing 
I should like better. He is just the man I want. Hamilton 
will be a great help to me. You will no doubt let him bring 
me your latest views; but is there anything you could tele- 
graph that you think I could do to bring the war to a more 
rapid conclusion? Sometimes those at a distance can see 
things that those on the spot miss. I can make fairly steady 
progress, and I try continually for something more; but I 
can never make a certainty of the latter, the Boers being 
always able to evade us, as in the recent Natal operations. 

The Blockhouse system does a great deal, but it takes up 
a large number of infantry. I should like to extend the line 
considerably ; also to deal effectually with the most difficult 


| XLVI A CHIEF OF THE STAFF 53 


question, how to make troops more mobile. I have tried 
pack-saddles and have to an extent succeeded; but it is not 
enough to catch the Boers, who go with nothing, and trust 
to pick up a few mealies in a native hut. 


The revival of Boer activity in the South African 
spring of 1901 was extended to Western Transvaal, 
where, for the moment, Kitchener could only spare 
Kekewich to face Kemp and De la Rey. Kekewich 
on September 13 left Naauwpoort for the Magalies- 
berg, and with 800 infantry, 560 mounted men, 3 guns 
and a pom-pom moved into the Zwartruggens, a 
rugged forest district peculiarly suited to Boer tac- 
tics. On the 29th he bivouacked at Moedwil, on the 
Selous River, and before reveillé next dav De la Rey’s 
men, 1000 strong, having rushed the picket, went 
straight for the camp. But they met more than 
their match in quality, and half-an-hour sufficed to 
send them to the right-about. Kekewich was badly 
wounded and lost a quarter of his fighting strength; 
he, however, quickly patched himself up, and a fort- 
night later was on the track of De la Rey, but a 
proposed attack concerted with Methuen—who had 
just driven De la Rey back from Kleinfontein— 
missed fire. 

There was beginning to be an uncomfortable con- 
viction that the end of 1901 would find the Boer 
chieftains still unaccounted for. Botha was just 
outside the protected area in the Hastern Transvaal, 
De Wet in the north-east of the Orange River Colony, 
and De la Rey in his favourite quarters, the 
Zwartruggens. 

Against De Wet, who had been located near Reitz, 
Kitchener now directed a drive of fourteen columns; 
on their arrival at that dreary place on November 


54 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


12 the troops were perhaps more vexed than sur- 
prised to find the bird had flown, though it was chir- 
ruping only twenty miles away. 

Steyn and De Wet just then indignantly turned 
down Botha’s new suggestion that the British Gen- 
eral should be approached on the subject of peace. 
Both leaders scouted the bare idea, and by the end of 
November De Wet had scraped together at Blijds- 
chap 1000 burghers who, after giving the go-by to 
three of Elliot’s columns, tucked themselves in the 
folds of the hills beyond Bethlehem. 

Kitchener was not to have a happy Christmas. 
A British force of less than 1000 men between 
Harrismith and Bethlehem, covering the construc- 
tion of the blockhouse line to Kroonstad, was split up 
into three detachments, too far apart to afford each 
other effective support. One of these, consisting 
entirely of Yeomanry, was on Groen Kop, three 
miles from Rundle’s Headquarters. De Wet chose 
Christmas Eve, a moonlight but cloudy night, to at- 
tack them, and by two o’clock next morning had 
placed himself at the foot of the precipitous side of 
the Kop. Not until the heads of the storming party 
actually appeared above the crest was the alarm 
given. Within an hour the struggle was over, the 
camp cut up, and De Wet was on his way to the hills 
with prisoners, guns, and wagons. Kitchener tele- 
graphed on December 26: 


Before the men in camp could get clear of their tents the 
Boers rushed through, shooting them down as they came out. 
The officers were shot trying to stem the tide. . . . There 
was no panic and all did their best; but the Boers were too 
strong and, once the pickets were overwhelmed, they had all 
the advantage. Including dead and wounded, about half 


XLVI GROEN KOP 9) 


the column are now at Eland’s River bridge; the remainder 
are prisoners. 


The disaster was the more disturbing as a few 
days earlier Damant’s force had met with misfor- 
tune, his advance guard having been outwitted and 
overborne by a number of Boers dressed in British 
uniforms. 

Kitchener was well aware that these episodes 
would loom large in the public eye at home, and that 
—without any striking British success—the gradual 
grinding down of the enemy was liable to be 
overlooked. ‘‘Oh, for a little luck! but I never get 
any,’’ he confided to Brodrick. ‘‘It is no longer real 
war out here, but police operations of considerable 
magnitude to catch various bands of men who resist 
and do all they can to avoid arrest. The Boers 
cordially dislike the blockhouse lines.’’ 

To Roberts he wrote: 


Who would have thought, when you left Johannesburg, 
that I should be a year in command with the war still going? 
History repeats itself, and to bring a people under evidently 
must take time and patience; they evidently are not gov- 
erned by any common sense, and simply continue a hopeless 
struggle until they are individually caught. It is through 
a mistaken idea of patriotism, which results in the ruin of 
their country. The only good thing about it is that it makes 
the future more secure. There is no doubt a large number 
of the Boers have the feeling, ‘‘Perish everything, rather 
than I should be called a traitor!’’ Many are disgusted at 
being deceived by their leaders, and fully know that there is 
only one end possible to the war; and yet they go on, for 
fear of being branded hereafter as ‘‘hands-uppers.”’ 


CHAPTER XLIX 


Mranwute the successes scored by Botha had de- 
manded instant counter-action. On November 16 
Bruce Hamilton started a sweeping movement with 
15,000 men in twelve columns to drive the com- 
mandos against the Swaziland border. His imme- 
diate aim was to tackle Botha on the high veldt. The 
Constabulary lines had been pushed forward fifteen 
miles to a line between Brugspruit and Waterval. 
With columns supporting his flanks, based on the 
Delagoa and Natal railways, Hamilton advanced 
towards Ermelo. 

Botha, however, knew to a nicety the movements 
of his adversary, and having disposed the Transvaal 
Government in a place of safety, doubled back arm- 
in-arm with Piet Viljoen to Oshoek, twenty miles 
west of Ermelo. Hamilton then set himself to se- 
cure Botha’s laager by one of the new-fashioned and 
very fruitful night raids. The modus operandi was 
that a party of native scouts were sent out to collect 
information. Three picked men would visit the 
Kaffir kraals and learn the latest news. Then the 
place to attack would be carefully selected. As a 
rule, the force employed numbered from 1500 to 
2000 men, usually without transport, with a couple of 
guns and ambulance, and with mounted Kaffirs scout- 


ing on either flank. Distances up to forty miles were 
56 


cur.xux FORETELLING THE END 57 


thus often covered; the desired point was to be 
reached before dawn. The troops were then rapidly 
deployed on an extended front, and with the first 
streak of day rushed the laager. Taken by surprise, 
and unable to get at their horses, the Boers usually 
put up their hands, and the affair was quickly over. 
These successful nocturnal raids were much enjoyed 
by the British and much resented by the Boers, who 
never felt sure of a night’s rest. 

While Benson in this part of the country was 
undermanned and without a proper base, Hamilton 
had the call of fresh troops; and the blockhouse line | 
which now connected Ermelo with Standerton and 
the Natal railway served him well. He took a large 
handful of prisoners and a quantity of material, but 
Botha himself got away and, pushing past Pulteney * 
and Plumer, crossed the upper Vaal. Hamilton had 
no better luck with Viljoen, whom he twice raided; 
some 200 Boers were accounted for, but Viljoen him- 
self escaped each time and was able to post a trouble- 
some body of 300 men inside the protected area. 

On December 13 Kitchener, committing himself 
for the first time to an approximate date, correctly 
foretold finality: 


I think about April we shall have pretty well exhausted 
the Boers and so enclosed them in areas that they will find 
it very hard to keep up much form of resistance. Of course 
for some time there may, and probably will, bea few bands of 
irreconcilables in difficult country, but these will be easily 
confined to districts. (Kitchener to Roberts, 13.12.01.) 


The following week he added: 


There is no doubt the Boers are much depressed in the 


1 Later Lieut.-General Sir William Pulteney. 


58 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


Transvaal and consider the game is up. The leaders still 
make them stick to it, telling them they have nothing to lose. 
Formerly they thought we should never be able to catch 
them all, but now they have changed considerably, and see 
that the day is not so very far off when there will be prac- 
tically no Boers in the field. Small matters show the change. 
The prisoners we took used to refuse to speak to the surren- 
dered burghers and treated them with great disdain; now it 
is quite the contrary, and they try to curry favour with the 
““hands-uppers.’’ (Kitchener to Roberts, 20.12.01.) 


In the same letter he deprecated the rash attempts 
to start new farms before the firing had ceased: 


t 

I am sorry to see by Reuter that men are being sent out 
from home to commence cultivation in the Orange River 
Colony. As I said in a telegram to Brodrick, I consider this 
premature; already the Boers have swept away Goold- 
Adams’s! stock and cultivation more than once. It is 
merely a gift to the Boers [for us] to go too fast, and noth- 
ing I can say will check the civil element in thinking that, 
because they do not hear guns firing round them, the war is 
over.and everything is safe. When the Boers knock over 
their projects, they only ask why were they not protected. 

We clear the country, and they then put out cattle and 
cultivation because there are no Boers in sight. Of course 
the enemy come back and make great capital out of their 
success. I try and implore people to wait until I can say 
with moderate safety ‘‘Go on,’’ but it is of no use. 


Botha was, however, to carry out his bat. Plumer 
and others not only failed to propel him and his 800 
Boers into Hamilton’s expectant arms, but in the 
attempt lost eighty men—taken prisoners. A fur- 
ther drive by Hamilton late in January did force him 
to take refuge in the Vryheid hills, where for a month 


1 Sir H. Goold-Adams. 


XLIX BOTHA AND THE VILJOENS 59 


he was kept on the move; after this he disappeared, 
and was no more seen until he turned up at the Peace 
Conference at Pretoria. His authority had of late 
only just sufficed to keep his men in the field, and he 
was constantly told either to end the war, or to give 
some good reason for continuing it. This was an 
awkward demand, as his chief reason for going on 
was the forlorn hope either of a weakening of British 
purpose, or of an eleventh-hour foreign intervention. 
But Europe stood aloof and Britain stood firm; more- 
over, the blockhouse line from Standerton to Won- 
derfontein was now complete and bisected the high 
veldt, and the three principal centres of the Kastern 
Transvaal were irrecoverably in British hands. , 

Piet Viljoen, in the west, was out of immediate 
reach at Vaal Kop near Bethel, and had succeeded 
in introducing a party of 200 men into the protected 
area behind the Constabulary posts. His circum-' 
stances, however, were precarious, for the devastated 
Bethel district was incapable of supporting a force of 
any importance. He had the choice of three courses 
—to follow Michael Prinsloo into the protected area, 
to join Ben Viljoen in the north-east, or to unite 
with De Wet in the Free State. . 

These alternatives were discussed among the Boer 
leaders on January 7, and, after some squabbling, a 
body of about 400 men threw in their lot with Piet 
Viljoen and joined Prinsloo on January 24, mate- 
rially strengthening his position, from which succes- 
sive attempts to oust him had failed. 

In the North-Eastern Transvaal Ben Viljoen and 
Muller, between whom no love was lost, kept them- 
selves to themselves; the former had his headquar- 
ters at Pilgrim’s Rest, twenty-five miles north-east 


60 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


of Lydenburg, with a body of about 900 men, while 
Muller haunted the hills in the west and south-west 
of Lydenburg. Neither leader could boil up any of- 
fensive spirit in their war-weary contingents. 

The Transvaal Government, which had been 
forced across the Delagoa Bay railway by Bruce 
Hamilton in December, narrowly escaped capture 
by Colonel Park, and were then persuaded by Ben 
Viljoen to take refuge with him. They set out to 
join him at Pilgrim’s Rest, but at first sight of the - 
barbed wire and blockhouses their courage oozed out 
and they turned back. Their discretion was justi- 
fied, as Ben Viljoen early on December 26 was caught 
by a company of the Royal Irish Regiment, and con- 
signed to St. Helena. The official personages evaded 
further pursuit and crossed to the west of Olifant’s 
River, whence, on March 12, by Kitchener’s permis- 
sion, they joined a conference with Steyn at 
Kroonstad: 


Ben Viljoen’s capture (he did not give himself up) may 
do some good in the north, but I doubt it having any very 
great effect, as he has been for some time working for peace, 
and it will be said he gave himself up. Our party was lying 
out for Schalk Burger and the Government, who, we thought, 
were going to see B. Viljoen, instead of which Viljoen went 
to see them and was caught. I would much sooner have got 
the Government. (Kitchener to Roberts, 31.1.02.) 


The third drive in the Orange River Colony ab- 
sorbed all available troops, and Piet Viljoen was left 
undisturbed in the protected area until the end of 
March, when, during a night raid, Lawley trod on 
him twenty miles east of Springs, and a ding-dong 
fight of little consequence and less result ensued. 


xLIX THE BOERS JADED 61 


Bruce Hamilton then took a hand, but Viljoen 
himself kept clear, while his lieutenant, Alberts, at 
the head of 500 men, bolted into the Orange River 
Colony with the British General in panting pursuit. 

Notwithstanding the Boers’ run of luck, there were 
signs that their cause was languishing. The men 
were very jaded, a little out of hand, and increas- 
ingly, if stealthily, pacifist. Kitchener in writing 
home could point to rifts in his opponent’s lute: 


There have been constant reports from secret agents that 
the great majority of the Boers do not intend to go on much 
beyond the end of the year, owing to want of food and am- 
munition. We have had such reports before, so I only men- 
tion them for what they are worth, which may be very little. 
From one of De Wet’s letters we know Botha wants to ar- 
range to meet De Wet, probably to discuss the future, as 
Botha’s men are very discontented with the way things are 
going, and at being led by the Orange Free Staters. Ben 
Viljoen is doing all he can to bring about peace, and his men 
are anxiously waiting to give up. De Wet’s own men are 
much more discontented and insubordinate than they used to 
be. At a meeting the other day De Wet had to sjambok one 
of his men for openly saying ‘‘they were being deceived,”’ 
and asking ‘‘how long they were to be kept at this hopeless 
struggle.’’ There have been several quarrels amongst the 
Free Staters lately. No one now cares to go down to the 
Colony, and De Wet has to exert all his influence to get men 
to attempt it. Kritzinger, after refusing for a long time, 
has at last been induced to make another attempt, but he has 
only started with 60 men, though he may gather some more 
en route. 


It was a good moment to deliver a shrewd blow. 


CHAPTER L 


Tue meshes of the widespread military net were 
strong, but the Boers were finding them wide enough 
to permit of parties slipping through by night. 
Kitchener improved his system, and so approved it 
that he suggested an analogy for Parliament then 
assembling. ‘‘Your campaign,’’ he wrote to Brod- 
rick, ‘‘has now started again, and I hope you will 
have every success. Let me recommend the block- 
house system; I have no doubt it would have an 
excellent effect in Parliament; you pin your adver- 
sary down to certain areas’’ (17.1.02). 

He now was substituting for the net a thin but 
continuous wall of mounted troops, fifty or more 
miles in length; this solid wall, with no gaps through 
which the enemy could escape, was to move forward 
by day, and at night every officer and man would be 
on duty to form a continuous line of pickets. The 
ends of the wall would rest on blockhouse lines, 
especially reinforced by fresh battalions of infantry ; 
and it moved towards a similar line, the railways 
being patrolled by armoured trains. The whole area 
of the drive was therefore to be fenced in by a living 
hedge. 

The physical disadvantage of the system was that 
it admitted of no substantial reserves; a really de- 


termined force could break through. But the moral 
62 


coar.t A MOVING WALL OF TROOPS 63 


effect was most satisfactory, as the weaker spirits 
who, in the old-fashioned drives, knew that they 
could generally escape without being hurt, now 
found they had to fight for their lives to get out. 
The new device of course made a searching demand 
on the discipline and staying powers of the British 
troops, who had to cover great distances at sustained 
speed, while preserving the dressing of a fifty or 
sixty mile line over rough country. 

In the first week of February Kitchener directed 
four columns respectively under Rimington,! Elliot, 
Byng, and Rawlinson against De Wet at Hlandskop 
—9000 men being distributed overnight on a front 
of fifty-four miles from Frankfurt: in the north to 
Kaffirkop in the south—an allowance of one man to 
every ten yards. The distance to the railway, about 
fifty miles, was to be covered in three days and two 
nights. Writing to Roberts on February 7 Kitch- 
ener said: ‘‘ You can imagine how anxious I am, as, if 
De Wet is still in to-night, his chances will be small. 
As far as I can see, the troops are working excel- 
lently, keeping touch along the whole line, and we 
may have a great coup.”’ 

But De Wet was not to be among the 300 burghers 
accounted for that night. Hampered as he was by a 
herd of cattle from which his people refused to be 
parted, he succeeded in cutting the wire fence be- 
tween Kroonstad and Lindley and made good his way 
to the Doornberg. This drive, if devoid of much ma- 
terial result, accounted for some fine fighting burgh- 
ers, and De Wet’s disciples were beginning to shake 


1 Brigadier-General Michael Frederic Rimington. One of his orders 
Tran: “Every man from the Brigadier to the last native to be on duty 
and to act as sentry for one third of the night.’”’ This in addition to a full 
day’s work! 


64 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


their heads. The experiment was to be renewed on 
a major scale. A portion of the north-east of the 
Orange Colony having now been cleared, the new idea 
was to drive the remainder of the Colony, in addi- 
tion to a portion of the Transvaal between the Natal 
railway and the Drakensberg, and the Winburg— 
Harrismith line. The drive was to be carried out 
by two distinct movements. Elliot, starting east- 
wards from Kroonstad and the Doornberg, was to 
advance with the right of his line resting first on 
Lindley and next on Harrismith, near which place 
he was timed to meet the other three columns under 
Rawlinson, Byng, and Rimington. This phase was 
to occupy four days, from the 13th to the 16th. The 
other three commanders, concentrating in the angle 
formed by the main railway and the Natal railway, 
were to drive along both banks of the Vaal, and when 
abreast of Tapel Kop would wheel to the right until 
they faced south, Elliot then joining in and keeping 
in line with them. The drive was to end on the 
southern blockhouse line between Eland’s River . 
bridge and Van Riemen’s pass. The programme 
was especially heavy for the northern columns, who 
would have to face eleven successive nights of out- 
post duty. 

Elliot started on February 13, and, after swinging 
an abortive blow at De Wet, reached the Wilge River 
on the 22nd, where he awaited the other columns. 
The Wilge was now held by the 2nd Leinster Regi- 
ment, Elliot’s column, and mounted troops from 
Harrismith. This was too wide a front for the 
numbers employed, and the northern blockhouse line 
was also too weak to stem the rush of fugitives from 
Rawlinson and Byng. A number of Boers had been 


L AT THE WILGE RIVER 65 


driven into the angle before the Wilge River, where, 
mixed up with De Wet and Steyn and their fighting 
followers, was a mass of women, children, cattle, and 
transport. De Wet saw that his best chance was to 
break through Rawlinson’s attenuated line at the 
point where it was supposed to touch Byng’s column. 
Shortly after sundown a mob of mounted Boers, 
wagons, and cattle started from Brakfontein on its 
desperate errand. The 900 combatants led the van; 
then marched De Wet and Steyn; then came the 
wagons, followed by an enormous herd of cattle 
covering several miles of the veldt. The fortunes 
of De Wet and Steyn were waning, but did not on 
this occasion forsake them; and at midnight the re- 
doubtable couple poked their way through the Brit- 
ish line, leaving women, children, cattle, and a 
heterogeneous mass of material—hbesides notabilities 
such as De Wet’s son and secretary—to swell the 
Harrismith commando and form a bulky prize for 
their pursuers. 

Kitchener, not displeased with this haul, allowed 
only three days to elapse before beginning his third 
drive. Two sets of converging columns met just 
where De Wet and Steyn were in hiding, but al- 
though some lurking commandos were broken up, the 
elusive pair made good their escape and took refuge 
with De la Rey at Wolmaranstad in the Transvaal. 
Two more drives, less ambitious because the troops 
had to be sent to the Transvaal, failed to put salt 
on De Wet’s tail,! but unrelenting pressure was evi- 
dently telling on the burghers’ nerves. 

De la Rey’s last, most successful, and to him most 

1“I wonder whether they will catch De Wet,” said Kitchener thirteen 


years later, when that duty lay with the Transvaal General. 


VOL. II F 


66 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


creditable, coup was now to be brought off. Methuen 
was bent on retrieving the valuable convoy captured 
by De la Rey on February 25, and tried to lick into 
some sort of shape the miscellaneous human material 
he was at pains to collect for the purpose. The 
so-called ‘‘column’’ was indeed a mixed crew; the 
1300 men who composed it were drawn from four- 
teen different units, varying in quality, calibre, 
moral, and colour. This job lot was further handi- 
capped by a prodigious train of ox and mule wagons. 

De la Rey was reported to be making for the 
Marice River; Methuen thought to intercept him, 
and told Kekewich to lend a hand from Klerksdorp. 
Grenfell was accordingly despatched to join Methuen 
at Roirantjesfontein, seventeen miles south of Lich- 
tenburg, where he arrived on March 7. 

Methuen, delayed by scarcity of water, only 
reached Tweebosch on the 6th; at 3 a.m. on the 7th 
his ox convoy, escorted by half his force, started, fol- 
lowed by the mule convoy at an interval of an hour. 
At dawn De la Rey made a sudden pounce from the 
rear. A panic was started by a native boy with led 
horses, who galloped through the mule convoy just 
as it was attempting to close up on the ox convoy in 
advance. The mounted troops forming the rear 
screen behaved, and bolted, badly. Some of the 
Yeomanry honestly tried to stem a rout, but were 
sucked into the current of it, and there followed the 
shameful spectacle of a mob of horsemen and mule 
wagons bumping along at top speed away from their 
comrades. Major Paris strove in vain to recall the 
mounted men to their sense and scene of duty. The 
valour of the British gunners and infantry, and 
Methuen’s own skill and superb personal courage, 


L TWEEBOSCH 67 


were unavailing. The camp was overcome, and of 
the British surrenders in the war the last and sad- 
dest had to be recorded. The bright spots in the 
sorry picture were the persistent no-surrender of 
the Northumberland Fusiliers and Loyal North 
Lancashires, and the chivalrous courtesy of De la 
Rey to his wounded opponents. 
Kitchener wrote to Roberts on March 9: 


Our dark days are on us again: first, the convoy from 
Wolmaranstad, and now this disaster to Methuen. It is 
dreadfully sad and will, of course, put off the end of the war. 
We had got De la Rey’s men well down, short of ammunition, 
and very anxious forthe end ofthe war. Nowthey areall up 
again, and we have to begin afresh. . . . I felt a little anxious 
about Methuen’s suggestion that he should march to Lichten- 
burg with Paris’s column, reinforced by mounted men and 
infantry ; but Paris has always done so well, and Methuen 
was quite confident, that I thought it was all right. I ar- 
ranged, however, that Grenfell, with a portion of Kekewich’s 
and Von Donop’s men, should meet him before he reached 
Lichtenburg, and co-operate against any Boers in the 
neighbourhood. 


So serious a set-back might well dispel any near 
prospect of peace. Brodrick rightly warned the 
country that the struggle might be prolonged and 
the last stages of its dreary progress be the most 
difficult. Kitchener had to set his teeth and keep his 
eyes open to the possibility of another cold-weather 
campaign. The British public was, not unreason- 
ably, inclined to regard Tweebosch as a discreditable, 
as well as deplorable, disaster. No one without ac- 
tual experience of veldt fighting was able to realise 
that our enormous numerical superiority could not 
of itself score successes, or even avert defeat, when 


68 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


against it were ranged the countless advantages en- 
joyed by adversaries who knew every hole and cor- - 
ner in the country and would traverse it without bag 
or baggage. 

On March 15 Brodrick wrote: 


It is, I think, inevitable we should take it very seriously. 
An utter rout of two columns in ten days, the loss of mate- 
rial and re-arming and equipment of the Boers, the loss of 
prestige by Methuen’s capture, and the misconduct of the 
mounted troops, seem to us to make it the worst business 
since Colenso. Moreover, it comes at a very bad time, and 
shows what a fine fighting spirit still exists in the remain- 
ing Boers. (15.3.02.) 


He proceeded to impress on Kitchener that the 
public were insistent on the punishment of those 
whose carelessness or incompetence was: responsible 
for these mishaps: ‘‘People here will stand any- 
thing now in the way of men or money, but they will 
not readily overlook carelessness in a small section 
of the force, when you and all your officers and 
ninety-nine out of every hundred men are undergo- 
ing immense exertions.”’ 

But Kitchener, a strict disciplinarian, was not to 
be hurried by popular clamour into acts of possible 
injustice : 


I am much obliged [he writes on April 6] for your letter 
of March 15. I quite agree with you as regards the strict 
punishment of those officers and men who, by their careless- 
ness, or through other causes, do so much harm; and I con- 
sider that this is most necessary for the good of the Army asa 
whole. One of the great faults in British officers is that they 
do not look upon their work sufficiently seriously at all times. 

They are in many cases spasmodic, and do not realise the 


2 CARELESSNESS OF OFFICERS 69 


serious nature of their responsibilities, and if they do so at 
one time they easily forget them. Though this is due to some 
extent to training, it seems to be a national defect, based a 
good deal on over-confidence. In my opinion, strict punish- 
ment is very necessary to impress on officers their very serious 
duties, but at the same time it does no good to act without 
the fullest inquiry, and strictly on legal lines. A hasty 
judgement creates a martyr, and unless Military Law is 
strictly followed, a sense of injustice having been done is the 
result. 

Military Law requires, in my opinion, considerable altera- 
tion to be effective, and to meet cases which have occurred 
during this war... . 


It should be solely for the benefit of the Army 
that examples are made of offenders—not for the 
gratification of a public opinion demanding a scape- 
goat: 


I am having one officer tried for the loss of the convoy, 
and six officers tried for Methuen’s disaster. These trials 
probably will result in other trials, as we get at the truth. 
You may be quite sure I will not let the matter drop, if I 
have anything to go upon. 


CHAPTER LI 


On the day Tweebosch was being fought Kitchener 
was communicating to the Transvaal Government 
correspondence regarding proposals for peace nego- 
tiations. Six weeks earlier Holland had formally 
offered to mediate between the contending parties. 
The Netherlands Minister suggested to Lord Lans- 
downe that the Boer representatives in Holland 
should repair to South Africa, consult with the lead- 
ers, and return with authority in their pockets to de- 
termine the conditions of peace. The British Gov- 
ernment flatly declined any outside intervention, but 
agreed to grant a safe-conduct, if required, to the 
proposed envoys. As, however, these gentlemen 
would have no influence over their compatriots in the 
field, and as the last word would certainly lie with 
Steyn and Schalk Burger, direct communication be- 
tween Kitchener and the Boer authorities seemed the 
more expeditious method. Brodrick anyhow had 
written: 


Our feeling is that any overtures should be made by the 
Boers in the first instance, and decided here after your con- 
sideration and Lord Milner’s. (1.2.02.) 


An incidental difficulty in the way of negotiations 
was that the Boers were as wide apart on the veldt 
as they were in their opinions. 

The Acting President of the Transvaal, Schalk 


Burger, under safe-conduct for himself and his 
70 


CHAP. LI PEACE PROPOSALS (is 


Government to pass the British lines at Balmoral, 
arrived at Kroonstad on March 22 to confer with the 
Free State Government as to drafting peace pro- 
posals—to find, as the British troops had so often 
found, that the Boer leaders were not easy to come 
by. De Wet was running up and down; Steyn was 
with De la Rey in the Western Transvaal; Botha was 
several hundred miles away to the east; Smuts was 
600 miles to the west. But Schalk Burger meant 
business and was willing to wait. 

Kitchener was just then telling his Government 
that everything might turn on laying down a definite 
period for the grant of self-government in the new 
Colonies: 


I believe, if two or three years could be fixed, on the un- 
derstanding that the Boers behave thoroughly well, that it 
would help greatly. If they come to us and say, ‘‘We are 
beaten—be generous,’’ then I think we should treat them 
with consideration. None of them like the idea of being 
handed down to posterity as traitors who gave their country 
away. (30.3.02.) 


But if sympathetic with the policy of reconcilia- 
tion, he was neither supine nor over-sanguine: 


Of course they have not seen De la Rey, whose attitude, 
after his recent successes, would not be conducive to peace. 
I am going all in my power to hit De la Rey hard as soon as 
possible, and hope soon to succeed. 


While, therefore, the Transvaal Government were 
locating the leaders, Kitchener was inquiring for 
them in quite another spirit. The recent disasters 
were the more galling because they threatened to 
disappoint his hopes of peace, just when he was be- 
ginning to feel he had it within his grasp. Dela Rey 


72 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


could not be left triumphant in the Western Trans- 
vaal, and to quell him a big effort was to be made. 
Four picked and powerful columns, making up a force 
of some 14,000 men, were concentrated in the Western 
Transvaal based on Klerksdorp. They were, how- 
ever, badly handicapped for their work, as the only 
blockhouse lines to help them were those which ran 
along the Schoom Spruit, thence to Lichtenburg and 
Mafeking, and along the Vaal. The object was to 
drive the Boers against these lines: the trouble was 
that, for the moment, the British, and not De la Rey, 
were the meat in the sandwich, and the position was 
only adjusted by a sporting dash of 11,000 mounted 
men through the commandos on the night of March 
23. This force—after a forty-mile ride—deployed 
at dawn on an arc of ninety miles. But the darkness 
had produced some disruption of the line, and—be- 
wildered though the Boers were by the scamper of 
British columns through their midst—De la Rey and 
Steyn rode out unnoticed; their companion Lieben- 
berg made a sensational escape a few hours later, 
and three guns and some groups of prisoners were 
the net return of the nocturnal raid. 

Kitchener up to now had directed all movements 
in the Transvaal and the Orange Colony from Pre- 
toria, corresponding directly and daily with his 
column leaders, but for the final fighting he contem- 
plated a change. It so happened that General Cook- 
son, one of Walter Kitchener’s subordinate com- 
manders, was making a reconnaissance in charge of 
a fine foree—on which Kitchener set special store— 
made up of Royal Horse Artillery and Mounted In- 
fantry, Canadian Mounted Infantry, and some picked 
Colonial troops. On March 31 Cookson was sur- 


LI LOCAL UNITY OF COMMAND 73 


prised, and by a concatenation of misadventures 
Headquarters was notified that his party had been 
cut to pieces. The perverse ‘‘news,’’ emanating 
from his brother, dealt Kitchener a heavy blow.* 
For two days the telegraph lines were inoperative, 
but on the morning of the third day a message was to 
hand that Cookson had beaten off his assailants and 
was in touch with his immediate commander. The 
relief was great, but Kitchener made up his mind that 
the situation called for unity of command on the 
spot, and Ian Hamilton was at once despatched to 
Middelburg to take control of the four columns, to 
which was added a fifth under Thorneycroft. The 
Boers, contrary to their usual practice of dispers- 
ing before the storm, concentrated their force of 
3000 somewhere on the line of the Hart’s River. 
Ian Hamilton ordered Kekewich, Walter Kitchener, 
and Rawlinson to sweep the country along the Hart’s 
River; then along the Vaal, and finally to Klerks- 
dorp. The movement began on April 10, and was 
timed to occupy four days, the distance covered to 
average forty miles a day. De la Rey having left 
to take part in Peace negotiations, Kemp took over 
the 2500 Boers who were to make the last stand for 
independence. 

Kekewich, who had reached Roodeval early on 
April 11, pushed on to the Hart’s River. His ad- 
vance guard at once located a large party of mounted 
men on the left front, which, until fire was opened, 
they mistook for a part of Rawlinson’s column. In 


ilan Hamilton wrote of Kitchener that though he was “impassive as 
a rock in appearance, he was really a bundle of sensitive and highly- 
strung nerves kept under control 999 hours out of 1000 by an iron will.” 
Somehow this particular blow at this particular moment hit him below the 
belt. For nearly two days and two nights he scarcely tasted food and 
would speak to no one except to give actual orders. 


74 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER ca. 


reality it was a force of over 1000 Boers under Pot- 
gieter, who drove in our advance guard and then 
made a fine charge across the open. The main body 
of the British at first made the same mistake. ‘‘It 
must be Rawlinson,’’ every one said, for who would 
start to gallop across a mile and a half of coverless 
ground against a force in position? But Boers they 
were, and with such dash did they come on that they 
were within 500 yards of their objective before a hur- 
ried British deployment could be effected. Even 
then our 1500 rifles and six guns only emptied saddles 
without checking the onrush. At 300 yards the line 
itself faltered, but a brave band, bravely led by Pot- 
gieter, still pressed on, and, fighting to a finish, fell 
behind their leader within 70 yards of the British 
bayonets. Kekewich and Rawlinson were quickly in 
pursuit of Kemp, who made good his escape, but left 
in their hands the much-prized guns which Methuen 
had lost at Tweebosch. 

The encounter, albeit only an episode, was per- 
haps the most critical of the war, for a Boer success 
at this moment, however ephemeral, might have spelt 
the indefinite prolongation of a dreary and desolat- 
ing struggle. 

For two years and a half both sides had stood 
up manfully to give and take some pretty hard 
blows, but the direct sequel to Roodeval was the 
final shaking of hands between Boers and Britons, 
as Ian Hamilton’s subsequent westward drive and 
some rather desultory movements in the Colony did 
nothing to harm or hinder the approaching consum- 
mation of peace. 


CHAPTER LILI 


Suc# in brief were some of the activities which for 
seventeen months Kitchener had from his office at 
Pretoria directed in person. From the very nature 
of the campaign it might seem as if our own signal 
successes in the field had been few in number and 
never sensational in character, whereas reverses to 
our arms had been salient features in the operations. 
But the secret of the ultimate British success lay in 
the folds of a steadfast continuity of logical purpose, 
while the ‘‘set-backs’’—frequent, and fraught with 
disappointment and disaster as they may have been 
—were for the most part unavoidable incidents in a 
long and wearing, but coolly calculated, process, from 
which there could be no turning aside, and to which 
there could be but one end. Kitchener’s mode of 
conducting the war was not exempt from unfavour- 
able comment. They were depreciated in some quar- 
ters as comparable rather to the working of a ma- © 
chine than to the action of an organism instinct with 
life—as depending too exclusively on symmetry of 
plan and punctuality of execution, and as relying too 
little on spontaneous dash and individualeunning. It 
was not unusual, while applauding his achievements 
asa great organiser, to find fault with his tendency to 


control everything in person—‘‘Qui trop embrasse 
75 . 


76 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


mal étreint.’’ Granted the ability with which he re- 
placed obsolete methods by an effectively organised 
system, it was objected that everything was abso- 
lutely centralised in himself. Was not his naturally 
imperious and self-reliant temper given too free 
play? While his driving power owed much to an 
iron will, an unflagging industry, an exact memory, a 
faculty of concentration, was not his position as 
absolute head of a great military organisation one of 
exaggerated isolation? The argument was fortified 
by the fact that up to November 1901 no one had 
been appointed to succeed to the part which he him- 
self had played to Lord Roberts’s lead. Yet his 
shrewdest critics have owned that his environment, 
even more than his temperament, was responsible 
for what was the only workable system. 

Self-contained by habit, and perhaps a little 
contemptuous of convention, he was not the ideal 
Staff director. He inclined either to trust a 
man entirely to carry out a special duty with- 
out supervision and interference, or else to do it 
himself. 

Thus, at least in two theatres of operations, ab- 
solute discretion was given to the leaders. In Cape 
Colony French was allowed a perfectly free hand, 
and was enjoined not to ask Pretoria for directions, 
but only for support when required. The same lib- 
erty was accorded to Ian Hamilton, who was tied by 
no instructions when in charge of the final drive 
through the Western Transvaal,’ the only messages 

1 He paid a flying visit to French in February 1902, and wrote to Brod- 
rick: ‘“‘He is quite cheerful about the future of Cape Colony, but no doubt I 
feel with regard to him very much as you do as regards myself—‘With all 
the troops you have, why in Heaven's name can you not finish it more 


quickly?’ The difficulties only really appear stronger when you are dealing 
with the troops on the spot yourself: then one realises.” 


LII KITCHENER’S METHODS 77 


sent him being either congratulatory on his suc- 
cesses, or approbatory of his plans, or mandatory— 
to go full steam ahead. 

Except in one or two special cases the Commander- 
in-Chief’s custom was to see the column commanders 
whenever he could, and give them minute instruc- 
tions. Nor was his paternal interest relaxed when 
they were in the field. Daily they had to cable 
to him direct; and daily he used to send them direct 
wires individually, for in concerted, or rather con- 
verging, movements of columns there was no rec- 
ognised rule under which the senior officer took 
command. 

The habit of intervening in current operations— 
of sending orders, sometimes directly, to a subordi- 
nate officer; the occasional descent upon a troubled 
scene, with as its possible sequel the suppression of a 
local commander—were methods likely to be frowned 
on by the old school. But in the field itself there was 
little protest against them, and there was much to be 
urged on their behalf. In his silent office, linked up 
to every post and garrison in the country, and with 
immediate and intimate knowledge of every turn of 
events, of every possibility and difficulty, the Com- 
mander-in-Chief was perforce a better judge of each 
situation than his lieutenants on the spot, who, ab- 
sorbed in the work assigned to him, would be often 
unaware of conditions which had supervened, and 
out of touch with the general strategy of the hour. 


1 Kitchener’s confidence in the Chief of the Staff who had been accredited 
to him was not confined to work in the field. Ian Hamilton was asked by 
the Government to write and cable home separately in order that the fullest 
light might be thrown on the situation. He, however, feeling it impossible 
to have private communications with the Home Government behind his 
chief’s back, laid before him copies of his cables and also of letters he had 
written to public personages. Kitchener thanked him for his loyalty, but 
refused to look at any of the missives. 


78 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


Strategy, safety, supplies, were all matters so closely 
and so variably affected by the stream of informa- 
tion, which with a thousand springs had its mouth in 
Pretoria, that the true direction could be given from 
nowhere than the central and supreme control. The 
mobility of the Boers had its counterpart in their 
quick-wittedness in gathering the intelligence which 
dictated their mercurial methods. But Kitchener’s 
efforts to improve the machinery for the collection 
and assimilation of his own intelligence had been 
entirely successful, and on that intelligence as sup- 
plied to him by Colonel Henderson ‘ he relied largely, 
and never in vain, for his own devisings. 

His choice of commanders was governed by intui- 
tion and personal observation, rather than by written 
report or reference to the Army List: 


I think it is a good thing to change [commanders] at times 
without having any serious cause for doing so against the 
individuals concerned. I judge principally by results, and 
some commanders, though good in many respects, are not 
quite sufficiently enterprising to catch the wily Boer at this 
particular stage ofthe war. (Kitchener to Roberts, 26.7.01.) 


His instinct for detecting merit was unerring; a 
brief conversation or passing incident would often 
suffice to reveal to him some valuable qualification 
or special adaptability, and he seldom failed to in- 
spire officers on whom his eye lighted with his own 
energy and willingness to accept responsibility. 
When he required an officer for a special purpose he 
was, perhaps unduly, indifferent to the branch of the 
Army from which he drew him, and was thus at 
times not unreasonably accused of robbing Peter to 


1 Later General Sir David Henderson. 


Lu TREATMENT OF OFFICERS 79 


pay Paul. But the active, discreet, and often com- 
paratively young men whom he marked out for 
special employment seldom fell short of his expecta- 
tion. If they knew that distinction was difficult to 
win in a school where service was hard and their 
master’s praise scanty, they knew also that they 
would neither be denied recognition as a reward for 
success, nor be made scapegoats in the event of 
failure. 

His treatment of officers was the reverse of that 
sometimes ascribed to him. Slackness and care- 
lessness and ‘‘letting things slide’’ were anathema 
always, but he was slow to wrath over an error of 
judgement. So far from being a hard taskmaster, 
intolerant of failure, his fault—if any—lay in the 
opposite direction. He himself admitted that he was 
not fiuent in praise, but he was prone to approve, 
and senior officers and his Staff have even been known 
to lament his reluctance to ‘‘tell off’’ an offender, 
and the infrequency with which he did so. 

Moreover, he was always anxious to find and 
record a man’s best side,t and even when failure 
necessitated removal he was at pains to report on 
previous good work or explain that ill-luck had at- 
tended well-meant efforts: 


24.5.01—‘‘ A’’ would be better in some other employ- 
ment; he has lost his nerve. 

“*B”’ is not well, but he is not ill—only tired, and should 
go home for a bit. 

“*C”’ does not appear to have done much. I cannot help 

1 “It would, I think, be a very good thing if a few brevets and distinguished 
service medals could be allowed to be given at once for service rendered of a 
particularly excellent nature. As you know, officers and men are tired, and 


they do not much believe that good services will be remembered. I asked for 
some by wire, but have had no answer.” (Kitchener to Roberts, March ’01.) 


80 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER  caar.io 


thinking he needs a change, and will give it him if I ean 
find some one to replace him. : 
I am worried about ‘‘D.’’ I do not think it will do to 
leave him in command of a column; yet he has made no seri- 
ous error, though I have had to criticise his operations. He 
has not the confidence of officers or men of his column. He 
is very strict about his horses, which is to his credit, but he 
does it as a sergeant-major would, and makes himself unnee- 
essarily disagreeable. But if he were a really successful 
leader in the field, the officers and men would put up with this. 


His prejudice, if any, was against officers whose 
service had been in smooth places—who had always 
been able to lean up against their seniors. 


If you think advisable, pray send ‘‘E’’ out. I personally 
know nothing of him. His reputation does not seem to 
point to his being a great success, but I do not put much 
trust in reputations which have been gained in the street or 
elub, and not in the field. 


CHAPTER LIT 


KitcHENER’s conduct of the campaign involved a 
strenuous working day. He was in his office at 6 
a.M., before which ‘‘operations’’ and many other 
telegrams had been opened and filed for his inspec- 
tion. After a close study of the messages his Staff 
shifted all the little flags on the map which covered 
the whole floor, when Chief and Staff on hands and 
knees would set the positions of 30 or 40 columns on 
the maps. Kitchener then, telegrams in hand, dic- 
tated answers and fresh orders. His immediate 
grasp of situations which were continually shifting 
would surprise even those accustomed to be with 
him. The circumstances of each column were al- 
ways clear in his mind, the names of their com- 
manders fixed in his memory, and his messages were 
admittedly models of brevity and clearness. 

After breakfast the heads of the Supply, Trans- 
port, Railway, and Ordnance Departments filed in, 
and with the detailed points of the night’s cables and 
of the exact position of the columns in his head, the 
‘*Chief’’ issued orders with unfailing accuracy as to 
despatch of stores, reinforcements, or other neces- 
saries to whatever place the columns were destined 
to trek that night. Remounts, Press Censor, Adju- 


tant-General followed in rapid succession, any legal 
Vol, II 81 G 


82 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


details of the latter department being a dry morsel 
for him. A very modest luncheon preceded further 
interviews with officers from the front, civilian offi- 
cials, and occasionally press representatives. 

At 4 o’clock the Commander-in-Chief usually al- 
lowed himself to be taken for a ride, which was sup- 
posed to last an hour, but before he had been twenty 
minutes in the saddle he would fret as to whether 
some message had come through, and on returning 
his foot was scarcely out of the stirrup before the 
intelligence news was demanded. Work went on 
until dinner, after which his own correspondence, 
private and official, had to be dealt with. 

The arrival of a Chief of the Staff enabled Kitch- 
ener to detach himself from his office for visits’ of 
inspection, which greatly benefited both him and his 
men: ‘‘I am sure it is a good thing for me, as well 
as for the troops, that I should personally see them 
as often as possible; and now that I have Ian Hamil- 
ton I can get away without trouble and without stop- 
ping continuity of work’’ (Kitchener to Roberts, 
13.12.01). 

The control of operations in the field was only a 
part of Kitchener’s cares. Administration claimed 
his attention unsparingly. During the early phases 
of the war neglected necessities had to be made good, 
regardless of cost, and calls for economy were cor- 
nered. Kitchener, who always maintained that econ- 
omy should attend on, and not conflict with, efficiency, 
determined on reaching Pretoria that expenditure 
should no longer run riot. His overhauling of local 
contracts, and later of all purchases for his Army, 
was drastic, and brought to light much that was 
unsatisfactory and not a little that was unsavoury. 


LI FINANCIAL ADVISER 83 


He thought it well to vest financial control in one 
individual and secured the services of the Assistant 
Under-Secretary of State at the War Office, Mr. 
Fleetwood Wilson, who arrived in South Africa in 
March 1901. The trained knowledge of the official 
enabled him to move easily among such diversities 
as commandeering and the damages done by the 
troops, the military railway administration in the 
new Colonies, the extravagance of the Ordnance 
Department at Cape Town,! and the charges for pro- 
viding specie; to advise competently as to reforms 
and economies, and to assist in setting up a general 
control of expenditure—a salutary restriction being 
that no large purchases or contracts should be made 
without reference to Headquarters. 

After the Army’s arrival at Bloemfontein the rail- 
way traffic question became acute, and the organisa- 
tion had been entrusted to the then Chief of the 
Staff, to whom the building and direction of railways 
was entirely congenial. The 1310 miles of Boer line 
which he eventually accomplished stand as an effec- 
tive pendant to his creation in the Sudan. 

When he took over command, he did what he 
could to adapt his transport to the tactics of the 
Boers. The first step was to separate the Director- 
ship of Transport from that of Supplies. He then 
attached to all the larger Commands, Deputy Assist- 
ant Adjutant-Generals for transport, with staff offi- 
cers serving with the columns and in the various dis- 
tricts; and twenty-five workshops and repair depots 
were formed at different centres. The formation of 
the Army into a number of columns to meet the new 
enemy tactics involved the allotment to each column 


1 Evidence given before the War Stores Commission. 


84 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


of its fixed allowance of mule wagons with baggage 
and two days’ rations, besides ox wagons to take 
six days’ supplies. Thus the transport with each 
column was a complete unit. The organisation of 
Supply was newly systematised, the whole country 
being divided into twenty-one districts, each with its 
depot, from which the smaller stations received 
their provisions. 


The work had been severe and searching—so 
severe that the workman had now and again felt 
that he might be obliged to hand over his tools. ‘‘I 
am getting quite worn out,’’ he wrote privately, ‘‘but 
I mean to see it through if the authorities think me 
competent.’?’ He was even prepared to admit that 
his own supersession in the High Command might 
be no less beneficial than the subordinate changes 
which he himself thought it necessary to make: ‘‘T 
was much obliged for your kind telegram saying the 
Government still had confidence in me. I must say 
I should not have been surprised if my failure to 
bring this war to an end had induced the Government 
to come to a decision that a change was advisable.”’ * 
But the Government had no mind to look elsewhere— 
not only because they could not lay hand on any one 
more capable, but because they knew well that if 
Kitchener’s mills ground slowly they ground surely, 
and that success, if out of sight, was within his reach. 
His strength and confidence in himself—which never 
really failed him—were well and wisely sustained by 
the unswerving support of Roberts and Brodrick. 
Piqued and disappointed as they sometimes were by 
the reticence which, as they thought, marked his 


1 Kitchener to Brodrick, 8.11.01. 


LOI ROBERTS AND BRODRICK 85 


correspondence, no word even of impatient inquiry 
ever escaped them. As Roberts was his constant 
champion when military critics—not always experts 
—gave tongue,! so Brodrick stood as his- powerful 
advocate on the rare occasions when Parliament ap- 
peared to chafe at delays, or to ignore the peculiar 
and persistent difficulties which attached to a war 
of attrition. Perhaps they alone knew how com- 
plicated and kaleidoscopic was his task; perhaps 
they alone recognised not only what he had achieved, 
but what he had been called upon and competent to 
prevent. 


1“I wish those who say that the war should be over would come out 
and show us how to do it.” (Kitchener to Roberts.) 


CHAPTER LIV 


On April 1 Schalk Burger, who for a week had been 
awaiting the Boer leaders at Kroonstad, received 
a message from Steyn that Klerksdorp would be a 
more convenient place for a conference. To Schalk 
Burger one place was as good as another if only 
peace could be promoted, and at Klerksdorp on 
April 9, in company with Botha and De la Rey, 
who joined him there, he met in conference Steyn, 
De Wet, Bremner, Olivier, and Hertzog—the last 
three being active members of Steyn’s Government. 
Thence they sent a message begging Lord Kitchener 
to meet them in person—time and place to be ap- 
pointed by him—and listen to direct peace proposals 
which they were prepared to submit, and ‘‘to settle 
all questions which may arise at once by direct con- 
versation and parley.’’ 

Kitchener at once invited them to Pretoria, and 
on April 12 at his house the representatives unfolded 
to him their story. Schalk Burger as spokesman 
professed an ardent desire for peace 1 with honour— 
attainable, it was thought, by an equitable treatment 
of six capital points, of which the first was purely 


1On April 11 Kitchener telegraphed: “As far as I can gather, the 
position is as follows—the Transvaalers are for peace, the Free Staters more 
or less against.” 


86 


CHAP. LIV THE SIX POINTS 87 


otiose: (1) All Forts in the Boer States to be dis- 
mantled; (2) the Franchise to be settled; (3) the 
English and the Dutch languages to be employed 
equally in the Schools; (4) a Customs, Postal, Tele- 
graph, and Railway Union to be established; (5) 
future differences to be settled by Arbitration and 
none but subjects of the parties to be arbitrators; 
(6) an Amnesty to be granted reciprocally. 

Steyn, who was evidently a very sick man, has- 
tened to add that, anxiousas all were for peace, they 
were equally set on securing the object for which 
the people had fought. ‘‘Does that mean independ- 
ence?’’ asked Kitchener quickly. Steyn nodded an 
afirmative—‘‘The people must not lose their self- 
respect.’’ Kitchener suavely suggested that men 
who had fought so well could never lose their self- 
respect, and begged his guests to face the real facts 
and bow to the inevitable, promising to advocate the 
grant of self-government in the near future.’ 

Both Presidents, however, stuck to their text— 
that the delegates could not proprio motu sign away 
the people’s independence. Kitchener, rather than 
set an abrupt term to a conversation, consented to 
submit the six points to the Home Government. 
The reply was quite friendly, but quite firm: 


His Majesty’s Government sincerely share the earnest de- 


1He had written home some weeks earlier that the question the Boers 
would surely ask was—‘“How long would it be, supposing they behaved 
loyally, before self-government would be granted to the new Colonies?” 
He was in favour of giving some guarded indication of the terms, as he 
anticipated trouble with the natives in the Transvaal, “who,” he said, 
“for two and a half years have seen white men chased by other white men, 
have suffered considerably, and have got out of hand. The Boers have 
sold them rifies for food, and are now much afraid of them. ... If the 
future self-government is tied up by financial arrangements, I think in two 
or three years we should be quite safe, with a properly arranged franchise, 
to give self-government, and it might relieve us of a good deal of trouble 
to do so.” 


88 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


sire of the Boer representatives, and hope that present nego- 
tiations may lead to that result. But we have already 
stated in clearest terms, and must repeat, that we cannot 
entertain any proposals which are based on the continued 
independence of the former Republics which have been for- 
mally annexed to the British Crown. 


At the second conference on April 14 Kitchener 
introduced Milner to the delegates, and must have 
breathed an inward sigh of relief that the official 
answer was evidently not going to break off nego- 
tiations. The Presidents still persisted that only 
on the basis of independence could they treat; but 
they suggested that the British Government should 
put forward its own alternative proposals, and 
Kitchener again agreed to advise his Government 
to formulate the terms which they would grant if 
independence were waived. 

Two favours were then asked: that one of the 
Boer representatives in Europe might be permitted 
to come back, and that an armistice should be 
granted for the delegates to consult their burghers. 
The first request was refused; nor was there to be 
any suspension of fighting. But Kitchener agreed, 
by way of compromise, to allow and arrange for the 
delegates’ free access to their people for consulta- 
tion, and to grant them the free use of the railway 
and the telegraph. The hands of Milner and Kitch- 
ener were helped by the arrival of Chamberlain’s 
despatch agreeing to accept ‘‘a general surrender 
on the terms of the offer made a year before at the 
Middelburg Conference,’’ and strengthened by the 
news of Kemp’s defeat at Roodeval, lan Hamilton’s 
despatch, with full details of the enemy’s losses com- 


LIV ARMISTICE REFUSED 89 


ing to hand just at the right moment. The conver- 
sations were adjourned to facilitate the assembly 
of a conference of sixty representative burghers— 
thirty from each State—to be elected by the people, 
any commando whose leader should be chosen as a 
delegate to be immune from attack. The arrange- 
ment, without the calling of a military halt, offered 
some of the advantages of an armistice to the Boers 
and a little ‘‘easy’’ to ourselves.” 

Kitchener began to see daylight, and even to 
assign places to the Boer generals at the forthcoming 
Coronation ceremony : 


It is quite exciting [he wrote to Lady Cranborne] to think 
that by the 20th of next month we may have peace. It 
would be such a good thing for all if it came before the Cor- 
onation. How I would like to see Botha, De Wet, and De la 
Rey in the procession; it is quite on the cards, and it would 
do them a lot of good to see the crowds. (20.4.02.) 


On the evening of the 18th the Boer officials left 
Pretoria. Steyn retired to Wolmaranstad, hoping 
to nurse himself for the final assembly; the others 
began the last of their many rides, the weapon in 
their hands being now a ballot-box. Day by day 


1“The lucky thing was that at that very moment [of the Roodeval 
victory] the Boer emissaries were in Pretoria consulting Lord K., who 
has many a time told me that his best persuasive to peace was the laying 
on the table at their Conference, on April 12, of my second wire announcing 
the completeness of our victory in the West. The full despatch, with details 
of the enemy’s losses, came to hand in the very nick of time.’”’ (Letter from 
Ian Hamilton.) 

2“I hope you will agree,” Kitchener wrote to Roberts, “that I was 
right to resist an armistice, and at the same time to give them facilities for 
the meetings they require. I shall keep a close watch on these meetings, 
and any that are hostile shall have it sharp. A little rest for our men and 
horses will be a great advantage to us, and give us a really good fresh start 
if we have to go at it again. I do not mean I am giving up operations— 
only going a bit slow, and not annoying those that vote solid for peace.” 
(20.4.02.) 


90 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


for three weeks the voting for the delegates pro- 
ceeded, but when the elected of the people repaired 
to the tryst with the Government at Vereeniging, 
they carried with them mandates so varying in colour 
and character that the Conference seemed more 
likely to rise in storm than to close with peace. 

In truth, Briton and Boer yearned alike for peace, 
but between them there still yawned the gulf of the 
independence question. The last year of toil and 
struggle had done nothing to relax England’s stern 
resolve, and the patriots were faced with the bitter 
alternative—either to yield the very object for which 
they had striven and suffered, or to fight on against 
an imperturbable and apparently inexhaustible 
enemy, with the assured prospect, after a prolonga- 
tion of the agony, of ultimate defeat. 

Kitchener knew that there was one stubborn 
opponent with whom he had to reckon. Steyn was 
adamant to argument, entreaty, or threat: 


I only fear that Steyn, in his ponderous way, will make a 
patriotic speech at the meeting and turn them round. He is 
a head and shoulders above the others, and has great influ- 
ence, owing to his better education and ability. 

On the whole, I think things look well. There is very little 
doubt that the Transvaal will vote solid for peace. De la 
Rey was the only doubtful one, and before he went away he 
said he would go with the majority of the Transvaalers. The 
Free Staters are doubtful, but they cannot go on alone, and 
we have so chaffed the Transvaal that they are being led by 
the nose by the smaller State that I really think they will 
stick it out this time. (Kitchener to Brodrick, 20.4.02.) 


A year ago the Free Staters were bellicose to a 
man, and the Transvaal had followed their lead— 
though only half-heartedly and hoping to get better 


LIV BOER DIFFERENCES 91 


terms. Now Botha and the Transvaal Government 
were ‘‘solid for peace,’’ but they could not sign 
away independence without the endorsement of their 
constituents. The two States, largely under the 
influence of their leaders, regarded the crisis from 
different points of view. Steyn, with an exalted 
sense of his duty to his people, was prepared for 
its sake to sacrifice himself and everything else. 
Kitchener bore handsome witness to his pluck: 


Steyn’s eyes are bad and he is generally ill. He asked to 
see a Dutch doctor friend in whom he had confidence. As 
the doctor was very anxious, for his own purposes, to get the 
war over, I allowed this, and after examining Steyn he told 
him that unless he immediately took rest he would die in 
three weeks. Steyn said, ‘‘I know it, but I must give my 
life for the people.’’ Another doctor was called in, and he 
gave a similar opinion; but Steyn insisted on going out 
again. (Kitchener to Brodrick, 20.4.02.) 


His uncompromising spirit had been contagious, 
inflaming not only De Wet and his burghers under 
arms, but also the long-suffering women, who vehe- 
mently encouraged their menfolk to hold out. 

Very different was the prevailing tone of the 
Transvaalers. After Kruger’s hasty departure the 
Transvaal was governed by moderate and practical 
politicians of the stamp of Botha, Schalk Burger, 
and Smuts, who had never been wholly wedded to 
the war policy: they would fight on so long as there 
was any real chance of success, but were indisposed 
to sacrifice their people’s substantial interests on 
the altar of sentiment, however lofty. The Trans- 
vaalers cherished no illusions. While their cause 
and that of the Free State were substantially the 
same, the consequences in the two cases of defeat 


92 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


had little in common. The Free State had far less 
at stake in the future, and was taking far fewer 
risks. She could, of course, lose—and did lose 
largely in men and money—but was sure in time to 
recover her former prosperity. 

The Transvaalers, on the other hand, had no 
mind to play the under-dog in their own territory 
—a disagreeable contingency no longer improbable. 
They had entered on the war to assert the right 
of one half of the population to absolute political 
control over the other half. The continuance of 
hostilities, however, bade fair in practice to bring 
about just the opposite. With the re-opening of 
the mines during the war a stream of Uitlanders had 
set in, and many more were on their way, This 
element was now rapidly becoming predominant, 
being reinforced both by Boers who had surrendered 
in the early days of the war, and by those who had 
openly sided with the British. The prudent patriot 
might well presage that with every week of war 
he would be placed at a further disadvantage with 
the British. 

On the British side the differences between 
Kitchener and Milner, though hardly less marked, 
lay in the respective angles from which they 
regarded the rédos of the war. There was no dis- 
agreement as to the method of conducting it, but 
by a curious change of their parts the Statesman 
was inclined towards stern measures, while the 
Soldier stood firm for reconciliation. Milner was 
insistent that British sovereignty in the newly- 
annexed Colonies must be the bedrock of the British 
terms. The Boers must be under no illusion as to 
who had won the war. We must not shelve the 


LIV BRITISH DIFFERENCES 93 


responsibilities we had incurred towards those Boers 
who had attached themselves to us; their services 
must be duly rewarded. As for the minority who 
elung to their tattered banners of defiance, well— 
Vae victis! 

Milner held—and was strongly backed in his 
opinion—that military conquest must precede peace 
negotiations. By the proclamation of April 1901 
the Boer leaders were outlaws; yet two of them, 
Schalk Burger and Steyn, were permitted to become 
delegates in the negotiations. This tacit amnesty 
was enlarged to cover all the members of both Boer 
Governments—amongst them Botha, De la Rey, 
De Wet, and Hertzog, outlawed alike in their civil 
and military capacities! 'The concessions made on 
both these points were distasteful to Milner, who 
objected to the Boer contracting parties being the 
leaders fresh from the field. He thought an easy 
attitude was uncalled-for and impolitic. The Boer 
forces were greatly reduced and daily diminishing; 
they were faced with a desperate shortage of food 
and of munitions of war. Our Army was at the 
zenith of its strength, and our pitiless blockhouse 
system had been perfected; and this just as the 
winter dreaded by the Boers was recurring. Surely, 
with its aid, the end must be at hand. In a word. 
Milner thought that our accounts with friend and 
foe must be strictly balanced, and that our bill for 
damages should be discharged to the last shilling. 

Kitchener, looking far ahead, believed that a 
peace based on the sheer exhaustion of our opponents 
might for ever preclude any real reconciliation,’ 

1 “Baird, who talks Dutch (though they do not know this), Marker, 


my aide-de-camp, and Leggett are in constant attendance. The young 
Boers, of whom there are a considerable number as aides-de-camp, etc., talk 


94 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER czar. rv 


and exclude any amicable incorporation of the Boer 
nation in the British Empire. We had won a long- 
contested struggle and it would become us to behave 
handsomely. A year earlier he had said: 


It will be good policy for the future of this country to 
treat them fairly well, and I hope I may be allowed to do 
away with anything humiliating to them in the surrender, 
if it comes off. 


And he maintained his opinion to the end: 


My views were that, once the Boers gave up their in- 
dependence and laid down their arms, the main object of 
the Government was attained, and that the future civil 
administration would soon heal old sores and bring the 
people together again. 
rather openly. They say that if no terms are made and they are forced 
to unconditional surrender they will hold themselves absolutely free to 
begin again when they get a chance and see England in any difficulty. On 


the contrary, if terms are arranged and independence is officially given up 
they will be unable to do so and will join us loyally.’ (Letter to Mr. Ralli.) 


CHAPTER LV 


Tue Cabinet, not unreasonably, declined to fix a 
date for the introduction of self-government, but, 
as Brodrick wrote on April 18, was disposed to be 
conciliatory as to the other two crucial points raised 
by the Boers. Indeed, the generous amnesty and 
liberal money grants for the re-settlement of the 
country might well have huffed some over-susceptible 
loyalists. The fateful meeting of the two Boer 
Governments and the sixty delegates took place 
on May 15 at Vereeniging, on the border of the two 
States. Relying on Kitchener’s promise that com- 
mandos which had sent their leaders to the Confer- 
ence should be immune from attack, the burghers had 
shrewdly elected as their representatives all their 
principal commanders. Steyn put in an appearance 
at the meeting, but, though his courage was as high 
and his brain as clear as ever, he was too weak and 
ill to take any active part in the proceedings. 

At the outset it seemed as if De Wet had succeeded 
in blighting the prospects of peace, for the Free 
State representatives and some of the Northern and 
Western Transvaalers had received an explicit order 
to stand fast by their independence. Schalk Burger 
led off the debate, and was at pains to save time 
and breath by reminding the Conference that the 

95 


96 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


British Government would decline to listen to any 
terms which in the slightest degree implied Boer 
independence. This did him the more credit, as he 
must have recognised that he might have to choose 
between the tragedy of a renewed struggle and the 
odium of a separate surrender. After the reading 
of a rather musty letter from the delegates in 
Europe, Botha rose and shrewdly cut at the root 
of the war party’s case by raising the nice legal ques- 
tion whether the delegates were absolutely tied by 
their mandates, thus throwing on the Free Staters 
the responsibility of forcing the Transvaalers to 
make peace without them. Hertzog, as a judge, 
declared that in law a delegate’s hands could not 
be tied—that as a plenipotentiary he must have 
an unfettered discretionary right to follow his own 
judgement. Smuts agreed with his learned friend, 
and the solid opinion of the two lawyers made a big 
dent in the irreconcilables’ armour. 

Botha at once followed up his advantage by 
drawing a gloomy picture of the condition of the 
Transvaal, where, although some districts could still 
hold out for a few weeks longer, others were already 
about to touch starvation point. 

Of the 11,000 Transvaal burghers in the field 
nearly 3000 had lost their horses, and their fighting 
strength had in the last twelve months been reduced 
by something like 40 per cent. The condition of 
the women—now no longer under British protection 
—was pitiable, and the attitude of the natives 
threatening. The whole situation cried aloud for 
immediate peace. Smuts, for his part, was fain to 
say that he definitely despaired of any success in 
Cape Colony. De Wet spoke tersely but fiercely, 


LV BOTHA’S ARGUMENTS 97 


and declared that fighting was as practicable—and 
therefore as incumbent upon good Free Staters—as 
it had been a year earlier. 

‘The now rather bewildered delegates, swayed 
hither and thither by the alternate arguments, were 
sorely tried in their endeavours to represent con- 
scientiously the views of their respective bodies of 
constituents. For the rest of the day and through- 
out the next the debate oscillated, one interesting 
fact emerging incidentally—the effectiveness of the 
blockhouse line in hindering inter-communication be- 
tween the commandos. It was not until the close of 
the second day that Kemp’s and De Wet’s invective 
was effectively countered by Schalk Burger, and the 
scale turned by Botha and De la Rey. Expanding 
his old, and expounding some new, arguments, Botha 
dwelt on the overmastering menace of the block- 
houses, the critical stage of the food trouble, the 
extreme shortage of horses, the enhanced sufferings 
of the women. The hope of intervention from 
abroad was as dead as that of internal trouble in 
Cape Colony, and British determination was as 
palpable as Boer discontent. De la Rey, whom 
De Wet with cool effrontery claimed on his side, 
was no less sagacious in counsel than he had been 
chivalrous in the field. He knew that with a word 
he could induce his followers to fight to a finish, 
but he was too shrewd—and too humane—to utter 
it. He personally could fight on—such was his 
contribution to the debate—but the Boer peoples 
could not. Let them beware lest, if the offer now 
made were refused, a far worse thing should befall 
them. 


De Wet bitterly taunted the Transvaalers with 
VOL. II H 


98 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


abandoning a struggle which they had started and 
in which they had involved their friends of the 
Free State. With his fanatic ery of ‘‘This is a war 
of religion’’ the second day’s session broke up. 

On the 17th Smuts and Hertzog presented a draft 
proposal on four points: 

(1) Relations with Foreign Powers to be ended; 

(2) A British Protectorate to be established; 

(3) Swaziland, Witwatersrand, and other terri- 

tory to be ceded to the British; 

(4) A Defensive Alliance to be concluded with 

Great Britain. 

The draft was approved by the delegates, and a 
Commission, composed of Botha, De la Rey, and 
De Wet, together with Smuts and Hertzog, was 
deputed to negotiate at Pretoria with plenary powers 
to act as seemed best on the spot. On May 19 
the Commission submitted to Kitchener and Milner 
these fresh suggestions, which Smuts and Hertzog 
endeavoured with ingenious casuistry to represent 
as not substantially differing from the British terms. 
Milner pulled them up short with a stern demand 
for a straight ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ to the British pro- 
posals, which Smuts wished to consider as only a 
basis for negotiation. This drew from Kitchener 
the barbed remark that, supposing the new Boer 
proposals were granted, they would be at one an- 
other’s throats before a year was out. At this hectic 
moment luncheon intervened and afforded an hour 
for reflection. Before the afternoon conference 
Smuts had an informal talk with the two Englishmen, 
from which issued Milner’s suggestion that a form of 
document should be submitted to the burghers for 
a definite decision. De Wet as a matter of course 


Lv PEACE TERMS DRAFTED 99 


was open-mouthed in protest, and a deadlock again 
threatered. It then occurred to Kitchener that 
fatal friction might be avoided if the military ele- 
ment were eliminated from the discussion and the 
settlement entrusted to a purely civil sub-committee. 
The suggestion was adopted, and the lawyers set to 
work—Milner, with Solomon at his elbow, was to 
confer with Smuts and Hertzog as to drafting an 
acceptable formula approximately on the lines laid 
down by Botha. 

For two long days Milner and his legal adviser 
matched their wits against the Boer lawyers. A 
concession was made to Boer sentiment; the new 
draft provided, not for a declaration of submission, 
but for a joint treaty, and the Boer signatories were 
described as acting on behalf of the Republics. To 
that extent in the preamble the fact of annexation 
was ignored; but this was more than compensated 
for by the opening clause, which promised that 
“‘the burgher forces in the field will forthwith lay 
down their arms, handing over all guns, rifles, and 
munitions of war in their possession or under their 
control, and desist from any further resistance to the 
authority of His Majesty King Edward VII., whom 
they recognise as their lawful Sovereign.’’ The fact 
of annexation was here fully recognised, and in the 
second clause the late Republics were simply de- 
scribed as the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies. 

Except in minor details, there were only two points 
in which the new draft differed from the Middelburg 
terms. The first related to the treatment of the 
Natal and Cape Colony rebels. The Boers could 
have no desire to interfere between the British Gov- 
ernment and its rebellious subjects, and it was now 


100 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


settled that the Colonial Governments concerned 
should deal with the matter. 

The second was a more complicated question, and 
related to the payment of the debts, receipts, and 
war losses of the late Republics. Kitchener, deter- 
mined that anyhow the chances of reconciliation 
should not be vitiated by any haggling over a petty 
question of cash, telegraphed on May 21: 


We have been through deepest waters to-day on a point 
about which I do not quite agree with the position Milner 
took up. Article XI., as arranged by Milner, stated that a 
million would be given for notes issued by the Transvaal 
during the war; the Free State issued none, and only gave 
receipts, and was not considered at all when the Middelburg 
million was settled. All the Commission have expressed 
themselves most strongly, and said that they would not 
recommend peace unless we redeem the receipts as well as 
notes. They consider that, had they raised a loan, they 
could have paid everything in cash, and we should be re- 
sponsible ;—that their not having done so does not relieve us 
of the moral responsibility of paying just debts after full 
investigation before a judicial Commission. They argue 
that we have taken everything, and therefore left them abso- 
lutely no means to redeem receipts which they as officers 
gave by the authority of their Government, and feel this 
very deeply as a slur on their honour. If they had 
anything left they would not ask, but we having taken all, 
the debts they guaranteed become worthless unless we keep 
them, and they cannot go back to their people unless this 
point is conceded. 

Milner argues that we are not called upon to pay the ex- 
penses of the war waged against us, and that they had 
brought this on themselves by losing, and that he could not 
agree to any modification. I tried to get a limit fixed to 
cover all notes and receipts, and eventually they said three 


LV POLICY OF RECONCILIATION 101 


millions would be sufficient ; and, if it was not, they agreed 
to a pro rata reduction. All other points suggested by Mil- 
ner were agreed to, and the Commission’s modification to 
Article XI. was introduced into the document which is being 
sent you. I told them that the extra two millions would be 
probably deducted from the sum to be allowed to re-establish 
farms, but they did not mind this argument at all, and only 
wished receipts paid. I judge it is vital to peace to grant 
this as it stands. Botha, De la Rey, and De Wet all practi- 
cally said they would not otherwise make peace, and this was 
written down by their secretaries, and will be known, of 
course, by all the irreconcilables. If the document is ap- 
proved by Government as it stands, I think we have every 
chance of peace quickly. 


CHAPTER LVI 


Tue Conference met again on May 28, and the final 
decision of the British Government was communi- 
cated to the Boer delegates. The draft treaty was 
practically unaltered, except as regards the financial 
clause, and the insertion of a proviso that persons 
who had been guilty of acts contrary to the usages of 
warfare should be tried by court-martial. 

The financial clause—to Milner’s satisfaction— 
was relieved of ‘‘compensation,’’ and the three mil- 
lions were now to be described as a ‘‘free gift’’ to be 
spent by local committees in each district on bringing 
the Boers back to their homesteads, and on the relief 
of persons who had been reduced to poverty by war 
losses—this to include National Scouts who had sided 
with the British. Milner impressed on the delegates 
that this document was absolutely final. It had to 
be submitted to the Convention just as it stood for a 
direct reply yea or nay. A definite period of three 
days was allowed for a definite answer to be given— 
this to expire on the evening of May 31. 

Steyn received the Commission in his tent and, 
before resigning his office of President of the Free 
State, shot his last bolt in a fierce denunciation of the 
treaty. The Report of the Commission was then 
read out to the Convention with the text of the draft 
treaty. A stream of questions followed the reading, 


and for two days the discussion dragged on. Kemp 
102 


CHAP. LVI THE BOER SUBMISSION 103 


and Muller still held out, but their cooler brethren 
thought the terms too tempting to be sniffed at, and 
the Free Staters, turning their backs on De Wet, lent 
a willing ear to the new conditions. On the morning 
of the 31st Kitchener telegraphed, ‘‘Reports from 
Vereeniging state that a majority for peace is al- 
most certain.”’ 

Yet at that very minute a new cleavage had ap- 
peared between the two States. For a moment it 
looked as if ‘‘ Pull devil, pull baker,’’ would again be 
the order of the day, the deputy for part of Bloem- 
fontein—one Nieuhardt—moving the rejection of the 
British terms, while Piet Viljoen urged their accept- 
ance. But at this tense moment the totally unex- 
pected occurred. De Wet, who in the early morning 
had been strenuously talked to, and successfully 
talked over, by Botha and De la Rey, startled every- 
body by suddenly pronouncing for peace. His con- 
version was as complete as it was rapid, and at a hur- 
riedly convened meeting in his own tent he hustled all 
but half-a-dozen ‘‘last-ditchers’’ into voting with the 
peace majority. The motion was carried at 5.30 p.m. 
by 54 votes to 6, and Schalk Burger sounded a note 
of dignity at the obsequies of Boer independence: 


We are standing here at the grave of the two Republics. 
Much yet remains to be done, although we shall not be able 
to do it in the official capacities which we have formerly oc- 
cupied. Let us not draw our hands back from the work 
which it is our duty to accomplish. Let us ask God to guide 
us, and to show us how we shall be enabled to keep our na- 
tion together. We must be ready to forget and to forgive 
whenever we meet our brethren. That part of our nation 
which has proved unfaithful we must not reject. 


The commissioners hurried with their priceless 


104 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


message of peace to Pretoria, and that night Kitch- 
ener telegraphed: 


The document containing terms of peace was signed here 
this evening at 10.30 p.m. by all Boer representatives as well 
as by Milner and myself. 


Brodrick added to the official message of thanks 
some welcome words of his own: 


You will have received the telegram expressing the thanks 
of His Majesty’s Government to Lord Milner and you, but I 
hope I may express the high sense which we entertain of 
your services throughout the negotiations. The last eight- 
een months have brought me much emphatic testimony 
about the confidence with which the Army in South Africa 
regards you as its Chief, and I am sure you will be glad to 
hear that the terms of surrender, in framing which you have 
had such a large share, appear thoroughly acceptable to the 
Public here. JI must also thank you personally for your 
frank correspondence, and unvarying helpfulness in all our 
difficulties. (2.6.02.) 


I am very grateful for all the rewards that have been 
showered upon me [Kitchener replied], but really what one 
feels is the sense of relief and security that no more regret- 
table incidents will occur. It was the fear of what might 
happen any minute that made life so unendurable. Thank 
God, that is all over now, and the end, I am glad to say, is 
equally well received on both sides. (8.6.02.) 


‘‘We are good friends now,’’ said the British 
General to Botha, with a sigh of satisfaction that the 
very weary warfare was accomplished: he was think- 
ing perhaps how little had been required for a recon- 
ciliation fourteen months ago, and how little had been 
gained by either side in the interval. Yet it was 
something to the good that the burghers had come— 


LVI PEACE SIGNED 105 


however reluctantly—to know, and above all to trust, 
the man who, twelve years later, was to rouse them 
again to battle and range them in line with the great 
armies he himself would call into being. 

At no time had Kitchener any idea of approaching 
the Boers with a corn-bin in one hand and a halter 
in the other. His main policy had been constructive 
rather than punitive. He set himself to master in 
fair fight, so that he might afterwards bring within 
the liens of a common interest ripening into a 
common loyalty a whole nation of fiery and faithful 
patriots. Most certainly he never entertained the 
theory—characteristically laid down just then by the 
German Staff—that the total intellectual and mate- 
rial resources of an enemy State must be destroyed. 
He felt rather that for the Boer Republics the prob- 
able alternative to union with England was vassal- 
dom to Germany, and was honestly convinced that 
a British-Boer union was possible, would redound to 
the benefit of both Boer and Briton, and would go 
far to settle the ‘‘Black’’ question. But if political 
independence was to be taken from the Boers with 
one hand, it was to be restored to them in a new and 
more secure form with the other. The change of 
status from a Republic to a British Dominion would 
leave democratic freedom untouched and with Brit- 
ish insurance added. 

‘*The trial of strength,’’ Sir Bartle Frere had once 
told Lord Carnarvon, ‘‘will surely be forced upon 
you, and no good will be gained by postponement of 
it, if only we start with a good cause.’’ The cause 
for which Kitchener had worked till physical energy 
was almost exhausted, and nerves strained almost to 


1 During the Zulu War, 1879, 


106 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


snapping point, was neither that of the Kimberley 
diamond dealer nor that of the Uitlander on the 
Rand. He looked, and laboured, for a South Africa 
pacificata, a South Africa amica, who would harness 
all her energy to England’s efforts in the years when 
that effort would surely be made. He knew that 
unconditional surrender and a dictated peace could 
produce no true amity. He said at Johannesburg: 


There may be individuals amongst our former opponents 
whose characteristics and methods we do not like or approve 
of; but, judged as a whole, they are, I maintain, a virile 
race and an asset of first-rate importance to the British 
Empire, for whose honour and glory they may I hope before 
long be fighting side by side with us. 


Having fought and won, he sought to bring about 
a generous peace on the basis of mutual agreement, 
the only peace which he believed would serve to form 
an indissoluble bond. 

History may be trusted to assign their due to each 
of the triumvirate responsible for our conduct in 
South Africa during those three fateful years which 
opened at Bloemfontein in May 1899 and closed at 
Pretoria in May 1902. More particularly will mil- 
tary history draw the right distinction between the 
responsibility of command which Kitchener had to 
face and that which had confronted Roberts. It 
seems ungracious to insist, but it is irrefutably true, 
that the optimistic utterances of the latter before 
embarking for home tended to obscure the real situa- 
tion from the country, and that, all unwittingly, the 
great soldier cheapened his own legacy to his suc- 
cessor. Roberts arrived in England to receive an 
ovation which was abundantly deserved, but also to 
foster hopes which were unfortunately premature. 


LyI FUSING BRITON AND BOER 107 


As early as October 1900 Rhodes had told the 
South African League that military complexities 
could be disregarded and attention concentrated on 
the best method of fusing Briton and Boer under our 
flag. Buller, who still had an immense public follow- 
ing, on his return in November assured us that the 
Boers no longer had any commander of distinction in 
the field, and that our troops need only hunt down 
a few desperadoes. To these dicta Roberts’s pro- 
nouncement a month later in Natal unhappily set his 
seal. Public opinion was for a time sadly at fault in 
South Africa as well as at home, although it is certain 
that to Milner and Kitchener the new—and true— 
conditions were painfully evident. Kitchener’s load 
was at least as heavy as that which had been laid on . 
his predecessor. Roberts had gone to South Africa 
the idol of the people, the chosen of the Government, 
the great leader of men who would surely wipe out 
the national discredit of previous failure and regild 
the rather tarnished prestige of our arms. He was 
to fight battles on the great scale and win spectacular 
successes with masses of men. Kitchener stepped in 
when operations in the field could arouse but scant 
enthusiasm—all the fizz and fun of fighting had evap- 
orated. No room existed for striking achievements; 
there were to be no more Paardebergs or Mafekings. 
It only remained to round up a few commandos and 
wind up a languishing campaign—a duty which 
Kitchener was expected to carry out, more suo, 
promptly and cheaply. During the next year and a 
half feeling at home underwent many disappoint- 
ments; and although confidence in the Commander- 
in-Chief was never impaired, the process of disillu- 
sion as to the war was painful, and the drafts on the 


108 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER caape. tv 


public patience were considerable and constant. But 
there was also a faction—numerically very weak but 
vocally very strong—which, bent on misrepresenting 
Kitchener’s actions, construed his measures, born of 
sheer necessity, into methods of barbarism. 

There had always been people who honestly be- 
lieved that the Boers were in the right; there were 
political partisans who hated Chamberlain; there 
were the Irish Nationalists who hated England; there 
was the type of person known in long after years as 
Pacifist ; and behind all these there may quite conceiv- 
ably have been an active foreign-fed anti-British 
propaganda. This combination was able to invoke 
and exploit the characteristically British sentiment 
of humanity, holding Kitchener up to odium for the 
steps which he was forced to take towards finality. 
Englishmen naturally abhorred the idea of burning 
homesteads, of cattle-driving, of destroying crops— 
however well-proven it might be that the Boer farms 
were at once supply-stores and armouries. Both in 
Parliament and in the Press the man responsible was 
denounced as cruel and callous—not only for what he 
had done, but for what he was erroneously, and some- 
times malignantly, alleged to have done. 

Here, as always, his admirers, who were many, 
were his devoted champions; his critics, who were 
few, detracted little from his fame, nothing from his 
character. That character stood undimmed by any 
attempt to cast_a slur on it, but the quick sympathy 
which was in truth one of its chief ingredients was 
necessarily mated to an unsuspected sensitiveness, 
and wounds, though unheeded, were never unfelt. 


CHAPTER LVII 


KitcHENER arrived in Cape Town on June 23, and 
sailed for home on the Orotava the same day. The 
South African capital gave him a warm welcome, and 
at a farewell luncheon he put in a strong plea: ‘‘ Now 
that peace has come I ask you to put aside all racial 
feelings, and all Leagues and Bonds, and strive for 
the welfare of your common Colony.’’ The whole- 
some advice was taken, and exactly a month later in 
the same city, and almost in the same words, Louis 
Botha was emphasising the necessity of Dutch and 
English working hand in hand. Kitchener’s last 
words in South Africa were a tribute to Milner: 


We all have confidence in Lord Milner. For nearly three 
years I have worked in close connection with him, and I may 
say that our old friendship, which existed prior to my going 
to South Africa, has only been strengthened and increased 
by the time of stress through which we have passed together. 


The day after the Orotava had sailed, King Ed- 
ward underwent a serious operation. The Corona- 
tion, which had been fixed for that week, was of ne- 
cessity postponed, and Kitchener, who arrived in 
London on July 12, found himself summoned to the 
King’s sick-room to receive the Order of Merit, of 
which he was one of the original twelve members. 


The holding up of the festivities had produced an 
109 


110 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


air of gloom and anxious expectancy in London; but 
the holiday crowds, now assured that the King’s re- 
covery was only a matter of time, made Kitchener a 
popular hero. He was accorded the same honours as 
had been given to Lord Roberts, the Heir Apparent 
meeting him on his arrival, and as representing the 
Sovereign entertaining him at luncheon at St. 
James’s Palace. The whole route from Paddington 
to the Palace was lined by British and Colonial 
troops, and by representatives of the Indian Army 
among whom his duties were soon to lie; and the 
streets were packed by people, anxious to give a 
cheer to the man who was now recognised as the 
foremost soldier of the day. And at the Coronation 
a month later it was his figure, next to that of the 
King himself, which was most eagerly sought by the 
mass of onlookers on that sultry 9th of August. 

South Africa had not driven Egypt far back in 
Kitchener’s mind. Among the inevitable crowd of 
addresses and public congratulations which greeted 
him, one of the first was that from the Borough of 
Paddington. It happened that the Mayor of the bor- 
ough for that year was Sir John Aird, whose firm 
had constructed the Nile barrage at Assuan, and 
Kitchener’s first question as he stepped on to the 
platform was, ‘‘How’s the dam?”’ 

And a few weeks later, when presented with the 
freedom of the Grocers’ Company and a gift of cups, 
he ‘‘thought that he would leave the speech-making’”’ 
to his fellow-guest Mr. Chamberlain, but thanked his 
hosts for their continued interest in Gordon College, 
and assured them that the cups would be ‘‘useful 
in India.”’ 

There was no chance of escape from the ritual of 


LVII ARRIVAL IN LONDON 111 


public dinners with the ensuing sacrifice of the emi- 
nent guest, the most cherished of all our institutions ; 
but the patience of audiences was not tried by long 
speeches. The Times reported him verbatim and 
in the first person—the final journalistic admission 
of greatness—but an industrious computation shows 
that the whole of his public remarks during three 
months in England occupy less space in that journal 
than one speech by Lord Rosebery or Mr. Asquith. 

But he spoke from his heart at Welshpool on 
September 7, when he urged on the old soldiers who 
had fought with him in South Africa ‘‘the great 
importance of not forgetting what you have learnt, 
and how greatly a man, whatever his spirit and 
pluck, is handicapped by want of training in a fight. 
You will therefore realise with me how essential it is 
that the young men of the country should join the 
military forces and become trained by those who 
have reaped experience during this war, so that 
they may in their turn be ready, if the necessity 
should arise, to take their places as trained men 
in the ranks. You must not forget that we shall 
not always have, nor do we wish to have, a war 
that lasts long enough to train our men during the 
campaign.’’ 

He spent his short vacation in a round of country- 
house visits. Powis, Hatfield, Welbeck, Wynyard, 
Knowsley, Whittingehame—Mr. Balfour had just 
become Prime Minister—alternated with a shooting 
trip to County Donegal, and—what appealed to him 
most—a visit to his maternal home at Aspall. 

In these brief weeks of recreation the soldier was 
learning with his usual painstaking some of those 
lessons of the social life from which his busy career 


112 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


abroad had shut him out. He was by no means 
insensible to its attractions; nor was he one of those 
uncomfortable guests whom hostesses know too well, 
who insist on bringing their own preoccupations 
with them into every house they visit, and who give 
the impression that the world would stop were they 
to cease their appointed and burdensome round of 
business. Kitchener’s brain might be working all 
the time at the military problems of the future, but 
he gave no indication of it to his fellow-guests; when 
there was nothing to do, he made no pretence of 
doing it. He neither loafed nor seemed preoccupied. 

But the impressions made on him at this time 
were permanent. The peaceful charm of English 
country life and, what is not quite the same thing, 
of country-house life, appealed to him strongly; and 
when he left for the Kast that autumn he had already 
made up his mind that on his return he would buy 
a place of his own. 

For the rest, apart from his visit to Chatham— 
‘‘which every Sapper must regard as the home of 
his youth’’—and Liverpool, where he was imperative 
as to the need of finding employment for discharged 
soldiers, he spoke as little as possible; and at Wel- 
beck, where he was asked ‘‘to say a few words about 
agriculture’’ before the local Agricultural Society, 
he frankly excused himself on the ground that ‘‘they 
knew a great deal more about that than he did.’’ 

His last public appearance on this visit was at 
Liverpool on October 11. His appointment to the 
office of Commander-in-Chief in India had been pub- 
lished for some weeks, but there were no indications 
of an immediate departure, and no announcements 
in the newspapers of the arrangements for that 


LvII TO KHARTUM AND INDIA 113 


rather pompous leave-taking traditionally associated 
with those appointed to high military or adminis- 
trative command overseas. 

The reality was widely different. On the morning 
of Friday, October 17, twenty minutes before the 
boat train left Victoria, the railway officials were 
notified that a compartment which had been booked 
in the name of Mr. Cook would be occupied by Lord 
Kitchener. Shortly before the hour of departure, 
he appeared at the station, accompanied only by 
two personal friends; there was no retinue of offi- 
cials and attendants—not even a man-servant—and 
neither the passengers at Victoria nor the other 
travellers on the train were aware that this quiet 
farewell, less ostentatious than that often associated 
with a family trip to the Riviera or Switzerland, 
marked the beginning of the new period of military 
reform in India. 

The newspapers, baulked of their legitimate prey, 
remarked that in Paris two days later Kitchener 
went to Chantilly races and the theatre, but refused 
to grant the French correspondents an interview; 
on October 27, after spending a night in Rome, he 
landed in Egypt. The next few days were given to 
an inspection of the Assuan dam, which was traversed 
in trollies, and a visit to the Sudan, where he opened 
the Gordon College at Khartum on November 8. 

Here indeed, on a subject that lay so near his 
heart, he spoke at more length than he had ever done 
in those formal and perhaps rather irksome replies 
to congratulations in England. He once again em- 
phasised the need of education in the Sudan, and 
expressed himself fully satisfied with the founda- 
tions that had been laid; he remarked that he ‘‘could 

VOL. II I 


114 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER  cmar.1vn 


not expect quicker progress—but was content to 
wait patiently for the future.’’ Ten years later he 
had the opportunity of seeing how far his hopes had 
been justified. 

A week later, after the inevitable banquet and 
garden-party at Cairo, he sailed for India. On the 
voyage he employed himself usefully in studying 
Hindustani,.and—from the biographer’s point of 
view—lamentably in strewing the Red Sea with the 
accumulated private correspondence of a quarter of 
a century. Perhaps he realised that the end of a 
period in his life had been reached, and he was now 
to be called upon to occupy his business in the greater 
waters of statesmanship. 


CHAPTER LVIII 


KITCHENER Was now vested with a command which 
had been the desire of his heart, and he must see to 
it that the choice was justified. He had served a 
good apprenticeship in Palestine and Cyprus, Egypt 
and the Sudan. His experience of authority during 
the next twelve years was rich in opportunity for 
strengthening a strong character and bracing the 
self-reliance of a public servant who could combine 
implicit loyalty to his chief with entire willingness to 
accept responsibility. His mental powers expanded 
and quickened with constant exercise, and while his 
companions noted his growth of character, his com- 
patriots at home marked him as the coming man. 

As Sirdar of the Egyptian Army he had effectively 
wrought to a high pitch of perfection some military 
material of fine quality but of doubtful stability. As 
ruler of the Sudan, carefully coached by Lord Cro- 
mer, he had mastered complex problems of civil 
government in a non-civilised community. The or- 
deal had been crucial; he emerged from it famous. 

The strenuous years behind him had proved him 
as a soldier and an administrator—the incident of 
Fashoda had disclosed the latent qualities of the 
diplomat. 

Much was expected of him in South Africa, where 


the task was in many ways more difficult, and per- 
115 


116 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


haps less to his taste, than any imposed upon him. 
Yet he not only set a satisfactory term to a long and 
bitter conflict, but sowed a seed of reconciliation 
which was to germinate and ripen into comradeship 
in arms in Europe and Africa alike. His work in 
India was to prove his powers in their full maturity. 
If in history his name will always be identified pri- 
marily with the creation of the new British Armies 
in the Great War, yet that achievement, for all its 
marvel and its miracle, was really the triumphant 
expansion of a military structure about which he 
had long been busy. And in that structure—solidly 
built and compacted to ensure the safety of the 
British Dominion in the stormy years which he saw 
ahead—a special prominence attaches to the sturdy 
ramparts he raised in India. As he often said, 
India was ‘‘England’s heel of Achilles,’’ and he re- 
garded its military security—next to that of the 
United Kingdom—as the chief factor in an effective 
system of Imperial defence. 

If Kitchener did much for India, India did much 
for him. Always a learner, he imbibed there lessons 
of life which stood him in good stead in the other 
high posts he was to be ealled to occupy. His 
already broad outlook broadened largely. With no 
diminution of strength or steadfastness his character 
mellowed; and its apparent hardness, never more 
than skin deep, was dissipated in the hitherto unex- 
plored interests of life which he at last permitted 
himself to penetrate and enjoy. Above all, his en- 
deavours to serve England’s great Asiatic Depend- 
ency were a preparation for and a prelude to his 
supreme effort to make England herself the domi- 
nant military power. 


LVIII THE INDIAN COMMAND 117 


Although to become British Agent at Cairo had 
for years been his dream, Kitchener had made no 
secret of his more immediate wish to be posted to 
the Indian Command. Soon after the victory of 
Omdurman he was saying to Lord Roberts, ‘‘I have 
let the War Office know that later I should like an 
Indian billet,’’ and in 1900 his succession to the 
Command in India was already being canvassed. 
The Viceroy, Lord Curzon, wrote to him that summer: 


I heard the other day privately from home that you are 
to be our next Commander-in-Chief in India. I know well, 
from our conversations before I left England, how greatly 
set your heart has been upon Indian service, and I can truly 
say that I have not myself been backward in assisting you 
to realise your ambition. 


The Viceroy proffered his hearty support to the 
prospective Commander-in-Chief, assuring him that 
the force of his personality would overcome the tra- 
ditional jealousy between the Indian and the Home 
Services which every selection for the supreme com- 
mand was liable to revive: 


The Indian Army will regard itself highly complimented 
by the selection of a soldier of your great reputation as its 
Chief; and you will before long, by personal visits to all 
parts of India, and by inspection of all classes of native 
troops, ingratiate yourself with them and show your per- 
sonal concern in their welfare. 


Nor did he hesitate to admit that it was high time 
to set the military house in perfect order: 


I will not conceal from you that there are many respects 
in which Army administration in India seems to me capable 
of great reform, and in regard to which I look forward with 


118 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


much confidence to the benefit of your vast energy and great 

experience. I see absurd and uncontrolled expenditure; I 
observe a lack of method and system; I detect slackness 

and jobbery ; and in some respects I lament a want of fibre 

and tone. Upon all these matters I shall have many oppor- 

tunities of speaking to you, and of suggesting abundant 

openings for your industry and force. 


This letter, however, was held back, the ‘‘private 
information’? being premature, and the reversion 
of the Indian Command remaining unsettled. In 
November! Kitchener, before taking over command 
in South Africa, wired to Mr. Brodrick at the War 
Office: ‘‘Am anxious to get India; can you help?”’ 
For the moment the help was withheld. Queen Vic- 
toria—well aware that, while Kitchener wanted to 
get the Indian Command, Mr. Brodrick wanted to 
get him to the War Office—wrote cryptically on 
December 14: ‘‘Upon the very important question 
of Lord Kitchener’s ultimate employment, here or 
elsewhere, the Queen thinks it not possible to decide 
anything yet.’’ 

But her Minister wrote more plainly: 


I have known for some time that you wish to go to India, 
and can assure you that, so far as I can assist to serve your 
wishes in any way, I will try to do so. But there is a very 
strong feeling, not only in the Cabinet, but outside, that your 


1 Some weeks later Roberts wrote to him: ‘‘Please wire if you would like 
to have command of one of the Army Corps. ... We are going to divide 
the Home Army into Six Army Corps, and I will keep the Salisbury Plain 
for you, if you like—always supposing India is an impossibility.”” (25.1.01.) 
Kitchener wrote to thank Roberts for this offer, which he felt unable to 
accept: “When this is over I think I shall require a rest for a while. I 
have had practically no leave for a very long time, and I think I shall want 
a thorough change. I do not think, therefore, I should be available for a 
Command in England, and as the Indian Command is evidently impossible, 
some more civil work—after a time—would be more what I should look 
forward to. I daresay I may some day find my way back to Egypt again.” 
(16.2.01.) 


LVI INVITED TO WHITEHALL 119 


presence at the War Office, as soon as you can be spared 

from South Africa, would give much confidence. . . . The 
oceasion is almost unique. The chance of reorganising the 
Army is not likely to recur in your lifetime, or mine, under 
similar conditions. You have the most recent and extended 
experience of any General in our service, or indeed in the 
world, of campaigns, since you have been at the centre both 
of Egyptian and South African expeditions. If you go to 
India, we should scarcely be able to avail ourselves of your 
experience at all. . . . If it influences you at all, I may say I 
have not taken the War Office with a view to half-measures. 
. . . You may not perhaps always have a Secretary of State 
who feels as strongly as I do the necessities of the case. 


But argument, coaxing, and drab visions of pos- 
sible unemployment were alike impotent to draw 
Kitchener a single step towards the War Office. To 
a friend who had been semi-officially asked to inter- 
vene, he wrote: 


Wyndham suggests my going to the War Office; I would 
sooner sweep a crossing. . . . I have no intention of going to 
the War Office in any capacity; so if India goes to any one 
else I shall have what I really want—a good long rest; and 
perhaps it will be the end of my military career. .. . Re- 
garding the work, it is not easy to explain, but I should be a 
hopeless failure at the War Office, under the existing admin- 
istration. . . . If I am not fit for India I am not fit for any- 
thing else. . . . But, as you say, I must not do what I wish, 
but what is good for the country. Jam quite willing to sac- 
rifice myself if I could do good. I sometimes wish I could 
get a bullet through my brain, as some of my best friends 
have had. 


For a while the issue lay between India and the 
Retired List, and after an unbroken spell of thirty 
years’ work the latter prospect was not devoid of 


120 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


attraction. ‘‘You are splendidly indignant,’’ Kitch- 
ener wrote from Pretoria to Mr. Ralli in January 
1901, ‘‘at my wanting a little rest after fifteen years’ 
continuous service, with only my short leaves. Why 
should a poor fellow like me have no pleasure or no 
time in his life to himself? But I am afraid I am 
grumbling again—I didn’t mean to.”’ 

The magnet of congenial work, however, proved 
irresistible ; he soon returned to the charge, and with 
better success: 


I fully recognise that my lack of experience of India ren- 
ders it difficult to place me at the head of military affairs 
there. Still, some Indian officers have told me that they 
considered it would be an excellent thing for the Indian 
Army to have some one in command who was not used to 
Indian routine, and could look at military matters from a 
larger standpoint than that of India alone. 

Also it is not unlikely that before long serious trouble 
may occur in India, which is really our heel of Achilles, and 
[ had therefore hoped to have the opportunity of gaining 
sufficient experience to be of use if war broke out. I fear 
that it was somewhat presumptuous on my part to look for- 
ward to the Indian Command; but after Lord Roberts’s 
recommendation I certainly did hope for it. 

I feel sure that I am not the man for the War Office, that 
I should be of very little use, and that I should be a certain 
failure. This is my personal conviction... If after talking 
the matter over with Lord Roberts, you feel that my want of 
experience in India might be overcome, so as not to stand in 
my way, I know you will do what you can for me. What- 
ever happens I shall always be grateful to you. 

1 Four years later, when Mr. Brodrick had exchanged the War Office for 
the Indian Office, and was once again Lord Kitchener’s official chief, he 
resumes the topic in a prophetic vein: “After every one has failed [at the” 


War Office] there will be a call for some one, and you will not be able to 
avoid the War Office for ever!’ 


LVIII THE ATTRACTION OF INDIA 121 


Mr. Brodrick, finding he could not lure his friend 
to Whitehall, was determined not to lose him for 
India, and Kitchener could write to him from Pre- 
toria: ‘‘Many thanks for the trouble you have taken 
on my behalf in arranging the Indian Command. I 
had almost given up hope of ever going to India, 
and now I feel there is still a chance of doing so, if 
all goes well out here.”’ 

In March 1901 the Viceroy took from his drawer 
the allocution he had composed eight months before, 
and in forwarding it exhorted Lord Kitchener in 
cordial terms not to postpone his coming longer than 
could be helped. Stress was laid on the fact that 
1903 would be the fifth and—as was then supposed, 
the last—year of the writer’s tenure of office, and 
on the impossibility of crowding into it the necessary 
concerted efforts. The Viceroy proposed, but events 
disposed; for South Africa held Kitchener fast till 
the summer of 1902, and Lord Curzon’s final de- 
parture from India was postponed till 1905. 


CHAPTER LIX 


THE incoming Commander-in-Chief landed in India 
on November 28, 1902, in time to act as chief umpire 
at the Delhi Manceuvres—which impressed him as 
being curiously unlike war—and to put a few final 
military touches to the Coronation Durbar which 
the Viceroy was preparing with meticulous care and 
on a magnificent scale. ‘‘Let me say,’’ the Viceroy 
had written to him just before he left England, ‘‘ with 
what pleasure I am looking forward to the co-opera- 
tion in Indian government of the foremost soldier in 
the British Army.’’ Kitchener’s name and fame 
had of course preceded him, but there were sinister 
auguries that he would be handicapped by his own 
masterful temperament, no less than by his lack of 
Indian service. He was believed to have come 
pledged to carry out ‘‘preconceived notions,’’ and 
to be bent on drastic changes without pausing to 
learn local conditions. 

The criticism was only partly true in form, and 
wholly misleading in substance. The preconceived 
notions were that ‘‘an efficient army is simply an 
insurance against national disaster’’; that ‘‘expendi- 
ture of money on an inefticient army can no more be 
defended than the payment of premiums to an in- 
solvent company’’; and that ‘‘on sound business 
principles the efficiency of an army ought to be pur- 


chased at the lowest possible price.’’? And, far from 
122 


CHAP. LIX ARRIVAL IN INDIA 123 


hustling on reforms, Kitchener with characteristic 
caution looked well about him before pronouncing 
any opinions—let alone proposing any changes. 

Quick to act when the moment for action had 
come, no one knew better how to play a waiting game. 
He never dawdled, but he never hurried; and the 
greater the object in view, the better able he was to 
exercise patience. Long delays which he judged in- 
evitable left him calm; little delays which he thought 
avoidable were apt tofret him. Ten laborious years 
were spent in preparing for the day when Gordon 
should be avenged. The recurring disappointments 
incidental to the wearisome winding-up of the South 
African campaign only stiffened his quiet determina- 
tion to see it through. But to be held up at a London 
street crossing was liable to be a provocation; to be 
detained for a few moments’ unnecessary conversa- 
tion was apt to rank as a real grievance. 

A new Commander-in-Chief was bound to form 
some first impressions. It needed no long Indian ex- 
perience to perceive how little had been done towards 
rendering our forces in India, during the critical first 
year of a campaign, independent of home assistance. 
It was patent, even to a newcomer, that Army Head- 
quarters were paper-logged with a plethora of corre- 
spondence and minute-writing, and its work impeded 
by the defective co-ordination of departments and 
the overlapping of their functions. Lord Curzon 
himself had written to Kitchener before his arrival: 
‘**‘T regard military administration in India as bound 
up in interminable writing and over-centralisation, 
from which I have been doing my best to relieve it.’’ 
And not long after taking up his command Kitchener 
entirely endorsed this judgement: 


124 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


I find I have hardly a moment here in this awful system 
of doing nothing but write Minutes, which apparently makes 
up the government of India! To get anything done, how- 
ever small, under the present system is the work of a life- 
time; and, as soldiers only hold their billets for five years, 
the result is evident, and is apparently exactly what the 
Government of India like. Some of my Minutes are, I fear, 
getting me disliked, as I cannot help pointing out how ab- 
surd the system is. (Letter to a friend, 11.3.03.) 


One step had to be taken quickly which, though of a 
revolutionary character, met with general approval. 
It had for some time been recognised that many bat- 
talions of the Indian Army fell short of the average 
standard, and that these defects were due to racial 
shortcomings. The historic cause of this inequality 
is easily traceable. In the early years of the Hast 
India Company’s rule constant wars in the Carnatic 
and the Dekkan gave a ‘‘bellyful’’ of fighting to the 
Bombay and Madras armies, and warlike adventur- 
ers from Upper India were constantly attracted to 
their ranks. But the conquest of Mysore and the 
overthrow of the Mahratta power shifted the focus 
of military activity from the south to the north, and 
Madras and Bombay soldiers found their occupation 
only in garrison duty. It came about that their re- 
cruits were enlisted from classes remarkable for 
cleanliness, docility, and aptitude in drill rather than 
for martial qualities. Meanwhile the conquest of the 
Punjab and the subsequent occupation of the Trans- 
Indus territory brought the Bengal Army into con- 
tact with the hardy Punjabis and the fierce tribesmen 
of the North-West Frontier, and incessant military 
activity afforded the officers opportunities of distine- 
tion and a practical training for war which were 


LIX RE-NUMBERING REGIMENTS 125 


denied to their comrades in the other Presidencies. 
All this tended to damp the zeal and mar the efficiency 
of the Madras and Bombay armies, and not a little to 
foster jealousies between them and the Bengal Army. 
Nor did the post-Mutiny reorganisation of the Indian 
military system do anything to abate these heart- 
burnings, and service in the other Presidencies be- 
came increasingly unpopular. Young officers who 
were ambitious, or could wield influence, strained 
every nerve to be posted to the Bengal Staff Corps, 
with the result that the Madras and Bombay Staff 
Corps were always considerably under strength. 
The amalgamation of the three Staff Corps in 1891, 
the abolition of the Presidential armies in 1895, 
and the creation of Four Commands failed to pop- 
ularise military service in Madras and Bombay, the 
conditions of which remained unhealthily stagnant. 
The position in 1902 was that, though the old 
Presidential armies were defunct, the traditions and 
jealousies which had beset them were still very much 
alive in their successors. In two of the four Com- 
mands service was generally very popular. The 
keenest or best-befriended officers still made their 
way into Bengal or Punjab regiments, while the less 
ambitious aspirants or less favoured applicants had 
to soldier in Bombay or Madras. It was clearly un- 
desirable that certain units of the Indian Army should 
put on efficiency at the expense of the others; and in 
preparation for war a sound fighting level through- 
out the Army was infinitely preferable to a limited 
number of corps d’élite. Kitchener decided in favour 
of welding together all Indian units; this would en- 
tail renumbering the Native regiments in a uniform 
series and bringing their peace establishments up to 


126 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


a uniform strength based on the requirements of the 
Field Army. He thought to increase the fighting 
value of the Indian Army by reconstituting nine 
Madras regiments into Punjabis, and five into Gur- 
khas, thus furnishing the North-West Frontier with 
fourteen sound battalions. And although Lord 
Ampthill, as Governor of Madras, pressed the polit- 
ical objection that the people of Southern India ought 
not to be deprived of the advantages of military serv- 
ice, he accepted the military counter-argument that 
“Gt is a well-known and incontrovertible fact that 
those natives of India who pass their lives in ease 
and prosperity, secure from outside incursions and 
war alarms, do unquestionably lose the qualities that 
make a good soldier.’’ And by keeping up so many 
of these regiments, the Indian Government was not 
only maintaining men with no fighting propensities, 
but was also ruining the professional zeal and effi- 
ciency of their young British officers. 

The Government, mindful of the lesson taught by 
the Mutiny, was alive to the danger of allowing any 
one element in the Indian Army to preponderate un- 
duly. An increase in the Punjabi infantry had as 
its necessary sequel a further recruitment of the 
valuable Gurkha material and the enlistment of more 
trans-border Pathans in the Frontier Militia, the 
Prime Minister of Nepal—an enthusiastic admirer 
of Kitchener—playing up splendidly in netting some 
6000 Gurkhas in four years.* 


1 Six years later the Maharaja of Nepal, as Marshal of the Nepal Army, 
‘ was writing to Kitchener: ‘‘Your Excellency—tThe officers and men of the 
Nepal Army have been greatly elated and consider themselves highly 
honoured to reckon your Excellency as one of their Generals. They feel 
proud and elevated at the association of your Excellency’s illustrious name 
with them. I beg on behalf of myself and the other officers of the Nepal 
Army to present to your Excellency as a token of our sentiments a Nepalese 


LIx REGIMENTAL TITLES 127 


The unification of the Army, besides securing par- 
ity of fighting value in the Native regiments, was 
also to do away with the persistent designation of 
regiments by their obsolete ‘‘Presidencies’’—a cus- 
tom both confusing and dangerous; one brigade on 
active service had actually contained three regiments 
bearing the same number! The new regimental des- 
ignations indicated the classes or countries from 
which corps were recruited, mention being no longer 
made of the former Presidential armies. Such titles 
as the ‘‘1st Bengal Infantry’’ or the ‘‘16th Bombay 
Infantry’’ disappeared, and in their place were 
adopted others, such as ‘‘1st Brahmans’’ or the 
“116th Mahrattas.’’ Scrupulous care was, more- 
over, taken in the re-numbering‘ to avoid wounding 
the esprit de corps of the Native regiments; the orig- 
inal numbers—or some association with them—were, 
whenever possible, retained, while historical titles 
were preserved and in many cases revived. The 
associations of regiments with famous leaders were 
perpetuated by appellations such as ‘‘Skinner’s 
Horse,’’ ‘‘Outram’s Rifles,’? or ‘‘Brownlow’s 
Punjabis,’’ which were added to the new regimental 
titles. For those Madras battalions who had fought 
with distinction in past wars was revived the name 
‘“Carnatic.”’ 


Regulation Helmet with Plumes, as is worn by a General in the Nepalese 
ASI. 3 <2” 

1“I am glad to say the Viceroy and Military Member both agree in the 
advisability of re-numbering the Indian Army as a whole. I am anxiously 
waiting your opinion on the papers Stanley took home before taking further 
steps. I am now assured if this is carried out I shall have all the Indian 
Army officers with me, and they will as you know carry with them the views 
of the Native officers and men. I am therefore in great hopes that this 
groundwork of organisation of the Indian Army will be sanctioned soon.” 
(Kitchener to Roberts, 12.2.03.) 


CHAPTER LX 


UNbERLYING all Kitchener’s thoughts for the future 
of India was the bedrock consideration of Defence. 
He determined to examine for himself her vulnerable 
side, and before he had been nine months in the 
country he had traversed the whole of the North- 
West Frontier. Circumstances had not suggested 
this feat to any of his predecessors, but to his then 
physical as well as mental activities the excursion 
was specially congenial. 

In the January of 1903 he made a preliminary 
inspection of the Tank, Wana, and Bannu sectors, 
and in February of the Khaibar Pass, Malakand, and 
Chakdarra. His larger tour was made in two jour- 
neys. With a fine contempt for the April heat he 
started from Nushki—far to the west of the hills 
round Quetta—and examined every pass and valley 
of importance from Baluchistan to the Khaibar, the 
route being by New Chaman, through the Zhob, 
Gumal, Tochi, and Kuram valleys, to Thal and 
Kohat. The inspections were in the nature of sur- 
prise visits, and the Commander-in-Chief, with only 
a small escort, penetrated into districts little known 
to any but Frontier officers. 

In August he tackled the northern section, through 
Gilgit,| Chitral, and Killa Drosh, to the lonely 


1From Astok, a small village on the road to Gilgit, Kitchener wired to 

Hatfield for news of Lord Salisbury, who was gravely ill, and received an 

answer within four hours. } ; 
128 


cmap.tx TOUR OF THE FRONTIER 129 


Shandur, Kilik, and Mintaka Passes, and on to the 
Pamirs. He wrote to Roberts from Chitral: 


We have had a delightful and very interesting tour so far, 
and I am very glad I came to these parts, and got an idea of 
the country. 

I went through Hunza and over the Mintaka Pass, sleep- 
ing one night in China on the Pamirs, and back next day 
over the Kilik Pass. We had to travel by very bad road 
over the mountains, as the river was too full to ford. Then 
back to Gilgit and on here by the same route as Kelly took 
when he marched to the relief of this place. 

We were received to-day with the wildest firing of match- 
locks and the mehter’s guns, bands, etc., which nearly drove 
my horse out of its senses. 

I start to-morrow for the Dorah Pass, shall then see the 
troops at Killa Drosh, and back to Gilgit via the Bolrogil 
Pass and the Darcot glacier. I expect to be back at Simla 
on October 24. 


The travelling was strenuous, nearly 1500 miles 
being covered in sixty days, and only at one place 
did the party pass two consecutive nights. Many of 
the excursions had to be made on foot over very 
rough ground, and this proved to be the last time 
Kitchener was able to walk any distance without 
great discomfort. During the tour he had time, 
while studying frontier problems at first hand, to 
digest the opinions of the experts to whom he lent a 
ready ear. He contrived also to sandwich between 
theours some useful talks with the Viceroy at Simla, 
on administrative topics, though he declined to draw 
up any definite proposals until he had occupied his 
post for at least a twelvemonth. 


1 Four years later he wrote to Lady Salisbury: “I walked ten miles the 
o.her day, which is my record since my leg was broken. It was a painful 
experience, and I could not put my foot to the ground for the next two days, 
so I am not going to try it again.” 


VOL. II K 


130 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


His first summer-time in India saw Kitchener’s 
social position happily established. The rumour 
which depicted him a stern and reckless innovator, 
prepared to trample on every tradition, was found 
to be no less fantastic than the picture which por- 
trayed him as a misanthrope and especially a mis- 
ogynist.1 A pleasant surprise was in store for 
Simla, where his appearance was sudden and un- 
expected. One afternoon ‘‘a burly sunburnt man’’ 
—as he was sketched—rode quietly in with a solitary 
companion, and next morning the station woke up to 
the fact that the Commander-in-Chief had arrived. 
Military officials made their way to their offices with 
unwonted punctuality, ‘‘a tall stranger riding down 
to join them there.’’ But outside business hours the 
Chief was found to be more than amenable to the 
Simla standard of hospitality. The ink was searcely 
dry in his visitors’ book before invitations began to 
flow out. Nor were these confined to a formal din- 
ner-party—the utmost that had been expected; a 
house-warming in the form of a ball was with char- 
acteristic promptitude arranged at Snowdon, and 
red-coated messengers were busy distributing the 
coveted cards. The ball made Kitchener’s reputa- 
tion as a host. He was evidently determined that 
his début in this capacity in India should be a sue- 
cess. He built out new rooms for the occasion, and 
was known to have thought out every detail and 
taken infinite personal pains to promote his guests’ 


1 At a State banquet given in Kitchener’s honour at Bhopal by the Begum, 
his hostess was on the point of reading her address to him from behind a 
screen in the drawing-room, when Mrs. Bayley, the wife of the Resident, 
at Kitchener’s request, asked Her Highness to come into the dining-room. 
The Begum readily complied, coming forward and proposing Lord Kitchener’s 
health in the midst of the assembled company. Kitchener replied in a 
charming little speech (Pioneer Mail, April ’08). 


Lx HOSPITALITIES AT SIMLA 131 


enjoyment. Those who nervously looked for a 
rather stand-offish reception were almost startled by 
the friendly greeting and the evident desire that 
everybody should have a good time in his house. 
And the reputed recluse soon showed himself abroad 
as a highly sociable personality. He was almost 
daily to be seen driving in a phaeton with a pair of 
fine English horses, a very smart A.D.C. by his side; 
and at dances, races, and polo he was a welcome 
figure, obviously interested in what was going on, 
and showing no inclination to retire into his official 
shell. 

Here is an opinion expressed of him at Simla that 
summer: 


His hand—the strong hand of one who decides slowly, but, 
having decided, pushes action surely to its goal, is beginning 
to appear in minor matters of military administration. He 
probes everything to the bottom. He is outspoken and 
gruff, but no one can fail to be impressed by the affection 
he inspires in those who are in contact with him. He at- 
taches the utmost importance to getting the best men avail- 
able into every appointment with which he has anything to 
do, irrespective of everything but efficiency. Formalities he 
dispenses with; minute writing he abhors. He has insti- 
tuted a weekly meeting of the heads of the great military de- 
partments to reduce inter-secretarial correspondence. He 
gets through an extraordinary amount of work with prob- 
ably less writing than any of his predecessors. This enables 
him to find time to take up long delayed schemes of reorgan- 
isation. He is to Lord Curzon what the broadsword is to 
the rapier. The confidence of the Native Army in him is 
growing. He is already the most popular man in India. 


CHAPTER LXI 


A cuosr study of the Army in India convinced the 
man charged with its efficiency that much in its exist- 
ing condition cried aloud for reform; that its dis- 
position, organisation, and methods of training were 
out of date; and that, though nothing like full value 
was being obtained from the fine material in his 
hands, public money was being lavished on objects 
which were obsolete. 

From the India Office itself came the suggestion 
that the distribution of troops—changed but little 
since the Mutiny—needed reconsideration. Units 
were scattered + throughout a large number of can- 
tonments, many of which no longer had either 
strategic or political importance. Regiments and 
battalions were isolated in small stations, with no 
opportunity of exercise with other arms; while, even 
in the larger stations, troops were grouped together 
with scant regard fe the exigencies either of com- 
bined training or of mobilisation. 

The existing organisation dated only from 1895, 
when tardy effect was given to the drastic recom- 
mendation of the 1879 Commission that the three 


1 Kitchener wrote colloquially to Lady Salisbury: “The troops are all 
higgledy-piggledy over the country without any system or reason whatever. 
It will take years to get it right, but by working it out thoroughly we shall 
have a good plan and J hope make no more mistakes” (16.7.03). 

3 


cuaP.txt REDISTRIBUTION SCHEME 133 


Armies of Bengal, Bombay, and Madras should cease 
to exist as independent bodies, and form a single 
Army of India organised in four Commands and 
Districts. By this change unification of the Army 
was to some extent secured and Presidential control 
disappeared. 

But new conditions quickly arose; Baluchistan 
had been occupied and added to the Bombay Com- 
mand, while Upper Burma was absorbed in the 
Madras Command, although it had no geographical 
or political connection with Madras, or indeed any 
other Presidency. Moreover, by important changes 
in the numbers and composition of the Native Army, 
and by additions made to the British troops, the rela- 
tive strengths of the four Commands were rendered 
even more unequal than when the Commission sat. 
The partition of the Army into these Commands was 
therefore no longer aCministratively convenient, 
while the march of events had introduced conditions 
which made it organically defective. The Afghan 
War had shown that the Army in India was not suit- 
ably organised for operations of any magnitude. 
When Russia in 1883 occupied the Turkoman coun- 
try, seized Merv, and crept forward towards Herat, 
India had to prepare herself to speak effectively with 
an enemy, and the organisation of her military forces 
was found to be little short of chaotic. It had been 
recognised that a genuine field force was indispen- 
sable, but the numerous mobilisation schemes put 
forward from time to time to meet this requirement 
only emphasised, without remedying, the radical un- 
soundness of the distribution of the Army. 

The question of distribution split itself into two 
main problems :—(1) the Maintenance of the Internal 


134 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


Security of the Country, and (2) its Protection from 
External Invasion. These two matters were inter- 
dependent, and any scheme for the reorganisation 
and redistribution of the Army must pay equal re- 
gard to both. 

Kitchener had first to determine under what sys- 
tem and on what scale the forces in India could 
be organised for field service. Without this as a 
standard no military problem could be satisfactorily 
solved—no military requirement accurately caleu- 
lated. In the absence of a definite aim or a fixed 
policy all true military reform would be held up; and 
until a well-considered and comprehensive scheme 
were adopted, there must be loss of power and much 
waste of money on fitful military expenditure. 

Accordingly, in November 1903, at the close of 
his frontier tours, the Commander-in-Chief sub- 
mitted to the Viceroy-in-Council his scheme for ‘‘ The 
Reorganisation and Redistribution of the Army in 
India.’’ Its essence was the substitution of Two 
Armies for the existing ‘‘Commands.’’ Its main ob- 
jects were three—(1) to reduce the garrison troops 
to the minimum essential for the country’s internal 
security, so as to set free the maximum force for 
service in the field; (2) to introduce a war organisa- 
tion in which every unit should have its allotted 
place and be ready for an immediate start on the 
signal for war; (3) to make the peace formations 
correspond, as closely as circumstances permitted, 
with war organisation, so that mobilisation should 
be smooth and easy. 


The question of Internal Defence was treated in 
personal consultation, and in complete harmony, with 


LXI INTERNAL DEFENCE 135 


all the local Governments concerned. It was deter- 
mined by three main considerations—the protection 
of the chief arteries of communication, the power and 
resources of a possible armed rebellion, and the 
amount of help to be expected from the Volunteers, 
Imperial Service Troops, Frontier Militia, and 
Police. Due allowance was made for the more mod- 
ern advantages of railways and telegraphs, and for 
the unarmed state of the bulk of the population; al- 
though the fact was not blinked that certain Native 
States might require watching. An estimate was 
made of the respective values of the auxiliary forces 
named, the réle of the Police being specially taken 
into account. 

The minimum garrisons required for internal se- 
curity being thus fixed, it was easier to define the 
principles on which the Army of India should be or- 
ganised and distributed. The rapid improvement of 
the Russian communications in Central Asia had 
altered the situation on the North-West Frontier and 
the existing Field Army (so-called) was now both in- 
sufficient and badly disposed for action. Kitchener’s 
scheme led off with the formation of a Field Army of 
nine Infantry Divisions instead of four'; each Divi- 
sion to have four British to nine Indian battalions, 
or 3200 British to 6489 Native bayonets. In addi- 
tion to this infantry force there were to be eight 
Cavalry Brigades and some extra batteries of corps 
Artillery. 

On one matter of organisation—the abolition of 


1 “If India had only the four, or possibly six, Divisions which are at 
present officially recognised as her Field Army available for service beyond 
the Frontier, I should not have been so long in forming an opinion; but on 
investigation I found that in reality she maintained a force sufficient to 
form no less than nine, and possibly more, Divisions for this purpose.” 
(Kitchener to Roberts, 27.7.03.) 


136 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP, 


the Mixed Brigade system, and the substitution of 
Homogeneous Brigades, each composed exclusively 
of either British or Native battalions—expert 
opinion was so sharply divided that a decision was 
postponed pending further consideration, and it was 
not until the summer of the following year that a 
Conference convened by the Commander-in-Chief 
registered its vote. 

Kitchener, well assured that his plan was economi- 
cally as well as strategically sound, was fully alive to 
the considerable outlay involved, and he freely con- 
ceded that its completion should be gradual as funds 
became available. 

The attitude of the Indian Government towards 
the scheme was benign; the Military Department, 
~ while challenging the accuracy of the financial 
figures, professed itself favourable, and the Viceroy, 
sharing both the particular doubts and the general 
approval of the Military Member, praised it as ‘‘a 
statesmanlike attempt to deal with the question on 
broad lines, and to provide an organisation that 
should suffice for at least a quarter of a century.’’ 
Lord Curzon judged it unlikely that ‘‘a better or 
more scientific plan could be produced,’’ and be- 
stowed upon it a comprehensive benediction: 


Its main advantages seem to me that it gives us a war 
organisation and a peace organisation in the same scheme, 
the two of course not being identical, but the latter being as 
closely assimilated to the former as circumstances permit ; 
and that it provides for the co-ordination, in the task of 
Imperial defence, of all the various armed forces which we 
possess in India, from the Regular Army to the armed Civil 
Police. 


LXI REORGANISATION APPROVED 137 


The Council endorsed the Viceroy’s opinion, and 
the several local Governments were in cheerful agree- 
ment as to the adequacy of the precautions designed 
for internal defence. Finally, on September 1, 1904, 
the Secretary of State gave it his assent in so far as 
no new expenditure was entailed, and an Indian 
Army Order of October 28 laid down the principle 
that the Army in peace should be organised and 
trained in the same units of. command in which it 
would take the field. 


CHAPTER LXII 


In the November of 1903 Kitchener met with an 
accident from which he never entirely recovered. He 
was riding alone—a custom against which his 
A.D.C.’s vainly protested—into Simla from his coun- 
try house, Wildflower Hall, and the mishap occurred 
as he was passing through a narrow tunnel in which 
a row of timber supports left intervening spaces for 
the protection of foot-passengers. A native sud- 
denly jumped out of one of these alcoves and caused 
the horse to shy, the General catching his foot in a 
wooden upright and jamming his spur into the 
horse’s flank. The animal in bounding forward 
forced the foot right round, and both bones of the leg 
were fractured just above the ankle. The road was 
- not much frequented, and there was a very painful 
wait before a passing rickshaw was available for 
conveying the patient to his quarters, where his limb 
was set. Yet within a fortnight he was telegraphing 
to Sir Archibald Hunter, ‘‘My leg is doing well, and 
I trust I may not long delay my pleasure of seeing 
the Bombay troops.’”’ ‘‘K. is getting on very 
quickly,’’ wrote one of his Staff a month after the 


1In 1913, under advice at Cairo, he determined that on his way home 
he would have the leg rebroken and reset by a German surgeon. Happily 
circumstances interfered with the visit to Germany, and an examination 
by a famous English specialist made it clear that the German operation 
would probably have resulted in gangrene and the loss of the limb. 


CHAP, LXII A SERIOUS ACCIDENT 139 


accident occurred; ‘‘he dashes about all over the 
house on his crutches, and is now talking of going on 
tour to Madras early in February. It seems rather 
soon, but I daresay he will.’ 


The grouping of the nine Divisions took per- 
manent shape as and when set forth in the Com- 
mander-in-Chief’s Memorandum of January 30, 
1904, entitled ‘‘The Preparation of the Army in 
India for War’’—a sequel to the scheme for Army 
Reorganisation and Redistribution. In its mature 
form, as amended in 1906-7, it marked a long stride 
in decentralisation. 

The nine Divisional Commanders were now in- 
vested with large independent powers, so as to enable 
them to dispose locally of all questions except those 
affecting either the Army as a whole or Divisions 
other than their own. They were authorised, when 
really necessary, to correspond direct with Army 
Headquarters, but expressly enjoined to take the 
fullest advantage of their new powers. It was im- 
pressed on them that an officer who habitually refers 
for orders questions with which he is himself entitled 
to deal, shows himself incapable of assuming respon- 
sibility, and ‘‘therefore wanting in one of the most 
essential qualifications for higher command.’’ ! 

This devolution of authority placed the Divisional 
Commanders in direct touch with Headquarters, and 
the sphere of the Lieutenant-Generals of Armies was 
rearranged. Disencumbered of other work, they 
retained their principal duty of training troops for 


1Early in 1905 a Staff Officer was able to write: “One already sees 
G.O.C.’s of Divisions and Brigades taking upon themselves much greater 
responsibility than formerly; correspondence is consequently decreasing, 
and the tendency is for Divisional and Brigade Commanders to settle every- 
thing concerning their respective commands themselves.” 


140 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


war, and in fact filled the part of Inspectors-General. 
The nine Divisions were combined in two groups, of 
five and four respectively, called the Northern and 
Southern Armies, each under the Inspectorate of a 
Lieutenant-General with his Staff. 

The training for war of the troops in each Division 
of course rested with the Generals of Divisions and 
Brigades. But in a wide area of country there was 
an obvious necessity for additional supervision and 
inspection, so as to obtain uniformity in training, 
discipline, and equipment, and in general prepared- 
ness for war. This work was allotted to the two 
Lieutenant-Generals, who were relieved from the dis- 
tractions of administrative and financial responsi- 


bility. i 


The twofold grouping of the Divisions was dictated 
by the strategical dispositions of the Army on the 
hypothesis of a campaign on the North-West Fron- 
tier. In the event of hostilities beyond the Frontier, 
and in support of our ally the Amir of Afghanistan, 
the armies in the field could advance by two main 
routes: (1) from Peshawar to Kabul, and (2) from 
Quetta to Kandahar, and would operate in two main 
bodies, with Kabul and Kandahar as their strategic 
pivots. Hence in peace the troops must be so distrib- 
uted that the Divisions would be conveniently placed 
in échelon on the main lines of railway, and that in 
war they could be rapidly concentrated and trans- 
ported towards the two main objectives: ‘‘It must 
not be forgotten,’’ Kitchener reminded the Council, 
“‘that distance is a factor of comparatively minor im- 


1 Kitchener would entirely sink personal feeling where the public service 
was concerned and a General of marked. ability whom he strongly recom- 
mended for one of these large commands was a man with whom his own 
relations in Egypt had been somewhat troubled. 


in =» 


a es 


Oa 


Per, Wy, ADEN 


British 
Somaliland 


CEYLON 


INDIA 


Showing the Northern and Southern 
Armies,and the Nine Divisions 
as established 1907. 


B E 


-Brahmapuira R. 


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Exit GROUPING OF DIVISIONS 141 


portance in the railway concentration of troops for 
war. ... We want to move the troops from unhealthy 
stations. . . . In order to make the best use of our 
existing material it is necessary not only to do all in 
our power to mitigate climatic effects, but also to dis- 
tribute our available forces so as to secure their effi- 
cient training in fighting formations in time of peace.”” 
The five Divisions lying at the foot of the Himalayas 
and pointing towards Kabul were the Peshawar, 
Rawalpindi, Lahore, Meerut, and Lucknow Divisions 
—these, with the three independent frontier Bri- 
gades of Kohat, Bannu, and Derajat, constituted the 
Northern Army. Ona lower line were the four Divi- 
sions pointing towards Kandahar—the Quetta, 
Mhow, Poona, and Secunderabad Divisions—which, 
with the garrisons of Burma and Aden, made up the 
Southern Army. It was inherent in the scheme that 
the two General Officers who had been answerable for 
the efficiency of the two armies in peace might expect 
to command them in war. 
The new disposition of the troops, hingeing as it 
‘did on possible external developments, provoked a 
surmise, which Kitchener was at pains to contradict, 
that he favoured a ‘‘forward’’ policy. It was also 
ascribed to him by certain critics that le intended to 
mass the greater portion of the Indian Army in great 
ceantonments along the North-West Frontier, without 
regard either to the requirements of internal defence 
or to the health and comfort of the troops: 


T have seen it stated [he wrote] that we intend to place a 
large portion of the Indian forces on the North-West Fron- 
tier, whilst others seem to be under the impression that the 
troops are to be collected together in certain great canton- 
ments. Neither of these statements is in any way correct. 


142 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


The principles on which we have been working are totally 
different. 

The distribution of the Army in India, as it stood before 
the present changes were introduced, has hardly seen any 
practical improvements since the days of the Mutiny. The 
military areas into which the country has hitherto been sub- 
divided have been mere geographical divisions of varied ex- 
tent, with a different number of troops in each. They were 
not such that peace formations were in any degree adapted 
to the requirements of war. The troops for the various 
Brigades and Divisions of the Field Army had to be drawn 
from widely separated: localities, and from different Com- 
mands. They could not be trained together in the tactical 
formations in which they would be employed in the field, 
and the numerous administrative details, on which every 
army must depend for its success and very existence, were 
extremely complex and unsatisfactory. 

These are the reasons which render it necessary to remedy 
some of the most glaring defects in the disposition of our 
forces. 


The label ‘‘ Redistribution Scheme’’ was perhaps 
thought to imply the massing of troops all along the 
North-West Frontier in positions whence at the mys- 
tic word ‘‘mobilisation’’ they would pour northwards, 
like greyhounds from the leash. This notion, which 
caused some shaking of old-fashioned heads, was a 
chimera. Of massing northwards there was very lit- 
tle. Hach Division of three Brigades was simply con- 
centrated in its own administrative area, where its 
General could lay his hand on every unit as needed for 
training or for war. Each Division was lodged in 
proper successive propinquity to its strategic line of 
railway, ready to meet trouble, external or internal; 
and each Divisional Commander could make his own 
arrangements, whether to deal with an emergency in 


LXI SYSTEM AT WORK 143 


his Divisional Area, or to reply to a general call 
northwards. 

As a net result of Redistribution and Reorganisa- 
tion, India was for the first time able, while maintain- 
ing an ample garrison, to await without alarm any 
difficulties arising beyond the frontier, to despatch at 
short notice two great armies to the vital points of 
contact with the enemy—the line of the Helmund and 
the heights above Kabul—and to stand steady for at 
least a twelvemonth, until Imperial reinforcements 
from overseas should arrive. 

Great as were the strategic 1 advantages of the new 
order, its administrative and educative value was 
still greater. Every field division could, on mobil- 
isation, be formed from its own divisional area, and 
could proceed complete and self-contained to the 
field of action, leaving the garrison for internal de- 
fence at the strength already determined. The 
nine? fully equipped Divisions, each consisting of 
three Brigades, were estimated to provide approx- 
imately 120,000 men in all—as compared with the 
former four-division system, which had furnished 
only 70,000 effectives, and these ill-organized and 
never in complete tactical formation. 

Perversely enough, the scheme was subsequently 


1 The system was first to be tested in the field in Sir James Willcocks’s 
operations in the Bazar Valley in 1907-8. Mr. Haldane wrote from the 
War Office on June 3, 1908: “I cannot let longer time pass without writing 
to you a line of congratulation on the admirable results on the North-West 
Frontier. The ease and speed with which the machine which you have con- 
structed works, illustrate in a striking fashion the enormous importance of 
organisation. What happened was possible only after scientific prepara- 
tion in a high degree. There is no doubt of the effect produced on training 
by organisation in large units, and I should like to see a pattern correspond- 
ing to what you have worked out obtain for all the forces of the Crown. 
We have it now at home. But we have not yet got it for our overseas 
force outside India.” 

2 These were never quite completed, and each Division had only a single 
Brigade of Artillery. 


144 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER cme. rxx 


said to be tainted with over-centralisation, whereas 
devolution was its fundamental and permeating pur- 
pose. Kitchener always insisted that an efficient, 
well-trained, and well-disciplined army can be ac- 
quired only by the organising and training of the 
troops, as nearly as practicable, in the same forma- 
tions in peace as will be employed at the outbreak of 
war, under the same Commanders and with the same 
Staffs. It was with this aim that the Divisional 
system was substituted for the previous ‘‘Com- 
mands’’ and their subordinate ‘‘Districts’’; and the 
change marks a definite acceptance of Devolution, 
not as amere temporary expedient, but as a cardinal 
and constant principle. 

The policy was rightly describable as one of decen- 
tralisation, in so far as it relieved Headquarters of 
many details which were rather the concern of the 
Divisional Commander. The terms ‘‘centralisa- 
tion’’ and ‘‘decentralisation’’ bore, however, a cer- 
tain ambiguity. If Kitchener initiated a strength- 
ened centralisation of authority at Headquarters, 
thus rendering general control and supervision more 
thorough, he certainly fathered a measure of decen- 
tralisation which entrusted more discretion to, and 
demanded more responsibility from, the subordinate 
commanders. 


CHAPTER LXITIT 


Waite the Government of India never averted its 
eyes from Russian movements which, of geographi- 
cal necessity, involved India’s relations with Af- 
ghanistan, the subject was to be closely considered 
by Mr. Balfour’s newly-constituted Imperial De- 
fence Committee. 

It was obvious that the protection of the Indian 
frontier was predominantly a matter of transport 
and supply. Success would lie with whichever of the 
two Powers was the better able to mass troops on the 
decisive spot at the crucial moment, and there main- 
tain them; in a word, everything would turn on 
rapidity of railway construction. 

When Kitchener stepped on the scene, Russia had 
already developed and strengthened her lines of com- 
munication with her Afghan frontier. But the 
Amir’s other great neighbour, India, was hopelessly 
behind-hand with her strategic railways; her tactical 
communications were almost entirely lacking; her 
frontier defences were either inadequate or in em- 
bryo.t. The Prime Minister in the House of Com- 
mons in May 1905 cited Kitchener’s opinion that dur- 
ing the earlier phases of a war—which, to be con- 
clusive, must needs be prolonged—India ought to 


1 Kitchener had written to Lady Salisbury: ‘In three years Russia may 
be rapping at our door with a double line of railway, and if in the meantime 
we have done nothing, we shall deservedly go to the wall.... The 
Curzons have been very kind and the weather is delightful, but I feel no 
pleasure in life if the Service suffers” (24.7.04). 

VOL. IT 145 L 


146 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


have available eight divisions of infantry, with a 
corresponding quota of other arms, in addition to 
necessary drafts. That this provision would suffice 
for at least the first twelve months of the war was 
Mr. Balfour’s own anticipation; but he insisted in 
the strongest terms that we could not without danger 
tolerate the slightest diminution of those obstacles 
and difficulties which at present confronted an army 
invading Afghanistan. Above all, not a single step 
should be permitted on the part of the Amir which 
might facilitate the enemy’s transport; and any at- 
tempt to construct a railway within Afghan territory 
to connect with the Russian strategic railways should 
be regarded by us as a directly aggressive act. 


I have never suggested [Kitchener wrote] that we are in 
immediate danger of an attack by Russia, still less do I do so 
now. What I do want to call attention to is the fact—so 
conveniently ignored or slurred over by those who regard all 
talk of danger from Russia as mere panic-mongering—that 
the problem before us is something more than a mere Indian 
one, inasmuch as we have solemnly guaranteed the integrity 
of the Amir’s dominions, and have pledged ourselves to de- 
fend his frontier. If we are to fulfil our obligations in this 
respect, what then becomes of the school which regards as 
impossible all idea of Russian aggression, and points to the 
intervening five hundred miles of mountainous and sterile 
country which separates the Russian frontier from ours? 
By making ourselves responsible for the integrity of the 
Afghan frontier, that frontier thereupon becomes in a mili- 
tary sense our own. 


As part and parcel of his military preparation 
Kitchener early in 1904 urged anew the cardinal 
point of the construction of strategic Frontier Rail- 
ways, which would bring up men and material to 


‘ 


LXII FRONTIER RAILWAYS 147 


such positions on or beyond the frontier as we might 
have to occupy. 

All authorities were agreed that the strategic front 
to be held at all costs against Russia was the Kanda- 
har—Ghazni—Kabul line, the two extremities of 
which were the objectives of India’s two newly-con- 
stituted Southern and Northern Armies. When Rus- 
Sia was approaching the southern or Kandahar end 
of our strategic front, we had lavished money on con- 
structing two railway lines to Quetta, and a single 
line thence to the Sind—Afghan border at Chaman, 
in the fond hope that it might be stretched to Kan- 
dahar. Kitchener advocated a direct line between 
Bombay and Sind. Till now Baluchistan—isolated 
by the deserts of Sind and Bikanir—could only be 
reached from Bombay either by sea, through Kara- 
chi, or by land circuitously through the Punjab. It 
was essential to bring Kandahar within easier reach. 
Herat, 485 miles distant from our railhead at Cha- 
man, was within 76 miles of the Russian post at 
Khushk. Kandahar was comparatively close to our 
frontier at Chaman, where we had stored railway 
plant for the extension of the line between these two 
points. A hostile Russia could occupy Herat with- 
out hindrance from us; we could of course forestall 
her in Kandahar; and with the Russians at Herat and 
the British at Kandahar, the interlying country 
would be the scene of first blows. But the Chaman 
—Kandahar extension, was indefinitely adjourned, 
largely because the old Amir was known to frown 
on it. 

Thus, the southern scheme was in suspense; in the 
north, towards the Kabul end of our strategic front, 
a scheme had yet to be adopted. Twenty years ear- 


148 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


lier the Russian advance had been directed chiefly to- 
wards the Amir’s southern dominions; now the cen- 
tre of gravity had shifted; the growth of Russian rail- 
ways and Russian intrigues had brought northern 
Afghanistan, including the Amir’s capital, within the 
scope of the Muscovite’s menace. To protect Kabul 
against a coup de main Kitchener asked for two 
broad-gauge railways right up to the frontier. One 
of these—an extension of the Kuram valley line 
from Kohat with its present narrow-gauge railhead 
at Thal—he wished to carry to the foot of the Paiwar 
Kotal, the nearest point on the frontier to Kabul, 95 
miles distant. Our troops, railed at this point, could 
within ten days be inside the Afghan capital; the 
new line would be invaluable for supplies and would 
enable us to closa our hand on Ghazni, a dozen 
marches off. 

The other broad-gauge line was to run through the 
Khaibar Pass to a terminus near Loi Dakka, at the 
eastern end of the Jalalabad valley, where a stock of 
100 miles of broad-gauge material would be kept ready 
for a rapid extension of the railway into Afghan ter- 
ritory. For this, two alternative routes were sug- 
gested—one by the Kabul River, the other known as 
the Loi Shilman—Gakke route, with a terminus at 
Loi Dakka. Thecontroversy as to the relative merits 
of the two plans—in which, roughly, civilian opinion 
was pitted against military—was vehement and vo- 
luminous. Kitchener plumped for the Loi Shilman 
route after prospecting it in company with General 
Macdonald,! who had already surveyed its rival. His 


1General, later Sir J., Macdonald, in a note of June 20, 1919, wrote: 
“There can be no doubt that the Loi Shilman line, had it been completed 
as Lord Kitchener wished, and connected with Lundi Kotal by a good 
military road, or by a light line up the Karu Shilman, would have been of 
great use in the present trouble with the Afghans.” 


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LXII RIVAL ROUTES 149 


choice was also that of the Viceroy, who had indeed 
rejected the Kabul River alignment six years earlier, 
holding that the military objections to it were insu- 
perable. The Loi Shilman route could easily be car- 
ried to Jalalabad, far on the way to the capital. Any 
demur on the part of the Amir could be easily met by 
telling him that, without railway access to the Kabul 
River plain, no adequate help—if and when required 
—could be given him at Kabul. It was an additional 
argument that the Kabul River route was exceed- 
ingly vulnerable to attack, being in places within 200 
yards’ range of fire, and would necessitate extensive 
and expensive protective works. It also presented 
at least one political objection. Our hold over the 
powerful Mohmands on the left bank was of the 
slightest, and we should only be permitted to build 
our railway in peace by paying blackmail; and even 
then the line would be at the mercy of any section 
of the tribe which considered that it had not received 
its fair share of the spoil. 

Kitchener’s argument prevailed in the Viceroy’s 
Councils; the Amir also was agreeable, only pleading 
that the frontier should first be definitely settled; the 
India Office sanctioned as much of the Khaibar line 
as was common to the rival routes. 

For a few months the matter was at a standstill, un- 
til it came under the notice of the next Viceroy, Lord 
Minto, who, in his keen desire to keep friends with the 
Amir, was not sure whether the Khaibar line had bet- 
ter be made at all. Amity with the Amir was also 
the keynote of Kitchener’s policy, but he thought that 
Habibullah’s impending visit to India would result in 
a reliable understanding. He told the Viceroy that, 
after examining the whole length of the frontier from 


150 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER  cauxm 


Nushki to the Pamirs, he was unable to say where, 
failing the Kabul—Kandahar line, we should be able 
with advantage of terrain and the support of the 
Afghans to withstand a Russian advance.! He also 
reminded him that Afghan anarchy might conceiv- 
ably render a partition of the country almost compul- 
sory. But behind all contingencies loomed the larger 
danger never absent from his mind. ‘‘I need not,’’ 
he wrote just then, ‘‘enlarge on the ever-present pos- 
sibility of European complications capable of react- 
ing on our position in the Middle Kast.”’ 


The whole discussion at that time proved abortive, 
for, after two civil engineers of first-rate importance 
had given diametrically opposite opinions as to the 
two lines, strategic railways, on the making of which 
Kitchener laid such stress, were strangled in their 
birth by the economical hand of Mr. Morley.? 


1 Lord Roberts when in India had represented that ‘nothing will tend 
so much to pacify the frontier tribesmen as the construction of a railway 
through their territory.” 

2 Mr. Morley was raised to the peerage in 1908. 


CHAPTER LXIV 


Tue more Kitchener calculated the bearings of Indian 
Defence the more convinced he was that there existed 
no accepted programme of military policy in the larger 
sense. It was indeed commonly, though vaguely, un- 
derstood that India might some day have to resist 
Russia and render help to the Amir. But there had 
been no true grasp of the obligations and responsi- 
bilities which might have to be made good by force 
of arms. Kitchener thought the hour propitious for 
taking stock of the position, and for defining our 
military policy: ‘‘We have with us,’’ he wrote in 
July 1905, ‘‘a Viceroy who is an acknowledged expert 
in all that pertains to the Middle Eastern Question”’; 
there was a recently renewed agreement with the 
Amir; there had just been a momentous declaration 
on Imperial policy by the Prime Minister. 

At the request of the Viceroy the Commander-in- 
Chief submitted a Note—with special reference to 
the Frontier—which might assist the Government to 
arrive at some consistent policy, and define its peace 
strategy. The Note referred to the unfortunate lack 
of decision and policy which had so long marked our 
dealings both with the Afghans and with the tribes on 
the frontier. It was essential that we should first 
weigh well our responsibilities ; next, examine our re- 


sources; and thenformulate our policy. ‘‘We should 
151 


152 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


have definite objects in view and a definite goal to 
work for. Until we have settled on these, we shall 
never carry the weight and prestige in Asia which 
are our due; there will always be danger of flabbiness 
and hesitation in our policy, and certainly there will 
be inefficiency and waste of public money.’’ 

British responsibility for the integrity of the Af- 
ghan frontier was Kitchener’s keynote, and therefore. 
a Russian advance must be a matter for grave con- 
sideration. Recent events had rendered improbable 
any immediate danger, but Russia must not be thought 
of as ‘‘crippled for a generation.’’ To say that any 
allusion to a Russian threat was panic-mongering 
was to ignore our solemn guarantee of the integrity 
of the Amir’s dominions and our pledge to defend 
his frontiers; and Russia might even hope to re- 
establish her loss of Asiatic prestige by seizing 
Northern Afghanistan or Herat—a step which she 
could take with comparative ease and little risk. A 
crisis might arise suddenly. A minor local squabble 
on the Russo-Afghan border might develop into an 
‘‘incident’’ and Russia, with a manufactured griev- 
ance, might address the British Government as re- 
sponsible for Afghan external relations. The Amir, 
politely deaf to our representations, might decline to 
give compensation or to admit any wrong. If, there- 
upon, Russia were to notify us of her intention to 
exact reparation from Afghanistan by force, should 
we accept the challenge? There would for us be only 
the suicidal alternative—which Russia might indeed 
be cynically contemplating—of shirking our responsi- 
bilities by a quibble as to the exact nature of our 
guarantee to the Amir, and leaving him in the lurch. 
Our prestige in Asia would then evaporate; Russia 


LXIV RELATIONS WITH THE AMIR 153 


would have gained a base some hundreds of miles 
nearer India, and we should have alienated the ruler 
and most of the people of Afghanistan. 

Kitchener invited his colleagues to ponder well, in 
the light of all innovations, the chances of an invasion 
and the means of frustrating it. Russia might move 
only a few steps at a time—always hoping that we 
should view her occupation of ground as only tem- 
porary; she might consolidate each new position, 
obtain a succession of jumping-off places, and pro- 
gressively facilitate any offensive design. Our plain 
policy was to regard any encroachment—even on the 
Panjdeh scale—as an act of war to be resisted. Yet 
under existing conditions we could make no vigorous 
reply, and might well have to turn a blind eye to 
foreign aggression from a sense of helplessness to 
deal with it. 

The Note, having indicated the military difficulties, 
described how these could best be met. To readjust 
our peace strategy was the first requisite. We had 
promised more than we could perform. Our diplo- 
macy had outrun our military means to make our 
pledges good. There must be a frank military un- 
derstanding with the Amir. The Afghan mood 
might be a little uncertain, but then the British atti- 
tude had not been quite stable. In a sharp conflict 
of ideas about necessary measures it was difficult 
to devise any workable plan for joint action. At 
one time we poured in money and arms; at another 
we withheld both, because uncertain how they would 
be used. There was underlying mutual suspicion; 
suspicion is apt to breed dislike, and dislike may 
always issue in something much worse. 

We should come to definite conclusions with the 


154 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


Amir, or he and we should part company. The Brit- 
ish Government had recently declared that Afghanis- 
tan constituted the most important land frontier of 
the Empire, where might well occur the struggle for 
the mastery of the Middle East. Let the Amir be 
positively assured of our reliance on our own arms 
and that we do not desire a foot of Afghan territory, 
but that our respective interests could only be pre- 
served either by cordial co-operation or by complete 
independence. The Amir would probably feel that 
he could not single-handed resist Russia, even if 
provided by us with money and arms; and could cer- 
tainly not rival Japan, who had herself borrowed 
Kuropean methods. 

If the Amir should consider that his safety lay in 
an intimate alliance with ourselves, let defence meas- 
ures be concerted. India could afford to be liberal 
as to armaments. But the curtain should be rung 
down on the farce of a one-sided military alliance; if 
the Amir should decide to stand out, we should make 
our own arrangements for the defence of India with- 
out further reference to him, and it might remain 
for us to consider ourselves absolved from all 
further military responsibility regarding Afghan- 
istan. 

Moreover, if Russia, by absorbing Northern 
Afghanistan, advanced her frontier to the line of the 
Hindu Kush, we should in self-defence advance our 
frontiers to the same alignment. Afghanistan 
would lose her independence, like the Central Asian 
Khanates and Baluchistan. 

The old notion of ‘‘a weak and friendly Afghan- 
istan’’ was very much out-of-date. It was negatived 
already by the Amir who, largely with our help and 


LXIV A FRONTIER POLICY 155 


our active connivance, was day by day waxing in 
strength.! 

In the second part of the Note Kitchener further 
outlined the frontier policy for war. Between India 
and the eventual battle-field was a belt of country 
inhabited by a hostile and fanatical people, to con- 
ciliate whom would be as easy as to fondle a brood of 
tiger cats. Forty years of alternate coaxing and 
correction had left these tribes only the more trucu- 
lent. The presence on our flanks and communications 
of well-armed and treacherous hordes was a grave 
risk; and if actual hostilities should occur it might 
require 50,000 of our best troops to control them. 
Kitchener had no very sensational or sweeping sug- 
gestions to make. He did not even think it necessary 
to occupy—as had formerly been authoritatively 
agreed upon—the whole border up to the Durand line. 
But he did advocate our dealing immediately with 
that tract of the frontier which, with its command of 
our two main lines of communication into Afghanis- 
tan, formed a real danger-spot should war break out. 

The tribes should not be bribed, nor allowed to 
think we are afraid of them; they should rather see 
that we intend to control them, and that, if absolutely 


1A Staff officer in India wrote to a friend in England: “Much that has 
been said of our policy of distrusting the Afghans is absolutely true, 
and is what Lord K. has urged over and over again, both as regards 
the Amir, and all the Mullahs and tribal leaders as well. A policy of 
making use of them, but showing marked distrust, is not only undiplomatic 
but is absolutely opposed to the simple rules of etiquette as observed by the 
Pathans and Afghans, whether from a worldly or a religious point of view. 
Make friends of them, or else make them afraid of you; but don’t make use 
of them when it suits you, and then try to assume a bullying tone which they 
know is not going to be supported by a fortiter in re attitude. Our policy 
for years has tended to stir up resentment and contempt among the more 
virile tribesmen, and a doubt of our sincerity and fair dealing among the 
remainder, which leads them to believe that, however much we may promise 
protection, it will not be afforded if it does not appear expedient at the 
Moment” (13.8.06). 


156 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


compelled by their ill-behaviour to enter their dis- 
trict, we should come to stay. 

It was not enough, the Note urged, that the tribes 
should be peaceable in peace time; their quiescence 
must be proof against the preaching of fanaticism, 
the greed for plunder, or the rumour of British re- 
verses. ‘To attain this it was certainly not a question 
of doing them deadly injury, but of extending to them 
our protection and, if they should expressly ask for 
it, of incorporating them in the Indian Empire. 

The trend of Kitchener’s mind as to India’s treat- 
ment of the Frontier tribes was shown in his recom- 
mendations for dealing with the Waziris and the 
Mahsuds. Our past treatment of the latter had been 
one long story of failure; many expedients had been 
tried, but our relations with them had drifted from 
bad to worse. The Home Government’s chief idea 
seemed to be that raiding parties should be set to do 
as much damage as possible, with punitive columns 
to follow them up. But while the Frontier Militia 
were not equal to punitive operations, a movement 
of Regular troops in anything like strength might 
precipitate a Mahsud crisis. In one blockade it had 
been found necessary to employ, besides the Militia, 
no less than nineteen Regular battalions, four cav- 
alry regiments, and three batteries of artillery. 

Kitchener averred that the present policy offered 
no hope of a permanent settlement. Nor could any- 
thing be less happy than our fitful flirtations—now 
with the Mullah, now with the Maliks. Lord Curzon 
in 1902 had justly condemned all recent schemes as 
‘mere patchwork,’’ but had added that ‘‘not until 
the military steam-roller had passed over the country 
from end to end would there be peace.’’ From the 


LXIV WAZIRIS AND MAHSUDS 157 


latter dictum Kitchener dissented, believing the pas- 
sage of the steam-roller would serve neither human- 
ity nor justice. The innocent would be apt to suffer 
and the guilty to wriggle out; the political result 
would be small and transient; our great defensive 
aim would be in no way forwarded. 

The remedy was not to be sought in expectations 
which promised no final settlement. Perhaps life 
and property on the Waziristan border were less 
secure just then than at any other time since our 
occupation of the Tochi and Gumal valleys. Our 
own subjects within the administered boundary, as 
well as the people of the protected areas, were bitterly 
complaining of our inability to afford them even a 
moderate measure of security. In default of other 
measures we had been forced to issue large quantities 
of modern arms to villagers—a procedure by no 
means free from peculiar and grave dangers. Mean- 
while the sepoys of the Militia had been sorely tried, 
being unable to move except in large parties; many 
had been brutally murdered, and one flayed alive and 
hacked to pieces. Even our Regular troops had for 
many months endured a bitter experience. 

The ‘‘Hit-and-Scuttle’’ method must be aban- 
doned, and a permanent remedy sought in the occupa- 
tion and administration of the Mahsud territory—a 
prescription rendered the more necessary by the gen- 
eral unrest in the world of Islam. A rupture with 
Afghanistan would be followed by the raising of a 
jthad, and a hostile combination against India of the 
border tribes now outside our control, whose fighting 
strength was reckoned at 309,000, and who had in 
three years absorbed 90,000 breech-loading rifles, of 
which 26,000 had been acquired quite recently. The 


158 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


Mahsuds alone were 12,000 strong, and their supply 
of modern arms had multiplied from 2648 rifles in 
1908 to 8453 in 1909. The longer just and justifiable 
action were delayed, the more difficult must it 
become. 

Kitchener advised that the occupation of the 
Mahsud territory should be carried out at the invita- 
tion of the Maliks—an invitation which need not 
be very difficult to procure. But on no account 
should the Indian Government preface this move by 
the injudicious announcement of our intention not 
to remain in occupation of Mahsud territory, which 
would alienate many of our friends, and throw the 
whole tribe into the arms of the Mullah. 

He then advocated the framing of a Government 
declaration on these lines: (1) An expression of re- 
gret that, owing to the inability of the Maliks to re- 
strain the lawlessness of certain sections of the tribe,* 
Government had, at the Maliks’ own invitation, been 
compelled to take up arms for the protection of its 
subjects and the punishment of evil-doers. (2) An 
announcement that the country was to be perma- 
nently occupied, though administered on a tribal 
basis. (3) An assurance that all peaceful inhabi- 
tants should be unmolested, provided they laid down 
their arms; and that no crops should be destroyed 
or villages burnt, unless active opposition were of- 
fered. (4) A promise to the tribesmen of oppor- 
tunities of future service in the army, militia, and 


1A General Officer wrote home: ‘As to frontier outrages, some of the 
questions in the House are nothing but incentives to fanatics in India to 
murder the first white man they see, and all of them are reproduced in the 
inflammatory native Press with their own remarks thereon. If these 
frontier outrages are to continue unpunished, the life of a British officer 
will be considered on the frontier as of less value than that of a dog in the 
eyes of our people’ (5.7.06). 


LXIV THE MAHSUDS 159 


levies, when the country had peacefully settled down. 
(5) An order for their complete disarmament, 
coupled with an assurance of protection against 
outside raiders. And, as a bonne bouche, it was 
suggested that a settlement on these lines need take 
but little time and cost but little cash. 


CHAPTER LXV 


In 1897 the Government of India had decided to sub- 
stitute locally-recruited Militia corps for Regulars in 
all posts held by our troops in the tribal country lying 
between the old administrative border and the Du- 
rand line. The custody of the Khaibar was given to 
the Khaibar Rifles, and the Kuram and North and 
South Waziristan were to be guarded, each by its own 
Militia. It was judged prudent, however, in the 
Samana and Zhob valleys, to retain garrisons of 
Regulars as a support to the Militia. Kitchener 
agreed, both as to the general futility of locking up 
Regular troops in isolated advanced posts, and as 
to the exception of the Samana and the Zhob; deem- 
ing it most unwise to withdraw reliable soldiers 
from these valleys, or even from North and South 
Waziristan, at any rate until the fitness and fidelity 
of the Militia had been thoroughly tested. 

In his tour of the frontier from Chaman to Chitral 
in 1903 the Commander-in-Chief was favourably im- 
pressed by the quality and efficiency of the force 
there; but he thought it a mistake that their numbers 
should barely suffice to man the works: 


The tribes know to a man the strength of these detached 
garrisons, and it would greatly add to the strength of the 
posts and the prestige of Government in these districts if 
they were not reduced to the absolute limits necessary to 


man the perimeter of the works. 
160 


CHAP. LXV FRONTIER MILITIA 161 


He recommended such an increase as would enable 
the Militia, in the event of an outbreak, to police the 
country, and the recommendation was put into effect, 
as far as it was possible to obtain serviceable recruits. 
The behaviour of the Waziri tribesmen had been the 
reverse of exemplary, and various acts of misconduct 
having culminated in a murderous attack by Sepoy 
Ghazis on their own British officers, it was found 
necessary to leaven the corps with Pathans of non- 
local tribes. 

Proposals were just then put forward in Council to 
withdraw the Regular troops from the Samana and 
to hand over Fort Lockhart to the Samana Rifles. 
Kitchener voiced military opinion in a strong protest, 
pointing out that on the Samana we dominated the 
border-line between our territory and the Orakzais, 
who grumbled openly at our tenure of the ridge, 
which they ardently coveted and coolly claimed. As 
he reminded his civilian colleagues, a hostile tribal 
force would be restrained from attacking the railway 
or entering our territory by the chastening reflection 
that the only route would leave Fort Lockhart in 
their rear, and that the British garrison could easily 
cut off their retreat. Moreover, if the fort, entrusted 
to a Militia garrison, were lost by misadventure or 
treachery, its recapture might prove difficult and ex- 
pensive. His argument was stiffened by the unrest 
already evident among the Afridis, which was to 
compel the Zakka Khel expedition of 1908.1. Obvi- 
ously the moment was peculiarly unsuitable for 


1 Lord Minto then wrote to Lord Morley: ‘‘Kitchener is the very essence 
of caution as regards the frontier. I know no one more anxious to avoid 
frontier expeditions, partly no doubt because he knows that with the vastly 
improved armaments of the tribes one on a big scale would be a very 
serious affair.” (23.3.08.) 

VOL. II M 


162 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


taking liberties with a not too stable military 
position. 

The withdrawal of the Regulars from Samana 
seemed, however, to have a special fascination for 
the Viceroy, who two years later returned to his 
point. He was then at the pains to represent to his 
Council that six years ago the Samana Rifles had 
been raised, with the consent of Sir William Lock- 
hart, for the express purpose of taking over the post; 
but he seemed to have forgotten that Lockhart’s 
consent was contingent on a body of British troops 
being permanently cantoned in the Miranzai valley 
—a condition which had never been fulfilled. Kitch- 
ener, backed on this occasion by all the Members of 
Council, was fain to withstand the Viceroy once 
more. He believed that the question, trivial as it 
might seem superficially, involved, not only the loyal 
performance of our obligations to the Amir, but even 
the defence of India itself : 


If we are to hope to carry out our obligations satisfactor- 
ily, there must be no possible shadow of doubt regarding the 
absolute safety of our communications on both the Khaibar 
and the Kuram lines of advance. The former line is not 
now under discussion. I will therefore confine myself to 
the question of the Kuram. 

For something like a hundred miles of its length the 
Kuram line of communications is flanked on the north by 
tribal territory. Our occupation of the Samana I regard as 
at all,times a valuable guarantee for the preservation of rea- 
sonable security, and in time of war such occupation would 
be vitally essential. We have now held the ridge for many 
years. Any feelings of irritation at what the tribes doubt- 
less at first regarded as our aggression must by now have 
passed away, and even if they had not I should not allow 
them to weigh against the much more important reasons in 


ue SAMANA | 163 


favour of our retaining command of the Samana by means 
of regular troops. I gather that even the most enthusiastic 
supporters of the project to depend solely on the militia will 
not tell us that there is no risk. There is risk, and consider- 
able risk, and so long as this is the case I cannot agree to take 
any chances where issues so important are at stake. If once 
we lost hold of the Samana through the defection or the un- 
reliability of the militia, we could only take it at consider- 
able loss, and its recapture would be but the beginning of a 
formidable frontier war which we all desire to avoid. So 
long as we retain regular troops there, the temptation of 
_ the tribes to rise and take the Samana will remain at a 
minimum. 

His Excellency remarks, justly enough, that he has been 
unable so far to put the finishing touch on the policy initi- 
ated six years ago because each year some new reason or ex- 
euse has been put forward by the military authorities against 
it. . . . I do not think that I will be held to have obstructed 
this matter merely in order to provide the ladies of the Ko- 
hat garrison with a hill station. On the contrary, J am so 
keenly in sympathy with His Excellency’s frontier policy as 
a whole in this respect, that I would gladly have assisted its 
final completion had I seen my way conscientiously to do so. 
But the more I have studied this question—which is, after 
all, but a small part of a much larger question with which it 
is intimately bound up—the more convinced I am that, on 
military grounds, it would be a grave mistake to withdraw 
the Regular troops from the Samana. I recognise that it is 
unadvisable that the question should be hung up indefi- 
nitely any longer. It should be decided one way or the 
other at once. I can only record my opinion against the 
proposed withdrawal. (3.7.05.) 


Lord Curzon, finding himself in a minority of one, 
was constrained to yield, although clinging to his 
own unwavering opinion, and expressing the hope 


164 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


that the ‘‘military advisers of Government would 
change their view before long.’’ 


The formation of reserves for certain frontier 
militia corps was the subject of a proposal put 
forward in 1905 by Sir Harold Deane, the Agent to 
the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier 
Province. The Viceroy smiled on the suggestion 
and referred it to Kitchener, who fully agreed but 
seized the opportunity to suggest a healthy modifica- 
tion in the terms of service: 


I am very strongly in favour of the principle of creating a 
reserve for our militia forces on the frontier. At present we 
train these tribesmen as soldiers, but instead of retaining a 
claim on their services as reservists—as we do in the case of 
Regular troops—we allow them, after a term of service which 
is usually short, to return to their villages in independent 
country, where we have no hold on them whatever. It is 
evident that we are thus forming a trained body of men among 
these tribes, who would only want a capable and dashing 
leader to become a most dangerous factor in any acute trouble 
between Government and the tribes, or in any period of seri- 
ous friction between ourselves and the Amir of Afghanistan, 
whose preponderating influence over the tribes is notorious. 

I think, however, that it is quite possible in time to bring 
about an improvement in our relations with these tribes by 
gradually and peacefully extending to them the influence of 
the great Indian Empire in the borders of these compara- 
tively small districts, by creating a feeling of confidence in 
us, instead of the suspicion in which we are now held, by 
opening to them sources of trade and profit, and by showing 
them, by every means in our power, that it is to their in- 
terest to join hands with us and become a loyal part of the 
Indian Raj. (26.9.05.) 


The contention, though it countered the original 


LXV A MILITIA RESERVE 165 


terms of enlistment, was well grounded. Kitch- 
ener held that, in order to secure the maximum value 
from the militia, and at the same time minimise 
their possibilities for harm, their obligations should 
extend, in case of war, to services anywhere in the 
Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind, or 
Baluchistan; and that they should be liable to come 
under the ordinary military code of the Indian Army. 
This proved to be the last military point on which 
Lord Curzon differed from military opinion; his 
successor in office asked Deane to submit fresh pro- 
posals, the result being the adoption of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief’s recommendation—sweetened by 
the grant of pensions to the various militias. 


CHAPTER LXVI 


KITCHENER’s purpose to secure a general prepared- 
ness for war was backed by the keen sense of a par- 
ticular war impending in the near future. Hence 
the significance of a discussion at the Simla Confer- 
ence of Lieutenant-Generals held in June 1905, on the 
advantages of Homogeneous Brigades, composed 
wholly either of British or of Native battalions, as 
compared with Mixed Brigades made up partly of 
British and partly of Native battalions. For tribal 
warfare on the frontier the Mixed Brigade had argu- 
able advantages; but for a prospective war, in which 
nine divisions might take the field, Homogeneous 
Brigades would be easier to supply and administer, 
and so to mancuvre. 

Experience had shown that under the Mixed Bri- 
gade system square men had not infrequently been 
put into round holes and vice versa. To Native 
troops had been allotted tasks which called for the 
parade-ground steadiness and perhaps for the lack 
of imagination peculiarly characteristic of British 
troops, and the converse was illustrated when, on the 
march, physical difficulties of ground were as formi- 
dable to the British as they were easily negotiable for 

1 Kitchener used to say that the lack of imagination with which the 


British soldier is sometimes twitted is a characteristic which at any rate 
prevents the possibility of defeat occurring to him. 


CHAP. LXVI MIXED BRIGADES 167 


the Indian soldiers. The objection which was put 
out that the formation of racial brigades might con- 
stitute a political danger was met by the simple reply 
that class brigades were not under contemplation. 

Kitchener wrote to Roberts from Mandalay 
(December 4, 1904) : 


I hear unofficially that the India Office is making some 
difficulty about my proposed Brigade formation for Mixed 
Divisions in case of war. Of course this does not apply to 
small wars, where Mixed Brigades of British and Native 
troops could be used; but in a big war, with seven or nine 
Divisions in the field, it would be, for supply and transport 
reasons, impossible to employ Mixed Brigades. It is merely 
a question of proportion; when you have large forces in the 
field the Brigade is no more than the Regiment in small 
wars; and consequently, if you have the proportion of Brit- 
ish troops in the Division it is practically the same, and far 
handier to use them. I do not, of course, intend that British 
troops are to be separated from Native. They will be 
trained with Native troops, and fight in all small wars as 
Mixed Brigades; but when we mobilise for the big war the 
Division will be the unit. I enclose an Allotment for 
Mobilisation which has gone out, and which will show you 
what can be done. 


The Government of India pressed this reform at 
home, and it received the necessary sanction. 


The self-contained unit for war—in India as 
throughout the Empire—was to be the Division. In 
case of foreign complications the equivalent of eight 
Divisions would be despatched from home, when the 
Division—as a ready-made unit in India—would 
provide a framework into which British Brigades 
could be comfortably and conveniently fitted. Under 


168 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


the Divisional system the British soldier would also 
be better and more easily supplied; and Kitchener, 
knowing how entirely Roberts would share his 
solicitude for the soldier in the field, appealed to him: 


I think every Division is a really good fighting force, and 
I certainly should not care for the responsibility of taking 
the Army into the field if the British troops were further 
broken up. You know what ‘‘Tommy’’ is—if he does not get 
his food he won’t fight ; and I see no possibility of his doing 
so if he is scattered through numerous brigades. I hope you 
will agree with my view. We can work in the reinforce- 
ments from England quite easily with this system. 


As the Division was the unit fixed upon for war, 
so it was to be the school for the training of all three 
Arms; Divisions and Brigades were, if possible, to 
consist of the units which would be associated on 
active service. Devolution being of the essence of 
the new order, General Officers Commanding Divi- 
sions and independent Brigades were desired to draw 
up their own annual training programmes and submit 
them for the information of the Commanders of the 
two Armies and of the Chief of the Staff. General 
directions, issued from Army Headquarters, pro- 
vided for a strenuous and searching course; but cli- 
matic conditions were so diverse, and garrison duties 
so multifarious, that the Divisional Commanders 
were left to lay down their own courses of training. 
A scarcely less arduous period was to be devoted to 
regimental competitions, rifle meetings, and prepara- 
tions for assaults-at-arms; but training was on no 
account to interfere with normal leave and furlough. 

The new War Division, complete with its divisional 
troops precisely as it would take the field, made a fine 
first appearance at the Rawal-Pindi maneuvres held 


LXVI THE DIVISION AS WAR UNIT 169 


in honour of the Prince and Princess of Wales in 
December 1905.1. Each infantry Division went by in 
Brigades, presenting a front of nearly 200 yards. 
The Divisional Cavalry and Horse Artillery marched 
on the outer flanks in mass, the Field Artillery being 
in column of batteries. The Pioneer Mail was moved 
to glowing periods: 


One saw a mass of men moving in what may be compared 
to a forest of bayonets, save where the Rifle regiments were 
placed, and the regimental colours rose above the helmets 
and turbans to mark the position of this or that regiment. 
Squads of scarlet, khaki, or rifle-green moved slowly past, 
and the impression made by this mass of infantry will long 
be remembered by all who saw the review. 


To the training of the troops in their new forma- 
tions and localities and under the new conditions, the 
Commander-in-Chief brought to bear, not his ‘‘pre- 
conceived notions’’ but his abundant and varied ex- 
perience. He knew—no one better—that the quali- 
ties nowadays required in the soldier were individ- 
uality and initiative, and in South Africa he had 
marked with satisfaction the willingness of junior 
officers and non-commissioned officers to accept re- 
sponsibility. The worst type of officer, in his 
judgement, was the man who considered his duty 
done when he had reported a difficulty to his next 
senior. 

He laid down? that for the Indian soldier, less 
instructed than his British brother, it is peculiarly 
necessary to encourage his intelligence and initiative 


1To Lady Salisbury: ‘‘The Prince and Princess have nearly finished 
their tour. It has been a great success and they have made themselves 
very popular. Very many thanks for the bridge markers. They will be 
very useful, as I never had anything of the sort. I am not a player myself, 
but the Staff and guests play.” (14.12.05.) 

2 Memorandum of April 1904. 


170 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


up to the limits imposed by discipline. This indi- 
vidual training was, above all, to be thorough. The 
native soldier readily acquires a soldierly bearing 
and picks up his drill; but under emergeney—espe- 
cially if bereft of his British officer—he is often pre- 
disposed to helplessness, and needs special tutoring 
to meet the unforeseen. Officers and non-commis- 
sioned officers were to qualify for independent com- 
mand in the field, and a beginning must be made at 
the bottom of the scale, constant opportunities for its 
exercise being afforded even to the youngest sub- 
altern. 


Mistakes will of course be made. But neither the young 
officer nor the rising non-commissioned officer should be dis- 
couraged by constant and sometimes harassing corrections. 
They should be allowed to carry out their plans, each in his 
own way, to their legitimate conclusion, so that they can see 
their mistakes for themselves; and then, if necessary, the 
superintending officer can with greater advantage point out 
any errors which have been made, explain their causes, and 
show how they may be avoided in future. Such a method 
of instruction, while impressing its lessons more vividly on 
the young officer and those around him, is the best insurance 
against their making similar mistakes in war. On the other 
hand, if a young officer or non-commissioned officer is 
sharply corrected as soon as he begins to make a mistake, he 
not only loses the benefit—so invaluable to himself and 
others—of seeing his errors and how they arose, but also that 
independence of thought and action, which it is our aim and 
object to foster and develop, receives a check from which it 
is slow to recover. 


It was specially enjoined that an officer’s education 
should not be restricted to his own branch of the 
service. No opportunity was to be missed of working 


LXVI TRAINING OF TROOPS 171 


the three Arms together, and Commanding Officers 
were at first a little dismayed at being told that they 
‘‘should always be ready, by mutual agreement, to 
place portions of their units at each other’s disposal.”’ 

The nemesis of neglect of training was illustrated 
from recent history, certain unpleasant occasions be- 
ing recalled when failure was directly traceable to an 
overweening confidence and a readiness to accept the 
placid theory that the British Army, even if imper- 
fectly trained, can deal with any enemy it is likely 
to meet. The moral was sharply drawn that to 
shirk real preparation for war was to court disaster. 


There are many cases to show that from such soothing be- 
liefs there may be a rude awakening. In the day of battlea 
Commander may find that his troops are not so well trained 
as he has fondly imagined, and that his Staff itself leaves 
something to be desired; that the whole military machine is 
in fact inefficient, and is not working smoothly. But it is 
too late then to remedy such shortcomings. It is during 
peace that we must prepare for war by making every com- 
ponent part of the machine—however apparently small and 
insignificant—thoroughly sound and serviceable. 


One of the expedients for improving training was 
a novel form of testing infantry units. It became a 
bone of contention between military experts whether 
success or failure had waited on this, so called, 
‘*Kitchener’s test,’’ its critics often forgetting that 
it was meant merely to serve a special purpose and 
not necessarily to recur. Regimental inspection had 
not proved altogether felicitous. Battalions heard 
of their own defects, but had no knowledge of how 
they compared with other units, and there was.a not 
infrequent tendency towards regimental faddism. 
By a system of marks for proficiency in various sub- 


172 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER czmoep. rxv1 


jects the ‘‘test’’ would inform battalions as to their 
relative merits, elicit special qualities, and bring to 
light the neglect of any particular subject. Marks 
were to be given for marching, attack of positions, 
bivouac duties, outposts, night operations, defence of 
positions, retirements, transport duties, and miscel- 
laneous duties, with deductions for inefficiency, 
whether marching, military, or personal. If the 
ratio of inefficients in hospital through preventable 
disease exceeded a certain percentage, marks were to 
be deducted. 

The Commander-in-Chief explained that his object 
had been to stimulate interest and create a spirit of 
healthy emulation. He believed that the test had 
brought about more progress in one year than would 
have been possible in five years had the competitive 
element been absent. While the standard of training 
in the best regiments was shown to be excellent, 
many failings had been exposed and could be cor- 
rected; and Infantry Commanding Officers, knowing 
what was expected of them, would be able to secure 
uniformity in training. The competition had been 
very useful, and its effect would not be evanescent. 
But, as the heaviest competitive work was bound to 
fall on the most successful Regiments, it was decided 
that for the future battalions should be judged among 
themselves in their own Brigades and Divisions. 


CHAPTER LXVII 


AurHoucH Kitchener—like Roberts, Wolseley, and 
other eminent soldiers—had never passed through 
the Staff College, he was keenly alive to its high 
value, and conscious of the cachet which it set on an 
officer’s career. He knew also that there were many 
excellent Indian Army officers whose purses were not 
long enough for a two years’ course at Camberley, 
and who were therefore debarred from competing for 
entrance. In order that service in India should not 
be penalised in this respect, he proposed to start a 
Staff College at Quetta, where officers would retain 
their Indian pay and live more economically than 
in England. The Indian institution was to be in 
every way a counterpart of Camberley, with the 
same rules, curriculum, and examinations, and even 
with identical lectures and a possible interchange 
of Professors and an inspection by the Camberley 
Commandant. 

The scheme, readily acquiesced in by the India 
Government, was challenged at home, where the au- 
thorities were haunted by misgivings lest the estab- 
lishment of a Staff College in India should create a 
separate school of thought, and so enhance and stere- 
otype the existing diversities of military opinion. 
The reply to this point was laconic: it was repre- 


sented to the Imperial Defence Committee that ‘‘the 
173 


174 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


Army has no military school of thought.’’ On mili- 
tary subjects a few individual officers lead current 
opinion—some one way, some another: ‘‘I only 
wish there was more thoughtful research, and more 
effort to base opinions on well-digested knowledge.”’ 

As regards the divergence of training, which the 
War Office seemingly apprehended, it was suggested 
in reply that Staff training is based on definite lines 
which do not admit of any great variation, and that 
the aim of the Staff College, wherever situated, is 
not to breed a school of military thought, but to im- 
part an instructional course of two years’ duration, 
by which officers acquire, as they cannot do elsewhere, 
a sense and a knowledge of their professional duty: 
“Tt is not unlike a veterinary or signalling or engi- 
neering course or class, and bears no resemblance to 
the system of education at ‘colleges’ in England.”’ 
Nor would any changes ever be proposed for the In- 
dian college unless they were also adopted, or at 
least approved, by the authorities at Camberley. 

A contrast was further drawn, not very flattering 
to ourselves, between the Staff immediately available 
for our campaign in South Africa and that which 
controlled the recent Japanese operations. The la- 
mentable shortage of trained British Staff officers 
was thrown into higher relief by a comparison with 
the startling excellence of the Japanese Staff.1 But 
even if the Government conceded that Kitchener’s 
training theory was arguable, they still boggled at 
his preferring Quetta to an enlarged Camberley. 
The answer to this particular plaint was based on 
conditions and environment—because the training 

1 Kitchener was kept well informed as to Japanese operations by Ian 


Hamilton’s graphic letters, and as soon as the war was over several mem- 
bers of the Headquarters Staff were sent to study the campaign on the spot. 


LXVII A STAFF COLLEGE 175 


in Staff duties is not, and probably never can be, 
compulsory, ‘‘If a Staff College course of instruction 
could be made compulsory for selected officers I 
would willingly and at once give up the Indian Staff 
College.’ 

Compulsion, however, was out of the question, and 
some alternative must be accepted: 


The fact is that the best officers of the Indian Army will 
not go to Camberley, and it does not suit many officers of the 
British Army serving in India to go home for two years: 
(1) Because they cannot afford it; (2) because they are mar- 
ried and settled down in India; (3) because they feel that 
they lose touch with what is going on in India, where possi- 
bly their future lies. 


What weighed with his officers weighed with their 
Chief : 


A young officer gets fond of hissurroundings and his sport, 
and does not like such a break in his life, which also costs him 
money, unless he has some special reasons forit. To join the 
Staff College here only means for a man a change of Station, 
not a change of life. Horses, servants, household gods go 
with him to his quarters at the Staff College, and he incurs 
no more expense there than he would have in his own regi- 
ment. What officers dread is the outside expenses in Eng- 
land. 


The officers who had gone from India to Camberley 
had not always been conspicuously successful. In- 
deed, out of the whole number of these, only two were 
found eligible for the first appointments of Comman- 
dant and Instructor at Quetta; and a chorus of 
Generals—echoed by confidential reports from Cam- 
berley—testified to the disconcerting fact that in 
many cases officers who had not been through the 


176 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER cz.txvm 


mill were better qualified for Staff duties than their 
more erudite colleagues. 


It is these officers whom I want to catch and train for the 
Staff in war. It is not that we have not capable officers out 
here, but that they won’t go to Camberley. . . . In default 
of their going there they must get Staff training either at 
Quetta or not at all. 


The Quetta institution quickly rose to all that its 
founder expected of it, and Kitchener, in addressing 
the students for the last time, and urging on them 
the importance of ‘‘learning how to learn’’ and to 
“delight in learning,’’ gratified his audience by tell- 
ing them that what pleased him most was the tone 
that pervaded the place: ‘‘It is exactly what I hoped 
it would be, both among professors and students.’’ 


At the Staff College Dinner in 1906 Kitchener fore- 
shadowed the formation on modern lines of a General 
Staff? for the Indian Army, and a year later it was 
enjoined on the new General Staff that it was their 
first duty to think—that their thinking must be 
directed solely to furthering the intentions of their 
General, who should be able to use their brains as 
though they were an extension of his own. The pa- 
per provided for the careful selection of officers for 
the General Staff, who after a period of service with 
it were to return to regimental duty; but it struck at 
the too frequent tendency of Staff Officers to lord it 
over their regimental brethren—a tendency not 
wholly absent even in the Great War, where the 
issues hung mainly upon the efforts of the regi- 
mental officer. 


1In a Memorandum submitted to the Government Kitchener had laid 
great stress on the importance of a competent General Staff for War. 


CHAPTER LXVIII 


Tue question of promoting native gentlemen to the 
higher grades of the Indian Army was a theme which 
after some years’ fitful discussion had been laid aside. 
As long agoas 1885 the Military Member, Sir George 
Chesney, and the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Roberts, 
had expressed diametrically opposite opinions on the 
subject, Chesney maintaining that the Indian Army 
suffered from the exclusion of natives from the higher 
military commands, while Roberts grounded his ob- 
jection to the proposal on the strong feeling inveter- 
ate to all ranks of the British Army that natives are 
neither physically nor morally their equals: 


It is this consciousness of the inherent superiority of the 
European which has won for us India. However well edu- 
cated and clever a native may be, and however brave he may 
have proved himself, I believe that no rank that we could 
bestow upon him would cause him to be considered as an 
equal by the British officer, or looked up to by the British 
soldier in the same way that he looks up to the last-joined 
subaltern. . . . Thus, for the present at any rate, the grant 
of such commissions to Indian gentlemen as would neces- 
sarily place them on the same footing as British officers, is 
in my opinion much to be deprecated. 


Roberts, however, was willing that the experiment 
should be tried of raising a Corps under native offi- 
cers, so long as they bore no British titles or rank. 

Chesney bowed for the time to Roberts’s judgment, 
but two years later revived the question, pleading 


that, whereas in civil life almost every avenue of em- 
VOL. II 177 N 


178 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


ployment and promotion was now open to a qualified 
native, his military career was abruptly cut short at 
field rank. The Military Member, regarding this 
differential treatment as doomed, asked for the es- 
tablishment of a military school for natives of good 
family who might there study their profession and 
learn to transact business in the English language. 
Roberts strongly dissented, and, reciting again the 
old lesson of the Mutiny, dangled before the eyes of 
the Government the possibility of highly trained 
native commanders using their knowledge against, 
rather than for, ourselves. 

After the subject had slumbered again for two 
years, it was roused by the Punjab and Bombay 
Governments, who hatched out fresh schemes for 
imparting the higher military instruction to native 
officers. Though these particular proposals were 
not favoured by Chesney, he took the opportunity to 
renew his own, while Roberts warmly protested, ‘‘I 
would resist the beginnings on however small a 
seale.’? Nor did he agree that the real difficulty in 
improving the native officer’s position was one of edu- 
cation: ‘‘In India, the least warlike races possess 
the highest intellectual capacities. The Gurkhas 
and Pathans, and to a less extent the Sikhs, are noto- 
riously as averse to mental exertion as they are 
fond of manly sports—as apt to fight as they are 
slow to learn. Once make education the chief crite- 
rion of fitness for command, and you place the most 
desirable candidates at a disadvantage possibly over- 
whelming.’’ 

Roberts’s three successors in office took no action 
in the matter, but in 1904 there was propounded the 
establishment of a military school for candidates for 


LXVIII NATIVE COMMISSIONS 179 


direct commissions in the Native Army. The scheme 
was submitted to Commanding Officers for their opin- 
ion, and referred to a conference of Lieutenant-Gen- 
erals in 1905, when Kitchener boldly pronounced 
that the dread of mutiny was an anachronism and 
must not hinder efficiency. The time had come to 
open certain doors to native officers, to increase their 
responsibility and to raise their status. The Gen- 
erals agreed nem. con., and voted for a military 
school at which both candidates for direct commis- 
sions, and non-commissioned officers selected for ac- 
celerated promotion, could receive proper profes- 
sional training. -The Commander-in-Chief prepared 
proposals for this, to be introduced when an oppor- 
tunity should offer, as financial and political consid- 
erations just then barred the way. 

It was just then not certain whether the Imperial 
Cadet School for the training of young nobles would 
be kept up, and any new scheme might have to be 
applied, not only to direct commission candidates, 
but to sprigs of lofty families wishful to learn the 
art of war. 

A military trainmg—and a commission as 2nd 
Lieutenant—had been given to young Indian gentle- 
men without a special prescription for their 
future employment; and special posts as Aides- 
de-camp, or in the Supply and Transport De- 
partment, had been not quite satisfactory ex- 
pedients. 

Mr. Morley, soon after he came into office, having 
been petitioned by friends of these young officers, 
proposed that a certain number of regiments should 
be officered chiefly by natives. 

Kitchener wrote: 


180 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


I have considered the question from every point of view 
and have discussed it with very many of those in India 
whose opinion is entitled to the most weight. I enclose a pa- 
per* which embodies the conclusions to which I have ar- 
rived. The difficulty of finding a practical solution of this 
most delicate question is immense, for, although there is a 
general consensus of opinion among the senior British offi- 
cers of the Indian Army that some measure of reform is re- 
quired, I cannot find any remedial means likely to secure the 


1 The memorandum was an exhaustive minute which contained, not only 
a record of Kitchener’s own. views. regarding the admission of natives of 
India for higher military employment, but also a complete review of the 
whole subject with the opinions of the leading authorities on almost every 
point involved. From it there stood out three complete proposals: 

“First, that the bar to the higher regimental promotion of native officers 
should be removed and that we should proceed slowly and cautiously to 
promote those who may be found in every way fitted for advancement. 

“Secondly, that in order to create a type of native officer qualified for 
such promotion, a Military College is essential. 

“Thirdly, that to prevent congestion in the army and enable native 
officers to have a sufficiently attractive career held out to them, a certain 
number of civil appointments must not merely be open to them, but must 
actually be reserved for them, of course under such rules in regard to proba- 
tion as will ensure their capability to perform the duties entrusted to them.” 
Kitchener added: “The second and third of these points are conditions 
precedent to the introduction of the first point, and, unless they can be 
conceded, I should not be prepared to move in the matter at all, but I 
do not imagine that they will meet with any serious opposition. Criticism 
will centre on their eligibility for higher positions in the army which 
it is proposed to bestow on direct commissioned native officers. I am 
well aware that this proposal will be attacked from both sides, one party 
objecting to Indians being allowed to occupy such positions at all, and 
regarding the safeguards provided as illusory and insufficient, the other 
saying that the safeguards are excessive, and will result in the eligibility 
for promotion remaining a dead letter. I believe the truth lies somewhere 
between these two opinions. On the one hand, I am sure that the 
Commanding Officers, having the welfare of their regiments at heart, will 
recommend none but fit and proper persons. On the other hand, I am 
equally sure that the British officers will accept as holders of these posi- 
tions men whom they have learnt to know, to appreciate, and to trust by 
previous intimate association in the same regiment, with a readiness which 
they would not extend to any one, however desirable in other respects, who 
was introduced into the regiment from outside. 

“Nevertheless, I freely admit that the results cannot be precisely foreseen, 
and that experience may show that modifications are required in one 
direction or the other. The main points are that the principle should be 
admitted, and that the Army should understand that Government does not 
mean it to remain altogether inoperative. If the principle be sound and 
be for the good of the Army on the one hand, and of the State on the other, 
no mere prejudices, whether on the part of military officers or of civil 
officials, should be allowed to stand in the way.” 


LXVIII A DELICATE QUESTION 181 


support of the majority. This is due in part to the dislike 
of change and in part to a deep-seated racial repugnance to 
any step which brings nearer the day when Englishmen in 
the Army may have to take orders from Indians. Chiefly, 
however, it is due to an honest belief—which is certainly not 
altogether unfounded—that any substitution of Indians for 
British officers must be detrimental to the efficiency of the 
Army. I have however reason to think that the scheme 
which I have sketched out in the accompanying memoran- 
dum is that which will arouse the least opposition as well as 
being that which will most likely prove a success. 

If it is considered advisable to take further steps in this 
matter I should like first to consult a certain number of 
senior officers of the Army, whom I would select, in order to 
obtain their advice and confidential opinions. 

I would impress upon you very earnestly the arguments I 
had adduced against the proposal to treat suggested changes 
in army organisation in a similar way to political concessions. 
No more serious danger could confront India than that her 
Native Army should make common cause with those who 
agitate for greater political powers, a result which would not 
long be delayed should the army unhappily learn to connect 
political agitation with military concessions and to expect its 
share in the spoil whenever any successful agitation may 
force Government to concede greater powers to the people. 
I have therefore recommended that any grant of pay or ra- 
tions should emanate from His Majesty the King, and should 
be announced in November, so as to be disassociated from the 
political concessions now under consideration which will be 
announced later. I would also suggest that if any change 
in the prospects of native officers for further military ad- 
vancement be decided upon it should be announced without 
any flourish of trumpets. 


Whatever political considerations might militate 
against granting to Native gentlemen an entrance 
into the higher military ranks, there could be no ques- 


182 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


tion as to the advisability of adjusting and in certain 
small ways ameliorating the behaviour and bearing 
of British officers serving in the Indian Army to- 
wards the Native officers. The Queen-Empress had 
impressed on officers proceeding to India with whom 
she was personally acquainted the importance of 
showing the utmost courtesy towards her Indian sub- 
jects, and it was her wishes that Kitchener ex- 
pounded when reminding both officers and men of 
what means so much to the Oriental: 


1. It is of great importance that the conduct and bearing 
of officers of the British Army serving in India towards na- 
tives of the country should at all times be such as to inspire 
respect and confidence. 

2. Officers, and especially young officers, in British units 
are not thrown into that intimate association with natives 
which falls to the lot of officers of the Indian Army and, 
when misunderstandings arise, the cause may not infre- 
quently be traced to ignorance of the customs and preju- 
dices of the people, coupled at times with some lack of con- 
sideration. Officers Commanding units, and all other senior 
officers, should make it their business, while serving in India, 
to study the native character, particularly that of Native 
soldiers, and by example and instruction should strive to 
improve their juniors’ knowledge of the country, and of the 
ways and customs of its inhabitants. ; 

3. The Commander-in-Chief is anxious to do all in his 
power to preserve good feeling between natives of India and 
the British Army, and His Excellency looks to the officers of 
the Army to set an example to their men in this respect. 
Lord Kitchener feels assured that if officers, in their treat- 
ment of, and relations with natives, will always remember, 
first, that they are British officers and gentlemen, and, sec- 
ondly, that the inhabitants of India are, equally with them- 
selves, subjects of the King, a much more satisfactory state 


LXVIU COURTESY TO NATIVES 183 


of feeling will grow up. In this respect it is particularly 
desirable that Native officers should be treated with pro- 
nounced courtesy and consideration, and as the omission of 
small acts of courtesy, unintentional though it may be, is 
liable to give great offence, a few words of explanation for 
those British officers who are new to the country will not 
be out of place. 

4. Native officers should always be given a chair when 
other officers are seated. The word ‘‘twm”’ and ‘‘tumhara”’ 
should never be used in addressing them: ‘‘ap’’ and 
“‘ap-ka’’ are the correct expressions. 

5. At public receptions and other occasions of meeting a 
point should be made of shaking hands with and speaking 
a few words to any Native officer with whom a British officer 
is acquainted. Any omission of such matters of courtesy 
is strongly felt by a class whose punctiliousness in matters 
of etiquette is a matter of common knowledge. 

6. Though at first sight these points may appear to be 
trivial, it will be evident that they are not so when it is 
remembered that by the omission of these small courtesies 
we unnecessarily wound the feelings of loyal and devoted 
Native officers. 

7. It is not generally known that the soldiers of the In- 
dian Army are of comparatively high social standing: many 
of them are men of good birth and hereditary soldiers : some, 
poor as they may be, will take no service except that of a 
soldier. They possess many sterling and admirable qual- 
ities, and have proved themselves excellent fighting men and 
fit to stand shoulder to shoulder with the best. It follows 
that they are proud, and being sensitive, their susceptibili- 
ties are easily offended. 


Officers were also enjoined never to neglect 
acknowledgement of a native soldier’s salute, even 
if the latter be in plain clothes; and the rank and file 
were to be instructed and advised as to avoiding 
offence to native susceptibilities. 


CHAPTER LXIX 


Wiruin a year of his arrival the Commander-in-Chief 
made some much-needed changes in the organisation 
of Native regiments as regards their establishment of 
British officers, in whose lot also he effected, not an 
hour before they were due, some healthy improve- 
ments. For many years many people had said—and 
said very loudly—that the altered scale of life and 
the increased expenses of service in India should be 
met by a corresponding improvement in the pay and 
promotion of the British officers of Native regiments; 
but it remained for Kitchener to take action. 

When in 1903 he drew up a Memorandum on the 
Preparation of the Army for War, the leanness of the 
Indian Army was such that, for the mobilisation of 
no more than four divisions, there would be a short- 
age of 265 British officers. Even so, the question of 
wastage was ignored, and only 12 British officers 
were allowed per battalion in the field, instead of 15— 
the minimum requirement under modern war condi- 
tions. Nor had the barest provision been made for 
any additional officers to train recruits and reservists. 

To mobilise the nine Divisions of the New Field 
Army 2934 officers would be needed, and the available 
supply fell short of this total by 938. As financial 


restrictions forbade the addition to the Indian Army 
184 


ete 6BRITISH OFFICERS’ PAY 185 


of 938 British officers, the only way open was to re- 
duce the deficiency gradually by working up, as op- 
portunity offered, to a peace establishment of 15 offi- 
cers per battalion. This would entail an immediate 
increase of 470 officers, and as modern warfare 
tended more and more to exact British leading in the 
field, it was decided to take on 350 at once. 

In 1904, therefore, one squadron officer was added 
to each cavalry regiment of the Punjab Command 
and one double-company officer to each infantry 
regiment of the same command; while as many 
squadron and double-company officers were added 
to the remaining regiments of the Indian Army as 
would suffice to raise their establishments to 12 
British officers, exclusive of medical officers. In 1906 
the establishment was further increased by the allot- 
ment of 14 British officers, exclusive of medical 
officers, to each cavalry regiment as well as to all in- 
fantry regiments, except 22 battalions which received 
an establishment of 13 officers, exclusive of medical 
officer, the Carnatic battalions being limited to 10 
officers. This provision did much to enhance the 
efficiency of Indian regiments, but during the Great 
War the first months of active service in France 
showed that even the establishment here set up was 
too modestly calculated. 

The old rules governing the promotion of officers 
eried for redress. Promotion in the Indian Army 
had been automatic on completion of the necessary 
period of service, without reference to the efficiency 
of the officer; it was a direct encouragement to the 
slacker and a discouragement to his keen comrade. 
Kitchener decided that no officer should be promoted 
unless pronounced fit in every respect, and specifi- 


186 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


cally recommended for his step: thus a double new 
principle was introduced—inefficiency to be penalised 
by deferred promotion, special merit to be rewarded 
by accelerated advancement. 

There were also personal conditions to be consid- 
ered. The Commander-in-Chief noticed that where 
the junior officers were remarkably—even exuber- 
antly—keen, a certain lassitude was often observable 
in the higher ranks. He attributed this to pro- 
tracted service in an enervating climate, and sug- 
gested that, at the end of a specified period, a full 
year’s home leave should be automatic. 

Again, it was a matter of common knowledge that 
the expenses of officers, especially of young officers 
in Indian regiments, were absurdly incommensurate 
with their pay, and that debts to money-lenders were 
often unavoidably incurred. The evil was now inves- 
tigated with something lke paternal care, and 
simple and natural remedies were supplied to make 
income at least balance reasonable outgoings—the 
first concession being the grant of Rs. 500 towards 
the purchase of a charger on appointment to a cay- 
alry regiment. Superfiuous full-dress uniform was 
suppressed, mess economies were instituted, and the 
regimental scale of expenditure reduced. Detention 
allowance was also granted to officers ordered from 
one station to another on temporary duty. In 
former days when locomotion was less easy and In- 
dian Society was smaller, more stationary, and bet- 
ter off, local hospitality went far to reduce the travel- 
ling expenses of officers who latterly had been obliged 
to spend money on hotels and conveyances; thus, for 


1 The silver helmets worn in certain Cavalry Regiments were within the 
experience of officers still serving. 


LXIX THE YOUNG OFFICER 187 


instance, a week’s detached employment on a court- 
martial meant a very unpleasant tug at private 
purse-strings. And, if the travelling tax on officers 
was a wrong, the inadequacy of the pay of junior offi- 
cers of the Indian Army was an injustice which gave 
rise to a crop of small scandals. The young officer 
was, as a rule, wholly without private resources, and 
his current expenses, without any extravagances, 
were such as to land him in difficulties. Case after 
case could be cited of unworldly-wise boys wriggling 
in the grip of money-lenders, and visibly deteriorat- 
ing in efficiency from sheer monetary worries, or at 
any rate unable to avail themselves of the privilege 
of home leave so essential for health and happiness. 
A Conference of Lieutenant-Generals in 1905 had 
urged an increase of pay in the junior commissioned 
ranks, and suggested that advantage should be taken 
of this increase to revise and simplify the whole pay 
system of the Indian Army. Three years later a 
scale was adjusted which at least allowed young offi- 
cers, by the practice of strict economy, to live upon 
their still somewhat exiguous emoluments. Kitch- 
ener wrote to Mr. Morley: 


As against possible savings, however, I must set one series 
of expenses which seems to me to be becoming unavoidable. 
I refer to the conditions of service of both officers and men 
of the Indian Army. The Indian Army in all its ranks is 
essentially a professional Army, willing to undertake any 
amount of work, however hard, but only on the condition 
that they receive a fair wage for a fair day’s work. With 
the general rise in prices in India and the fall in the pur- 
chasing power of the rupee, the pay of the junior British 
officer and of all the Native ranks—after deducting neces- 
sary expenditure on uniform and equipment—has ceased to 


188 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER ©#4?. rar 


be a living wage. In the case of junior British officers the 
only remedy is a slight increase of pay, but in the case of the 
Native ranks it will for the present be sufficient I think to 
adopt a much less expensive expedient—of relieving them of 
some portion of the cost of equipments which they have to 
provide for themselves out of their scanty pay. 


CHAPTER LXX 


Ir the soldier is to fight well he must be fed well; * if 
he is to make himself efficient, he must—as far as 
conditions allow—be made comfortable; if he is to 
respect himself in his profession he must be ade- 
quately remunerated; if he is to give of his best to 
his country his country must do its best for him. 
Such was Kitchener’s conception of what was due, 
not of grace but of right, to the soldier under his 
command, and amid his large strategic and adminis- 
trative schemes he never slackened in his care for 
the well-being of the troops. 

Although he rarely entered a club himself, he knew 
the value of clubs and institutes for officers and men. 


1 Kitchener wrote to Lady Salisbury: ‘The greater part of the native 
army is brave and loyal, but their physique is in many cases deplorable. 
They do not eat sufficient food, saving their money or rations for their 
families. This was just the same with the Fellahin in Egypt until I stopped 
it. They are always smoking a great deal too much. I mentioned having 
noticed this to an Indian Army General, and he said, ‘You are quite right. 
In one month’s campaigning in Tirah, out of a regiment of 750 strong, 
only 300 effective men were left although the regiment had not been under 
fire’ ” (25.1.03.) 

“IT think the Indian Army qualifications may be overrated. The idea, 
which I know has been encouraged, that K. is out of sympathy with it, is 
an entirely mistaken one. Possibly he may not have understood it at first, 
and his shy reserved manner may have been somewhat against him, but 
Kitchener is always thinking of the welfare of his Indian soldiers, and what 
can be done for them and their native officers when they retire into private 
life. I am sure the Indian Army recognises now the enormous amount he 
has done for it in many ways. The more I see of him, the more I admire 
his ability, excellent judgement, and levyel-headedness. He would do 
splendidly in any position, and is a valuable asset which the country cannot 
afford to see put on the shelf. He is a curious personality, not attractive in 
manner, but has a kind heart buried away somewhere, and his inner tastes 
are much more artistic than military.” (Lord Minto to Lord Morley, 
30.11.08.) 

189 


190 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


Lord Roberts in 1887 had introduced into India Regi- 
mental Institutes which Kitchener warmly approved 
in principle and set himself to improve in detail. 
The management of the Institutes was purely regi- 
mental, and they were ‘‘run’’ directly and exclusively 
by the officers of the unit. Their success therefore 
hung on the interest taken in them by Commanding 
Officers, and their standards of comfort and attrac- 
tiveness differed to an undesirable degree—Insti- 
tutes deteriorating with insufficient interest taken in 
them by the officers. The funds available to promote 
comfort and provide amusement depended on profits 
earned, which naturally varied with the business 
qualities of the management. Another great disad- 
vantage was that, on a unit moving to another sta- 
tion, the bulk of the Institute property had either to 
go with it at great expense or be sold locally at 
heavy loss. 

Kitchener decided that Institutes should, at the 
discretion of the Commanding Officer, be managed 
either by officers or by civilian tenants, and that an 
Army Institute Fund should be created as a central 
agency for the improvement of Regimental Insti- 
tutes. Under the earlier arrangements Institutes 
were practically ‘‘tied houses,’’ as contracts with In- 
dian Breweries compelled the consumption of a cer- 
tain amount of Indian beer before English ale could 
be supplied. Kitchener, for whom no point was too 
pilulous, determined that this direct incentive to in- 
temperance should be removed, and that, on the ex- 
piration of the contracts, only good English beer 
should be supplied at the lowest possible rate. The 
expense of removing or selling the property on the 
unit changing stations was met. by the Army Fund 


LXX ARMY INSTITUTES 191 


taking over the bulk of the furniture, and this cost 
was defrayed by a charge of one penny per gallon of 
beer to be credited to the Fund. The success which 
attended the experiment was immediate, and the 
British soldier was to enjoy a place of recreation 
and refreshment scarcely differing from the condi- 
tions of a Sergeants’ Mess. 

For some unaccountable reason the Military Sav- 
ing Banks had been closed in 1901, when the men’s 
accounts were transferred to the Indian Post Office 
Savings Bank. The British soldier, generous to a 
fault, is usually happy-go-lucky about money, and it 
is never easy to induce him to ‘‘put by,’’ especially if 
he has to step outside to do so. The Commander-in- © 
Chief gave orders that money could be lodged with the 
military authorities for transfer to the Post Office, 
and in 1908 special facilities were secured to the men 
for directly depositing their money in British Sav- 
ings Banks in order to encourage thrift, and imbue the 
soldier with the necessity of providing for his future. 

He found also—it seems strange that no one found 
it earlier—that the clothing of the soldier was a 
source of waste and worry. Hitherto periodical free 
issues of clothing had been made, and the soldier, 
having no personal interest in his wardrobe, was con- 
stantly requisitioning for new uniform. Under a 
Royal Warrant of 1908 it was laid down that, gener- 
ally, the cost of all issues and renewals of clothing 
was to be met from a consolidated clothing allow- 
ance, to be paid quarterly. The men quickly realised 
that it was to their personal benefit to take care of 
their kit, as the fewer their applications to the regi- 
mental stores the more money they drew from the 
quarterly clothing allowance. Another practical re- 


192 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


form was to substitute trained master-cooks for the 
native artist, whose preparation of the food had been 
seldom satisfactory, and not always cleanly. The 
advent of sergeant-cooks from the Poona School of 
Cookery was highly approved in the British Corps. 
The cooks were further employed in instructing as 
many men as they could make pupils, and in spread- 
ing a knowledge of cookery which experience in 
South Africa had shown to be woefully lacking. 
Although Kitchener spent most of his life in the 
East he believed that, for the most part, a protracted 
stay in a hot climate was injurious to health and 
efficiency. And—with no home of his own—he 
firmly believed in making the home the centre of 
affection. In 1904 he approached various shipping 
companies on the subject of cheap passages for men 
who wished to take furlough home at their own cost. 
The P. & O. Company quoted a return fare of £20 
per head, but this was found to be outside the sol- 
dier’s means. The Commander-in-Chief tackled the 
subject anew and in 1906 submitted a modified 
scheme to Government under which soldiers were 
eligible for two kinds of furlough—payment furlough 
and free furlough. The former was to be open to all 
ranks, after two years’ service in India, on payment 
of £15 for a free passage and messing on a transport. 
The concession was subject to the applicant being 
able to show that he had valid reasons for going 
home, that his character was at least ‘‘good,’’ and 
that he was not inefficient by reason of alcoholism or 
avoidable disease. Free furlough was to be given, 
on the same terms as for non-commissioned officers, 
to all soldiers who had completed six years’ service 
abroad, provided that they would extend their serv- 


LXX THE SOLDIER’S WELL-BEING 193 


ices to complete twelve years with the colours, and 
would have at least two years to serve on their orig- 
inal engagements after their return. Certain classes 
were to be ineligible, and the maximum number ab- 
sent from India during any one summer was not to 
exceed 250 on payment and 500 on free furlough. 
Payment furlough was eventually sanctioned, but 
Kitchener’s free furlough proposals were more than 
the War Office could stomach. 


The well-being and contentment of the Indian sol- 
dier were equally a subject for his Chief’s solicitude. 
A constant grievance was the total inadequacy of the 
kit-money grant of 30 rupees per man. Kitchener 
represented to the Government that, out of this sum, 
the Sepoy had to be supplied with khaki uniform, 
great-coat, boots, puttees, and indeed every article 
except his cloth uniform and his arms. He urged 
that in the last forty years conditions had changed, 
and, whereas the Sepoy’s equipment was formerly 
simple and inexpensive, he was now obliged to pro- 
vide himself far more expensively, being liable to be 
sent at short notice to any part of India as well as to 
Ceylon, Singapore, and Hong-Kong. His outfit 
therefore had to be improved in quality and quantity, 
the expense falling on the man and the resulting effi- 
ciency being enjoyed by the Government. During 
the first year and a half of his service the Sepoy was 
usually writhing under stoppages, and his very rea- 
sonable discontent was exhibited in a growing tend- 
ency to shorten his service and take his discharge at 
the end of three years. This was obviously a penny- 
wise-and-pound-foolish policy, as the new outfit for 


recruits was a considerable charge. On Kitchener’s 
VOL. II O 


194 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


recommendation the kit-money was doubled, and rea- 
sons for grumbling were proportionately reduced. 

In the course of his tours the Commander-in-Chief 
found that, owing to the increasing number of Sepoys 
who claimed discharge after three years’ service, and 
the consequent excess of recruits in the ranks, certain 
battalions, though up to strength, were unable to 
produce the 752 efficient soldiers necessary for mob- 
ilisation. The evident distaste for military service 
was assigned on inquiry to three causes. The pen- 
sions were not sufficiently attractive; the deduction 
for kit and clothing put soldiering in bad odour with 
the agricultural classes; the rates of pay were low 
in comparison with those obtainable in the police, 
as well as with the wages to be earned on railways 
and canal works. 

Kitchener endorsed a recommendation of his 
Lieutenant-Generals in favour of revising the pen- 
sion rules and rates in the Native Army. He was 
bent on putting an end to irritating deductions from 
pay. He reminded the Government that the rates of 
pension differed little from those of half a century 
ago, although there had been an increase both in the 
cost of living and in the demand for highly-paid la- 
bour in civil life. At the same time, military training 
was exacting much more from the Sepoy, whose 
sphere of employment had widened to embrace not 
only the length and breadth of India, but Ceylon, 
Mauritius, the Straits Settlements and China, besides 
occasional service in Somaliland, Uganda, and Cen- 
tral Africa. 

Under the greater strain a larger number of men 
naturally became unfit for further service. Up till 
1886 such cases would have been classed as ‘‘unfit,’’ 


LXX THE SEPOY’S WELL-BEING 195 


and if fifteen years’ service had been completed, men 
would have been invalided on the ordinary pensions of 
their rank. In that year, however, this privilege had 
been withdrawn and no pension could be earned 
without twenty-one years’ service, under which period 
any man invalided received a pitiful gratuity. This 
hardship was the more illogical asit bore more heavily 
on those regiments which had seen most active service. 
The Commanding Officers naturally hesitated to send 
up men for discharge until they had qualified for a 
pension, and thus a number of men wholly unfit even 
for peace manceuvres were encouraged to serve on. 

The result was equally infelicitous if the discharge 
regulations were strictly enforced, and many men, 
fearing a break-down, would leave the army after 
five years’ service while physically eligible for civil 
employment. The short-sighted abolition of the 
invalid pension had injured the efficiency of units by 
loading them with young soldiers and had also 
caused heavy recruiting expense. 

A Conference of Lieutenant-Generals unanimously 
agreed that pensions should be of two classes, ‘‘or- 
dinary”’ and ‘‘special.’’ Non-commissioned officers 
and men should be entitled under the ordinary rates 
to a pension after eighteen years’ service, while 
Jemadars were to receive a pension after twenty in- 
stead of twenty-four years, and the senior native 
officers after twenty-one instead of twenty-four 
years. Men of fifteen years’ service and upwards 
ineligible for ordinary pensions but about to be dis- 
charged because of unavoidable ill-health were now 
declared eligible for ‘‘special’’ pensions. 

Kitchener pressed for an early adoption of these 
proposals lest the recruiting difficulty should become 


196 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


so acute as to necessitate a very substantial increase 
of pay. There could be, he thought, no better guar- 
antee for the loyalty of a community than the pres- 
ence in its midst of a large and contented body of 
pensioners. 

With Redistribution of the troops had come the 
necessity of service in districts remote from the 
men’s homes, and that they should visit their friends 
at frequent intervals was a matter of special concern 
to the author of the scheme. Recruits were derived 
chiefly from the agricultural classes; a large propor- 
tion consisted of married men, and married quarters 
were quite insufficient. Asa partial set-off to a diffi- 
culty, 30 per cent of the battalion received furlough 
annually, but this concession did not satisfy require- 
ments, as men often genuinely pleaded urgent private 
business such as law-suits, marriages, and deaths. 
The expense of travelling, especially in the case of 
Pathans, Punjabis, or Hindustanis serving in South- 
ern India, was prohibitive, and to soften the hard- 
ship Kitchener succeeded in arranging for the grant 
of return tickets for single fares for all soldiers going 
home pn leave. Further, he decided that, whenever 
a regiment was stationed at a place 500 miles ! distant 
from the men’s homes, the Commanding Officer 
should grant special furlough and free passage by 
rail to a maximum of 20 per cent of the strength in 
addition to the 30 per cent already authorised. The 
arrangement was highly appreciated, and cut away 
the chief objections to stationing regiments at a dis- 
tance from their recruiting centres. 

It was hoped that the grant of increased kit-money, 
the revision of clothing allowances, the grant of a 
‘special boot allowance, and especially the amendment 


1 Subsequently increased to 800 miles, 


LXX NATIVE SOLDIERS’ PAY tO 


of the pension regulations, might forestall any aug- 
mentation of pay. But time and close study of mod- 
ern conditions went to prove that the native army, 
and especially the Silladar cavalry, was not receiving 
a fair day’s pay for a good day’s work, and that an 
increase of emoluments was a matter of justice. 

A suitable occasion for the public announcement of 
this great boon occurred on the fiftieth anniversary of 
the assumption of the direct administration of India 
by the Crown, and, in a special Royal message, it was 
announced that the terms of the concession would be 
promulgated on January 5, 1909. A special Army 
Order then announced that (1) all native officers 
would receive pay at the rates hitherto laid down for 
the highest grades of their respective ranks; (2) non- 
commissioned officers and men of the Silladar cavalry 
would receive a monthly increase of 3 rupees, and 
that non-commissioned officers and men of the artil- 
lery, non-Silladar cavalry, sappers and miners and 
infantry would enjoy a monthly rise of two rupees; 
(3) non-commissioned officers and men of all arms 
would receive a daily free issue of firewood on the 
graduated scale dependent on circumstances of 
service. 


APPENDIX TO CHAPTER LXX 


“* T hold that in India every Englishman by birth or de- 
scent owes it as a duty to his country to become an efficient 
Volunteer, and I cannot therefore help on this occasion ex- 
pressing my disappointment at finding this duty disre- 
garded. My remarks apply not only to Calcutta, for in all 
India I notice with deep regret that not half of those who 
ought to be Volunteers are sufficiently patriotic to belong to 
the Volunteer organisations.’’ (Address to Caleutta Vol- 
unteers, 22.3.04.) 


CHAPTER LXXxI 


Lorp Curzon, on his reappointment as Viceroy for 
a further term of two years, took the opportunity 
between his two periods of office to return home in 
April 1904, chiefly from motives of health, but partly 
to confer with the Home Government. His duties 
as, Governor-General devolved on the Governor of 
Bombay, Lord Ampthill, under whose friendly aus- 
pices the Commander-in-Chief proceeded with the 
new scheme of Army Reorganisation and Redistribu- 
tion. The financial corollary of the Reorganisation 
scheme was not issued until August 1908, when a cir- 
cular letter was sent to the Divisional Commanders. 
Drafted in great part by Kitchener’s own hand, it 
bears trace of his financial flair. He always insisted 
that a good soldier could and should be a good man of 
business, and he here defined his ideas on decentral- 
ised control of, and decentralised responsibility for, 
certain classes of Army expenditure.! Hmbedded in 
the circular was a little homily on economy in the 
Army: 


The enforcement of economy is primarily an administra- | 
tive duty. The process of audit merely weeds out unsanc- 
tioned expenditure; but, though valuable in the way of 


1A new Government manual explained to the controlling officer for 
what particular kinds of outlay he was now responsible, and how he could 
more easily check his monthly expenditure; the Separate Divisional Budgets 
showing him at a glance the exact amount of money he had at his disposal. 


198 


CHAP. LXXI THE DUAL CONTROL 199 


suggestion, it throws no light on its necessity. The admin- 
istrative authority alone can say when expenditure is being 
needlessly incurred. 

The Government of India accordingly desire in the first 
place to impress on you your responsibility, independently 
of all financial check, for initiating proposals for reduction 
of expenditure, and for restricting the growth of fluctuating 
charges in every possible way consistent with efficiency. 
Existing standards of expenditure should not be regarded 
as final, even though fully covered by sanction and of long 
standing. Establishments, though not excessive in relation 
to the volume of work and the modes of transacting it with 
reference to which they were constituted, may frequently 
be found capable of reduction by the adoption of entirely 
new arrangements; and suggestions with this object in view 
should, whenever possible, be submitted to the Government 
of India. 


Kitchener’s experience of the working of the mili- 
tary machine had erystallised the conviction that 
over all other needed reforms there towered the 
necessity of ending a system which subjected the 
Army in India to the twofold control of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief and the Military Member of Coun- 
cil. In a Memorandum written early in 1903 he had 
incidentally referred to the subject. Lord Curzon 
wisely recommended, and Kitchener willingly agreed 
to, a postponement of the whole question till he 
should have had longer experience of office. 

But in July 1904, having been asked by the Secre- 
tary of State for a free and frank opinion on the 
condition of the Army in India, he had new occasion 
to allude to a crying abuse traceable to the Dual 
Control: 


There is no doubt that, if we had a big war on the fron- 


200 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


tier, there would be a frightful crash. A system under 
which Transport, Supply, Remounts, Ordnanee, are entirely 
divorced from the executive command of the Army, and 
placed under an independent authority, is one which must 
cause an entire reorganisation as soon as war is declared— 
rather late to begin! 

Money voted for the Army is wasted out here just as 
much as, if not more than, at home; but they all seem to 
like it, and efficiency is the last thing that appeals to any 
one except the Viceroy. What has been done in the past is 
right, and nothing must on any account be altered by horrid 
innovators from benighted England—be they Viceroys or 
Commander-in-Chief! Curzon has done a great deal, but 
there is still so much to do. 


The proved success of his Renumbering scheme 
and the prospective success of his Reorganisation 
plans would be nugatory without further remedial 
action. Of what use, he asked, were well-trained and 
organised troops if they Jacked ammunition, guns, 
horses, and transport, and if their supplies were 
defective? He suggested that for the next three 
years any available money might be spent in making 
the Army in India self-supporting in the production 
of war material— 


which, if we were cut off from England, we should com- 
pletely run out of, and be unable to procure. 

By the extension of Indian factories we hope to be 
able to turn out guns and other equipments more cheaply 
than we have hitherto been able to obtain them from 
England; and this will have the further advantage to 
India that the money spent on labour will go to Indian 
workpeople. 


Did he foresee that the time would come when Eng- 


LXxI WASTE OF MONEY 201 


land herself would be glad to be supplied with In- 
dian-made munitions of war?! 

Kitchener could not forsake his point that waste 
of money is an inevitable outcome of the Dual Con- 
trol, and a few weeks later, in reply to a query on ex- 
penditure, he wrote: 


I quite realise the danger of an Army becoming too 
expensive. The example we have had at home is very 
much to the point, but I think Mr. Arnold Foster is wrong 
when he states that the swollen Army budget is entirely 
due to the number of men maintained. It is really much 
more due to the cost per man. . . . The Dual Control of the 
Army out here is fatal to both efficiency and economy. 
(21.9.04.) 


Mr. Brodrick promised to ‘‘clear the way for his 
reforms and smooth the working of the Departments 
at Simla.’’ The question of a change of system, he 
says, is under careful consideration, and Lord Kitch- 
ener’s views are ‘‘efficiently advocated.’’ His letter 
has been shown to the Prime Minister, who ‘‘ wishes 
the whole situation discussed at the Cabinet.’’ Lord 
Curzon, who is in England, and must be consulted, is 
for the moment too much out of health to be troubled. 
Meanwhile Mr. Brodrick, in view of the ‘‘big piece 
of work’’ Lord Kitchener is putting through, depre- 
cates his allowing ‘‘any difference on small questions 
to mar it.”” He favoured Lord Kitchener’s propos- 
als, but was a little sceptical about anticipated econ- 
omies; his confidence in financial forecasts had lately 


1 “We have already supplied 65,000,000 rounds for Imperial requirements 
outside India, and in addition to this I can supply 5,500,000 about the middle 
of November, and thereafter a similar amount monthly for six months.” 
(C.-in-C., India, to the War Office, 24.9.14.) Curiously enough, the policy 
of making India supply even herself from her own munition factories was 
disfavyoured by the Nicholson Commission of 1912. 


202 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER cmap. 1xx1 


suffered a rude shock at home. ‘‘The new scheme 
here,’’ he lamented, in allusion to War Office reform, 
‘‘is not doing much in the way of economy.”’ 

The appeal to put aside ‘‘any difference on small 
questions’’ suggested that the civilian had missed 
the soldier’s principal point. It was no ‘‘small ques- 
tion’’ that stirred him, but the sense of a profound 
peril menacing England’s rule in India and her 
power everywhere. 


I am very sorry [Kitchener wrote from Saharanpur in 
November] that you do not agree with me about the danger 
of continuing the present defective system of Army Admin- 
istration in India. . . . If we go to war under the present 
system I can see nothing but disaster ahead. Army Head- 
quarters is entirely unorganised and chaotic, and yet I sup- 
pose some people think the Commander-in-Chief in India 
is responsible for having things in order. 


Mr. Brodrick appears to have admitted the mili- 
tary argument; after consultation with the Cabinet, 
and on the advice of the India Council, he wrote a 
despatch to the Government of India which, dealing 
primarily with the divorce of Transport and Supply 
from the Commander-in-Chief’s management, raised 
the whole question of the Dual Control over the 
Army. . 


CHAPTER LXXITI 


On New Year’s day, 1905, in response to the Secretary 
of State’s despatch and to the Viceroy’s direction to 
report upon it, Lord Kitchener issued a historic 
Minute‘ on the Dual Control of the Army in India. 

This was the starting-point of a memorable con- 
troversy—not confined to the two great protagonists 
—which, though officially settled within a few 
months, was destined from time to time to break out 
anew. The settlement itself was subjected to early 
alteration, and in the flux of time underwent further 
modifications in its working. 

The situation around which discussion sprang up 
originated almost accidentally, ‘the existing system 
of Military Administration having its roots far back 
in the past. When the three Indian Presidencies— 
Bengal, Bombay, and Madras—each possessed its 
own army, a connecting link between their several 
forces and the Governor-General in Council was con- 
veniently provided in the person of an official desig- 
nated the Military Member of Council. With the 
welding of the Indian Armies the authority of the 
Commander-in-Chief in India—who hitherto had been 
in reality Commander-in-Chief only in the Presidency 
of Bengal—became geographically co-extensive with 
that of the Military Member, and both had seats on 
the Viceroy’s Council. 


1“I would state,’ he wrote privately, ‘‘on my reputation as a soldier, 
that I consider the change not only necessary but essential, if the Army is 
to escape disaster in war.” 

203 


204 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


Long before Kitchener’s advent to India the opin- 
ion was growing that this Dual Control was detri- 
mental tothe Army. Lord Roberts has been claimed 
as belonging to the school which regarded the Mili- 
tary Member as the oracle of truth and the Dual 
Control as the Ark of Salvation, but so far back as 
1889 he had written a Minute on the relations between 
the Commander-in-Chief and the Military Depart- 
ment, in which he declared that not only had the 
existing procedure become ‘‘cumbrous, dilatory, and 
complicated,’’ but ‘‘its defects were gradually in- 
creasing’’: 


The evils of the arrangement [he went on to say] are 
palpable. All the work involving references between Army 
Headquarters and the Military Department has to be done 
twice over. Neither the Commander-in-Chief nor the Mili- 
tary Member of Council sees the arguments on which the 
opinion of the other is based, and the Viceroy is apt only 
to see the Military Department’s side on every case. 


And when Roberts pronounced both on Mr. Brod- 
rick’s Committee and in the House of Lords in 
favour of the retention of the Military Member he 
was careful to say: 


I learn that a fresh evil has been growing up in the shape 
of excessive noting of criticisms in the Military Department 
on the purely military aspect of proposals which are sub- 
mitted with the weight and authority of the Commander- 
in-Chief, whereby much unnecessary delay is caused and the 
main issue is frequently obscured by a mass of irrelevant 
criticisms and side-issues. 


The opinion had been early held that one or other 
of the two authorities was superfluous. The Military 


LXXII “DIVIDE ET IMPERA”’ 205 


Member was generally thought the more eligible for 
eclipse, though Sir Ashley Eden’s Committee in 1879, 
when condemning the dual system as impracticable, 
recommended the exclusion of the Commander-in- 
Chief from the Council. But not until Lord Kitch- 
ener took definite action was anybody inspired to 
utter the curious paradox that the Army needed two 
chiefs in order to secure an ‘‘equipoise,’’* and that 
the Viceroy in Council should have two principal 
military advisers in order to pit their opinions against 
each other. Divide et impera? as a military maxim 
was hitherto supposed to be applicable to an enemy: 
it had never been thought to express the attitude of 
the Head of the State towards his own armed forces. 
There was something of fantastic novelty in the con- 
ception of the Commander-in-Chief and the Military 
Member as the two rogues falling out, with the Vice- 
roy, as the honest tertius gaudens, coming blandly 
by his own. Kitchener, fresh from warfare in South 
Africa, saw in the throttling power of the Military 
Department not only an injury to military efficiency, 
but a menace to the safety of India: ‘‘In war the 
present system must break down; and, unless it is 
deliberately intended to court disaster, divided coun- 
sels, divided authority, and divided responsibility, 
it must be abolished.”’ 

It has been held that no man is worthy of the con- 
fidence of the country if he does not know how to 
resign as wellas howtorule. Kitchener’s proffered 
resignation of his leadership on the banks of the Nile 
is open to adverse comment; but in India, believing 
that to procure the removal of the Dual Control was 


1 Mr. Brodrick, despatch, 31.5.05. 
2 “The system is that of Divide et impera” (Sir E. Elles). 


206 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


a prime duty, he had no other course than either to 
carry his point or relinquish his command.! 


I feel it [he wrote] an imperative duty to state my con- 
viction that the present system is faulty, inefficient, and 
incapable of the expansion necessary for a great war in 
which the armed might of the Empire would be engaged in 
a life-and-death struggle. . . . India is no longer in her 
former fortunate position of comparative isolation, in which 
she had merely to guard against possible rebellion within her 
borders, and protect her frontiers from the tribesmen and 
adjoining Native States. Slowly but surely the deserts of 
Central Asia, which were once believed to be an impenetra- 
ble barrier, have been crossed by a Great European Power. 
They are now spanned by railways which have only one 
possible significance; and we have every indication that 
our Northern neighbour is pushing forward her preparations 
for the contest in which we shall have to fight for existence. 
Even at this moment, as I write, the political outlook is 
threatening; he would be a bold man who would venture 
to predict that we shall not become involved in the struggle 
before our preparations are complete. We cannot initiate 
changes at the last moment; and it must be remembered that 
we shall not merely have the Army in India to deal with: 
the resources of the Empire will be freely placed at our dis- 
posal, and we shall have to account to the Empire for the 
use we make of them. Are we, then, really sure that, under 
our present system, we shall be able to discharge the heavy 
obligation which will devolve upon us? If I thought it 
possible—if I thought that by some minor modification we 
could secure this object—I would gladly say so; but I am 
convinced that such is not the case, and I therefore urge 


1The Viceroy had intimated to the Commander-in-Chief that he was 
unduly weighting the scales of judgement by tendering his resignation if the 
Dual Control were upheld by the Home Government. The Commander-in- 
Chief suggested with all respect that the balance could be adjusted by the 
Viceroy letting it be known that he would do likewise in the event of its 
abolition. 


LXXII THE MILITARY MEMBER 207 


that we make use of such breathing-time as may be before 
us, not only in reorganising and preparing our Army for war 
—as I have already recommended—but also in remodelling 
the machinery for administering it, so that we can make 
the best plans of operation, and be able to carry them out 
smoothly and effectively when the time for action comes. 


The issue was represented as a trial of strength 
between a military and acivil supremacy. In reality 
it lay, not between a soldier and a civilian, but be- 
tween two soldiers. Theoretically, the Military 
Member might be a civilian, and his duties were in- 
tended to lie with the quasi-civil side of Army admin- 
istration. But actually the office had always been 
filled by a soldier, and thus by degrees the Military 
Member, being constantly at the Viceroy’s elbow and 
having a seat at the Council-table, had found himself 
not only crossing swords with, but dominating, the 
General Officer on whom was supposed to rest entire 
responsibility for the discipline, training, and dis- 
tribution of the Army. The Military Member posed 
as the Viceroy’s official mouthpiece, so that to resist 
him was to undermine the Viceregal authority. 
Kitchener objected, less to the Military Member’s 
acting as middleman between the Viceroy and him- 
self, than to his being able to interfere on his own 
initiative in purely military questions—to his being 
allowed to interpose a veto on the Commander-in- 
Chief’s proposals, and thus quite possibly to prevent 
them coming before the Viceroy in Council for dis- 
cussion. 

It was here that the shoe pinched. Kitchener con- 
tended that the Commander-in-Chief’s requirements 
should be criticised, however severely, and disal- 
lowed, however ruthlessly, after, and not before, they 


208 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


had been considered by the Viceroy in Council. He 
asked that he might be free to conduct his own busi- 
ness; that, like other Members of Council, he might 
have direct access to the Viceroy; that his proposals 
should not be shelved by a rival official, or ‘‘minuted 
on’’ by junior officers! employed in that official’s 
department : 


I am responsible for the efficiency of the Army in India, 
but I had no opportunity of explaining my own plans to 
the supreme authority, the Indian Government; they had 
to be filtered through the brain and mouth of another mili- 
tary officer. There is no question as to the right of the 
Government of India to decide finally on questions of 
policy; the civil power is, of course, supreme. All I con- 
tend for is that it must be adequately informed as to the 
plans which I, as the responsible expert it employs, think 
necessary for the efficiency of the Army. 


Being taxed with an attempt to undermine a basic 
principle of the British Constitution, Kitchener could 
fairly retort with an appeal to the unwritten consti- 
tutional maxim that Authority should go with 
Responsibility. Undeniably, the man in power must 
be the man responsible; but under the Dual Control 
the converse proposition—equally valid—was fla- 
grantly violated, in that the man saddled with full 
responsibility was vested with nothing like full 
authority. 

Lord Roberts himself was forward to say that, 
“af the Military Department must be maintained, at 


1 The year before Kitchener’s arrival in India, the Commander-in-Chief 
—himself a cavalry officer—after consulting the Commanding Officers, 
had strongly recommended a change in the horse establishment of native 
cavalry regiments. The matter had to be referred to the Military Depart- 
ment for approval, but was returned with a minute signed by a captain 
saying the change could not take place, as the Department did not agree 
that the proposal would be advantageous to the Army. 


LXXII SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT 209 


least one group of functions now controlled by it 
should be transferred to the Commander-in-Chief.’’ 
The reference was to the curious anomaly that, al- 
though the Commander-in-Chief was admittedly the 
executive head of the Army, the services on which the 
Army depended for its food, its equipment, its arms, 
and its transport,! were not under his control, but 
separately administered by the Military Member: 


It seemed difficult [wrote Lord Kitchener] to suppose 
that an army divorced from these services could exist as an 
effective fighting machine, and the removal from the mili- 
tary head of the Army of the responsibility for supplying 
the troops could not but be a bar to efficiency and a conse- 
quent danger to the Army and to the country. No com- 
mander in the field can be expected to obtain decisive 
results unless he is perfectly sure that he can rely on these 
services; and no commander in the field can administer 
them with efficiency and economy unless they have been 
trained and administered under him in peace. 


The Secretary of State himself ? adduced a glaring 
instance of the infelicitous working of the military 
machine. A request of the Commander-in-Chief, 
dated February 17, 1904, relating to Small Arms 
Ammunition, was not officially commented on by the 
Military Department till May 19. Discussion in the 
Department drifted on to July 21, when a despatch 
was sent home. Mr. Brodrick, considering the mat- 
ter urgent, hurried to London in the middle of his 
holiday, and on August 16 telegraphed a reply. The 
Military Department, however, coolly decided to dis- 


1A very significant instance of this peculiar arrangement had just 
occurred. If the return of the Tibet Expedition had been postponed, no 
less than one-third of the whole Indian transport, which was outside the 
control of the Commander in-Chief, would have been locked up. 
2 Despatch to the Viceroy, 31.5.05. 
VOL. IT ib 


210 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


regard the authoritative telegram, and await details 
by post. Reference to the Adjutant-General and 
further correspondence occupied the next eight 
weeks, and it was not until December 22 that a 
decision was arrived at under which the Commander-. 
in-Chief found himself obliged to accept a partial 
fulfilment of the requisition dated ten months previ- 
ously. Mr. Brodrick also alluded to the serious de- 
lay in placing orders for supplies, although—thanks 
mainly to Lord Curzon’s own brilliant financial ad- 
ministration—a large available a had for some 
time been in hand. 

Even as regards these very supplies, Kitchener 
had to complain that, while he could not get the 
ammunition which he considered absolutely neces- 
sary, he had been loaded up with a quantity of 
Ordnance stores for which he had not asked. 


““The Civil Supremacy in Danger’’ has been an 
attractive rallying-cry ever since the days of Crom- 
wellian militarism, and great play was made with the 
allegation that the Commander-in-Chief’s single 
military control would pierce the constitutional 
supremacy of the civilian Head of the State. 


I am [Kitchener said] as fully imbued with, and as strong 
a supporter of, the principle that the Army should be in 
complete subordination to, and under the supreme control 
of, the Civil Government as any of my opponents can be. 
Two years’ experience of Indian Army Administration had 
proved to me conclusively that certain changes were essential 
for the efficiency of the Army both in war and peace, and 
that the recognition of three principles which I advocated 
and from which I have never since diverged, as a basis on 
which to frame a sound system of Military Administration, 
was absolutely necessary. These principles are the following : 


LXXI THE CIVIL SUPREMACY 211 


1. That Dual Military Control in the Army, and dupli- 
cation of work in the Military offices, should cease. 

2. That their chief Military Adviser should have direct 
access to the Viceroy and Government of India without the 
intermediary of a second independent Military channel, 
which caused constant misinterpretation and distortion of 
the views put forward. 

3. That under the supreme authority of the Viceroy and 
Government of India the power of military control should 
be given where responsibility is held to lie. 

No one will, I think, assert that these principles had any 
place in the system of administration by means of the Mili- 
tary Department, against which I found myself compelled, 
in the interests of military efficiency, to protest. If these 
principles are admitted, all that I have contended for will 
have been conceded; on the other hand, if they are con- 
demned, then I have been wrong. 


In a word, the régime, with its outcome of vexa- 
tious delay, endless and at times profitless corre- 
spondence, duplication of work, and possibilities of 
disastrous friction, was to Kitchener’s mind hope- 
lessly unworkable. After giving it a full and fair 
trial he decided to enter his official protest, and to 
say frankly that under the conditions of the Dual 
Control he could not perform the duties laid upon 
him. 


CHAPTER LXXIII 


Tur Commander-in-Chief failed to obtain the con- 
currence of the Viceroy. Lord Curzon, whose emi- 
nent place in the list of Indian Rulers is a matter of 
history, felt himself obliged to resist what he re- 
garded as an encroachment on his own prerogative. 
Taking up the high constitutional ground, he de- 
clared that, since the Viceroy is the supreme head of 
the Sovereign’s forces in India, no duality of control 
could exist—an assertion which did nothing to 
weaken Kitchener’s logical position. For the Vice- 
roy’s supremacy—never denied or doubted—would 
remain unaffected by the disappearance of one of his 
two subordinates, and the Dual Control was equally 
objectionable even if it were renamed a Dual Advis- 
ership. The mischief lay in the duality—the divid- 
ing of the house against itself. And it was perti- 
nently asked why, if a dual advisership ' was salutary 
for the Army, the same arrangement should not be 
beneficially applicable to other departments, so that 
two Finance Members or two Members charged with 
Home Affairs should be played off one against an- 
other. Lord Curzon’s reply—that the functions of 
these officials were essentially different from those of 


1 The Viceroy, said Kitchener, could scarcely expect to find satisfaction 
in having to decide highly technical questions of military policy, military 
administration, or military discipline on which his two military advisers 
might give diametrically opposite opinions. 


onsp.ixxia THE VICEROY’S OPINION 213 


the Commander-in-Chief—left untouched the patent 
fact that to set two men to do one job is logically 
absurd and practically mischievous. 

The supposed menace of Military Autocracy was 
made to double its part. It was predicted that the 
Commander-in-Chief would have not only too much 
power but too much work.’ While he was roundly 
accused of advocating a military despotism and of 
‘seeking to dethrone the Government of India from 
their constitutional control of the Indian Army,’’ a 
pathetic picture was drawn of his being overborne 
by the weight of his military duties. Neither repre- 
sentation tallied with the facts. The bogy of autoc- 
racy was well laid by Mr. Brodrick, when he enumer- 
ated the graduated series of checks which every 
legislative proposal of the Commander-in-Chief 
would have to meet. The suggestion of overwork 
was well answered a year later by Mr. Brodrick’s 
successor, Mr. Morley, when he remarked that the 
measure of any official’s responsibility is not neces- 
sarily, or even commonly, the measure of his work; 
that concentration of authority avoids, rather than 
involves, multiplication of labour. 

Kitchener in his Minute showed that so far from 
the Dual Control saving work for his office, its true 
effect was the exact opposite—witness the mass of 
correspondence, conflicting written opinions, and 
duplication of functions, the outcome of existing 
methods of conducting business, by which his work 
was vastly yet needlessly multiplied. Again, the 
specially selected and technically trained officers of 
his Headquarters Staff were involved in much extra 

1In his farewell speech Kitchener was able to quote the 65,000 miles 


travelled on his tours of inspection as a sufficient refutation of the reproach 
that his other duties had interfered with inspection work. 


214 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


labour by the necessity of explaining technical points 
to officials in another department. 

The process of devolution inherent in the reorgani- 
sation of the Army—by which a multitude of minor 
matters hitherto referred to Headquarters were 
dealt with by Divisional Commanders—proved so 
effective that twelve years later Sir Charles Monro, 
after eighteen months’ tenure of his office in the 
midst of a raging war, seemed well able to cope 
both with his current work, and with all matters 
reserved for his decision, as well as to make such 
tours of inspection as he wished. 

Lord Kitchener was at first impressed by, and 
was at special pains to deal with, the argument that 
during the Commander-in-Chief’s absences the Vice- 
roy would be shorn of responsible military advice. 
But the point was met by the Home Government’s 
timely imposition of a Chief of the Staff. In time 
of peace no difficulty could be contemplated, as dur- 
ing tours of inspection the machinery at Headquar- 
ters would run on uninterruptedly, and the Chief of 
the Staff could adequately represent his master. In 
the event of a war of such importance that the Com- 
mander-in-Chief took the field, the same functionary 
could still remain behind available for reference, and 
a perfected system of field telegraphs should enable 
the Viceroy to keep in close touch with his military 
lieutenant, and to assure himself that the operations 
were being pursued agreeably to the general orders 
given to the High Command. 


Kitchener’s indictment of the Military Department 
was met by an opposing Minute drafted by the Mili- 
tary Member, Major-General Sir Edmond Elles, As 


LXXII SIR EDMOND ELLS 215 


Kitchener in his Minute had said that his criticisms 
were directed against a system and not at any indi- 
vidual, so General Elles tactfully disclaimed any idea 
of resisting innovation if a case for reform were 
made out; observing, however, rather pointedly, that 
the trouble arose, not from the system, but from the 
way in which it was now being worked—a remark 
which of course offered a tempting Tu quoque. 

Sir Edmond Elles denied that experience in any 
wise justified the censures passed on the existing 
system. The relations between his Department and 
Army Headquarters ‘‘could be rendered closer if the 
Commander-in-Chief would freely and frankly admit 
his subordination to the Governor-General in Coun- 
cil.”’ The Military Member’s principal thesis was 
that ‘‘by law every act done by the Military Member 
is an act of the Governor-General in Council.’’ It 
followed that Lord Kitchener’s criticisms had been 
directed against the control and interference, ‘‘not 
of the Military Member, but of the Government,’’ 
because that functionary acted ‘‘on the delegated 
authority’’ of the Viceroy in Council. This striking 
hypothesis doubtless served to explain the attitude 
of the Military Department in the controversy. 
Whether it was a correct hypothesis was a question 
of law; but whether, even if correct, it covered the 
ground of debate was a question of simple fact which 
public opinion was well able to judge for itself. Sir 
Edmond Elles’s Minute was drafted with great fo- 
rensic skill, and had considerable historic interest; 
but, however meritorious, it failed to convince a 
special committee of experts, two successive Secre- 
taries of State in Council, two Cabinets, and the 
Committee of Imperial Defence. 


216 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


After studying the arguments of his two military 
advisers, Lord Curzon embodied his own views in a 
Minute dated February 6, 1905. In this Paper, 
which ran along the highest level of his famous prose, 
he stated his inability to accept Lord Kitchener’s 
sustained indictment of the Military Administration, 
and impressed on his fellow-civilian Members of 
Council the weighty responsibility imposed on them 
of judging between an ‘‘almost unprecedented con- 
sensus’’ of opinion among eminent ex-officials, and 
the views of ‘‘an authority in whom all recognised 
one of the foremost living masters of the science of 
military government, as well as of the art of war.’’ 

It is not an unfair comment on this appeal to the 
views of past officials that circumstances had in 
recent years tended to accentuate the inherent short- 
comings of the Dual Control. Lord Curzon himself 
candidly said that he had felt—even acutely—the 
want of a strong hand at the reins of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief’s Department. It was natural that 
any manifestation of weakness by the holders of that 
office should have had for its sequel a stronger and 
more pertinacious assertion of authority by the 
Military Department. 

In defending the Military Department from the 
imputation of having obstructed reforms, Lord 
Curzon aptly appealed to the personal experience of 
Kitchener himself : 


It is little more than two years since he came to us with 
an authority and reputation second to none in the British 
Army. We recognised the enormous advantage that was 
certain to accrue to India from the application of his 
abilities and experience to our military problems; and I 
assert without fear of challenge that my own aim and that 


LXXIII LORD CURZON’S MINUTE 217 


of every one of my colleagues, inclusive of the Military 
Member, has been to smooth his path and to facilitate the 
execution of the great task which, with characteristic energy, 
he at once took in hand. . . . We have in fact endeavoured 
to facilitate the execution of Lord Kitchener’s plans by 
every means in our power. The result has been that, within 
less than two years, he has carried through a series of re- 
forms that would have more than filled an ordinary quin- 
quennium, and that will stamp his name indelibly upon the 
military history of this country. 


Lord Curzon could marshal a notable list of the 
military measures passed during the short period of 
Lord Kitchener’s tenure of office and on his initiative 
—a catalogue of achievements which did honour to 
the Viceroy’s promptness in approving and sagacity 
in improving these beneficial reforms. Yet even so 
brilliant a legislative record could not be regarded as 
an offset to—still less be accepted in disproof of— 
the concrete and detailed complaints made against 
the administrative system and the spirit in which 
it was liable to be worked. 

Lord Curzon was unable to recall any ‘‘ occasions 
upon which the slightest attempt had been made to 
encroach upon the legitimate prerogatives of the 
Commander-in-Chief,’’ who, he thought, had mis- - 
conceived the constitution of the Government of 
India, and was proposing, ‘‘not to disestablish an in- 
dividual, or even a Department, but to subvert the 
military authority of the Government of India as a 
whole, and to substitute for it a military autocracy 
in the person of the Commander-in-Chief.’’ 

It was true, the Viceroy admitted, that ‘‘Lord 
Kitchener had brought to their counsels a range of 
experience and knowledge rare even in the illustrious 


218 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


list of Indian Commanders.’’ But to his mind the 
peril in such a case was all the greater. In the 
reluctance of civilians to pronounce judgement on 
military questions there lurked the grave danger of 
the Viceroy being left to bear alone the burden of 
accepting or rejecting the proposals of the military 
element. 

This extreme coyness of civilians as to expressing 
themselves on military matters—even of a highly 
technical character—is hardly borne out by observa- 
tion; but, as Kitchener had explained, it was no part 
of his purpose to deprive the Head of the State of 
the best and fullest military counsel. Lord Curzon 
shared the fear that the Commander-in-Chief—he- 
sides being invested with undue authority—would 
be charged with duties beyond the capacity of any 
one man, whatever his energy or powers.’ ‘‘If any 
man,’’ he said gracefully, ‘‘were capable of such a 
burden, it would be the present Commander-in- 
Chief; but I believe it to be in excess of human 
capacity.’’ 

The Viceroy was confident that no change was 
required in a system which he now re-sealed with his 
approval: 


With great reluctance, therefore, but without hesitation, 
I am compelled to advise against acceptance of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief’s proposals. This is the first occasion on 


1 “The statement that the burden thrown upon the Commander-in- 
Chief’s shoulders is too heavy for one man is absurd. The fact is, K. has 
had very little to do for a long time. His staff say he never works after 
2 P.M., but I believe that he is generally free long before that. Certainly he 
is an early riser, and does a good deal before breakfast, but his billet in 
comparison with others here is an easy one, and consequently he has been 
able to be away on tour a great deal. He has been a great decentraliser, 
and the divisional system has taken much work from headquarters. More- 
over, military information now at the disposal of the Viceroy is far more 
complete than it has ever been before.” (Lord Minto to Lord Morley, 
1.7.09.) 


LX XII THE VICEROY’S COUNCIL 219 


matters of the first importance on which I have dissented 
from him. But larger issues than the authority or views 
of any individual are at stake. In my view the entire con- 
stitution of the Government of India in relation to military 
matters is involved ; and it is our duty to consider the position 
of Government as a whole as well as of the Military Com- 
mander, and of our successors as well as of ourselves. Witha 
sufficiency of tact and conciliation I believe that the present 
system can be worked both efficaciously and harmoniously. 


The Viceroy’s judgement was endorsed by all the 
civilian Members of Council, while that of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief was shared by all but one of the 
senior Generals in India. Six weeks later the Gov- 
ernment of India sent home a despatch, to which 
Kitchener subjoined a brief Minute of dissent. In 
it, however, he repudiated afresh any notion of 
military autocracy or any wish to weaken that abso- 
lute control which must vest in the Governor-General 
in Council.* 

On May 31 the Secretary of State conveyed to the 
Viceroy the decision of the Cabinet. They consid- 
ered it inexpedient that there should any longer 
exist two Departments under the Government of 
India charged with military affairs. Broadly, the 
Kitchener protest was upheld. The Commander-in- 
Chief was henceforth to be responsible to the Viceroy 
in Council for the personnel and training of the 
Army, for strategical plans, for military intelligence, 
and for schemes of mobilisation. 


1A year later Lord Minto wrote to Mr. Morley: “I am bound to say that 
Kitchener’s position as explained to me was entirely different to what I 
found it to be. I was told that he was aiming at a military autocracy, and 
that it was evident he intended to minimise any constitutional safeguards 
which might be urged. One can only take people as one finds them, and I 
cannot but say that he has been perfectly straightforward with me, and has, 
as I am sure you will see from the papers I have sent you, been anxious 
to recognise all constitutional requirements.’”’ (10.1.06.) 


220 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


Duties of a quasi-civil character such:-as the pur- 
chase of stores, ordnance, clothing, etc., would be 
shouldered by a new Department of Military Supply, 
represented by a Member of Council, whose functions 
were described as ‘‘essentially those of a civilian 
administrator with military knowledge and experi- 
ence.’ 

The Secretary of State saw very nearly eye to eye 
with the Commander-in-Chief : 


The position is as follows: The most distinguished soldier 
available is placed in command of the Army in India. He 
is necessarily subject, as in every other country where the 
command of the Army is not in the hands of a despotic 
ruler, to financial and political checks. But in India alone, 
as it is believed, among all military organisations, the Com- 
mander-in-Chief is subject to having his military proposals 
checked and criticised by another expert of less standing 
and reputation than himself, who, after reviewing them, has 
the privilege of submitting the result to the final court of 
appeal in India, namely, the Governor-General in Council, 
where he votes on an equality with the Commander-in-Chief, 
and, finally, conveys to his own colleague the orders of the 
Government. 

This situation is rendered the more anomalous by the 
fact that. the Secretary to the Government of India; who is 
necessarily in close relations with the Member in charge of 
the Military Department, is also an officer in the Army, and 
is available for consultation by the Viceroy without the 
knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief, who has conse- 
quently two critics of inferior rank whose views on military 
questions may be preferred to his. 


Under the new arrangement, all measures involy- 
ing expenditure proposed by the Commander-in- 
Chief were on the financial side of course to run the 
gauntlet of the Finance Member before being ratified 


uxm DECISION OF THE CABINET 221 


by the Viceroy in Council. They were then liable to 
be referred to the Secretary of State sitting in 
Council, and by him in the last resort to the Cabinet. 

Mr. Brodrick thus sought to allay Lord Curzon’s 
fears as to the creation of a system of military 
autocracy: 


Your Excellency reviews the dangers which would be 
involved by having a Commander-in-Chief as sole military 
adviser to the Government. I think that, in puttiig for- 
ward this contention, Your Excellency has hardly done 
justice to the checks under which the Government of India 
is worked. Even if the proposal of Lord Kitchener were 
adopted in its entirety, measures connected with the Army 
would still be subject financially to the criticisms of an 
expert financier with a large Department, the head of which 
has a seat in Council. In their political bearing, they 
would come under the review of five or six trained Heads of 
Departments sitting in Council; while above and beyond 
both is the Governor-General himself, wielding great power, 
with access to all documents or persons whom he may desire 
to examine. 

Supposing all these obstacles to have been surmounted, 
any change of importance, and many which are not of great 
importance, are, by the statutes which govern the adminis- 
tration of India, referred to the Secretary of State in Coun- 
ceil at Whitehall. The organisation of the Department 
under the Secretary of State involves the review of any 
military measure by a Military Department which has at 
present an Indian General at its head. Such measures are 
then submitted to one or more Committees of the Council 
of India, on which experienced military officers have, from 
its inception, always had a place, and are finally subject to 
the decision of the Secretary of State in Council. 

By the mere fact of the time occupied in the transmission 
and consideration of the documents, it is obvious that no 
step can be taken hastily or without due deliberation. In- 


222 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


deed, were the machinery about to be set up de novo, it is 
open to doubt whether the Indian Government might not 
urge that the checks imposed on the passage of a measure, 
from the time it leaves the hands of its author, to its final 
adoption after discussion in London, are too numerous for 
the rapid progress of business. 

Bearing in mind all these processes, which, though famil- 
iar to your Excellency, do not appear to have been fully 
weighed in the despatch under reply, it is difficult to under- 
stand how the absence of a second military expert in Coun- 
cil ‘‘would produce a military autocracy,’’ or violate ‘‘a 
fundamental principle of our constitution.’’ 


Kitchener, though not obtaining all he had asked 
for, accepted the decision of the Home Government 
whole-heartedly, and bent. himself at once loyally to 
carry out his newly-defined duties.1_ He set special 
value on his now admitted right of bringing his pro- 
posals in all their freshness before the Viceroy in 
Council without having to risk a preliminary veto 
being passed on them by a rival Department. 

A question arose between the Viceroy ‘and the 
Home Government as to the exact extent of the new 
Supply Member’s duties. Lord Curzon asked that 
he should be ‘‘available for official consultation by 
the Viceroy on all military questions without distine- 
tion.”’ The India Office admitted the Governor- 
General’s ‘‘constitutional right to consult any mem- 
ber of his council on any subject,’’ but denied that 
the Supply Member had ‘‘any special claim to be 
consulted.’’ It was apparently feared that, if the 
new official were a soldier, as Lord Curzon insisted 


1He assured Mr. Brodrick that “although the scheme was not entirely 
after his heart, he would carry it out loyally.’’ On certain points he was 
in doubt both as to their meaning and their merit, and he might make 
suggestions; ‘‘but, whether these were allowed or not, he would accept the 
scheme as it stood, and make it work to the fullest measure in his power.” 


LXXII THE VICEROY RESIGNS 223 


that he should be, a wide loophole would be left for 
an eventual revival of the Dual Control. 

Lord Curzon’s resignation a few weeks later was 
due, not to the main ruling of the Home Government, 
but to their refusal to appoint his nominee to the 
post of Supply Member. If the controversy over 
Dual Control, accentuated by a subsequent regretta- 
ble misunderstanding, cast a shadow over the once 
cordial relations between the great Viceroy and the 
great Soldier, posterity will always like to remember 
that, eight years later, in the supreme hour of na- 
tional trial, these two faithful servants of the Crown 
united to work in close amity with heart and brain 
against their country’s foe. 


CHAPTER LXXIV 


Tue change of Viceroys in India synchronised very 
nearly with the change of Government in England. 
In November 1905 Lord Minto? arrived in Caleutta, 
and in December the Balfour Administration tottered 
to its fall, when Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman offered 
the portfolios for India and War to Mr. Morley and 
Mr. Haldane. The association of Mr. Morley with 
India marks a new phase in the story of Kitchener’s 
Indian command. The incoming Liberal Govern- 
ment, deeply pledged to a policy of Retrenchment, 
had to accept as a legacy from the late Ministry the 
rather stale problem of Army Reform. The corre- 
spondence which passed during the ensuing three 
years between Mr. Morley and Lord Kitchener has 
psychological as well as political interest. No two 
men could be more diverse in character, in antece- 
dents, in temperament, in outlook; and to the end 
their points of view remained far apart. The one 
was a soldier, who must always hold himself ready for 


1 “I confess I have been very much puzzled as to the opinion of Kitchener 
which is so prevalent both in India and at home. It seems so often to be 
assumed that he is over-bearing, self-seeking, and difficult to deal with. 
One can only speak of people as one finds them, and all I can say is that I 
find him very broad-minded; very ready to see both sides of a question, and 
perfectly easy to deal with: whilst his minutes on the questions we have 
had to consider since I have been here have been much the ablest and most 
moderate I have had before me. Of course he has strong opinions, and no 
doubt is inclined to speak of them, but so far I have found him perfectly 
ready to look at this from different points of view.” (Lord Minto to Mr. 
Morley, 1.2.06.) 

224 


CHAP, LXXIV MR. MORLEY 225 


arbitrament by the sword; the other a civilian of 
civilians, to whom the business of war was not merely 
alien but abhorrent—so abhorrent that he resigned 
office rather than be a party to it. But the innate 
frankness and sincerity of purpose ingrained in both 
men served to disarm prejudice and to break down 
any intellectual barriers; and their correspondence 
bears witness to a sympathetic understanding, even 
where agreement was unattainable. Almost the first 
letter Mr. Morley wrote after entering the India 
Office was: 


DEsrR Lorp KircHeneR—I take the liberty of writing 
to announce to you that I am, since Monday, installed as 
Secretary of State in this office. 

I daresay that your ideas and mine do not in all import- 
ant matters coincide. But, be that as it may, I only wish 
to say that you may from the first count upon my careful 
and serious consideration of any views that you from time 
to time may lay before the Government of India. 

You will not, I believe and hope, take this communication 
amiss. I am only anxious that, if controversy should ever 
arise, no sort of personal element should enter. 


Kitchener was avowedly pleased and perhaps a 
little surprised by this suave self-introduction: 


Dear Mr. Mortey [he wrote]—I fully appreciate the 
kindness of your thought in writing to me, and I ean also 
realise some of the difficulties with which you are confronted. 

You may be quite sure that, whatever decision is come to, 
personal feelings on my part will never arise. 

I naturally hope, for the good of the Army, that the 
decision arrived at may be favourable to the changes which 
were about to be introduced. I would only like to take this 
opportunity to ask you not to believe anything stated about 

VOL. II Q 


226 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


me and my intentions which I have not myself written. If 
you are in doubt about my meaning on any point, I am 
always ready to answer any question. 


Kitchener, fully aware of Mr. Morley’s feverish 
anxiety to cut down military expenditure, was at 
much pains to explain the running of the Army on 
business lines. The Minister did full justice to the 
soldier’s care for the public purse, and, as to the dis- 
cussions still carried on over the dead body of Dual 
Control, showed an open mind. The new Liberal 
Government was a little fluttered over ‘‘military 
autocracy,’’ but Mr. Morley flatly said that he would 
‘‘eo into the matter and judge for himself.’” As he 
reminded Lord Minto, ‘‘it was no tabula rasa that 
they found’’ on assuming office ; the compromise they 
had inherited must be carried out, the new Govern- 
ment declining to permit the controversy to be re- 
opened.! The Military Department being moribund, 
and its heritable effects being in process of distribu- 
tion between the offices of the Commander-in-Chief 
and the new Military Supply Member, Mr. Morley 
requested the Government of India to submit for his 
approval the amended rules of business delimiting 
the future duties of these departments. 


The drafting of the rules revealed a cleavage of 
opinion in the Viceroy’s Council as to the functions 
of the Army Secretary. While the Viceroy, with the 
new Supply Member, Major-General Scott, and the 
Finance Member, Mr. Baker, believed this official’s 

1In the course of his despatch Mr. Morley spoke of a mischievous rise 
of temperature—to a point considerably above normal—in the discussion. 
The Members who had differed from Kitchener wrote to him, taking excep- 


tion to the remark, and expressing their appreciation of his uniform courtesy 
and fairness to them all through the controversy. 


LXXIV THE ARMY SECRETARY 227 


position sufficiently independent to guarantee a con- 
stitutional control of the Army, they recoiled from 
any shadow of a Dual Control. On the other hand, 
their civilian colleagues—fearing that the Army Sec- 
retary’s status would, under the new order, be in- 
ferior to that of the other Secretaries of Depart- 
ments—were bent on strengthening the already 
strong constitutional check on the Commander-in- 
Chief which the Army Secretary could exercise. 

A year earlier Kitchener had almost laboured the 
point of securing the position of the Army Secretary, 
and he now disclaimed the least desire to belittle him. 


With due regard to the satisfactory conduct of business 
in the Army Department, I desire that the Secretary should 
be in a position to inform the Viceroy of all that happens, 
and keep His Excellency in full touch with Army matters, 
for I quite recognise that the complete control of the Vice- 
roy over Army matters must be maintained. 


Mr. Morley regarded this particular point as ‘‘the 
pivot on which the discussion turned,’’ and decided 
that all matters, before reaching the Commander-in- 
Chief as head of the Army Department, must pass 
through the hands of the Army Secretary. The 
Minister saw in this proviso ‘‘a vital element in any 
scheme which is to be at once workable and 
constitutional.’’ 


A little later Mr. Morley drew from the Govern- 
ment of India a strong expression of dissent by a 
proposal which, among other issues, would have abol- 
ished an office known as the Military Finance Branch, 
instituted as a liaison between the Army Member and 
the Finance Member—its head, the Financial Ad- 
viser, serving under both. Kitchener and Baker 


228 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


urged its retention, the former claiming ! that a spe- 
cial Military Finance Branch was of great value in 
the interests of economical military administration: 


It is most probable that, among the distinguished soldiers 
who will hereafter succeed me as Commander-in-Chief and 
Army Member, some will attach less weight than I do to 
financial as opposed to purely military considerations. In 
such a case it is essential that the Commander-in-Chief 
should have at his side an experienced financial officer who, 
while remaining subordinate to the Finance Member, will 
have the opportunity of giving special consideration to, and 
advice on, the financial aspect of cases before their reference 
to the Finance Department. (17.1.07.) 


Mr. Morley was so impressed by the opinions of 
the men on the spot that he generously surrendered 
his own, and gave his blessing to the new rules, the 
effect of which was to concentrate all financial busi- 
ness in the hands of the Financial Secretary, and to 
strengthen the control exercised by the Finance 
Department over every description of Army ex- 
penditure. 

A period of three years sufficed to cover the Decline 
and Fall of the Military Supply Department, although 
in India there was no disposition to bring this about. 
Least of all did Kitchener take any action, direct or 
indirect, to that end. The first move came from the 
Secretary of State, whose despatch of June 28, 1907, 
after acknowledging the good results of the Supply 
Member’s work, raised the question whether the 
building and manufacturing services of the Army 
need be entrusted to a separate Department. The 
Government of India, while deprecating the disturb- 
ance of a compromise only eighteen months old, as 


1 Minute, 17.1.07. 


LXXIV THE SUPPLY DEPARTMENT 929 


likely to cause a recrudescence of heated discussion, 
admitted that the proposal, which spelled an annual 
saving of 150,000 rupees, was due to sound economic 
and administrative considerations. 

Kitchener viewed the matter with mixed feelings: 1 
“Lé mieux’’ might well be ‘‘l’ennemi du bien.’’ The 
system instituted in 1905 was not of his own devising, 
but he had accepted it whole-heartedly, and deemed 
the moment inopportune for giving a jerk to machin- 
ery * which had not long been set up, and which— 
largely owing to the ready co-operation of the Supply 
Member—was working smoothly and satisfactorily. 
Personally, also, he would regret being deprived of 
his colleague’s advice and assistance, which he had 
hoped to enjoy during the rest of his term of office. 

Mr. Morley, however, although he granted it a 
year’s reprieve, was decided that the Supply Depart- 
ment cumbered the ground: 


I do not feel sure [he wrote at the end of 1907] that this 
apprehension [of a recrudescence of controversy] is well 
founded. It seems to me that public opinion has to a great 
extent acquiesced in the settlement arrived at in 1905; and, 
further, that some of those who were opposed to the change 
then made... now recognise that the Military Supply 
Department has proved to be superfluous. ... In these 


1 The Viceroy wrote to the India Office: “I had the case up in Council 
last Friday. Lord K. said very little except that the abolition of the Supply 
Department and its absorption into the Army Department would bring 
about what he had always recommended, and that in respect to efficiency, 
he had not the slightest doubt that what you suggest is right; but that, all 
the same, he would much prefer to leave things alone for the present; and 
the general feeling of Council was that it would be very hard on us to expose 
us to criticism which would undoubtedly be stirred up if the Supply Depart- 
ment is done away with, and the whole Army administration put under one 
head, as would be the case if the change is made.’ (29.8.07.) 

2One of the Headquarters Staff, in March 1906, told a well-known 
mnilitary writer that “Lord K. hopes nothing more may be heard on Indian 
Army matters—at any rate till all the new machinery is in motion. The 
one thing he wants now is to be left severely alone.” 


230 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER caar. rxxty 


cireumstances—even if a considerable amount of discussion 
and controversy were to be aroused, I could not, for that 
reason, consent to be a party to the retention of an arrange- 
ment which throws a heavy charge upon the revenues of 
India, and which in your opinion has been shown by ex- 
perience to be unnecessary and inconvenient. 


In January 1909 a despatch was sent to India in 
which the abolition of the Department was formally 
notified; and thus, by the successive action of the 
two great political parties at home, a new system 
of military administration—approximately as advo- 
cated by Kitchener—was at last established in India. 


CHAPTER LXXV 


Mr. Moruey was no sooner in the saddle than he 
started a drastic cutting down of Army expenditure, 
maintaining that Russia’s ill-success in the Russo- 
Japanase War had lessened the risk of an attack on 
India, and that the concession of Kitchener’s de- 
mand for an increase in the pay of the Native Army 
must involve a curtailment of military expenditure 
in other directions. 

A heavy stroke was then dealt at the ‘‘ Kitchener 
Reforms.’’ The cost of these was met by a ‘‘special 
grant’’ spread over five years. But as each year’s 
grant had to bear, not only new expenditure, but 
charges recurring from former years, the annual out- 
lay grew and the sum to meet it shrunk. 

The Minister’s letter to Kitchener of April 6, 1906, 
was ominous: 


Any reduction of European forces obviously, if necessary, 
ought to be kept as quiet as circumstances allow. For I 
take it for granted that such things are pretty closely 
watched in India, both Native and European. 


Mr. Haldane! agrees that, whatever else may be done, the 


1 Two months later Kitchener wrote to a friend: ‘It is sad to see these 
reductions in the army as proposed by Mr. Haldane. The reduction of 
Artillery and Guards is the worst part of it. I expect before long Mr. 
Morley will get his knife into us here on similar lines, reduction of military 
expenditure.” 

1 An Indian Staff officer wrote that Mr. Morley was perhaps aiming at 

231 


232 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


cadres are to be preserved. This, I make sure, will be in 
strict conformity with your firm views. 


Mr. Morley summed up the case between England 
and India as to the apportionment of military 
charges. While India was paying only one-third of 
the cost of the British garrison, England was charged 
two-thirds, besides the whole cost of the Reservists. 
The War Office held that, as India absorbed one- 
quarter of our total rank and file, she ought to con- 
tribute towards the Reserves, and—in case of war— 
further payment for wastage as well as for reinforce- 
ments. India would, on this showing, be debited 
with a total of slightly over one million per annum: 


I have not yet laid this story before either the Military 
or Finance Committees of the Council here, nor do I intend 
to do so until I hear what you may care to say on this 
aspect of the things now coming under discussion. 

What I deprecate as strongly as I can is a paper wrangle 
between departments, and so, I suspect, do you. Such 
wrangles never do any good, and they only impede business. 
It is my place, as the honest broker, to help to reconcile the 
general necessities of H.M.’s Government with the legitimate 
requirements of the Indian department of that Government. 
And the Indian department may count on my being a pretty 
stout champion—at the same time as being honest broker— 
of their interests. The difficulties are only too visible. The 
W.O. wants more money from India. J want India to pay, 
not more, but less, in military expenditure.!_ The W.O. seeks 
to reduce its contingent of men to India. Your scheme, as 
originally propounded and partially sanctioned, would re- 
quire a still larger contingent. Rather a puzzling situation! 


the abolition of the salt-tax. ‘‘He will see, or rather has seen, that the 
two and a half millions which are more immediately ear-marked for K.’s 
scheme would almost cover the loss to the revenue by the immediate aboli- 
tion of the salt-tax. He will therefore, I anticipate, issue a ukase that this 
sum is not to be spent, and that military expenditure will not be sanctioned 
beyond the limits of the Budget.” (26.7.06.) 


LXXV MORLEY’S ECONOMIES 233 


I return to my tiresome text—the Russian lull. I hope it 
may be more than a lull; but, whether or not, it gives us a 
ehance of looking at our difficulties coolly in the face. The 
Amir, the ‘‘tiger-cats’’ on the border, the troubles of the 
unlucky W.O., the ‘‘bitter cry’’ in this country for Re- 
trenchment, and all the rest of it—must be looked at as 
a whole and without any fuss and extravagance. . 
(6.4.06. ) 


Kitchener, who only sought to secure full value 
for public money, reminded his correspondent that 
_ mnilitary efficiency depends less on mere expenditure 
than on perfected organisation and thorough train- 
ing; and to these, he said, insufficient attention had 
been paid. ‘‘Spasmodic efforts’’ had been a vicious 
substitute for ‘‘a consistent and continuous policy,’’ 
so that, ‘‘although India had maintained a force 
numerically large, she had not had her money’s 
worth in the shape of an efficient army.’’ (30.4.06.) 

Believing that a further cutting down of expen- 
diture must endanger efficiency, he saw but two ways 
of easing the British taxpayer. One was ‘‘to mini- 
mise the risk of war,’’ with an eye to ‘‘reducing the 
forces that had to be maintained’’—a course which 
might create a panic at home, and tempt aggression 
from abroad, besides handicapping our diplomacy. 
The preferable method was to lighten the weight 
of taxation by widening the distribution of its 
incidence : 


India [he wrote] should bear her due share of the burden, 
but out here the prevalent idea—strongly supported by Lord 
Curzon—is that all Imperial obligations, such as defence 
against Russia, should be borne entirely by the British tax- 
payer, and that India should be called upon only to meet the 
cost entailed by internal disturbance or small wars on her 


234 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


immediate frontier. It is held that for everything else she 
should be able to rely on England, and to throw all respon- 
sibility for results on England. The more, therefore, that you 
reduce the forces out here, the greater will be the possible 
demand which England may have to meet in case of emer- 
gency, and the less help will India be able to give to the 
Empire in case of need in South Africa or elsewhere. 
Money payments by India to England, even for services 
rendered, are generally strongly resented, but the mainte- 
nance of British troops in India at India’s expense is con- 
sidered less objectionable. So long, therefore, as India’s 
revenue can fairly stand the charge, I think, from the Impe- 
rial and financial point of view, it would probably be ad- 
visable in this way to relieve England as far as possible of 
her excessive burden of military expenditure. The War 
Office may say that this is not practicable under the linked 
battalion system, but to my mind that system is unsound 
and in no sense essential to our military efficiency. 


Kitchener admitted two possible economies—the 
prevention of waste and a reduction of peace effec- 
tives, coupled with an increase of reserves. Pro- 
vided the policy of Army reorganisation were con- 
scientiously pursued, and the Government would go 
bail for Russia’s quietude during the next few years, 
he would concede a temporary and limited reduction 
of British Infantry in India. But he stipulated that 
the existing units should be maintained, and that 
the maximum reduction should be 200 men per bat- 
talion, to meet the War Office requirements as re- 
gards drafts: ? 


But [he added], though willing to agree to a reduction 
of drafts to this extent, I confess I do not understand how 
1 Writing in June, Mr. Morley told Kitchener that “the War Office 


consider—so far as they are concerned—that you have treated them very 
well in assenting to a temporary reduction.” 


LXXV INFANTRY REDUCTIONS 235 


such a reduction can be of benefit to the War Office finan- 
cially. If, as appears to me to be the case, the real crux of 
the military situation lies in the swollen estimates, and if 
Mr. Haldane requires reduction of expenditure, I should 
have thought he would be more inclined to keep the units 
in England—for which he pays—under strength by these 
ten thousand men, than to reduce the Indian Establishment, 
which costs him nothing. 


As regards drafts, Kitchener’s care for the health 
of the troops did not prevent his suggesting that 
with the improved sanitation of cantonments, the 
increase of hill-stations, and the preventive method 
of inoculation for enteric, men might now be sent out 
to India a year younger than at present. With a 
shorter period between enlistment and embarkation, 
and a longer average duration of service in India, 
there would be fewer men required for drafts and 
lower charges for transport. A rider was added 
that soldiers should have further facilities for visit- 
ing their friends on furlough. 

The suggestion, made in the interest of England 
rather than of India, found no favour at home, and 
was tacitly dropped. 


I hope, however [Kitchener pleaded], that the idea of giv- 
ing men greater facilities for going home on furlough ! will 
not be abandoned on that account. The popularity of serv- 
ice in India depends much on the provision of such facility, 


1Ten years later Kitchener was writing to Sir John French: “July 
21, 1915.—I hear that leave is now being granted to the French Army at 
the rate of about 4 per cent, the period of leave varying from four to 
eight days. As the distance a soldier has to travel to return to his home 
is reckoned with, a soldier who is a native of the South of France is 
probably given the maximum duration of leave, which is eight days, as it 
would take him at least 48 hours to go and return. Preference is given 
to men who have been at the front for six months or more and to married 
men. What rules have you laid down for the granting of leave to our 
men? It would be as well to make them as liberal as possible.” 


236 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


and recruiting for the Army at large must necessarily be 
seriously affected by any general objection to serve in this 
country where so many British regiments are stationed. 


Another round with the Minister was fought out 
over the Capitation Rate payable by India to Eng- 
land for the supply of British soldiers. The War 
Office made out that at present they were heavy 
losers; Kitchener demurred, and at the end of a 
lengthy discussion as to the proportion of expense 
which India should bear, he framed a possible basis 
for an adjustment: 


It may be thought [he was careful to say] that, in dealing 
with this question, I have somewhat accentuated the separate 
existence of England and India. No one recognises more 
fully than I do that the whole British Empire—including 
India—must be considered as one and indivisible, the safety 
of the various parts of which is necessarily contingent on 
their interdependence. ‘‘ Perish India’’ may mean ‘‘ Perish 
the British Empire’’; and the converse—any disruption or 
weakening of the British Empire—must mean very proba- 
ble destruction to India. When, however, we have to 
arrange the money transactions between two parts of the 
Empire, it is, I think, admissible, and likely to lead to a 
fairer decision acceptable to both, to deal with the case more 
from the individual standpoint of the two parties concerned, 
and without giving prominence to the above consideration. 
(30.4.06.) 


The Secretary of State seemed to think that the 
discussions might appear like a triangular duel be- 
tween the War Office, the India Office, and the Com- 
mander-in-Chief in India. He replied amiably: 


I am greatly obliged to you for sending so full a reply. 
. . . My only misgiving is lest, while making an effective 
advance towards meeting the War Office difficulties, you 


LXXV THE CAPITATION RATE 237 


have done a bad turn to my economic or economising inten- 
tions... If I understand it aright, your suggestions about 
the Reserves, for instance, and an Indian contribution 
thereto, would mean an addition to Indian military expen- 
diture, which is the very thing to which, if they take my 
advice, H.M.’s Government will not consent on any account 
—short of some pressing exigency. 

I know you may say that India has a right to frame mili- 
tary schemes for which India pays. Yes—but the India 
that frames the schemes is not the India that pays: just the 
contrary. The India that frames is not India at all, but a 
body of Englishmen at Simla. And it is the business of 
us Englishmen at Whitehall to criticise and control expen- 
diture on behalf of the India on whom the other English- 
men lay the burden. 

But all this can wait. Allow me only to add my thanks 
to you for your last few words. For my own part, I assure 
you that I have from the first taken your loyal desire to 
help us entirely for granted, and shall continue so to do. 
(25.5.06. ) 

1 The War Office had argued that, since in case of war the Reserve would 
be India’s principal source of reinforcement, India ought to bear a share 
of its cost. Kitchener rejoined that, if hitherto no demand had ever been 
made on India, it was solely because she was presumed to have neither 
a claim on the Reserve’s services nor a voice in its management. To secure 
that claim and that voice he was prepared to ask India to pay her share of 
what the Reserve cost. Otherwise he foresaw that the Reserve would be 


utilised for some non-Indian interest. This was the point to which Mr. 
Morley referred. 


CHAPTER LXXVI 


Karty in 1906 the Committee of Imperial Defence 
inquired whether the Anglo-Japanese Treaty and the 
Anglo-French Entente had modified the political and 
strategical conditions upon which Kitchener’s re- 
organisation of the Indian Army and its preparation 
for war had been framed. | 

Kitchener, however, had no comfortable words to 
offer. He was by no means sure that the effect of 
the Japanese success was entirely to our advantage 
in the East; a marked change had come over native 
opinion as to the possible issue of a fight between 
Asiatics and Europeans. There was a shrewd idea 
abroad that what Japan had done Persia or Afghan- 
istan could do; in India itself Russia’s defeat was 
used in cheap rhetoric as a stone to fling at the 
British supremacy.’ 

On the other hand, neither the Anglo-French nor 
the Anglo-Japanese rapprochement appealed to the 
Asiatic mentality—Mussulmans, indeed, rather re- 


1‘“Japan’s jump,’”’ Kitchener wrote to Lord Salisbury, “has fired the 
imagination of the Indians, and opened up to their minds possibilities 
previously unheard of. They cannot see how different they are in every way 
to the Japanese, and feel convinced that, if given the chance, they would 
do as well or better. Amongst the poorer classes, which form the vast 
majority of the nation, our rule is considered just, is liked and believed in. 
They fully realise that its abolition would entail their ruin. To them the 
higher native is equally distinct and unknown as, and far less sympathetic 
than, the white sahib.” 

238. 


CHAP. LXXVI JAPAN’S EXAMPLE 239 


senting alliance with a people whom they regarded 

‘as idolaters. And, if Russian activity had been 
checked through the disorder of her finances and 
depreciation of her credit, it might only need a re- 
plenished war-chest '—and perhaps the sympathy of 
another great military Power—to repair her offen- 
sive power against India. It could not therefore be 
advisable to slacken efforts or modify plans. 


The specific question was then propounded 
whether the present establishment of British soldiers 
in India—namely, 70,680, exclusive of officers—was 
excessive, or only sufficient to maintain internal 
order in India. Kitchener suggested that before de- 
ciding the point it would be well to define the danger 
against which we had to guard. 

The main danger was, of course, a possible revolt 
on the part of the armed Native force, though the 
probability of military discontent was largely dis- 
counted by our having given the Sepoy the option of 
discharge: if the Native soldier liked to leave, he 
could do so on giving two months’ notice. The men- 
ace to internal order would lurk rather in religious 
propaganda among the civil population in recruiting 
areas, whence disaffection might easily spread 
amongst the Army, the Police, and the Native States’ 
armed forces—classes dominated by the same reli- 
gious influences as their neighbours, and, under the 
Indian system of inheritance and land-tenure, for the 
most part personally and pecuniarily interested in 
all matters affecting the civil population. 

There were about 400,000 natives under arms; it 
was as a counterpoise to this formidable total that 


1 Kitchener did not forget that Russia—mistress of herself and her 
millions—had anyhow been a barrier to German penetration in the Hast. 


240 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


the British garrison was required in time of peace; 
and Kitchener asserted that, far from being exces- 
sive, it was only adequate by reason of the great 
diversities of race amongst the natives and their 
consequent lack of cohesion.! 

He held that, apart from specially pressing condi- 
tions, such as those which prompted the shout for 
help from South Africa in 1899, any thinning of the 
British force would be not only dangerous, but dele- 
terious; to undermine confidence in the stability of 
our rule would discourage the investment of capital 
in India and injure industrial enterprise.” 

The proportion of the British garrison to the 
Native troops in India was laid down in 1859; it had 
since been repeatedly re-examined, and in principle 
always reaffirmed. 


The Secretary of State next asked for the views 
of the Government of India as to the actual effect of 
the Anglo-Russian Convention on Indian military 
policy. The Commander-in-Chief in a Memorandum 
of October 21, 1907, which was accepted as represent- 
ing the Government’s opinion, expounded anew the 
complete problem of the defence of India, and elab- 
orated the cardinal purposes for which our forces 
had to be kept there. It was shown that—besides 
safeguarding India from external attack, preserving 
order amongst the border tribes, insuring our ability 


1In Russian Central Asia the proportion of armed white soldiers to the 
civil population was as 1 to 92, and in the Caucasus 1 to 101, while in India 
it was about 1 to 3800. 

2 “Capitalists will not place their money in India, nor assist in the develop- 
ment of its resources—on which this country’s prosperity depends so much 
—unless they are convinced that there is assured security. If we desire to 
attract capital, we must be careful that no idea gets abroad that our posi- 
tion is insecure, or that we are neglecting necessary precautions.” (Speech 
to Calcutta Chamber of Commerce.) 


LXXVI DANGERS TO INDIA 241 


to discharge our obligations to Afghanistan, and 
securing us against internal revolution—the Army in 
India was liable for service beyond the seas, or for 
the general requirements of Imperial Defence. 

The Russian threat to Afghanistan in 1885 had 
called for an addition of 10,000 British and 20,000 
Native troops, the sole increase made in the Army 
during a quarter of a century, although—apart from ~ 
the continuous anxiety as to Russian activity in 
Central Asia—there had been large accessions of 
territory, the chief of which, Burma, must alone 
absorb a large garrison: 


It will be realised that the present strength of the Army 
in India is not based on the consideration of any critical 
situation with regard to Russia, or on the probability of any 
immediate advance on her part. 

The Convention just concluded will, it is hoped, remove 
the danger of any proximate disturbance by her of the 
peace in Central Asia. But, even if it could be regarded as 
a complete guarantee of peace with Russia herself for 
many years, there are other conditions inherent in our oc- 
eupation of this country which cannot be ignored when the 
strength of our forces is brought under consideration. 


Ten years previously the North-West Frontier was 
ablaze with fanatical excitement; our total Field 
Army of four Divisions was employed for a whole 
year before order was restored. Since then the num- 
ber of tribal fighting men had increased to nearly 
300,000, with over 92,000 breech-loaders and 65,000 
other rifles; and thousands of additional arms were 
being imported into the country. Conditions had 
therefore been rapidly changing to our disadvantage, 


and, in the event of a similar rising, we should cer- 
VOL. II R 


242 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


tainly have to employ a very much larger force than 
before. 

Behind the tribes again, and closely connected 
with them by religious bonds and by fanaticism, 
there always lurked the possibility of trouble with 
Afghanistan. The Afghan regular troops numbered 
about 100,000 men with over 500 modern guns, be- 
sides an armed irregular force of about 35,000. The 
Amir, during his visit to India in 1907, had stated 
that he was sparing no effort to improve and increase 
his army, and with our subsidy he could organise a 
much larger force, equipped with up-to-date rifles 
and guns. Apart from Russia, a fight with Afghan- 
istan—complicated as it must be by the hostility of 
the tribesmen—would demand every man and gun 
of the new nine Divisions. The internal garrison 
would thus be dangerously weak. In no other coun- 
try—even in peace time—did the military force bear 
so small a proportion to the population; and in war 
the Indian garrisons would sink to a mere fraction 
of the peace strengths. 

The Memorandum laid stress on the significant 
recrudescence—following upon the issue of the 
struggle between Russia and Japan—of warlike 
preparations in Japan, China, Tibet, Nepal, Persia, 
and Afghanistan, and on the Pan-Islamic movement 
observable throughout the Mohammedan world, as 
productive of a serious effect on the North-West 
Frontier and beyond. In India, too, Japan’s mas- 
tery of a great Western Power had given rise to 
ideas which must have an important bearing on our 
measures of precaution. 

The recent Convention fixed upon us, for the first 
time, the responsibility of keeping the peace between 


uxvu NO REDUCTION OF THE ARMY 243 


Russia and Afghanistan, and this was rendered more 
difficult by the deep animosity subsisting between 
Afghans and Russians, which was based partly on 
religious grounds, and partly on the territorial en- 
croachments of the latter. Any reduction of our 
forces in India must induce the Amir to pay less 
attention to our advice. 

It was submitted in fine that our available force 
was barely sufficient for proper security, and that 
any reduction was incompatible with the safety of 
our rule, and could only be made by accepting un- 
warrantable risks. 


CHAPTER LXXVII 


In March 1907 Mr. Morley, set on economy at all 
costs, directed that no works should be begun under 
the Redistribution scheme until he had approved of 
the estimates; and in August he further strengthened 
his strangle-hold on the ‘‘special’’ military expendi- 
ture by imposing restrictions on the amount to be 
spent on the various heads of the Kitchener pro- 
posals. At first contenting himself with cutting 
down the special grant from 325 lakhs of rupees to 
290 lakhs, he in July 1907 intimated that the reduc- 
tion would be permanent. 

Deaf to the declaration of the Government of 
India that without taking serious risks no reduction* 
could be made, either in the strength of the Army in 
India, or in the general standard of war preparation 
indicated, the Secretary of State reiterated his de- 
mands for a meiosis in military expenditure. 

Lord Morley, in March 1908, once more trotted 
out the Anglo-Russian Convention in its bearing upon 
military policy. The despatch rehearsed previous 
arguments, while it admitted the cogency of the 
Government of India’s case. Lord Morley—premis- 


1“So far I have been able to resist attempts to reduce the Army out 
here, but one never knows what may be done. Indian opinion does not now 
carry much weight. Germany certainly looks as if she were preparing to 
take advantage of our weakness. I hear a number of German officers 
recently did a staff ride in England from Edinburgh to Penzance, and that 
they have been active in Ireland in the neighbourhood of our big harbours.” 
(Kitchener to a friend.) 

244 


onap. xxx HCONOMY AT ALL COSTS 245 


ing that the centre of gravity in the diplomatic 
situation had shifted as a result of the Anglo-Russian 
Convention—postulated that some readjustment of 
military policy had become inevitable. In particular, 
the necessity for improving the conditions of service 
in the Native Army had long been recognised by 
the Government of India, and important steps had 
already been taken to that end. He invited the 
Government of India to consider that question as well 
as the equally important subject of the housing of 
Native troops. To provide money for these purposes, 
while effecting a reduction in military expenditure as 
a whole, Morley suggested savings under two heads: 


(i.) To dispense, either in part or in whole, with the 
provision of the new units considered necessary by 
Lord Kitchener to bring the strength of the Field 
Army up to nine Divisions. This would admit of 
the reserve of stores and animals being correspond- 
ingly reduced. 

(ii.) To reconsider Lord Kitchener’s scheme for the re- 
arrangement of Divisional Areas with a view to ~ 
ascertaining whether, by some alterations in the 
boundaries of the Areas, it might not be possible, 
without dislocating the Divisional organisation, to 
provide at much less cost for placing a suitable 
number of troops under each Divisional General ; 
so distributed as to admit of combined training and 
reasonably rapid mobilisation. 


Lord Morley further suggested the relinquishment 
of the additions to the Quetta and Baleli garrisons 
and of the construction of the new Cavalry Canton- 
ment at Mhow. 

Kitchener advised his Government to consent to 
the execution of a part of his programme being 


246 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


spread over a longer period, to surrender the special 
grant, and to forgo the re-grant of lapses; but to be 
adamant as to any material reduction or change in 
the two great schemes afoot, and above all to press 
for (1) the conversion of three more companies of 
Royal Garrison Artillery into mobile Heavy Bat- 
teries; (2) the formation of four Field Telegraph 
Companies; and (3) the location of a Cavalry Bri- _ 
gade at Baleli, near Quetta. 

In urging that their proposals should be permitted 
to go forward to completion, the Government of 
India dealt with Lord Morley’s idea that the organi- 
sation for training the Army might be effected by a 
rearrangement of Divisional and Brigade boundaries. 
The question had been frequently examined: 


We have satisfied ourselves that the results aimed at 
cannot be even approximately attained in this way. 

But, notwithstanding the above, we believe that without 
reducing the Army and without abandoning the intention 
eventually to complete its organisation for war, it may be 
possible, without undue risk, to meet your wishes to a very 
considerable extent. In view of our improved relations with 
Russia the steps necessary to complete our organisation may 
now, in our opinion, be carried into effect more slowly and 
deliberately than has hitherto been contemplated. (2.7.08.) 


The Viceroy’s Government did not mince words 
in stating its conclusions: 


We consider that we went to the utmost limit of safety in 
regard to the question of actual additions to strength; and 
the fact that, at that time, we specially aimed at the most 
efficient organisation of a minimum establishment makes it 
impossible for us now to effect economies by the simple proc- 
ess of abolishing units or reducing cadres. (2.7.08.) 


ux MILITARY WORKS SUSPENDED 247 


Lord Morley, however, pinning his faith to the 
Anglo-Russian Convention, was determined that 
money must be saved. He accepted the abandon- 
ment of the special grant and conceded the forma- 
tion of the four Field Telegraph Companies; but he 
refused for the present the conversion of Garrison 
Artillery into Heavy Batteries, arrested all military 
works not actually in hand, and put a final veto on 
the Cavalry Cantonment near Quetta. 

The deliberate reversal of his predecessor’s policy 
brought to a standstill the military reforms approved 
by the Committee of Imperial Defence. Lord Morley 
had himself described these measures as ‘‘embracing 
the most pressing need of the moment—the reorgani- 
sation and redistribution of the Army in India ’’: a 
fine tribute to them which he somewhat stultified 
when he deliberately sacrificed them to meet other 
charges. 


The Commander-in-Chief’s office work, which he 
constantly said had been materially lessened under 
the new system, in no way interfered with his tours, 
or even with such social avocations as devolved on 
him and which he manifestly enjoyed. His tours 
extended to an itinerary of over 40,000 miles. He 
visited almost every Indian potentate, and estab- 
lished cordial relations with them;! the native 


1“I have been touring ever since I left Simla and have had a very 
interesting time, and seen a good deal of new country. I went in 20 days 
from Peshawar to Cape Comorin, the most southern point in India. I saw 
some curious types of people. At one place the Maharaja is always ex- 
pected to be gay, so every morning he has a smile elaborately painted on 
his face. When I arrived he had just lost his only son, and on my condoling 
with him he quite startled me by turning his grinning face to me. I 
afterwards found he was near tears, but could only smile. 

“The caste of another Maharaja was the thieves’ caste, and though he 
is very wealthy he has to rob some one twice a year to maintain his caste. 
If he cannot find some one to rob, the State hides some valuables and he 
takes them.” (Letter to Lady Salisbury.) 


- 


248 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER ae 


princes entertained him royally after their wont, and 
offered him the best sport in their dominions. 
Kitchener appreciated this keenly, although, like 
other eminent soldiers, he was only a moderately or 
fitfully good shot, and his small experience of the 
battue at home was little to his taste. But he thor- 
oughly enjoyed the opportunities of big-game shoot- 
ing which India afforded him, and his tiger shoots 
were certainly his most exhilarating recreation. 

His inspections were marked by rapidity and thor- 
oughness rather than by any réclame. His staff was 
unprecedentedly small, and his movements published 
or heralded as little as possible. When he had com- 
pleted his inspection he would return to his train and 
travel at night, whereas his predecessors had usu- 
ally occupied a camp specially prepared for them or 
placed at their disposal. His reason for this eus- 
tom—which was at first open to some misunder- 
standing—lay in his determination that, whatever 
his other terrors, the- Commander-in-Chief should 
not be a cause of expense to General or Regimental 
Officers, and he declined to be entertained at a cost 
which he knew they could usually ill afford. 

His own hospitality, both in Calcutta and at Simla, 
was constant and profuse, and his successors in office 
may well be grateful to him for the embellishment * 
of his official homes, where he indulged his nascent 


1 ‘“‘SIMLA, October 1, ’08.—I feel all the better for my tour in the hills, 
and last night I gave my first ball. I always have to give two each year, 
as Simla is socially so large that they could not all get in if I only 
gave one. I enclose a photograph of my newly decorated drawing-room. It 
was taken before I got the silk for the panels and a different set of electric- 
light sconces, which are much better, but it will give you an idea. It is all 
white and gold with a light grey-blue in panels. The plaster ceiling and 
everything was made here in the house by Indian workmen. No European 
but myself had anything to do with it. I think: you would like it... 
When I have finished here I think I shall set up as a house decorator in New 
York.” (To Lady Salisbury.) 


LXXViI THE AMIR 249 


taste for art and his constant delight in flowers. 
He was as pleased to win the prize at the Caleutta 
floral exhibition for the best display of orchids as he 
was particular to send to Paris for the cotillon pres- 
ents when he gave a ball for the début of the 
Viceroy’s daughter. His personal staff! were his 
constant companions and close friends, and from 
England year by year there came many of his ac 
quaintances to stay with him and be initiated into 
the pleasures of an Indian winter. 

In the early part of 1907 he was at Agra for 
the reception of the Amir of Afghanistan. That 
potentate declared himself, and evidently was, pro- 
foundly impressed by the personality of the famous 
soldier, who initiated him into the mysteries of Free- 
masonry, and Habibullah remained under its spell 
for the rest of his life. And if the personality of the 
Commander-in-Chief impressed him, care was taken 
that the Army should impress him also. The very 
strongest and most striking military array was made, 
with the air of there being a good deal behind it, 
and men and material alike struck admiration into 
the Amir’s soul. ‘‘Why,’’ he exclaimed wrathfully 
to one of his suite, ‘‘has the Army in India been so 
lightly represented to me? Why have I never been 
told of their greatness?’’ 

Kitchener wrote to Lady Salisbury at the end of 
January: 


The Agra week is over and I have just returned to Cal- 
cutta from Poona. The show at Agra went off very well. 


1 Kitchener wrote from Melbourne toa friend: “I am so sad at losing my 
last connection with my happy Simla family. FitzGerald has been recalled 
to India and left me entirely on my own a fortnight ago. I must say I 
feel rather lonely without a companion after being so many years surrounded 
by my boys, who always looked after me so well and were such friends.” 


250 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


The Amir, although somewhat like Kaiser Bill, is not auto- 
eratic. We shall not find it difficult to get on. He is very 
fond of anything military, and really knows a good deal 
about it. I have had a good deal of experience in dealing 
with orientals of his type, so I get on very well with him. 
He asked me to pay him a visit in Kabul as his guest, as 
he would like to show me his Army. 


And a fortnight later: 


The Amir has at last left Calcutta after putting off his 
departure several times. In the town he bought everything 
from toys to a bridge with a 300-foot span. There is no 
doubt he was delighted and impressed with his reception. 
He took rather a fancy to me, and when we parted was so 
overcome that he could not speak and wept on the way to 
the station. I wonder whether his emotion was genuine. 
He insisted on dining with me the last night. Shortly after 
tea I said it was time for him to depart, and that our rule 
was to welcome the coming and speed the parting guest. 
McMahon pulled out his watch, which the Amir immediately 
seized and took away from him. He said nothing would 
induce him to go. He would sleep here if we went on press- 
ing him. But anyhow he would not go beforel a.m. I had 
to send and dismiss the guard at the station and ask the offi- 
cials who were waiting to see him off to come round here. 
When I told him he was upsetting all his people he said, ‘‘I 
do not want them. Let them go to bed.’’ He then pro- 
ceeded to play the piano and sang and distributed photo- 
graphs of himself. At midnight I took him by the hand and 
walked him out to his motor. I think at the back of his 
mind he thought it was polite to show reluctance to go: if 
this is the Afghan custom it is very inconvenient. This 
morning he has wired to me to say he is quite well and has 
thoroughly enjoyed hearing the big guns fire at Bombay. If 
he gets over his return all right I think we have got a good 
deal of influence over him and have done very well. 


imi  HABIBULLAH’S FRIENDSHIP 251 


This meeting at Agra was not without its effect 
on history. When the Great War came, many 
attempts were made by the Germans to foment 
trouble in India, and their emissaries and propa- 
ganda were frequently sent to Afghanistan to preach 
a ‘‘holy war,’’ or, if that ambitious policy should 
fail, at least to instigate risings near and descents 
upon the North-West Frontier. The shrewd politi- 
cians of Kabul were well informed of the course 
the war was taking in Europe and well instructed in 
the records of the German successes, but Habibullah 
remained a firm and loyal friend of England through 
the whole four years of the conflict; and it is not 
merely a coincidence that the threatened Afghanis- 
tan rising and descent upon India broke out within 
a few weeks of his assassination, shortly after the 
Armistice had been signed. 

After the Amir’s departure he started a little cor- 
respondence with Kitchener: 


KABUL, 19th Zelkaida 1325. 
(December 25, 1907.) 


MY DEAR AND ESTEEMED F'RIEND, Lorp KircHENER—Your 
kind letter, with the Asparagrass [sic] Roots has duly 
reached me. According to the instructions enclosed in the 
letter the Roots were sown: hope they will grow and give the 
fruits! In your letter you have kindly mentioned that 
‘faccording to my promises I send these Roots.’’ My dear 
friend, certainly I am also waiting for your second promise 
to be fulfilled ; and it was this—that you so kindly promised 
that you will try your best to get permission from the Indian 
Government to send workmen for making Cordite powder 
in the Afghan factories, on fixed pay, for the Afghan 
Government. 

Now I am thanking your Excellency for the fulfilment of 
the first promise—that is, sending me the Roots of Aspara- 


20 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER cz.rxxvn 


grass. And I am very fond to thank you for the second 
promise also—that is, to send [a] workman for making Cor- 
dite powder, after he arrives Kabul on fixed pay, in Afghan 
Government service; because I see that the Afghan Govern- 
ment is in great need for making Cordite powder, and hope 
that, because of my friend’s (your Excellency’s) trying for 
me, will be successful in getting the workman.—Your Friend, 
SirAJUL-MinLat-I-W Appin, 


Fort WILLIAM, Caxcurra, 
January 17, 1908. 


Your Masesty—lIt gave me great pleasure to receive your 
Majesty’s letter of the 19th Zelkaida and to learn that you 
are in good health after your long and successful journey 
through your Majesty’s Dominions. I was also glad to hear 
that the asparagrass [sic] roots had arrived safely and that 
your Majesty was pleased with them. 

With regard to what your Majesty says about the manu- 
facture of Cordite at Kabul—as I told your Majesty when 
you were in India, the process is a very dangerous one, 
requiring special precautions. J do not know what answer 
the Government will give if your Majesty made an applica- 
tion to be supplied with experienced workmen for the pur- 
pose, as it is not easy to find qualified employees. But I 
can assure your Majesty, should you see fit to make such a 
request, and the Government agree, I will do my best to see 
that your Majesty’s wishes are carried out in as efficient a 
manner as possible. 

The absence of your Majesty from Calcutta this year is 
felt by us all, and renders our time of residence here less 
happy than last year, when your Majesty was with us. I 
pray God for your Majesty’s continued health and welfare, 
and subscribe myself the sincere friend of your Majesty and 
of the gallant Army of Afghanistan, 

KITCHENER. 


CHAPTER LXXVIII 


Karty in 1907 the political agitation of many years 
began to assume a more sinister form. A spirit of 
unrest bred a school of seditious thought, and it 
quickly became apparent that the leaders of the 
disaffected party had marked out the Native Army 
as their immediate prey. They sought to persuade 
the Indian troops of the general fundamental in- 
justice of the British rule, and to stir their bile by 
insisting on the differential treatment of the British 
and the Indian soldier—harping on the pay accorded 
to the one and the amount of work exacted from 
the other. 

The story got wind at home that this effort 
had succeeded. The Commander-in-Chief promptly 
wrote to the Viceroy: 


My attention has been called to the following statement in 
the Spectator of December 10: ‘‘A condition of unrest has 
been created in the Indian Army to which no parallel can 
be found since the days of the Mutiny.”’ 

If anything of the sort existed, it would of course be my 
duty to bring the matter to your knowledge; but such is 
not the case, there is no unrest in the Indian Army. This 
is only another of the many baseless fabrications that are 
now being concocted at home to influence His Majesty’s 
Government. 


If Your Excellency has any doubt on the subject, I hope 
253 


254 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


you will employ the many sources of information that you ’ 
possess to investigate the matter and inform Mr. Morley of 
the result. 

I have no wish to trouble you with refutations of the 
many untruths about me that are being circulated at home, 
but this one is so peculiarly harmful and malignant that I 
cannot help thinking the facts should be brought to the 
knowledge of the Secretary of State. (11.1.07.) 


The Commander-in-Chief just then also induced 
the Viceroy to withhold assent from a new colonisa- 
tion bill which pressed hardly on certain groups of 
native military pensioners. 


I daresay you would like to know [he wrote just then to a 
friend] what I think about the present state of this country. 
Well, amongst the disloyal there are two parties. There is 
a small extreme lot, who wish, and are doing all they can, to 
induce all Indians to join and kick us neck-and-crop out of 
the country. They have very few adherents in the Native 
Army, and are doing their utmost to seduce others from 
their allegiance by seditious leaflets and native papers scat- 
tered free amongst the men: for this we want a Press law. 

The larger party, which extends to the villages, hope by 
seditious acts and disloyal behaviour to frighten us into giv- 
ing them something for their personal advantage, while at 
the same time they remain protected from the more unruly 
classes and from outside contingencies by British bayonets. 
The latter party, however, seem to be gradually joining the 
former, and in case of a row would be all carried away by. 
the more extreme party. There is a secret society—the 
Arya Samaj—which contains these two parties. Remem- 
ber—Indians, like all Orientals, are extremely excitable 
and led away by lies. 


The attempts to bring about disaffection in the 
Army were as grotesque as they were offensive. 
Unfortunately, the credulity of the native was apt 


LXXVIII SEDITION IN INDIA 255 


to lend itself too readily to these fantastic rumours. 
Agents were busy spreading stories among the 
warlike races of India that Government was attempt- 
ing to reduce their numbers by poisoning the wells, 
so as to induce a spread of plague; by distributing 
poisoned sweetmeats; and by destroying unborn 
children. It was alleged openly that by such means 
the Government hoped to render more wheat avail- 
able for export to England! A case was even 
reported in which some Native soldiers who were 
engaged in correcting military maps were prohibited 
by the villagers from approaching the wells until 
they had been thoroughly searched, with a view to 
discovering hidden poison. 

Officers commanding regiments were equipped 
with full authority to strike at the root of the evil. 
Government was constrained to adopt stringent 
Measures against the chief agitators, and Laj-pat 
Rai and Ajit Singh, the ringleaders in the Punjab, 
were deported. 

The time was over-ripe for resolute dealing with 
the agencies which fostered and diffused sedition, 
particularly among the Punjabis, one of the richest 
sources of recruits to the Indian Army. Kitchener 
was anyhow determined that the Native ranks? 
should be protected from these pernicious influences, 


1He wrote in May to Sir John Maxwell, who had just been in India 
with the Duke of Connaught: 

“The more one looks into things, the more general and deep-seated is 
this discontent [found to be] in India. We shall have to walk warily for 
some time to get things right. The prestige of the sahib has suffered, and 
the result is a want of discipline. People who never thought of criticising 
the British Raj do so now more freely. The native Press is responsible for 
a@ great deal; they recommend bombs and a combination to turn us out, 
openly and with impunity. We must stop all this. 

“The Viceroy is first-rate; the Army is, I think, all right—one or two 
Tegiments are not quite satisfactory; and of course all this cannot go on 
without affecting the native soldier more or less. But, on the whole, I see 
no cause to suppose there is any disaffection of a serious nature. There 


206 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


and he urged the necessity of repressive action 
against both seditious assemblies and treasonable 
literature: 


From the very numerous reports which have reached me 
I am convinced that the first and most important matter that 
demands our attention is the protection of the troops of the 

Native Army from the persistent and determined attempts 
that are notoriously being made to tamper with their loyalty 
by means of seditious newspapers and inflammatory leaflets. 

Agitators know, and have in many cases openly stated, 
that the success of their efforts to undermine our rule de- 
pends entirely on their being able to seduce the Native Army 
from its allegiance, and to persuade the Sepoys to throw in 
their lot with them. We have had much evidence to this ef- 
fect, but it is only necessary to quote a few of the reports. 

In May last the Government of Eastern Bengal quoted a 
conversation with a Bengali agitator who stated that the 
Indian Army would refuse to fight against Indians, and that 
every possible attempt was being made to corrupt the Army, 
which ‘‘must sooner or later be influenced by prevailing 
ideas.’’ Ina confidential report of June 6 last it was stated 
that the agitators were concentrating their efforts on propa- 
gandist work in the ranks of the Native Army. 

On June 7 a Sialkot report stated that a Hindu agitator 
regretted in conversation that nothing could be done ‘‘unless 
or until the Native regiments have become disaffected,’’ and 
are a few individual cases, however—which is not surprising considering 


the persistent attempts the agitators have made to tamper with their 
loyalty. 

“T sent round a quite-trusted old Mohammedan Native officer to see how 
things were. In one station where there were two Sikh regiments he got 
into conversation with a Mohammedan armourer in each regiment, and they 
promised to let him know the feeling in their regiments. A few days after, 
Number 1 armourer went to see Number 2 in the other lines, He had not 
been five minutes before a Native officer turned up and asked him his busi- 
ness. In the shop a torn copy of the paper Hindustan was lying about. 
The Native Sikh officer spotted this and called the senior Native officer. He 
came with other officers, and our armourers were hooted for having seditious 
literature and ‘bringing disgrace upon the Regiment,’ etc., and Number 1 
was hustled out of the regimental lines. 

“So you see they are on the qui vive.” 


LXXVI TREASONABLE JOURNALS 257 


that this would not happen until they had been better edu- 
cated as regards their grievances. 

On June 9 it was reported that a Meerut lawyer, a well- 
known sedition-monger, had also remarked that it was recog- 
nised by the leaders that nothing could be done until the 
Native troops had been won over. 


His vigorous representations were punctuated by 
proofs of the growing audacity of the sedition- 
mongers, who were just then adding the item of 
assassination to their political programme. 

The Government of India drafted a Bill for the 
stricter control of public meetings and for the pros- 
ecution of publishers of seditious literature, and at 
Kitchener’s request inserted a clause directed against 
such propaganda within military cantonments. In 
a minute of June 5 he urged immediate and uncom- 
promising action. Treason, he bluntly said, could go 
no further than for an Indian newspaper to speak of 
the King-Emperor—in whom the loyalty of the Army 
should be centred—as drunken, careless, sinful, and 
tyrannical. Although this astounding utterance had 
been reported more than a month previously, no 
official notice had been taken—‘‘This shakes to its 
very foundation the confidence of the Native soldier 
in the efficiency of our power and the stability of our 
rule.’’! The warning fell unheeded on official-civil- 
ian ears, which could not be persuaded that dissem- 
ination of disaffection in military cantonments is far 
more injurious, even if not more offensive, than else- 
where. A colourless Act was passed for the preven- 
tion of meetings likely to promote sedition; its limi- 
tations defeated its object; many of the extremist 

1A native soldier, decorated with two medals, had actually addressed a 


meeting held at Calcutta to demand the abolition of British rule in India. 
al 


VOL. II 


258 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


leaders, deprived of the opportunity of tub-thump- 
ing, sought an outlet for their rancour by penning 
gross newspaper articles. Outrages succeeded one 
another, and there was a little epidemic of bomb- 
throwing—the usual victims being the officials who 
were in the black books of the disloyal party. Fur- 
ther action had to be taken, and on June 8 there was 
enacted a belated measure, based on the English Act 
of 1883. Another Act was also passed to penalise 
newspaper incitements to murder and other crimes. 
Kitchener’s advice had long ago indicated such legis- 
lation, but the Government was only now spurred in 
its course by the disclosure of intimate relations be- 
tween the perpetrators of crimes and the proprietors 
of certain journals. 

The stream of outrages was, however, unstemmed. 
A Government approver was actually murdered in 
the Alipore gaol at Calcutta; a Bengali police- 
inspector, whose intrepid activity had made him 
specially obnoxious, was shot dead outside his own 
door; and a second attempt was made on the life of 
the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. The Govern- 
ment was now really roused, and on December 11, 
1908, the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act was 
passed to expedite the trial of anarchical offences, 
and to suppress the pernicious secret societies. 

It spoke well for the high standard of discipline 
in the Native Army that, during this searching 
period, in only a few instances could it be found that 
the Native ranks had succumbed to sinister cajoleries 
—only one Native soldier, a Sikh, was actually tried 
under the Indian articles of war for sedition.t At 

1 “Notwithstanding the agitation which has recently been going on in 


the Punjab, an attempt made to influence the Army, I am glad to say the 
loyalty of the Sepoys has not been affected.” (Kitchener to Morley, 23.5.07.) 


uxva LOYALTY OF INDIAN TROOPS 259 


a meeting of the Legislative Council on November 1, 
1907, the Viceroy was forward to say: 


I hope that your Excellency, as Commander-in-Chief, will, 
on my behalf as Viceroy and representative of the King- 
Emperor, convey to His Majesty’s Indian troops my thanks 
for the contempt with which they have received the disgrace- 
ful overtures which I know have been made to them. 


CHAPTER LXXIx 


One of the few occasions on which Kitchener alto- 
gether in vain withstood Mr. Morley to the face was 
when he begged that a sanatorium for Aden should 
be established at Dthala in the interior. Dthala 
is the capital of the Amir of that province, an Arab 
chief whose territory is under the protection of the 
British Government, and who received from it a 
subsidy, conditional—among other points—on his 
keeping up a prescribed force there. Situated about 
5000 feet above the sea and 96 miles from Aden, 
Dthala offered a wholesome contrast to that hotbed 
of sickness for British soldiers of which the better 
part has been aptly described as ‘‘Hell with the lid 
off,’’? while the crater where troops were also placed 
was dubbed ‘‘Hell with the lid on.’’ The Political 
Resident, General De Brath, had written to Mr. 
Morley urging the inexpediency on political, military, 
and humanitarian grounds of giving up Dthala, and 
saying bluntly that the British troops were rotting 
at Aden. ‘‘I should like,’’ he remarked, ‘‘to see the 
regiment of Native troops withdrawn from Dthala 
and replaced by two companies of British troops. 
This would have the effect of reducing the garrison 
by six companies, and at the same time would enable 
us to withdraw British troops from_the crater.’’ 
Mr. Morley forwarded the letter for Kitchener’s 
perusal, and on August 23, 1906, wrote himself : 


Some leading man at the War Office has told me that in 
returning from India (I think) he found our troops as fit as 
possible. I had a long conversation with General Mason * 


1 General De Brath’s predecessor. 


CHAP, LXXIX SANATORIUM FOR ADEN 261 


on his return from Aden, and I did not gather from him, 
though he was much in favour of the sanatorium on the up- 
lands, that our force at Aden was in such desperate case as 
De Brath seems to discover. Political considerations, you 
may justly say, are not your office, but there is no harm in 
my saying to you that it is important in our view that we 
should just now avoid any step which might be construed by 
the suspicious Turk (with a certain European Power at his 
ear) as looking as if we had designs on his Holy Places, ete. 
Anyhow it is proper that you should have a chance of know- 
ing what De Brath says on the actual state of things. 


Kitchener put in two powerful pleas for Dthala: 


I visited Aden several times and can assure you that it is 
one of the worst stations for British troops which we have to 
maintain. In India we are doing all we can to send as many 
British soldiers as we can to the hills in the hot weather. I 
would urge from a humanitarian point of view that a sana- 
torium at Dthala for the British Garrison at Aden is most 
necessary and should be retained. I cannot help thinking 
that, now that this hinterland has become British territory, 
it would have a very bad effect if the Government refused to 
allow this much-needed sanatorium to be established on a 
high and healthy plateau. I know that Turkey is very jeal- 
ous of any approach to the Holy Places or increase to our 
influence in Arabia, but it is not so much from the Aden side 
that they are apprehensive regarding us—it is rather the 
position and hold we have in Egypt and Suakin which causes 
them anxiety, and I feel sure that abstention on our part 
from using Dthala as proposed would have little or no effect 
on the Turks—the contrary might even reassure them as 
giving a reason for our recent extension of territory. On 
the other hand, our leaving Dthala might give rise to local 
troubles, and any military action in suppressing these would 
probably cause considerable suspicion at Constantinople. I 
sincerely hope that after consideration you will agree to our 
having a military sanatorium at Dthala. 


262 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


Mr. Morley now had to choose between the opinion 
of an official on the spot, supported by the chief mili- 
tary authority, and the lukewarm recommendation 
of the former Political Resident, coupled with the 
statement of the nebulous individual whom he 
described as ‘‘some leading man at the War Office,”’ 
whose stzy at Aden was presumably limited to the 
three hours allotted to passengers. Mr. Morley, 
after marshalling political obstacles and suggesting 
that ‘‘a host of most tiresome questions’’ would be 
raised by a British cantonment in foreign territory, 
thought to clinch his case by the prospect of expen- 
sive transport: ‘‘Of course a sanatorium is an ad- 
vantage. But don’t let us forget the heavy cost; 
the difficulties of a Civil establishment at Dthala; 
political entanglements; and finally the removal of 
part of the garrison to a dangerous distance (80 
miles or more) from its work, unless we go in for a 
railway.’’ Economy—near akin to parsimony— 
gained the day, and Kitchener was finally worsted in 
his efforts for the often sick, and generally sorry, 
soldiers at Aden. 


The differences of opinion which now and again 
almost hardened into official duels did nothing to mar 
personal regard, and the Secretary of State even 
stepped out of usual routine to inquire if the Com- 
mander-in-Chief would accept a proposal from the 
War Minister to remain two years beyond the orig- 
inal and usual appointment: 


March 15, 1907.—As the expiry of your term in the post 
of Commander-in-Chief is now coming into sight, I take the 
liberty of inquiring whether it would be agreeable to you to 
have the term extended for two years more. As you know, 
the appointment rests with the Secretary of State for War, 


LXXIX EXTENSION OF COMMAND 263 


and not with me; but I have every reason to believe that this 
extension would command his cordial concurrence. Before, 
however, the matter takes formal shape in Mr. Haldane’s 
hands, it would be an advantage if you would tell me that 
your own wishes and views point the same way as mine. I 
am sure that the Viceroy would be much gratified if you 
assent to my proposal. He will tell you so. 
The Indian military problem perhaps approaches a 
rather critical stage (not that I apprehend what is called a 
Crisis, or anything like a Crisis), and I see no grounds for 
doubting your zealous co-operation in bringing the next 
stage of things to as satisfactory a settlement as circum- 
stanees allow. On the other hand, the enormous advantages 
of your continued presence in India,’ from every point of 
view, are so obvious, that it would be waste of time for me to 
press them upon you. So, in short, I hope very strongly 


1 Six months earlier Mr. Morley had consulted the Viceroy as to this 
extension: “I have just sent you a telegram [Lord Minto wrote] in reply 
to your question about a possible extension of Kitchener’s time. ...I had 
a talk with him some weeks ago, and he told me he would like to stay on 
here to complete his work, but that he saw no particular reason for raising 
the point just now as he had still some time to run; that he certainly did 
not look forward to taking up military work at home, and that he did 
not feel inclined to share the labours of the Army Council. I told him I 
could quite understand this, but at the same time he might, no doubt, if he 
liked, exercise considerable influence on army matters in the House of 
Lords. He said he saw this too, but he was evidently not looking forward 
to a career at home. He then told me very privately that what he would 
really like would be to succeed Lord Cromer in Egypt; that he felt he 
could fill the position, and that he imagined Cromer would not stay on much 
longer, and that he-might wait and see. . . . The more I see of him, the 
More confirmed I am in the opinions I have expressed to you about him. 
He is a most able administrator, and I always find him broad-minded, far- 
seeing, and very ready to look at both sides of a question. I would put 
Kitchener far beyond the military category. I believe him to be a really big 
man whose abilities the country should never lose sight of. I can assure 
you that since I have been here, he has shown every anxiety to meet any 
views I have expressed, and I am quite certain that should he stay on here 
you would never find him the least inclined to overpress his opinions. He 
would express them no doubt clearly and strongly, but beyond that I am 
sure he recognises that a true imperial strength lies in loyally working out 
the views of His Majesty’s Government. Personally, I never look upon him 
as entirely absorbed in purely military work. He is a curious personality, 
rather shy, and very much wrapt up in his garden. If he goes home and 
feels that he is not likely to follow up a career suitable to his ambition, I 
ean quite imagine his retiring into private life.” 


264 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


that you will give me an affirmative answer, which I may 
convey to the proper quarters, and the sooner you are in a 
position to reply, the more convenient it will be. 


Kitchener was not perhaps unprepared for the 
invitation, although he had not made the slightest 
move to secure it. He answered frankly: 


April 7, 1907.—I am very grateful to you for the kind 
terms of your letter offering me an extension of my com- 
mand in India. Lord Minto has told me he wishes me to 
continue my work, in which IT naturally take the greatest in- 
terest. JI have therefore asked him to wire to you my ac- 
ceptance and thanks for your kindness and appreciation of 
my work. 

My only doubt about accepting your kind offer of an ex- 
tension of command related to a personal matter, namely 
health. I have recently had a good many attacks of mala- 
rial fever, and I was rather looking forward to a complete 
change and rest at the end of my five years in India. I 
have, however, been quite well lately, and my doctor passes 
me as sound; so I hope that nothing will interfere with my 
being able to carry out the extension you have been good 
enough to give me. 

I shall do my best during my extension to carry out your 
wishes as regards the administration of the Army on sound 
and economical lines. 

I am now, after the Calcutta session, taking the usual 
fortnight for shooting in the jungle, before inspecting in 
northern India. We have only got three tigers and three 
bears up to date. 


Mr. Morley amiably rejoined: 


1 Kitchener wrote just then rather wistfully to Lady Salisbury: “Yes, 
I have always looked forward to my first Sunday in England being spent 
at Hatfield. It is a time-honoured institution, is it not? Sometimes the 
Tealisation of the pleasure it will give me seems a long way off, but the 
years pass quickly out here as one has lots of work, and now the work is 
all quite pleasant, for a new system of army administration has more than 
justified my wildest hopes.” 


LXXIX APPLICATION FOR LEAVE 265 


May 3, 1907.—Your letter of April 7 gives me lively 
satisfaction, and I am heartily glad that you agree to go on. 
The official notification from the War Office will most likely 
reach you by this mail, I think. 

Nothing can be more valued by me and H.M.’s Government 
than what you call ‘‘sound and economical administration.’’ 

I hope you have quite thrown off your fever. 


But the fever was persistent, and that summer 
found, and left, Kitchener physically a little out of 
sorts. On September 24, with the approval of the 
Viceroy, he asked a favour of the Home Government: 


IT am writing to ask whether you have any objection to 
my visiting Singapore, Hong-Kong, and North China about 
the beginning of April next year. I have ascertained that 
there will be no objection on the Viceroy’s part, and he has 
authorised me to write to you on the subject. I should by 
this means have an opportunity of making myself acquainted 
with the conditions under which those regiments of native 
infantry serve which India lends to the War Office for garri- 
son duty. The principal reason, however, is that I am 
anxious as regards my own health, and have been advised 
that a rest and sea-voyage would be of great value to me. 
In November next I complete five years’ service as Com- 
mander-in-Chief, and they have, as you know, been years of 
incessant work. On my return from South Africa I had 
practically no leave before coming to India, and I now feel 
that my services during the two years’ extension you have 
been good enough to give me are likely to be of much greater 
value if I were allowed to enter on them after a short respite 
from the continuous work that follows a Commander-in- 
Chief wherever he goes in India. By leaving immediately 
after the Calcutta session I save a month’s tour, and should 
take up my work in Simla in July instead of May. 

I send this letter by General Duff so that he may person- 
ally explain any points on which you may desire further de- 


266 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


tails. Should you wish me to submit an official application 
for sanction I have asked General Duff to telegraph to me to 
that effect, but I do not imagine that that course will be 
necessary, for what I propose seems to be covered by prec- 
edents and regulations, and only to require your approval. 


Mr. Morley thought otherwise, and dexterously 
parried his correspondent’s proposal: 


November 7, 1907.—Your letter of September 24 rather 
strikes me with dismay. You do not say precisely for how 
long you would wish to be absent from the Government of 
India, but I presume that it would be for an appreciable 
measure of time. 

It is only, I think, three or four months ago since I re- 
ceived, as the foundation of the case for sundry measures of 
repressive legislation, a strong Memorandum of yours de- 
picting the dangers of disaffection in the Indian Army as 
real and of imminent, if not even actual, urgency. In the 
state of things so emphatically pressed on my close atten- 
tion, you won’t think it unnatural that I should feel uneasy 
at the idea of your being off the scene even for a week. 

Then here is another difficulty. You represent military 
things upon the Executive Council of the Governor-General. 
What is to become of them in your absence? You will not, 
I think, refer me to the head of the Military Supply Depart- 
ment? Even if you did, I cherish the hope that this de- 
partment may vanish into limbo almost before you could 
start. Be that as it may, military questions in the Council 
of the Governor-General would practically be in a state of 
suspended animation so long as you were away. Now I 
expect Indian military policy, in all its aspects, to be an 
object of much interest and importance for some months to 
come. Are we to hang it all up? 

Again, is it safe to leave the Army Department—in an 
experimental stage, remember—to its own devices and re- 
sources? How would that coach travel without you—I don’t 


LXXIX APPLICATION WITHDRAWN 267 


know whether to call you lynch-pin or mainspring?. . 

Now for health. There you have meat your mercy. Only 
observe that I shall get into a scrape (for there are vigilant 
and powerful critics here, in Parliament, and especially out 
of Parliament) for having invited you to accept an extension 
of your term as Commander-in-Chief. They will ask me 
whether I had taken into account the years of your incessant 
labour; and whether I was right in what I did, and in what 
I rejoice that, by your good will, I was able to do. Your 
absence even for a moderate time will give point to this. 

I have written to you, quite frankly and informally, the 
objections that present themselves to my mind. Will you 
do me the kindness to turn them over? 

The discussion of these important and delicate matters by 
writing, instead of face answering to face, is the worst of all 
the drawbacks to the relations between this office and the 
Government of India, thousands of miles away. 


Kitchener, who was never unwilling to look at 
things from the other man’s point of view, saw that 
Mr. Morley had the best of the argument: 


December 1907.—I am very much obliged to you for your 
kind letter, and have asked the Viceroy to telegraph to you 
to withdraw my request. 

I can quite see the force of the arguments you mention in 
your letter against my leaving India early next year. Had 
it been possible,. I should much have liked a rest and sea- 
voyage, and should, I think, have come back to my work 
fresher and perhaps better able to deal with the many ques- 
tions that have to be decided. 


But, although he withdrew his proposal, he could 
not shake off his fever, which clung to him for some 
months and was proof even against the pleasant news 
which reached him at Christmas. 


December 18, 1907.—I think this will reach you a day or 


268 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


two after the New Year, and that date will bring you the 
bestowal of a new honour from the hands of the King. You 
will allow me to offer you my cordial congratulations—and 
my sincere wish that you may live long to wear this, and 
whatever other decorations may fall to you before you leave 
India. Your zealous interest in the field of your labours is 
recognised by everybody who knows enough about it to be 
a competent judge, and I consider myself fortunate in pro- 
curing your consent to such an extension of those labours 
as may suffice to bring them to a satisfactory close. Only I 
daresay that in military things, as in most other depart- 
ments of public life, one has to learn the lesson of being 
content with Second Best. The politician, at any rate, finds 
out that his trade is an affair of second best, and to resign 
himself to it is the beginning of wisdom. Only not on the 
day of battle. 

I think you know that the King himself especially 
favoured your decoration, and you will believe also that the 
King’s wish was cordially seconded both by the Viceroy and 
myself. 

To-day we hear of the death of Lord Kelvin, the most 
distinguished of the civil members of the Order of Merit, 
to which you belong on the other side. When I say most 
distinguished, I mean in intellectual power and versatility ; 
for if beneficent contribution to human happiness be the 
test, I suppose Lord Lister would run Kelvin hard. You 
will wonder why I waste my time in putting to you riddles 
with barren answers. 

I have had visits this week from General Smith-Dorrien, 
Malleson, and Maconchy. They all had plenty of interest- 
ing things to tell me—and I really think I shall know some- 
thing about Indian problems, as they are called, perhaps by 
the morning of the day when I have to hand back my seals - 
of office to the Sovereign. 


The recipient set the right value on his new 
decoration: 


LXXIX A NEW DECORATION 269 


I think you will realise that I prize the G.C.I.E. more as 
a mark of the confidence and approval of the Government 
than as a decoration. 

I am very glad you have been able to see several officers 
lately either returning to England or on leave from here. 
I feel sure conversations with them must be advantageous. 


NOTE 


To the Great Lorp KiTcHENER, High Commander-in-Chief, General 
Commanding the brave and powerful Army of England of hun- 
dreds of thousands of men. 


I am at present in extensive good health and happiness, living at 
rest on the clear snow-clad mountains, taking pleasure in the all- 
powerful Mahadeva (lit. “‘Five-faced-one’’). 

You are conducting and directing the brave army satisfactorily, 
like a rare turquoise. 

To be brief: the Sahebs of Gyantse have sent a plate (or “table”) 
with supports for (my) pleasure. It is made altogether equal to a 
pattern, without any difference, which increases my happiness beyond 
all thought. ; 

To be brief: as I have said, now that all the people of England 
and Tibet have now and henceforth become friends, with the affection 
of an elder and younger brother, there will be complete happiness 
in your heart. 

There is no need to say how strong we consider it has become. 
And wishing that soon the life of the friends of our benefactor may 
be still further strengthened, (lit. “deepened”) both in time and 
place, it gives pleasure and satisfaction to say that it will continue 
steadily and continuously like pure milk. 

With a silk scarf. On a propitious date. 

(Seal of the TAsH1t LAMA.) 


Address (on the back of the letter)— 

To the Great Lord Kitchener, High Com- 
mander-in-Chief, General Commanding the 
brave and powerful Armies of England of 
hundreds of thousands of men. 


The letter is undated. 
It may be interesting to note the spelling of the Tibetan, in which 
the name of Lord Kitchener is transliterated: 
“Lor-sqra-skyid-chi-nar.” 
“Lor- d- Ki- tche-ner.” 


CHAPTER LXXX 


ALTHOUGH sanitary science in India had made many 
steps forward, enteric fever and malaria were still a 
scourge of the British Army and a leading cause of 
death and disability. The subject was much on 
Kitchener’s mind, and at the 1905 summer meeting 
of Lieutenant-Generals he laid stress upon its urgent 
importance. 

Recent discoveries in bacteriology facilitated a 
systematic investigation which Kitchener, after the 
conference of 1905, instituted into the causation and 
origin of these maladies; a campaign against the 
house-fly, with its nidus in the night-soil accumulated 
near cantonments, and the mosquito—the recognised 
agents of the two diseases—resulted in a most sig- 
nificant drop of nearly one-half in the death and 
sickness rates. Stringent preventive regulations 
were issued as to sanitation, inoculation for malaria, 
the purification of water, and the preservation of all 
food and drink from contamination; and it was per- 
emptorily ordered that all persons—British or 
Native—before being employed in the preparation 
of any sort of eatables intended for the troops, should 
undergo a medical examination. Depots were also 
established in the hills for enteric convalescents, 
often carriers, who had hitherto not been sufficiently 
recognised as a source of danger to their comrades; 
and technical training in hygiene was provided for 

270 


cmap. ixxx VHNEREAL DISEASES 271 


selected N.C.O.’s and men, each of these sanitary 
sections being supervised by a medical officer. 

Kitchener knew, however, that he had to deal with 
another foe far more dangerous and deadly to the 
men under his command, and in a Memorandum 
largely penned by himself * he urged on General and 
Commanding Officers that they must watch over, not 
only the health, but the morals of the troops; and 
he bade officers to set a real example to their men in 
their standard of life. Casting no aspersion on past 
methods, he said deliberately that he expected from 
one and all a keener sense of duty and responsibility, 
and a higher standard of moral courage, in order that 
full effect should attend the measures he advocated 
for dealing with a curse which was sapping the 
efficiency of the Army: 


The Commanding Officer of a regiment [he wrote] should 
realise that the primary causes leading to impurity and dis- 
ease are drink and idleness, and these he should energet- 
ically combat by every means in his power. He should 
encourage in his men a belief in leading a good healthy life 
both mentally and physically, and should provide them with 
the means of living it. : 

He should see that his men have plenty to do, and are 
fully exercised and interested in their daily work while it 
lasts; and when that is done he should ‘foster a love for 
games and outdoor exercise of all sorts. He should check 
excessive drinking, and must be particularly watchful in 
this respect after pay-day. ... 

While all Officers should do all they possibly can to pre- 
vent impurity by advice and influence, and still more by 
setting an example of self-restraint, we must not stop there. 
We must not forget that the young soldier is a thoughtless 


1A draft of a large part of this, in his own handwriting, is still extant. 


272 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


youth, suddenly placed in new surroundings in a very dif- 
ferent climate to that in which he has been brought up—with 
manifold temptations from the natives of the country for the 
smallest fraction of the rupees in his possession, and with 
very few healthy amusements and interests outside his 
barrack life; and that in these circumstances he requires the 
utmost protection against himself that we can afford him. 

In former days the existence of this vice and the desir- 
ability of regularising it were recognised. But public opin- 
ion has put an end to this system, which had the great draw- 
back that it might be said to—and in some eases possibly did 
—place temptation to be impure in the way of the young sol- 
dier. But this is, to my mind, no reason why we should step 
aside and cease our endeavours to combat an evil, the dan- 
gers of which we all so clearly recognise. We should not be 
content to let things take their course, or to seek salvation in 
the mere publication of cantonment laws, which, though 
good enough perhaps in themselves, lose all their force in 
the absence of sensible and regular application. 


This Memorandum, which detailed the means to 
be adopted by cantonment magistrates as well as by 
combatant and medical officers,! was followed by an 
Adjutant-General’s letter of June 1905, which in- 
cluded further instructions—chiefly on administra- 
tion and sanitation—and concluded with a note that 
excited considerable comment at the time: 


The Commander-in-Chief is aware that officers sometimes 
hesitate to adopt measures for the prevention of disease in 
cantonments owing to their fear of public opinion, and under 
the impression that their efforts will not be supported by 


1To the medical cfficers a special instruction was issued: ‘They should 
take every opportunity, while impressing on patients in a kindly manner 
the very serious effects of their indiscretions, to see that no special comfort 
or indulgence is provided for them in hospital; such patients should be 
made to feel that though they are there te undergo treatment, they must not 
look for the indulgences and additional comforts which are provided in the 
case of illness which they cannot avoid.” 


LXXX AN APPEAL TO SOLDIERS 273 


Army Headquarters. On this point His Excellency directs 
me to observe that he considers that public opinion was quite 
justified in condemning a system under which prostitutes 
_ were maintained by Government for the use of the sol-. 
diers. All recent legislation on the subject, warnings to sol- 
diers, as well as punishments, etc., are framed with a view to 
the diminution of vice and to induce soldiers to adopt a 
higher moral tone; and the idea that vice can be prevented 
by allowing disease to exist in cantonments, and by regard- 
ing the liability to infection as an effective deterrent, is not 
and never has been the view held by persons of sound 
judgement. 


Later on in the year Kitchener issued yet another 
Memorandum, appealing directly to the soldiers, in 
whose ‘‘Small Book’’ it was ordered to be inserted: 


On his arrival in India, Lord Kitchener learnt with regret 
the very serious extent of the ravages made by venereal dis- 
ease among British troops serving in this country, and at 
once set to work to combat its growth and spread in the 
Army. The results of these efforts, so far, have been en- 
couraging ; but there is a limit to what can be done in this 
direction by the authorities to whom the welfare of the sol- 
dier during his tour of service is entrusted, unless they re- 
ceive the hearty co-operation and assistance of the men 
themselves, and it is in order to obtain their help that Lord 
Kitchener now addresses to them these remarks which he de- 
sires them to read and keep in mind during their service in 
India. 

Lord Kitchener feels sure that new arrivals in this coun- 
try, and even those of more experience, frequently suffer 
from want of knowledge of how to protect themselves from 
the dangers to which they are exposed in a strange country, 
and of the means by which they can best preserve their 
health and render themselves a credit to their corps. 

The climate and conditions of life in India are unfortu- 


nately such as to create temptations greater than those 
VOL. II T 


274 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


which exist in countries outside the tropics. The absence 
of home associations throws men more on their own re- 
sources, and deprives them of many of those helps towards 
resisting temptation which surround them in England. 
During the cold weather there may perhaps be enough work, 
healthy exercise, and amusement to keep men occupied, 
mentally and physically; but throughout the long months 
of great heat in the plains, time often hangs heavily on their 
hands, and with want of occupation comes the temptation 
to excessive indulgence. 

It is therefore all the more necessary that those who are 
serving their country in India should exert to the utmost 
those powers of self-restraint with which every man is pro- 
vided in order that he may exercise a proper control over 
his appetites. They should avoid any excess in liquor, on no 
account touch country spirits, take an active interest in their 
profession, and do their utmost towards making themselves 
really smart and efficient soldiers in every respect. They 
should take part in all healthy outdoor sports and games, 
and always keep themselves in good training and physically 
fit. Both mind and body? should be fully occupied, and 
a lively interest cultivated in all their surroundings. In 
this way, work will be found much easier, and life generally 
more pleasant. 

Above all things, men must remember that they should 
do credit to their regiments; for the good name of a regi- 
ment lies in the keeping of every man belonging to it, and 
necessarily suffers if the men become inefficient through 
venereal diseases. It is discreditable, and even dishonest, 
that, by contracting through self-indulgence a disease which 
he can avoid, a man should render himself incapable of 
doing that work for his country which he enlisted to do. 

1In an address on higher Mohammedan education Kitchener said: ‘“‘We 
ought to enable the youths of Mohammedan races under our rule to carry 
out that grand Mohammedan precept, which is also the precept of other 
religions, that to improve the mind and body is the duty of man to God. 
Education must elevate your minds, must improve your faculties of thought, 


must clear your vision, and make you understand your place and duty in 
the world.” 


LXXX APPEAL FOR SELF-CONTROL 275 


Unless pride in their corps, and the desire to do it credit, 
keeps men from this danger, they must be prepared to see 
other regiments chosen for active service when the chance 
comes, and their own left behind. 

It is therefore the duty of asoldier, not only to keep him- 
self clear of disease, but also by his good example to help his 
comrades to avoid temptation. The older men particularly 
should realise their responsibilities in this respect. Very 
much depends on the tone and example which they set, and 
even if they themselves have suffered, there is all the more 
need that they should do their utmost to keep their younger 
comrades straight, and prevent them from lowering the good 
name of the regiment as a whole. No soldier who is unable 
to exercise due restraint in these matters can expect to be 
entrusted with command over his comrades. 

Every man can by self-control restrain the indulgence of 
those imprudent and reckless impulses that so often lead 
men astray, and he who thus resists is a better soldier and 
a better man than the man of weaker will who allows his 
bodily appetites to rule him, and who lacks the strength of 
character to resist temptation and to refuse to follow any 
bad example he may see before him. 

Remember the better infiuences of life. What would 
your mothers, your sisters, and your friends at home think 
of you if they saw you in hospital, degraded by this 
eause? And later on in life, when you might rightly hope 
to marry and settle down, it will make a difference to your 
own happiness and that of your family—which no words 
ean express—if you can do so with a body clear of those 
loathsome diseases which, if once contracted, may be passed 
on to your children. 

Lord Kitchener would further point out that, although the 
military penalties incurred by those who contract venereal 
diseases can only be considered as of minor importance when 
compared to the more dreadful and far-reaching conse- 
quences above referred to, yet men should remember that they 
exist and should know what they are. Promotion may be af- 


276 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER  ca.uxxx 


fected, first-class service pay is forfeited, for it is given for effi- 
ciency, and men who have suffered from these diseases remain 
inefficient for long periods ; guards and duties missed while in 
hospital have to be made good, so that the self-indulgence of 
those who contract disease may not throw extra work on their 
comrades; on their return to duty they may find all indul- 
gences, passes, etc., withheld, and the canteen may be closed 
against them. Should me be invalided for venereal dis- 
eases, gratuities and pensions are liable to be affected. 

Further, it must be remembered that it is impossible for 
long to conceal the existence of disease, and that the at- 
tempt to do so is an offence which is very severely punished. 

Lord Kitchener asks all the men who compose the British 
Army in India, which he is proud to command, to read this 
Memorandum very carefully and think over these matters; 
let each then consider for himself whether indulgence is 
worth the price which has to be paid for it in disease, in 
punishment, in injury to the man himself, his wife and his 
children, in destruction of the efficiency of his corps, and in 
degradation of his own body and mind. 


The Memorandum was no perfunctory platitude, 
but the outcome of the author’s feelings on a dark 
and difficult subject. For him vice was vice, and 
could neither be laughed at nor licensed. His own 
stern self-control in no way blinded him to the well- 
nigh irresistible temptations which beset the soldier, 
and more especially the British soldier serving in the 
East. He looked for no moral Utopia, nor—hu- 
manly speaking—saw any real cure for a terribly real 
ill. But he did think, and was not slow to say, that 
alongside any religious influences, with which he kept 
himself in close touch, much might healthily be done 
—which unhappily had been left undone—to protect 
the men for whom he held himself responsible from 
a grave physical and moral evil. 


CHAPTER LXXXT 


THE Commander-in-Chief’s Budget speech for 1909- 
1910 was his swan-song in the Legislative Council. 
The soldier-economist had his say—a say which went 
to explain and justify his military administration, 
and to recount the reforms carried out on his initia- 
tive during the preceding six years and a half. He 
was able to report the complete re-armament of the 
Indian Artillery with quick-firing guns, and a corre- 
sponding increase of ammunition, wagons, horses, 
and establishments. Both this and another costly 
change, the re-arming of the whole of the troops with 
the new rifle, had been effected entirely out of India’s 
own resources: in respect of both arms and ammuni- 
tion India was nearly self-supporting. 

It is strange how few people come under the 
fascination of finance; men are prone to talk about 
money—only the money must be theirs, or that of 
their friends, actually or potentially. The resources 
of a community are a dull subject, and the finances 
of a municipality or a State are considered exclu- 
sively the affair of financial experts. 

But Kitchener was one of the few men, and cer- 
tainly one of the very few soldiers, to whom finance, 
as such, was an attraction:! in the study of Indian 

1 He was very pleased to hear in South Africa that the Chancellor of 


the Exchequer, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, had expressed his high opinion of 
his financial capabilities in all military matters. He invited Sir Michael 


278 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


finance he found a mental occupation not only con- 
genial but bracing. He was admittedly fortunate in 
that the inception of his reorganisation policy coin- 
cided with a period of Indian prosperity. During 
his seven years he had of course to cut his coat 
according to his cloth. He naturally took advantage 
of the fat years to obtain a special grant of limited 
duration for pressing requirements; and in the suc- 
ceeding lean years curtailed expenditure wherever 
possible, so as to bring the normal military budget 
back to its former level, or even lower. 

Thus the reorganisation schemes were financed by 
a special fixed grant spread over five years, and 
amounting in the aggregate to something less than 
£10,000,000 sterling, of which the amount spent was 
less than £8,250,000. 

The expenditure of this special grant was distrib- 
uted under three heads: 

1. All special outlay outside the reorganisation of 
the personnel. A sum of rather more than £4,500,000 
covered various items, of which re-arming the artil- 
lery cost £1,750,000; ordnance machinery, ete., 
£200,000; buildings, ete., £600,000; coast defence, 
£432,000, and so on. 

2. The initial cost of the reorganisation scheme, 
ineluding (a) less than £1,000,000 for purchase of 
land and building operations, and (b) a sum of under 
£2,000,000 for preparation for war. 

3. The recurring cost of the reorganisation scheme, 
which amounted to over £750,000. The fifth year of 
the special grant, 1910, saw economies effected to the 
extent of £320,000. 


to act as one of the trustees for his military grant; but the arrangement 
was not carried out, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer favoured nothing 
but gilt-edged stocks for the purpose. 


LXXXI FAREWELL TO THE ARMY 219 


Invitations to farewell dinners, for which neither 
time nor human digestion was available, poured in 
and had to be regretfully declined. But a notable 
exception was made in the banquet at the United 
Services Club at Simla, when Lord Minto, after 
paying a tribute to one who was not only ‘‘an 
illustrious Commander-in-Chief, but a far-seeing and 
sagacious statesman, upon whose loyal support in 
difficult times the Viceroy could always count,’’ 
alluded to the loss sustained by ‘‘a community of 
friends who have learnt to dissociate the character- 
istics of the stern soldier from the refined taste 
which has laid out the gardens of Wildflower Hall, 
and has so artistically decorated the ever-hospitable 
walls of Snowdon.’’ 

Kitchener, in his reply, made the point that while 
the younger officers could rightly long for war, and 
burn to show their zeal and devotion in the fiery test 
of battle, it would not be well that the Commander- 
in-Chief, who, sitting on the Viceroy’s Council, takes 
his part in shaping the destiny of the Indian Empire, 
should share or allow himself to be swayed by any 
such consideration: ‘‘We must know and feel that 
for this, as for every nation, peace is the greatest of 
all blessings, so long as it is a peace with honour.”’ 

In September, just before laying down his com- 
mand, Lord Kitchener issued his farewell order to 
the Army of India: 


Steady persistence will be needed to maintain even the 
present standard of efficiency, while that higher ideal which 
has not yet been reached can be attained only by continued 
effort. Continuity is indeed the key-word of this my last 
message to the Army in India—continuity as regards the 
end aimed at, the means by which that end is sought, and 


280 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


the efforts without which nothing worth the doing ean ever 
be accomplished. ... One of my aims throughout my 
tenure of command has been the devolution of power down- 
ward throughout all ranks of officers, with a view to encourag- 
ing that personal initiative and readiness to accept responsi- 
bility which are so invaluable in war, but which cannot 
then be looked for unless they have been made habitual by 
constant exercise in peace. The response has been encourag- 
ing, but seven years is all too short a period for the forma- 
tion of a mental habit throughout the whole of a great 
Service. I hope and believe that in time my object will 
be fully attained. 

I specially commend the British troops in this country 
for the whole-hearted support they have given me in my 
efforts to increase their physical efficiency, and to reduce 
preventable disease... .I make it my request to them 
that they will permit no falling back in these matters. . . . 
I bid farewell to the Army in India, both British and In- 
dian, with regret, but with full confidence in its future. 


Kitchener left Simla on September 6 for Poona, 
where he was to hand over his command to Sir Moore 
O’Creagh. The whole of the population, European 
and Indian, turned out to bid him farewell. The 
troops from Jutogh voluntarily walked many miles 
to the cart-road down which his motor was to pass, 
to cheer their Chief; and at the military stations 
through which his special train ran troops—equally 
of their own free will—congregated. Soldiers in 
hundreds had insisted on having access to the plat- 
form, to have the last glimpse of Kitchener Sahib. 


In his administration of the Army in India Kitch- 
ener kept constantly in mind the external demands 
which hereafter might quite conceivably be made on 
India’s military resources. Before his arrival im- 


ee THE GERMAN MENACE 281 


proved communications had already diminished the 
historic isolation of the great Peninsula, and the 
menace of a Russian advance upon her north-west 
frontier was in some ways greater in 1902 than it 
had ever been before. Three years later Russia was 
defeated by Japan, and from that defeat there arose 
a new tendency to moderation at Petrograd, and a 
readiness to come to terms with England, which 
issued in the Agreement over Persia in 1907. The 
triumph of Japan, while it gave military students 
much to ponder over, entailed considerations of first- 
rate importance. If it led directly to the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance, it was hailed throughout Asia— 
and not least in India—as the victory of an Asiatic 
over a European race, which broke the long spell of 
European dominance. 

But Kitchener saw the dawn of another danger to 
India. Germany had quietly started a process of 
peaceful penetration in Asia Minor, and her more 
outspoken politicians and professors were already 
assigning to her the guardianship and eventual in- 
heritance of the Ottoman Empire.? The opening up 

1 Evidence is not wanting that the Russian disposition to treat with 
England was coloured by her recognition of the new preparedness against 


any aggression. 
2In 1908 Kitchener wrote to a friend: 


“ SIMLA, October 8, 1908. 


“T have always, as you know, been very much interested in the Eastern 
question, and this recent flare-up is quite exciting. Please let me know all 
you can on the subject. In old days I used to know my Constantinople, 
Bulgaria, etce., well, and speaking Turkish gave me rather a pull in seeing 
what was going on behind the scenes. It seems to me that we have now a 
great opportunity of retrieving our position in the Moslem world. The 
Turkish Army is composed of some of the very best fighting material, and 
we have only to look at the Baghdad Railway and the conduct of Russia in 
Persia to see how important it is for us to support Turkey and be the one to 
help her to reorganise her forces. 

“TI do not see how much could be done except as Ambassador. That post 
would, however, place whoever occupies it in a position to do a great deal 


282 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


of a new overland road to India was the pleasant 
theme of publicists who laid stress on the weakness of 
England’s position in Egypt and India, and exalted 
the Kaiser’s réle of protector of the whole Moham- 
medan world. The Berlin-Baghdad railway was al- 
ready denominated the Berlin-Byzantium-Baghdad 
Bahn;/but Bengal and not Baghdad was to be the 
terminus, and Germany was indulging herself in 
something more than a dream of becoming mistress 
of India. The Kaiser might choose Morocco, at the 
other end of the Moslem world, for a spectacular 
display of strength; but the substantial danger lay 
in the East, where German merchants, missionaries, 
soldiers, and prospecting engineers were predicting 
the future of Prussia as an Asiatic power. 

Without pretending that the peril was acute, or 
likely to become acute, while he was responsible for 
the defence of India, Kitchener watched with anxiety, 
if not with alarm, every move of this coming new 
competitor in Asia; it was borne in upon him before 
he left England in 1902 that the Kaiserliche policy 
rendered war between England and Germany a con- 
tingency to be reckoned with in the East no less than 
in the West. 

And so it came about that, if the Anglo-Russian 
Agreement prevented his immediate defence policy 
from being put to the proof, his handiwork enabled 
India five years after he left her to make her great 
Imperial contribution to the Great War. 


at the present juncture, and unless we have a really good man there, Russia 
or Germany will assuredly pull the chestnuts out of the fire. 

“T still hold the rank and Sultan’s Commission of a Lt.-General in the 
Turkish Army, and should rather like to revisit old haunts and see old 
friends, but it is not easy to see how this could be done, 

“Remember the extent of our influence at Stamboul very seriously affects 
our position in this country as well as in Afghanistan and Egypt. I hope 
we shall not let the chance slip.” 


LXXXI THE INDIAN ARMY 283 


APPENDIX TO CHAPTER LXXXI 


*“‘But for Lord Kitchener’s work, India could never 
possibly have given the great help she has to the Empire 
during the War.’’ Sowrotea famous General of the Indian 
Army, who fought in France, Flanders, and the Dardanelles. 

The first call on England’s Asiatic Dependency was for 
two complete infantry and two cavalry divisions to be sent 
to France—a call which fifteen years earlier would have 
caused dire consternation. But Kitchener had left India 
mapped out in nine divisional areas, each calculated to 
contain a complete fighting division ready to go anywhere, 
with a definite allotment of troops to ensure the internal 
safety of the country. Thus, in quick reply to his own eall 
from the War Office, the Indian Government could send off 
smoothly, swiftly, and fully equipped, the divisions im- 
mediately needed for France, the first convoy sailing on 
August 25, 1914. Without the organisation set afoot by 
Kitchener, the divisions—if sent at all—would have been 
formed by a miscellaneous collection of regiments drawn 
from all parts of India, with hurriedly thrown together 
staffs, transport, and departmental details. 

This initial and substantial despatch of troops for France 
had searcely been effected when fresh requisitions at a few 
days’ interval were made and met for further divisions to 
proceed to East Africa and Egypt. The contingent for 
East Africa consisted of one complete British and Indian 
brigade with additional Indian troops to the approximate 
strength of an infantry division. As, on account of the fly, 
horses could not be maintained in East Africa, no mounted 
troops were asked for, except one Indian mountain battery. 
To Egypt, with equal absence of fuss or friction, was sent 
the equivalent of three Indian infantry divisions. 

Then, when India might have been thought to be drained 
dry, came the call to Baghdad, with the prompt response 
of a complete and highly organised division? of all arms, 


1 The 6th Poona Division. 


284 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER cz. txxx 


the Indian authorities providing the transport—and, be it 
remembered, India was the while sending home the whole 
residue of the British infantry, excepting nine battalions, 
in exchange for a much smaller number of Territorial 
battalions. 

At the time when the Mesopotamian Expedition left 
India no question had been raised as to any advance be- 
yond Basrah, and up to the capture of Basrah it is generally 
admitted that the Expedition was a complete success in its 
conception, organisation, and equipment—a success which 
was all the more striking because India’s powers were tried 
far beyond anything that had been contemplated. In ordi- 
nary times such an expedition as that sent to Baghdad 
would have been prosecuted with the whole military 
strength of India, whereas in the present case it had to be 
furnished out of resources already drawn upon and de- 
pleted by three previous demands. 


CHAPTER LXXXII 


On September 12, three days after he had formally 
laid down the Indian command, Kitchener, with his 
A.D.C., Captain FitzGerald,' sailed from Tuticorin. 
For the time being he was High Commissioner- 
designate and Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief 
in the Mediterranean in succession to the Duke of 
Connaught—the appointment was never actually 
taken up—but he was free for a tour he had long 
desired to make in the course of which he would 
respond to the iivitation ? to pronounce on the de- 
fences of Australia. 

China and Japan were Kitchener’s personal ob- 
jectives. On the road to the Far East the forts, 
harbour, and strategic points were inspected at 
Singapore, and at Saigon the significant compliment 
was paid of a parade of French Anamese troops. 

1Captain O. A. G. FitzGerald, 18th Bengal Lancers, in 1906 replaced 
Major F. Maxwell, V.C., as Aide-de-Camp to the Commander-in-Chief. 
Thereafter, except for a few months, when he had to return to India from 
Australia, FitzGerald was scarcely ever apart from his Chief for a single 
day. Sir Henry Rawlinson joined the party in Peking. 

2Mr. Cook, speaking on the Defence Bill in the Commonwealth Parlia- 
ment on September 21, 1909, said: ‘“‘We have invited one of the best 
soldiers of the Empire—perhaps the Empire’s most celebrated organiser: 
I allude to Lord Kitchener—to visit us and advise us as to the lines upon 
which we ought to proceed in. reference to all matters making for the 
organisation and efficiency of our army. He will come here, and we shall 
ask him frankly to look at us as we are, to tell us freely what are our 
defects, to suggest remedies, and to do everything that is necessary to put us 
upon the right track to thorough army efficiency. . . . Lord Kitchener’s 
advice will be welcomed—it will be most valuable to us.” 


285 


286 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


By the beginning of October the tourists had 
arrived at Shanghai, a day having been spent in 
Hong-Kong and Canton. At Shanghai Kitchener 
was duly impressed with the gold deposits of the 
Hong-Kong and Shanghai Bank, was pleased with 
the local volunteers—a congeries of nationalities 
making up a battalion, which he inspected at his own 
request—and was attracted by some local collections 
of Chinese porcelain. ; 

From Shanghai the party proceeded to Peking, 
where the Imperial Guard was turned out for the 
British General’s inspection, an unprecedented 
honour for a foreign visitor to the Chinese capital. 
Professional duties were then resumed, and, accom- 
panied by Viscount Terauchi, the Japanese Minister 
of War, Kitchener travelled into Manchuria, to see 
the battle-fields of the Russo-Japanese War. He was 
familiar with every incident of the campaign through 
the copious notes he had received from Sir Jan 
Hamilton; but the visit to the flat country where 
modern trench-warfare had been carried on five 
years earlier was not forgotten when trench-warfare 
was hideously elaborated five years later. The 
battle-field at Mukden was so large—a strip of it was 
ninety miles long—that the party only had time to 
examine the smallest though most important portion, 
a part of the northern flank; but at Port Arthur, on 
the return from the interior, it was possible to make 
a more detailed examination of that part of the field. 
Some time was spent at 203-metre Hill, where a 
Japanese officer of heavy artillery described the at- 
tack on Port Arthur, and explained in detail the dis- 
position of the artillery. He admitted—in reply to 
Kitchener’s suggestion—that Port Arthur under 


LXXXII TO CHINA AND JAPAN 287 


more vigorous treatment might have fallen three 
months earlier, and that the Japanese had been 
strategically wrong in not sooner attacking the Hill, 
but explained that they had been constrained by the 
fear of a counter-attack exposing their communica- 
tions on the Peninsula. 

In China Kitchener’s interest in art rivalled his 
interest in war. At Mukden, where a Chinese 
wooden house, with a circular hall and chambers all 
round, had been specially constructed for his recep- 
tion, he indulged himself with many happy hours 
among houses full of rare china. The Imperial col- 
lection itself was surrounded by pagodas, and its 
precise whereabouts was a supposed secret. The 
distinguished visitors were introduced to it through 
a labyrinth of passages, and were closely watched by 
a Chinese official attended by an armed guard. The 
Regent had asked Kitchener to accept four speci- 
mens of his famous ‘‘peach-bloom’’ china, but had 
not facilitated a selection by having any light in the 
room or any dust removed from the hundred and 
fifty pieces from which the choice was to be made. 
It was therefore due as much to good luck as to good 
management that the vases chosen—now family heir- 
looms—should have been pronounced by experts as 
of the finest quality. 

From Port Arthur the journey was through Korea 
to Japan, where for months Kitchener had been 
looked for with feverish curiosity. At every railway 
station children brought from long distances and 
provided with miniature British flags were drawn up 
in line, and as the special train very slowly passed 
through, the great_soldier appeared at the window 
to receive a remarkable ovation. In a land where 


288 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


patriotism is imbibed with mother’s milk, it was 
obviously—and indeed avowedly—intended that the 
children should be brought face to face with a man 
whose service for his country was to be an object- 
lesson to them. 

In Japan Kitchener and his staff were treated as 
official guests of the nation; a palace at Tokio was set 
aside for their use, a ceremonial reception was ac- 
corded to them, an invitation to attend the Imperial 
Manceuvres was pressed on them, and a luncheon was 
given by the Mikado, who conferred on his guest the 
Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun.!_ At Nokoto, as at 
other places on the way to Yokohama, where he 
embarked for Shanghai, more crowds of cheering 
children were assembled, and a little—but very little 
—porcelain and woodwork was bought. Kitchener 
made no secret of his preference for Chinese over 
Japanese art, as of his preference for Japanese over 
Chinese soldiers.’ 

By the end of October he was back at Hong-Kong 
and sailed thence on a small Dutch steamer for Java, 
where the Dutch loaded him with hospitality and in- 
sisted on his visiting every inch of their beautiful 


1 Kitchener was also the guest of honour at a banquet given by the 
Maple Club, where he was a little embarrassed at having to sit cross-legged 
and spear oysters from a saucer. 

2“November 20, 1909.—I have been having a most enjoyable time in 
Japan, where every one did their best to make my visit pleasant and 
thoroughly succeeded. I was much struck by the excellence of the Japanese 
Infantry. I have never seen better; their cavalry was bad, but their 
Staff work well done. I only wish the spirit of our people and our Army 
Administration was more like that of the Japanese.” (Kitchener to Lady 
Salisbury.) 

3 ‘We spent the afternoon puzzling out how we could get from Japan 
to Australia via the Dutch East Indies, which I got Lord Kitchener to 
say he will visit. It is a pity not to see such interesting places when one 
is in the part of the world, and going by a Dutch steamer we visited about 
a dozen small islands between Java and New Guinea, at one of which we 
shall be picked up by a cruiser from the Australian station.” (Letter from 
FitzGerald.) 


LXXXI ARRIVAL IN AUSTRALIA 289 


island. Another small Dutch steamer was chartered 
for the voyage from Java to Port Darwin, which was 
reached a day later than scheduled, as the boat ran 
ashore on an island reputed to be the home of 
cannibals. 

There was an undesigned fitness in the fact that 
Kitchener first set foot in Australia at Port Darwin. 
That little town is the terminus of the ocean cable 
and of a proposed trans-continental railway which 
comes to an inglorious and premature end a hundred 
odd miles inland; it is a port with little shipping, a 
city with hardly any citizens, and the capital of a 
huge country with hardly any population. The 
empty and undeveloped Northern Territory had long 
been recognised as one of the most vulnerable points 
in the military position of the Commonwealth, and 
its weakness could not fail to strike Kitchener’s eyes 
when he arrived there on December 21. 

Ten days later, after spending Christmas at 
Thursday Island, Kitchener received a great welcome 
from the people of Brisbane. On January 3 he 
watched the manceuvres of the Queensland troops, 
but committed himself to no comment on their work; 
and at an official banquet to him that evening he 
simply remarked on the progressive spirit and enter- 
prise he saw around him. 

Two days afterwards he travelled south to Sydney, 
where the Minister of Defence stated that ‘‘the 
simple reason for Lord Kitchener’s visit was that in 
many lands, in the most difficult situations, he had 
blazed many a track along which the peoples con- 
cerned were marching to prosperity, safety, and 
security, and the Government felt it could not do bet- 


ter than go to this source for the purpose of formu- 
VOL. II U 


290 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


lating a scheme of defence which would enable us to 
hold this continent for ourselves and the Empire.”’ 
Kitchener replied that Australia must rely in the 
first instance on the Navy to keep communications 
open with the rest of the Empire, but that she must 
have sufficient land defences for the Navy to be free 
to do its work. 

He inspected the Liverpool Camp and watched 
some field operations, when he bluntly superseded — 
the set plan and instituted a fresh tactical seheme— 
an attack on a convoy in a hilly bush country. The 
result was indecisive, but the day’s work spoke to 
the quality of the Australian troops.! 

Before leaving Sydney he was urged to address 
the State Parliament, and in the course of a very 
terse straightforward oration recommended that 
‘the country should support its defenders by taking 
a great pride in them and by insisting on the aboli- 
tion of all that savours of shams and uselessness.’’ 

Three days later, on January 11, at Melbourne, 
after having unveiled a memorial at Bathurst to those 
who had fallen in South Africa, he gave—what Aus- 
tralia had been eagerly awaiting—the first public in- 
dication of his judgement of the military qualities of 
the Antipodes. It was almost wholly favourable: 


In no other country in the world, as far as I know, do the 
young men show such natural military qualification on which 
to base their military career. A great deal of the training 
that, in ordinary course, would have to besupplied to obtain 
an efficient soldier is already part of the daily life of many 
of your lads; and the work done in the cadet corps is a most 
excellent preparation for the more serious adult training 

1 The local paper noticed that Lord Kitchener frequently put his hand 


on the shoulder of an old soldier and talked to him like a re-discovered 
friend. 


LXXXI SYDNEY AND MELBOURNE 291 


which will eventually turn out your citizen soldiers. I do 
not wish on this occasion, before my inspection is complete 
or my ideas crystallised, to say anything definite about the 
organisation I would propose; but I think I may mention 
shortly a few points that I consider are of importance. In 
the first place, I think you should carefully preserve the 
excellent natural characteristics of young Australia, which I 
hope will always remain a feature in the military life of 
your young men. I have heard it mentioned that discipline 
may be wanting, but I do not think you need fear this 
amongst thoroughly trained Australian troops. They may 
have their own special methods and manner of expressing 
themselves; but, gentlemen, discipline does not depend 
upon any shibboleth of that sort. Discipline is undoubtedly 
a most essential and most important part of all military 
life, and it is absolutely necessary for success in war. I feel 
sure every true Australian soldier will know and realise 
that unhesitating, uncritical, willing obedience to all lawful 
authority does not entail servility to any individual. It is, 
to my mind, essential that you should establish a high-class 
primary military educational system, in order that your 
officers, particularly the instructional officers, should be 
thoroughly grounded in their profession, so as to be able 
to teach both officers and men with the authority of com- 
plete military knowledge; I cannot help feeling strongly 
that no second-rate military standard in this country will 
appeal with any permanence to the people who under the 
Bill will take part in your military development. You may 
get on for a time, but unless you place your ideal of the 
national forces high you will find that the day will come 
when the security of this country will have degenerated to 
a very low ebb. Soldiers must take a pride in their 
efficiency and respect themselves as a fighting force, 
thoroughly educated, trained, and equipped, and ready for 
the field. There is no reason, as far as I can see, why the 
national forces of Australia should not make their stand- 
ard of efficiency on a par with, if not higher than, those of 
the military Powers in Europe or elsewhere. 


CHAPTER LXXXIII 


KitTcHENER remained at Melbourne for a fortnight; 
he saw much of the Victorian troops, witnessed some 
maneuvres, and was in constant consultation with 
the Commonwealth Ministers! regarding the re- 
sources of the Dominions. He left Melbourne on 
January 30 for Adelaide, stayed there twenty-four 
hours and went on to Perth, where he laid a heavy 
finger on the lack of systematic railway communica- 
tion of Australia: 


It seems to me, gentlemen, that one of the great needs of 
Australia is systematic, statesmanlike, and comprehensive 
railway extension. Trunk lines opening up communication 
and developing the fertile districts in the interior of this 
vast country would undoubtedly stimulate more than any- 
thing else the growth of your population, as well as foster- 
ing trade and considerably increasing your means of de- 
fence. At present, Australia’s expenditure on railway con- 
struction appears to be often spasmodic, as well as agers 
influenced by purely local conditions. 


The hint was taken, reinforced by plain words as 
to the dangerous isolation of West Australia; rail- 
way construction on the great scale, which had lan- 


1 The Ministers were somewhat startled at their visitor’s knowledge of 
the geographical resources of the country, which one of them admitted in 
many respects exceeded their own. As soon as the then Commander-in- 
Chief received authority to accept Mr. Deakin’s invitation he had search 
made for every book on Australia that Calcutta could produce. He also sent 
forward two officers to regulate his programme and to learn such local 
facts and figures as he thought he would require. 

292 


cx, rxxxxm1 THE. AUSTRALIAN REPORT 293 


guished for many years, was now pushed on with 
such vigour that within ten years the first great 
trans-continental line from Perth to the East was 
opened for traffic. 

Kitchener re-visited Adelaide, stayed in camp with 
the troops of South Australia, and then proceeded to 
Tasmania. His final inspections were the troops at 
Hobart and Launceston; he then returned to Mel- 
bourne, handed in his report to the Government, and 
on February 13 sailed for New Zealand.* 

His Report, which took the form of a memorandum 
on the defence of Australia, was published a few days 
after his departure. Mr. Deakin, the Commonwealth 
Prime Minister, remarked: ‘‘The Government has 
appealed to Caesar, and we shall be prepared to defer 
to Caesar’s judgement.’’ As a matter of fact there 
was little public criticism of his recommendations, 
and the public press generally expressed approval 
of them. 

Kitchener in his Report reminded Australia that 
in time of war the British Naval Forces might need 
to be concentrated in some one theatre of operations: 
‘Consequently, in seas remote from that theatre our 
command of the sea might be temporarily suspended ; 
and it might be some time before our supremacy was 
assured in all waters. It was the duty of all the 
self-governing Dominions to provide a military force 
adequate, not only to deal promptly with any attempt 
at invasion, but also to ensure local safety and public 


1 He wrote to a friend: “I have just finished here and am starting to-day 
for New Zealand. It has been rather hard work, not so much from the 
mnilitary point of view, but on account of the innumerable receptions by 
Mayors and others. The other day, after travelling all night in the train, 
I was told we should have breakfast in a hotel at 7:30. Forty people sat 
down. We drank the King in cold coffee dregs, then three long speeches to 
propose my health, and a short reply from me.” 


294 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


confidence until our superiority at sea has been de- 
cisively and comprehensively . asserted. ... The 
Home Forces should be so organised as to compel 
an enemy contemplating an invasion to make the 
attempt on such a scale as to be unable to evade our 
Naval Forces.’’ 

Kitchener pronounced the existing forces of Aus- 
tralia inadequate in numbers, training, organisation, 
and munitions of war. The danger of want of popu- 
lation and consequent ineffective occupation in many 
parts of the country was very serious and even 
perilous to the stability of the Commonwealth. The 
railways, which had naturally been constructed to 
facilitate the occupation of the interior by settlers, 
were precisely for that reason more favourable to 
the invader than to the defender. 

He stated that the young men of Australia were 
good fighting material and full of zeal, as he had 
found during the South African War. He had 
noticed in their camps the great keenness among all 
ranks to render themselves efficient, and to apply 
their knowledge to practical conditions of work. 
These qualities were indispensable, but not sufficient 
to enable a force to take the field against thoroughly 
trained regular troops with any chance of success. 
They needed regular training to withstand a regular 
army. ‘The training he had seen in the camps ‘‘indi- 
cated a distinct tendency to go too fast, and to neglect 
essential preliminaries of training for more advanced 
studies than the troops engaged were capable of 
carrying out properly.’’ He advised the formation 
of a land force of 80,000 men—half to defend the 
cities and ports, and half to be a force to operate as a 
mobile striking force anywhere in Australia. This 


LXXxII MILITARY AREAS 295 


force should consist of 84 battalions of infantry, 28 
regiments of light horse, 56 batteries of artillery, and 
14 companies of engineers. The annual cost would 
be little more than the amount Australia was already 
spending. 

He also recommended the division of the country 
into various military ‘‘areas’’—each providing a 
definite proportion of a fighting unit and put in charge 
of a trained instructional officer with assistants. 
Ten areas would form one group under a superior 
officer. The areas would depend on density of popu- 
lation. He urged the establishment of a military 
college on the model of West Point, and of a Staff 
Corps to be entirely drawn from the Military College. 

The Australian Defence Act of the previous year 
had made provision for the compulsory military 
training of every young and able-bodied male be- 
tween the ages of 18 and 26, with a previous training 
asa cadet from12to18. This system was generally 
approved by Kitchener, with certain additions and 
amendments, as providing the basis of a citizen army 
which would in time become a powerful force. 

The memorandum shows in every line that Aus- 
tralian military interests had been treated from the 
standpoint of Australian home defence,” but deep in 


1 “Any political interference with the management of such institution, in 
which disciplinary training forms an important part, and the efficiency of 
which is so essential to the defence of Australia, should be strictly avoided.” 
The College was duly established at Duntroon, and a Naval College on 
similar lines at Sydney. 

2“The new Defence Act will give sufficient numbers to defend the 
country effectively if the Force provided under it is efficiently trained, 
organised, and equipped. It must, however, be distinctly recognised that a 
National Force maintained at a high standard of efficiency can only be 
produced by the work of years, and that such work must be steady and 
continuous; any divergence from the policy decided on may, and probably 
will, lead to chaos and useless expenditure of money. If plans and essential 
preparations have been deferred until an emergency arises, it will then be 


296 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER  caae. 


the writer’s own mind there lay a much graver ques- 
tion, which had perhaps hardly occurred to his genial 
Australian hosts. He had long foreseen that the 
day would come when the whole strength of the 
Empire must be concentrated against an aggressive 
foreign Power, and he was quite consciously prepar- 
ing for the test. 


On February 17 Kitchener arrived at the Bluff in 
the South Island of New Zealand, and proceeded to 
Dunedin, where he at once claimed a family connec- 
tion with the colony. ‘‘I feel I am not a stranger 
coming amongst you, for my father owned property 
in the neighbourhood and my brother worked 
amongst you in this locality for some years. I have 
had too the great pleasure of meeting my sister 
here.’’ 

He was seen at Christchurch, Port Lyttelton, Well- 
ington, Auckland, and Napier, and at each place 
closely inspected the local troops, veterans and 
cadets, besides the defence works at Tairoa Heads 
and Harbours. He could be drawn into few remarks, 
though constantly pressed for them, but exclaimed 
with something like indignation at Fort Jervois in 
Port Lyttelton: ‘‘This fort is obsolete; it must have 
been built from a text-book.’’ At Johnsonville rep- 
resentatives of the old fighting race of New Zealand 
were gathered to present an address of welcome. 
One of the Maori Members of Parliament began to 
read the address, which began, ‘‘ Welcome! Welcome! 
Welcome! Brave one, son of the Great God of War, 
Tutenganahan,’’ but he went on to read it in English. 
found too late to act, because the strain of passing from peace to war will 


entirely absorb the energies of all engaged, even when every possible con- 
tingency has been foreseen.” 


LXXXIM NEW ZEALAND 297 


Kitchener at once interrupted him with, ‘‘No, please 
let me have the Maori. I can read the English for 
myself,’’ and the musical tongue of the old race of 
“‘The Long White Cloud’’ was at once substituted. 

Kitchener found in New Zealand a fine match for 
the manhood of Australia, and at Christchurch 
voiced his admiration: 


It will [he said] be a source of the utmost gratifica- 
tion to me in after years if I can be associated with a 
measure that will enable the splendid young manhood of 
New Zealand to render themselves thoroughly efficient for 
the defence of this country, and able to take their share in 
the maintenance and honour and solidarity of the grand 
old Empire to which we all belong. 


He urged, in a discussion of the military position 
with the Times correspondent, that New Zealand and 
Australia were largely interdependent in a military 
sense, since an enemy who established himself in the 
one country would be a standing menace to the other. 
In a political sense the Commonwealth and Dominion 
had always insisted on their absolute independence 
of each other, but the military lesson was too clear to 
be neglected. His report on the defence of New 
Zealand was presented to that Government on March 
10 and followed the lines of his memorandum on 
Australia. And in a letter to Sir Joseph Ward, the 
Prime Minister of New Zealand, he emphasised the 
necessity for holding political and military interests 
apart: 


It appears to me that for your land forces New Zea- 
land and Australia should adopt homogeneous military 
systems, in order to be able to efficiently support one an- 
other in the event of national danger. At the risk of 


298 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


repetition I wish again to emphasise the importance of 
placing the ideal of your defence on as high a standard of 
efficiency as possible, in order that the men serving, as well 
as the public, may have a just pride in the fighting value 
of the force, and so insist upon the observance of the im- 
portant principle that defence should be outside party 
politics, and not used by individuals for political purposes. 


‘‘We are given directions how to train the men, 
but where they are to come from is left to the imag- 
ination.’’ So ran the only critical contemporary 
observation. The rock face of hard fact was to be 
the answer before many years had passed. 

On March 16, 1910, Kitchener left Wellington, New 
Zealand, by fae M beer for Rarotonga and Tahiti; 
at the latter island he changed into the Mariposa for 
San Francisco, at which port he arrived on April 7.1 
That the United States had prepared a right royal 
welcome was evident from the start, for Mr. Gillette, 
the Governor of California, at a banquet in Kitch- 
ener’s honour on the night of his arrival, described 
him grandiloquently as ‘‘the greatest general of the 
greatest army of the world.’’ 

After a day in San Francisco and a short trip 
through the Yosemite Valley, Kitchener proceeded 
east. During his hour and a half in Chicago he was 
mobbed by an enthusiastic crowd and interviewed by 
a local lady journalist; on April 15 he reached New 
York, and the following day he visited West Point, 
an institution for which he had always expressed the 
most profound admiration and which he constantly 


1“Orr SAN FRANCISCO, April 7, 1910.—I am looking forward to seeing 
you all again. I have managed to get along alone all right, but it is 
rather dull travelling twenty-one days without any news at all and this 
ocean is not very well named, particularly when it has small boats like 
this one to toss about. I am afraid I shall be rather worried by reporters 
in the States, but it will not last long.” (To Lady Salisbury.) 


LXXXII VISIT TO AMERICA 299 


held up for example. In deference to his wish, there 
were neither escort nor salutes; it was a simple in- 
spection by a professional soldier of a factory of 
professional soldiers in the making. 

A delightful day spent over the famous Altman 
Collection, a treat which for years Kitchener had 
promised himself, was preceded on April 18 by a 
banquet given in his honour by the Pilgrims—the 
club which confers a kind of unofficial order of merit 
by its cachet; two days later he left for England on 
the Oceanic. An interviewer seized him at the last 
moment with the inevitable demand for his impres- 
sions. ‘‘T have found New York,’’ said Kitchener, 
*‘to be wonderful and delightful. So many things 
have impressed me that I hardly know which to men- 
tion. I think, however, I am perfectly safe in saying 
that New York should be proud of her beautiful 
women.’’ With this perhaps unexpected tribute 
closed the rapid rush through the United States. 


APPENDIX TO CHAPTER LXXXIIT 


Prior to the adoption of Kitchener’s scheme in 1911 
Australia’s adult force had consisted of one Infantry Di- 
vision (twelve battalions) and other details of Light Horse, 
Fortress Troops, etc., raised and maintained in the States 
and districts from which the 1st Division Australian Im- 
perial Force was later raised. 


EMBARKATIONS FROM AUSTRALIA FOR THE GREAT WAR, BY ARMS 


Infantry 2 - . 210,981 Light Horse : - 30,365 
Machine-guns ; ‘ 4,476 Veterinary : : 378 
Tunnellers . : - 3,970 Flying Corps . : 2,275 
Artillery E ; . 23,887 Wireless : 3 : 434 
A.A.M.C. : 3 . 12,945 Cyclists : : 2 570 
AAS. : : : 9,735 Trench mortars . : 1,218 


Engineers. - : 9,950 Chaplains . F : 386 


300 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER cz. rxxxm 


Transport Officers 3 531 Miscellaneous arms re- 

A.A.N.S. 3 ‘ 2,054 turned to Australia . 2,555 

General reinforce- ———— 
ments - % . 15,071 Total F . 831,781 


ToTaL ENLISTMENTS INCLUSIVE OF NAVAL AND MILITARY 
EXPEDITIONARY FORCE TO PACIFIC 


Naval, 3,856 Military, 412,953 Total, 416,809 


EMBARKATIONS FROM AUSTRALIA ACCORDING TO PLACES OF BIRTH 


Victoria : . 92,553 United Kingdom . . 64,221 
New South rales . 88,250 New Zealand 5 : 4,214 
Queensland ; .- 28,253 Other British Countries 2,246 
South Australia . . 27,761 Foreign Countries 3,137 
Western Australia y 8,042 —_——_ 
Tasmania . : . 13,104 Total 3 . 331,781 


Sa IN THE AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE ACCORDING 
To STATES TO 1.9.18 


New South Wales . 161,821 Western Australia . 82,028 
Victoria ; j . 111,305 Tasmania . Pi . 15,262 
Queensland . : . 57,084 ————_ 
South Australia . . 34,566 Total 5 . 412,066 


The scheme which New Zealand adopted followed closely 
on the same lines as that of Australia; and from New Zea- 
land there sailed 100,444 of all ranks to bear a noble part 
in the Great War. 


CHAPTER LXXXIV 


Tuer Oceanic arrived at Plymouth on April 26, and 
two days later Kitchener had what proved to be his 
last audience with King Edward, who presented 
him with the Field-Marshal’s baton and—what was 
almost equally agreeable—absolved him from his 
promise to assume the unnecessary and unsatisfac- 
tory Mediterranean Command. 

Just before leaving India he had written to a friend: 


Mr. Haldane offered me the Mediterranean Command, but 
I refused it. Lord Morley tried pressure and this I resisted. 
Then they brought in the King. Hewired mevery strongly 
urging my acceptance. I said I had already refused for 
reasons given, but as His Majesty’s wishes were commands 
to me I placed myself in his hands. After some time for 
consideration he wired that I should accept for a short time 
under new conditions, so I had nothing else to do and had 
to wire to Mr. Haldane that in deference to His Majesty’s 
wishes I would accept. If the Government play the King 
we poor soldiers are done and can only obey, at least such 
are my principles. I think it is rather hard on me, as I 
wanted a time to myself and had no wish to replace the 
Duke of Connaught in a billet which he found a fifth wheel 
on the coach, but I do not see that I could have done any- 
thing else. I hope the Duke will understand that it has 
been no wish of mine and contrary to every inclination and 


interest I have to follow him in the Mediterranean. 
301 


302 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


The reversion to the Viceroyalty of India was just 
then uppermost in the King’s mind, who pressed on 
the Government his earnest wish that Kitchener 
- should succeed and walk closely in the steps of Lord 
Minto. The Government knew that the public would 
not allow Kitchener to stand idle in the market-place, 
and knew also that the post at Malta, already discred- 
ited by the resignation of the Duke of Connaught, 
was wholly unworthy of his abilities, for which India 
alone seemed to offer full scope. But on his appoint- 
ment to India the Government were divided. The 
majority of the Cabinet were indeed more occupied 
with the constitutional crisis at home than with In- 
dian affairs. The ultimate decision rested with Lord 
Morley; the Prime Minister was ready to back Mor- 
ley’s choice, though he made it known that personally 
he would be pleased if the lot fell on Kitchener. But 
the Secretary for India could not brace himself to the 
idea. Apart from his inherent objection to soldiers 
as soldiers, he disliked intensely the idea of appoint- 
ing a soldier to a post normally held by a civilian, 
more particularly since ‘‘the impression made in 
India by sending your greatest soldier to follow re- 
forms would make them look a practical paradox.’’ 
With Kitchener himself he was personally friendly, 
and apparently agreeably surprised. ‘‘I was a good 
deal astonished,’’ he wrote to Lord Minto, ‘‘for I had 
expected a silent, stiff, moody hero. Behold, he was 
the most cheerful and cordial and outspoken of men, 
and he hammered away loud and strong, with free 
gestures and high tones. He used the warmest lan- 
guage, as to which I was in no need of any emphasis, 
about yourself; it was very agreeable to hear, you 
may be certain.’’ 


uxxiv THEK INDIAN VICHEROYALTY 303 


An audience with the King, who earnestly urged 
him to nominate Kitchener, and a strong personal 
recommendation from Lord Minto, did little to re- 
duce the Minister’s reluctance; he would do no more 
than promise to reconsider the subject and pronounce 
on it a month later. Before the month was over 
King Edward was lying in state in Westminster Hall. 

Harly in the new reign the question was revived, 
but Lord Morley’s objections remained as strong as 
ever, and he backed them with the threat of resigna- 
tion if Kitchener should be sent to Calcutta. The 
threat was effectual. A constitutional crisis had 
been postponed only by the King’s death, and Mr. 
Asquith preferred the unemployment of Lord Kitch- 
ener to the loss of Lord Morley. 

A day or two after the death of King Edward and 
when the political storm was stilled for the time by 
the outburst of national sorrow, one of Kitchener’s 
friends remarked to him, ‘‘The King has died at the 
psychological moment.’’ ‘‘Not the psychological 
moment for me,’’ was the reply. It was true. If 
King Edward had lived a few weeks longer, it is 
thinkable that the honest, if rather far-fetched, 
doubts of the Minister would have been overcome, 
and that a Viceroy would have been taken direct 
from the Army List. 

But the wheel of time comes full circle in the end. 
Had Kitchener succeeded Lord Minto, he would have 
been in India when the war with Germany broke out, 
and he could scarcely have left the East to crown his 
career by the raising of the New Armies. When 
' Mr. Asquith accepted Lord Morley’s exclusion of an 
eminent soldier as such from the Indian Viceroyalty, 
he was unconsciously preparing the way for the 


304 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


same soldier to become his colleague in an office 
scarcely less dedicated by precedent to civilians. 

After thirty-seven years of constant work Kitch- 
ener was to enjoy something like a holiday. The 
summer and early autumn were leisurely spent in the 
country in England and Ireland, and after King 
Hdward’s funeral he was not seen in public until 
October. Ata Town Planning Conference, revelling 
in his rank of F.R.I.B.A., he recalled the contrast 
between Old and New Khartum: 


The old Khartum was an African pest-house, in which 
every tropical disease thrived and was rampant. Now 
malaria is almost unknown, though mosquito curtains are 
not in use, and last year there were only eleven cases of 
malaria in a town of fifty thousand inhabitants. I do not 
think that such results have been achieved in any other 
British dependency, and this excellent work in Khartum 
does not stand alone in the Sudan, where sanitary condi- 
tions generally prevail and demonstrate the thorough ef- 
ficiency of the administration of the country. 


At Middlesex Hospital, when distributing the 
prizes at the Medical School, he urged the students to 
study tropical medicine, and, remarking on the fact 
that soldiers and doctors had often to work in close 
contact, he suggested that they should pay some 
attention to the connection between army discipline 
and medical progress. 

This speech to the students was made at the re- 
quest of the President of the Hospital, Prince Francis 
of Teck, one of the brothers of Queen Mary, who had 
served under his command in the Sudan and South 
Africa, who had been one of the few admitted to 
the intimacy of friendship, and at whose funeral 


LXXXIV IMPERIAL DEFENCE 305 


Kitchener was to be a pall-bearer only three weeks 
later. 

One opportunity of retaining the services of the 
new Field-Marshal could scarcely be missed. Gen- 
eral Botha, speaking early in October on the question 
of South African Defence, had been forward to say 
that the advice of his former opponent should be 
taken on all that pertained to the safeguarding of the 
Empire. A few weeks later a seat on the Committee 
of Imperial Defence was offered to Kitchener and 
by him accepted. 


VOL. II x 


CHAPTER LXXXV 


As his new duties need not be immediately assumed, 
Kitchener, rather dreading an English winter, to 
which he had been a stranger almost since boyhood, 
decided to revisit Egypt and make.a trip to British 
Kast Africa. Early in November he left London for 
Constantinople, but cut short a proposed stay in 
Turkey, and wrote to Lady Salisbury from Cairo: 


I went from Vienna to Constantinople. Things are not 
going well there for us; in fact we are out of it altogether, 
and the German is allowed to do as he likes. There is a 
good deal of discontent, and I should say a row of some 
sort, probably war, must be the outcome of it all before 
long. I was rather afraid my presence might attract atten- 
tion and might mean something, though I refused to see any 
of the Young Turks, so after three days I thought it wiser 
to go on to Alexandria. It has been very pleasant in 
Egypt as in every station. Besides officials there were a 
lot of native officers and soldiers who had served with me 
and who seemed really glad to see me again. 


He gave some time and attention at Khartum to 
the Cathedral and Gordon College,’ and then went 


1 Six months later, in a letter published in the Times on May 15, 1911, 
Kitchener appealed for £4000 for Khartum Cathedral, in order “adequately 
to represent our religion in an outlying portion of the Empire, and give the 
hard-working British officials in the Sudan a permanent consecrated church 
in which to worship God.” 


306 


cx, xxxxv IN BRITISH EAST AFRICA 307 


on board a steamer placed at his disposal by the 
Sudan Government, from which FitzGerald wrote: 


It is most luxuriously comfortable, cabins and dining- 
room all mosquito-proof; the bathrooms with their long 
baths are perhaps the greatest comfort. To come in after a 
hard day in the jungle to all this comfort is a style of shou- 
ing to which I am foreign. We steam up along this great 
river and three of its tributaries, the Arab, Zeraf, and Ateor, 
through country of every description. Sometimes the thick 
jungle comes down to the water’s edge and one can only see 
the few animals that happen to be by the river; at others 
huge grass plains stretching right away to the horizon ab- 
solutely covered with game, antelope of many kinds, giraffes 
and elephants, while in places the water swarms with hippo- 
potami. So far we have bagged elephants, buffalo, hippo, 
and six different kinds of antelope. We are now on our way 
to shoot for elephant, etc., just north of the Lado Enclave, 
and then for the white rhinoceros in the Enclave itself. 


The tour was planned to include a march to Lake 
Albert Nyanza, occupying about nine days at four- 
teen miles a day; then four days by steamer, followed 
by nine days’ marching to Lake Victoria Nyanza and 
across to Port Florence, the terminus of the Uganda 
Railway. By the end of February the journey was 
made, and Kitchener had travelled by way of Nairobi 
to Mombasa. On his road through British East 
Africa his observation of the country determined him 
to apply for land in the Protectorate; he then and 
there formed the idea that some years hence, when 
his public career was over, he would spend his sum- 
mers at his Kentish home and in his winters seek the 
warmth of Hast Africa. 

The intention could never be carried out, but the 
land was bought, in conjunction with three friends 


308 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


—Major McMurdo, Major Leggatt, and FitzGerald. 
Kitchener during his tenure of office at Cairo took a 
keen and active interest in his tropical property, and 
even in the last two years of his life—when Secretary 
of State for War—he would snatch an occasional 
hour to discuss its improvement and all the possi- 
bilities of its cultivation. The death of McMurdo in 
April 1914 was a great grief as it was a great loss to 
the partners in the enterprise; Kitchener made up 
his mind to take over the other fourth share of the 
estate—his whole interest in which he bequeathed to 
FitzGerald—and an important development of the 
property was the theme of a long business conversa- 
tion between the three on the day before Kitchener 
and FitzGerald went to their death. 

Before leaving East Africa, however, in 1911 
Kitchener could do little more than apply for a land 
grant to the Governor, Sir Percy Girouard; for on 
arrival at the coast he received an intimation that 
the King desired him to command the troops in 
London at the forthcoming Coronation. The order 
compelled him to hasten his return to England, and 
he sailed from Mombasa on March 7 in the German 
liner F'eldmarschall. 

On his way back to England he stayed a day or two 
in Venice at Lady Layard’s house, where the German 
Emperor, who was also in Venice at the time, took 
the opportunity of calling upon him; it so happened 
that he met the Kaiser once more in London a few 
weeks later, at a luncheon on May 18, at Lord Hal- 
dane’s house. The two men never saw each other 
again. 

The next two months were mainly occupied with 
the arrangements for the Coronation on June 22. 


uxxy KING GEORGE’S CORONATION 309 


Ceremonial functions were not Kitchener’s hobby, 
but he was determined that nothing should be left 
undone which could be done to provide for the dignity 
of the occasion, the comfort of the troops, and the 
safety of the people. The Coronation orders to the 
troops made up a weighty volume of 212 pages, and 
covered every detail which could connect the Army 
with the ceremony. There was a tendency to criti- 
cise rather than to appreciate the thoroughness 
which led to the erection of barriers between the side 
and main streets through which the procession 
passed, and which could be closed if at any time, in 
the opinion of the police, the size of the crowd and 
the press of people became dangerous. This was a 
new feature in the public life of England, and the 
London crowd, proverbially good-tempered and well- 
behaved, were a little inclined to resent these precau- 
tions as an infringement of their cherished liberty. 

Kitchener had no misgiving that the crowd would 
get out of hand or misbehave itself, but he knew that 
a crowd may be a danger to itself; and he remem- 
bered the terrible disaster at the ill-starred Corona- 
tion in Russia. Whether the barriers kept some 
timorous souls away or not, the crowd of sightseers, 
both for the Coronation itself and for the longer pro- 
cessional ride the day following, was enormous; but 
no casualties were incurred. The military arrange- 
ments, which compared favourably with precedent, 
were carried through without a hitch, and within an 
hour of the conclusion of the service in the Abbey, 
Kitchener, his work done, his reports in, was receiv- 
ing one or two friends at his flat in Whitehall. 

The excitement of the Coronation having subsided, 
and Kitchener having been introduced to the House 


310 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


of Lords by Lord Morley and Lord Milner, public 
attention was again drawn to the inability or un- 
willingness of the Government to employ his services. 
A national talent was being folded in a napkin. 
Questions were asked from time to time in the House 
of Commons, to which indefinite answers were re- 
turned; the newspapers enlarged on the subject, and 
in a leading article the Times regretted the position, 
ascribing it to Kitchener’s refusal to accept power 
without responsibility. 

Two events occurred at short intervals which 
served to underline a popular protest. Ten days 
after the Coronation the Kaiser had despatched the 
Panther to Agadir, and it was evident that the Ger- 
man Government was again preparing to undertake 
an aggressive policy in Morocco and the Mediterra- 
nean. Ten days before the Coronation it was an- 
nounced that Kitchener had accepted a directorship 
of the London, Chatham, and Dover Railway. The 
contrast could not escape comment. 

The procedure of the German Government made 
it clear that the whole question of Mediterranean 
policy was to be tested afresh; the phrases of German 
professors and German newspapers made it equally 

clear that the whole question of African colonisation 
was to be raised. Since Germany postulated the 
necessity of an eventual physical connection between 
her Eastern and Western Colonies in Africa, in con- 
tradistinction to the Rhodes policy, never formally 
abandoned by England, of a Cape to Cairo Railway 
or a linking up of the northern and southern British 
spheres in South Africa, compromise could scarcely 
prevail.1 Germany clamoured her demands, and al- 


1A precisely similar position as regards colonial expansion had arisen 
in America in the eighteenth century, the French line of colonisation 


LXXXV BRITISH AGENT IN EGYPT 311 


though the solidity of the Entente defeated her for 
the moment on the main Moroccan question, she 
secured the cession of a substantial strip of French 
African territory, and the policy of Danegeld seemed 
certain to be revived when opportune in Berlin. If 
German expectations had not been keyed so extrava- 
gantly high the Agadir incident would have been 
scored as a pure victory, since Germany, and Ger- 
many alone, derived indubitable profit from the epi- 
sode in an enlargement of her West African posses- 
sions. 

‘The British Government, without any ambition for 
new spheres of influence, was determined that its 
footholds should in no wise be weakened by Germany, 
and remembered that if Berlin could interfere in 
Morocco at one end of the Mediterranean, she might 
be ready to intervene in Egypt at the other. 

The British Agent and Consul-General in Egypt, 
Sir Eldon Gorst, had been ill in England for many 
weeks, and it was known that his recovery was im- 
possible; the need of a strong successor was urgent. 
The Government were a little nervous about the 
selection of a soldier, but while they hesitated Lord 
Cromer interposed his word. Some years before, 
when Kitchener was in India, his name was bruited 
to follow Cromer in Cairo. Lord Cromer strongly 
opposed the suggestion at the time; he thought— 
erroneously, as it turned out—that Sir Eldon Gorst 
would successfully carry forward his own traditions 
and carry out his own policy, and he still saw the 
former Sirdar as a great military organiser but in- 
eligible as an administrator and diplomatist. But he 
had vigilantly and without prejudice marked Kitch- 


extending north and south, the British east and west. The issue was 
decided in the Seven Years’ War. 


312 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER ca.1xxxv 


ener’s later years in Calcutta; he had noted that his 
character had mellowed as his knowledge widened; 
he knew the man’s true worth and Egypt’s true want, 
and—a witness against his original belief—he now, 
as he had once before, irresistibly urged Kitchener’s 
claim to high office. ; 

On June 20 Sir Edward Grey wrote: |) 


: 

The King approves very cordially of your going to Cairo, 
and the arrangement is one which has evidently given him 
much pleasure, so that it may now be regarded as settled. 

I find we must get an exequatur from the Turks before 
any formal appointment is made. : 

I should like the formal announcement and appointment 
to be dependent, to some extent, upon the news of Gorst’s 
health; but, as the question is now practically settled, there 
is no reason your friends should not know. 

1Sir Edward Grey, in making the announcement to the House of 
Commons, said: “It does not mean a change of policy from civil and 
administrative reform to military policy. It is not a reactionary policy. 


Lord Kitchener goes to continue our work in Egypt and to promote progress 
as far and as fast as it is reasonable and practicable to do it.” 


CHAPTER LXXXVI 


KircHENER’s exequatur was duly granted by Turkey, 
and in September he embarked at the Docks for 
Alexandria with a servant and two dogs, having as 
usual given the slip to any adepts at the art of ‘‘see- 
ing off.’’ The only farewell which he would not 
evade was that of a party of North London Boy 
Scouts, who had camped during the summer in his 
grounds at Broome Park.! A detachment of these 
made their way to Liverpool Street Station and 
begged for a word from him. Alighting from the 
train, in which he had already taken his seat, Kitch- 
ener spoke to them: 


Now, boys, it is very good of you to come to see me off to 
Egypt, and I am very glad to see you. I hope you will all 
work hard and keep the Scout law while lam away. When 
I come back I hope to see you again at my home at Broome 
Park, and I trust you will be able to have some more sport 
with the rabbits there. Once again, I am glad to see you 
all. 


1Since his return from East Africa he had taken considerable interest 
in the recently-established Boy Scout movement, to which his notice had 
been drawn by Sir Julian Byng. One of his rather rare speeches had been 
made on July 18 to the Scouts at Leicester: ‘ ‘Once a Scout, always a 
Scout.’. You will find the Scout law and Scout training very useful through- 
out life; so never allow Scouting to be looked upon as a game that is over. 
Keep it going as long as you are alive. As boy and as man help by all the 
means that lie in your power, and when we have a million men and boys— 
as I hope we shall have—imbued with the spirit of the Scouts, our nation 
may well be proud of its manhood.” 


313 


314 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


His arrival was more eventful than his departure, 
for, on the very day he landed at Alexandria, Italy 
was presenting an ultimatum to Turkey, and an- 
nouncing her purpose to occupy Tripoli. Turkey’s 
soft answer failed to turn away wrath, and Italy 
declared war forthwith. 

Strict neutrality was prescribed by England for 
Egypt, no less than for herself; but anxiety was felt 
as to a possible manifestation of popular feeling 
among the Egyptians during a conflict between a 
Christian Power and a potentate who was at once 
their Caliph and their Suzerain. The people took it, 
however, very quietly. No strong Nationalist party 
was raging; the Ministers as sensible men saw clearly 
on which side Egyptian bread was buttered, and 
though the Khedive may have gleefully anticipated 
golden opportunities for intrigue, he was at first on 
his best behaviour. Some excitement, fostered by 
certain newspapers, hardly survived a sharp rap 
over the knuckles administered to those organs of 
disaffection; and even the question of interning a 
shipload of sick Turkish soldiers passing through the 
Suez Canal on their way back to Yemen caused no 
demonstration.1_ In Alexandria the beginnings of a 
riot brought on by some armed Italians and Greeks 
were quickly quelled by the police, and though there 
was a small amount of illicit and secret traffic over 
the Egypt-Tripoli desert boundary, the populace 
remained tranquil. A few hot-headed Moslems nat- 
urally desired to help their co-religionists across the 
western border, but the Turk has never been beloved 
in Egypt, and there was no rush to back him. 

Moreover, the British Agent had a quiet way of 


1 They were allowed, after quarantine, to pass. 


LXXXVI EGYPT AND TRIPOLI 315 


quenching inconvenient military ardour. Early in 
the war, a respectable Moslem deputation waited on 
the British Agent to suggest the despatch of a few 
Hgyptian battalions to help the Turks: ‘‘That is 
quite a good idea, only as I could not improvise fresh 
Egyptian troops I might have to ask for some Eng- 
lish battalions to come here.’’ The bland reply had 
effect and the audience melted silently away. 

On another occasion several Egyptian officers asked 
leave to volunteer for the Turkish Army. ‘‘By all 
means; only I should warn you that, as the establish- 
ment of officers must be kept up to strength, your 
places will necessarily be filled by promotions from 
the junior ranks, so that when you return you will 
find yourselves automatically on the retired list.’’ 

Yet one more deputation—this time of Bedawin 
sheikhs—sought permission to raise desert levies for 
the Caliph’s service. Kitchener complimented them 
effusively on their warlike spirit, but was sure it 
would be a thousand pities if Egypt were to lose the 
services of men of so fine a fighting quality; and he 
undertook that, on their return, they should come 
under the Law of Conscription from which they had 
been specially exempt. The matter was reconsid- 
ered and the request withdrawn. 

The war ran through all three years of Kitchener’s 
administration, and was rich in incidents which re- 
quired delicate handling. Italy, who might well sus- 
pect Turkey of trying to communicate with Tripoli 
through Egypt, was a little shy of our assurance that 
Kgypt’s arms were folded. The main trouble was 
on the undefined western frontier, where questions 
of the ownership of Sollum, of Jaghbub, Siwa, and 
Kufra—of the exact point where Egypt’s boundary 


316 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


touched the sea—of gun-running—of the loyalty of 
the nomad tribes, and above all of the intentions of 
the Senussi—arose almost every day. 

The eastern side also had its complications. If the 
Italian warships in the Red Sea bombarded the 
coasts of the Hejaz, and the Turks consequently re- 
moved the lights and beacons from that coast, how 
about the neutral through-Canal traffic? Or, when 
Italian ships fired fifty shells at the Turkish post at 
Rafa’ah, on the Palestine-Sinai boundary, and in- 
advertently hit the Egyptian post alongside;! and 
when they did the same thing at the opposite end of 
the boundary, killing three mules at Akaba—were 
such occurrences to constitute a casus belli between 
Italy and ourselves? 

The treaty between Italy and Turkey, signed at 
Lausanne after a year of war, did little to relieve the 
tension. Six months earlier Kitchener had correctly 
anticipated that ‘‘peace between Italy and Turkey 
would not make any difference in Tripoli’’: not only 
did the local Arabs continue their sparring along the 
coast regions of Tripoli and Cyrenaica, but the 
Senussi and the tribes of the interior joined in and 
kept the game going till the great European con- 
flagration was well alight. 

In Egypt the new British Agent found many 
changes—some for the better, some far otherwise.” 
Side by side with enhanced material prosperity there 
had been unsatisfactory growths. In the early days 


1 “Breaking one water-pot, value one shilling, for which,” Kitchener 
solemnly wrote, “I am not prepared to claim compensation.” 

2Foremost amongst the constructive measures by which Egyptian 
agriculture was nursed and reared into vigorous and fruitful life had been 
the building of the great Assuan Dam and the completion of the scheme of 
irrigation—as large and elaborate a system of water storage and distribution 
as was ever devised by wit of man. 


LXXXVI THE FELLAHIN 317 


of British occupation the European community had 
been limited in size. In Cairo the British colony of 
hard-working soldiers and civilians had formed a 
happy family under the kindly, if despotic, sway of 
*‘the Lord.’’ With the improved condition of the 
country hotels had sprung up like mushrooms, and 
swarms of cosmopolitan financiers, attracted largely 
by the cotton boom of 1907, had descended upon the 
land, bent on exploiting it for their own benefit, and 
bringing with them the not unmixed blessings of an 
extraneous civilisation. 

The scheme of Government remained outwardly 
the same, with its advisory General Assembly, Legis- 
lative Council, and Ministers. But a new spirit was 
being generated; there were the old Capitulations ? 
still unabolished and inimical to healthy reform; 
there was the new Nationalism growing in influence 
and in capacity for mischief; there was need of a 
better judicature, of better sanitation, of better agri- 
culture, of better schools, and—above and before all 
—of a better lot for the fellahin, the backbone and 
mainstay of the land. To give effectual help to the 
peasant was to come at once to grips with the law of 
debt. 

The fellah combined with an amazing capacity for 
work a positive genius for getting himself inextri- 
cably into the clutches of the usurer. From dawn to 
dusk he was in his field digging, hoeing, irrigating, 
sowing, tending, gathering, and only asking to pro- 
duce enough to make both ends meet; he had no am- 
bition, no craving for wealth, no interest in politics. 
But his unremitting industry was punctuated with 

1The Capitulations were originally letters of privilege delivered by 


Sultans of Turkey to Europeans resident in Egypt. Cromer and Kitchener 
always hoped, looked, and worked for their abolition. 


318 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


sporadic outbursts of extravagance. Temptation 
beset him in the form of local feasts, marriages, and 
other family occasions—the families vying with one 
another in spending more money than they could 
afford—and fitful and foolish expenditure, coupled 
with a delight in litigation, rendered the fellah an 
easy prey to the rapacious money-lender who in- 
fested the rural districts. Having mortgaged all his 
property at a scandalous rate of interest, his finan- 
cial condition went from bad to worse, and the small 
proprietor would too often awake to find himself sold 
up and his family brought to beggary. 

These harmless and hard-working agriculturists 
form more than four-fifths of the population of 
Egypt, and the industry which they bring to bear on 
its rich soil is the bedrock of its prosperity. It was 
in the interest, therefore, not of a class, but of a 
community, that Kitchener introduced the Five Fed- 
dan Law. 


This law [it was stated] is based on a number of instances 
of similar legislation in other countries . . . such as the bien 
de famille insaisissable in France . . . and the Punjab Land 
Alienation Act in India. It gives protection to the small 
eultivator—of five feddans and under—against expropria- 
tion of his land, house, and farming utensils for debt. It 
does not prevent his selling his land, should he so desire, or 
raising money on his crops. The law is not retrospective 
as regards debts already incurred. The protection of the 
poorer fellah in this matter was rendered necessary by the 
action of the small foreign usurers who, scattered through- 
out the country in the villages and financed by various banks, 
were able, with the support of the Capitulations, to lend 
money on mortgage to the fellahin at exorbitant rates of 
interest—30 to 40 per cent and even higher being not un- 
usual charges. Not even a country as agriculturally pros- 


LXXXVI THE FIVE FEDDAN LAW 319 


perous as Egypt can indefinitely stand such a burden, and 
unfortunately the inducements held out to the fellah to take 
the first step into debt were temptations few could resist— 
with the inevitable consequence that, once he was in the 
clutches of the money-lender, there was no escape for the 
victim until the whole of his property became so involved as 
to bring about his expropriation. . . . The fellah, though I 
hope learning, has not yet acquired, habits of thrift, and had, 
up to the establishment of Savings-banks in the villages, no 
secure place to keep his money. It will no doubt take a 
long time to change the habits of centuries. Meanwhile 
the security of the cultivator’s tenure required safe- 
guarding.? 


A Draft of the Bill was submitted to various ex- 
perts; its critics and opponents were many and not a 
little bitter, the comments of the Alexandria Cham- 
ber of Commerce being conspicuously caustic. The 
money-lenders rose as one man in wrathful denuncia- 
tion, and some highly respectable banks and financial 
magnates were moved to dismal predictions. The 
author of the Bill was warned that he would not only 
upset the internal credit system of the country, but 
would render the fellah’s lot even less happy than 
before. Some of the lending banks were, of course, 
adversely affected, and large landowners objected 
that an increase of peasant proprietorship would 
reduce their rents. Kitchener willingly listened to 
any proposals for mitigating incidental hardships to 
lender or borrower, but was not to be moved from 
prosecuting his measure, and on June 14, 1912, the 
Legislative Council approved the Bill. 


1 That security of tenure indeed required safeguarding was amply proved 
by the Report of a Commission in the following year, to the effect that no 
fewer than 619,107 properties of under five feddans were saddled with debt 
to the tune of nearly 16 million Egyptian pounds, giving an average indebted- 
ness of nearly E£26 per feddan. 


320 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


The financiers might have spared their forebod- 
ings; the new law took effect gradually and grate- 
fully and—except for the harpies at whom it was 
aimed—innocuously. The fellahin were quick to 
appreciate it, and never sought to evade its clauses. 
A year later Kitchener could write: ‘‘You know how 
fond people are of petitioning on the very slightest 
grievance. The Prime Minister told me yesterday 
that there had not been a single petition from an 
owner of five feddans and under against the Five 
Feddan Law.’’ (11.5.13.) 

A contributory proof of its efficacy was to be found 
in the fact that Greeks in Mitylene and elsewhere, 
who had been accustomed to entrust their money to 
the usurers in Egypt and to draw high interest from 
the peasants, now had to find other, if less remunera- 
tive, investments. Kitchener’s reform stood justi- 
fied, and since his day the Five Feddan Law has 
brought contentment and prosperity into thousands 
of humble homes.? 

Another early care was to facilitate and expedite 
the delivery of the peasants’ goods to the markets of 
the large centres. Small quays were constructed at 
Cairo for landing produce, and while the so-called 
‘froyal’’ road to Heluan and that between Cairo and 


1 The text of the law as finally promulgated on December 4, 1912, was 
as follows: 

“The agricultural holdings of farmers who do not own more than 5 
feddans cannot be seized for debt. This exemption from seizure includes 
the dwelling-house of such farmers and their dependencies, as well as two 
draught animals and the agricultural implements necessary for the cultiva- 
tion of such land. Such exemption applies to the claims of mortgage- 
creditors and those who are secured by a pledge or a droit d’affectation 
hypothécaire, but not to privileged creditors. 

“The above provisions shall not affect the rights of creditors whose 
security is registered at the time of coming into force of this law, nor those 
of unsecured creditors whose document of title has obtained an official date 
before that time.’ 


LXXXVI AGRICULTURE 321 


Alexandria were being laid out, Kitchener had small 
roadways made in the country, which enabled 
vehicles to be substituted for donkeys, and thus con- 
siderably increased the carrying power of the tillers 
of the land. 


VOL. II Y 


CHAPTER LXXXVII 


Havine helped to set the agriculturist class on their 
feet, the British Agent sought to stimulate agricul- 
ture, and especially to improve the quality and quan- 
tity of the cotton crop. He had always a penchant 
for tropical cultivation; he bought land for himself 
in East Africa, and about 1893 invested some of his 
slender savings as Sirdar in an island near Assuan, 
where he was wont to devote his little leisure % 
experimental farming. 

His present position gave him a fine opportunity, 
of which he quickly availed himself, to explore and 

e , . 

expand the resources of one of the richest agricul- 
tural countries in the world. His practical knowl- 
edge saved him from being beguiled into approval of 
fanciful and self-interested proposals often put for- 
ward by men of straw. He would lend a willing ear 
to any honest. suggestion, but would sanction no sort 
of scheme, however scientific, without close personal 
serutiny.? 

1Just before the outbreak of the war Kitchener, as Vice-President of 
the International Congress of Tropical Agriculture, presided at the Imperial 
Institute over a meeting convened to discuss cotton cultivation, particu- 
larly in Egypt. He had announced beforehand that he would not have 
much to say, and the assemblage—-which included foreign delegates from all 
parts—was agreeably surprised by his arrival with a large map and a 
number of diagrams, and by his spontaneous delivery of a lecture on the 
means taken to reclaim waste salt land at Biala. He made the point that 


this was an object-lesson to the Egyptian cultivator, who was best converted 
by ocular demonstration. 


322 


CHAP. LXXXVII COTTON 323 


Nearly one-third of the agricultural soil of Egypt 
is under cotton, the quality of which is unrivalled. 
In our Lancashire spinning-mills its length of staple 
has rendered it the standard cotton, by comparison 
with which the best American varieties are classed 
as substitutes. 

A crop which bears an average annual value of 
over thirty-two millions sterling is a first-class na- 
tional asset, and it is a matter of financial concern to 
the State to insure that its cultivation be carried out 
on the most approved scientific principles, with a view 
to extracting full value from the soil, and for giving 
full protection to the crop. The ground has to be 
selected and prepared; it must contain no salt; it 
needs to be kept moist enough to nourish, but not wet 
enough to rot, the growing plant. The seed must 
be good in quality, and all of one sort, and according 
to sample. The plants need to be spaced at proper 
intervals, without crowding, and a watch kept against 
various diseases and several kinds of insect pest. 
In fine, the toil of the peasant grower, the heir of 
immemorial rough and ready methods, must be sub- 
jected to scientific supervision. 

In 1907 the price of cotton had so varied as to 
cause a sensational ‘‘boom’’ followed by a sensa- 
tional ‘‘slump,’’ in which fortunes had been made 
and lost. Kitchener believed that such unhealthy 
fluctations in prices might generally be prevented if 
the cultivation of cotton were brought under authori- 
tative direction. 

Over the rather thin ice of State interference it 
was advisable to walk warily. The multifarious in- 


1He always insisted on seeing fortnightly a tabular statement showing 
particulars of each field of cotton planted. 


324 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


terests at stake rendered it liable, if too drastic, to 
defeat its own ends, and to arouse resistance—pas- 
sive from the fellahin, overt from the financiers, 
covert from the cotton operators. As a first step, 
not only cotton-growing but all agriculture must 
come under the paternal care of Government. Such 
protection was long overdue. Seeing that the whole 
economic reservation of Egypt was dependent on this 
one industry, it was strange that the State had al- 
ways left it severely alone until Sir Eldon Gorst in 
1910 started a small Department of Agriculture 
within the Ministry of Public Works. This new office 
absorbed the expert staff of the long-established 
Agricultural Society, a non-official body which under 
Prince Kamil Hussein—later Sultan of Egypt, 1914 
to 1918—had done much good work, though it lacked 
the authority necessary to enforce reform. 

Kitchener would not raise the status of the Depart- 
ment until he had probed its organisation; its use- 
fulness should be certified before its powers were en- 
larged. One of its principal duties was to explain 
and exploit official decrees and to bring them to the 
peasant’s door. Let villages be flooded with cireu- 
lars couched in the simplest language and treating 
of processes of cultivation, precautions against and 
destruction of insect pests, economical and effective 
methods of applying irrigation, the preservation of 
beneficent bird life and the like—such leaflets to be 
read out to his neighbours by the Headman of each 
village after the Friday prayers in the local mosque. 
Conversations on such matters were to be encour- 
aged, instructors were to be despatched to district 
centres, and advanced classes in agricultural lore 
formed in the large towns. 


LXXXVII THE COTTON AREA a20 


The chief hindrance to progress was the curious 
apathy of the peasantry—the persons primarily con- 
cerned. Reason makes slow headway against cus- 
tom, and in Egypt the system of cultivation, like 
most Egyptian industrial methods, differed little 
from that directed by the Pharaohs. Even a peril 
like that of 1911, when more than half of the cotton 
area was invaded by the cotton and boll worms, 
failed to stir the native cultivators. They piously 
regarded the evil as a visitation of Allah, sat still and 
murmured monotonously ‘‘ Allah kerim.’’ The more 
materialist among them, to whom it dimly occurred 
that Allah might work through human instruments, 
could only suggest the firing of maroons to frighten 
away the caterpillars. 

It was late in 1913 before the Department of 
Agriculture burgeoned into an independent Ministry, 
which succeeded to the accumulated wisdom and ex- 
perience of its forerunner, and enjoyed an authority 
and resources such as the older body had never 
known. At its head was an Egyptian Minister with 
an English Assistant to supply motive power. 

The British Agent was all-concerned to extend the 
cotton area, but not at the expense of the wheat and 
millet harvests. The country was growing 95 per 
cent of its own food, and cotton must not interfere 
with daily bread.? And, as he reminded those who 
clamoured for ‘‘more cotton,’’ there was an unlim- 
ited area waiting for them in the Sudan, between the 
White and the Blue Niles immediately to the south 
of Khartum—the region known as the Gezira, where 


1 An official circular revised by Kitchener, who entitled it the Recon- 
naissance before the Battle, was issued to instruct cultivators as to the 
prevention of the cotton worm. 

2Intermittent cotton-growing was possible in his reclaimed salt areas, 
provided it were alternated with “land-washing”’ crops of rice. 


326 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


vast tracts of the true black cotton soil lacked noth- 
ing but irrigation to render it abundantly fruitful. 
For nearly a dozen years Sudan cotton had been 
recognised as of the finest quality; nothing but want 
of funds, of properly distributed water, and of 
labour, had prevented the development of the Gezira 
on the lines of several satisfactory experiments al- 
ready made. 

In the Sudan seventeen years earlier Kitchener 
had fully weighed the possibilities of cotton when the 
country was as yet unsuitable for its production on 
a large scale. Now, however, Wingate urged, and 
Lancashire shouted for, the development of the 
Gezira and other cotton areas—at Tokar and on the 
Gash; and the British Agent, believing that largely 
increased supplies of cotton would become a British 
requirement, appealed to London for a loan to be 
devoted in nearly equal parts to irrigation and other 
preparatory processes, and railway extension. 
Three millions was the final figure of the loan—a 
compromise between the sum of five millions first 
thought of and the single million which it was con- 
templated that the British Exchequer should be 
asked to advance. In the financial world the Sudan- 
ese Loan, guaranteed by the British Government, had 
many powerful friends, but it was not till the March 
of 1913 that it received the sanction of Parliament. 
Its double effect was, as Kitchener had foreseen, to 
stir up the industry of the country and to strengthen 
the foundations of a commercial future, largely 
grounded on cotton.? 


1 The final decision at the beginning of 1914 as to the allocation of the 
money was: cotton-planting and irrigation in the Gezira, £2,000,000; 
ditto at Tokar and Kassala, each £100,000; railway extension, £800,000. 
The details of the scheme, drawn up under Kitchener’s personal supervision, 
included (1) the construction of a barrage on the Blue Nile capable of 


LXXXVII THE SUDANESE LOAN 327 


Egypt’s enjoyment of a plentiful oil supply of her 
own is in no small degree due to Kitchener’s inter- 
vention at a critical moment. The early search for 
productive oil-fields was disappointing; the first ex- 
perimental borings brought little encouragement, and 
a second and more expensive venture to discover oil 
in paying quantities and to construct a refinery at 
Suez only suggested that the work might have to be 
stopped and the field abandoned. The one hope was 
that the Egyptian Government could be persuaded to 
be sympathetic—in particular, that it would consent 
to extend the areas where boring was permitted and 
to broaden the conditions of the licence granted to 
the promoters. The enterprise was hanging on a 
thread when Kitchener decided that the Government 
must befriend a project which presented such rich 
possibilities, and which even in his time produced 
rich results. 


supplying water to irrigate 3,000,000 acres, and (2) the construction of a 
preliminary main canal and of subsidiary canals to irrigate 300,000 acres, 
of which 100,000 acres would be under cotton. It was estimated that the 
work could be completed in four years. 


CHAPTER LXXXVITI 


Tue British Agent was as much concerned with the 
health as with the wealth of Egypt and took infinite 
pains to brighten the conditions of life for the fel- 
lahin. He insisted on better housing and modern 
sanitation; he designed model villages and gardens; 
he provided open spaces, and even put out some of 
the ancient monuments where they could be seen and 
enjoyed by the masses. 

He was confronted early in the day by startling 
statistics of infant mortality, which could often be 
traced to quite preventable accidents at birth, im- 
proper feeding, and unwholesome neglect. Arrange- 
ments were therefore at once made for giving simple 
and salutary instruction to mothers and midwives in 
their responsible duties; and, as the local doctors 
were few and inaccessible, the local barbers were 
put in training to render qualified first aid until the 
medical practitioner could be summoned. By setting 
up clinics at dispensing centres it was hoped to deal 
with ordinary ailments and bring the people into 
touch with medical aid, and the fresh attention which 
Kitchener insisted on being given unstintingly to the 
admirably equipped Eye Hospitals was calculated to 
stem the ravages of ophthalmia and eye disease. 
No visitor to Egypt comes away without an ugly 


reminiscence of the semi-blind men and women, and 
328 


enap. uxxxvin THR PUBLIC HEALTH 329 


of children with eyes running with sores and en- 
crusted with filthy flies, which they neither tried nor 
were told to brush away. Kitchener had a fellow- 
feeling for these victims, as his own eyes had suf- 
fered from undue exposure to the sun,' and he be- 
lieved that a real, if partial, remedy was to be found 
for ophthalmia as for other diseases if greater care 
were bestowed on children of tender age. 

He would keep himself closely informed of the 
condition of women and children, not only by per- 
sonal inspection, but by asking his friends to pay sur- 
prise visits to dispensaries and other medical cen- 
tres. In the early part of 1913 a lady was writing 
home: ‘‘These dispensaries are very widely used 
now by the natives, and when I visited one at Assiut 
I found that hundreds of women and children were 
receiving attention. The nurses told me that when 
Lord Kitchener visited them he went into every de- 
tail and evinced the keenest interest.’’ 

Nor were his sanitary efforts confined to women 
and children. He made important changes in the 
Public Health Department, and devoted especial 
attention to endemic diseases largely contracted 
through germs entering the bodies of the natives 
when bathing or paddling in stagnant pools. 

‘The Department of Health found it uphill work 
to fight the incredible apathy and ignorance of the 
natives. ‘‘It is easy,’’? Kitchener wrote, ‘‘to chron- 
icle the insanitary conditions of the villages of 
Egypt; but not so easy to point out practical rem- 
edies.’’ His first remedies took the form of ele- 
mentary hygienic education, village sanitary inspec- 


1 Just after Omdurman Queen Victoria wrote to him: “The Queen is 
sorry to hear that the Sirdar is suffering from his eyes, but she trusts he 
has nearly recovered by this time.” 


330 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


tion, and the filling up of the birkas (stagnant 
pools); but some time elapsed before these innova- 
tions were approved by the Egyptian fellah or towns- 
man, to whom sanitary measures were works of 
supererogation. 


Second perhaps to the Capitulations as a source 
of confusion in the government of Egypt was the 
system of phantom ‘‘free institutions’’ founded after 
the Arabi Rebellion of 1882. The setting-up of the 
Legislative Council and the General Assembly was a 
sop thrown to political doctrinaires at home, who 
imagined that an Oriental people ruled throughout 
their age-long history by the strong hand of a master 
could now be safely granted, if not a liberal constitu- 
tion, at least something which contained ‘‘the germs 
of constitutional freedom.”’ ! 

Both Council and Assembly suffered in their com- 
position by defective principles of selection and 
election respectively. The Council was supposed to 
exist as a very select body of men always ready to 
assist the Government with criticism, suggestion, and 
counsel. In reality, urged by agitators and extrem- 
ists, it had tried to exceed its functions and to inter- 
fere in important questions lying outside the scope 
of its responsibility. Similarly, the General Assem- 
bly, doubtless inspired by the best intentions, proved 
a hindrance rather than a help, partly by obstructive- 
ness, partly by agitation in favour of ill-timed 
crudely-planned measures of supposed ‘‘reform.’’ 


1 Representative consultative bodies were no new thing in Egypt. Apart 
from lesser councils of sheikhs, local commissions, town councils, mixed 
municipalities, councils of agriculture, and others, there were the provincial 
councils which were doing very good work, but none of these had 
representative powers. 


uxxxmt =A LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 331 


Kitchener thought that one serviceable body 
would be more satisfactory than two of doubtful 
quality, and at his instigation the existing procedure 
was to be liberally reformed. A law of July 1913 
secured for the new single Chamber—the ‘‘Legis- 
lative Assembly’’—a direct, instead of an indirect, 
popular representation. Yet, while the genuine 
voice of the people could now be heard in the counsels 
offered to Government, there was neither the pur- 
pose nor the pretence to confer on them legislative 
control. 


As regards any real representation of the Egyptian peo- 
ple [wrote Cromer to Kitchener about this time], which 
could ultimately in some degree take the place of personal 
Government, probably the wisest thing for the moment is to 
leave the whole question alone. . . . National representa- 
tion in Egypt in the sense in which the term is generally 
used is a Sheer absurdity, for the very natural and sufficient 
reason that the Egyptians are not a nation and, so far as 
can now be foreseen, are not likely to be a nation, at all 
events during the lifetime of any person now living. They 
are a fortuitous conglomeration of a number of miscella- 
neous and hybrid elements. 


The first Session, which closed in June 1914, was 
not an unqualified success, and time was required 
for the new Assembly to adapt itself to its new duties 
and become a valuable ancillary to the Government. 
But before the Chamber could re-assemble the out- 
break of the Great War had an immediate effect on 
Egyptian affairs, and later on the administration of 
the country was to be very roughly shaken. It was 
then freely said that the sense of injustice which 
stung Egypt sorely when the Hejaz were raised to 
the dignity of a kingdom, and autonomy was prom- 


332 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


ised to Mesopotamia and Syria, would never have 
so rankled if the man who was saturated with sympa- 
thy for the country had still been in the country or 
even alive to represent the workings of her mind. 


Intimately associated with any legislative reform 
of the British Agent was the double duty of sustain- 
ing, or rather of reviving, the full dignity of his 
official status and of keeping a light but tight hand 
on the restive Khedive. Kitchener’s advent raised 
the question of his rank with regard to the other 
Consuls-General, of whom he was as a matter of fact 
the junior. 

A dilemma was likely to occur at the first Khedivial 
levée. How could the man who represented the 
supreme authority in the land yield the pas to 
the Chef de Mission of a quite minor Power? On 
the other hand, could he openly flout the established 
table of precedence? There was much chatter and 
some heart-burning as to what would happen. But 
when the day came, the Representatives of the 
Powers arrived at the Palace only to find that the 
British Agent had—owing to pressing business in the 
afternoon—already sought and secured a special 
audience of the Khedive in the morning. 

Long experience had taught Kitchener that a cer- 
tain amount of pomp was no bad conducive to pop- 
ularity with the natives. Sir Eldon Gorst, with the 
amiable intention of showing himself in sympathy - 
with popular feeling, had, by an exaggerated sim- 
plicity of life, tended to lower the prestige of the 
Agency. His successor revived the gorgeous run- 
ning syces in front of the carriage; he clothed his 
cavasses in the traditional gold-decked Turkish cos- 


uxxva THE KING AT PORT SUDAN 333 


tume. He was always well mounted, and he and his 
staff paid particular attention to the whole turn-out; 
he entertained lavishly, and even coaxed His 
Majesty’s Office of Works into adding a ballroom to 
the Agency, which was equally available for his own 
entertainments or for meetings to promote a good 
cause. On the return of the King and Queen from 
India,’ early in 1913, he arranged for a royal landing 
at Port Sudan, where the Sovereign was acclaimed 
by the sheikhs summoned from all parts of the Sudan 
to do him honour. And Kitchener’s knowledge of 
Arabic and acquaintance with individual Arabs gave 
him a facility for intercourse denied to Lord Cromer. 
Tn his office, and more often in his garden, he would 
welcome sheikhs and peasant proprietors, whose 
names and circumstances were usually familiar to 
him; to their grievances and aspirations he would 
sympathetically listen, and they would go away satis- 
fied that their case and cause would not be neglected. 

After the departure of the King and Queen the 
British Agent proceeded to Khartum and thence 
travelled to El Obeid on the new railway which, 
starting from Khartum up the Blue Nile, branched 
off across the Gezira, crossed the White Nile and 
brought the capital of Kordofan into direct contact 
with civilisation. Here again he thoroughly probed 
the cotton question and visited the experimental 
farm at Taiyiba, his inspection there hardening his 
resolution to demand a loan for the Sudan in con- 
siderable excess of the million at one time contem- 
plated. With Wingate he was also able to discuss all 

1For the passage of the King and Queen through the Red Sea the 


Turks, with commendable courtesy, had relit their lights and replaced their 
beacons. 


334 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


the conditions of the Sudan, the settlement with the 
French of the Dar Tama—Dar Masalit question on 
the Darfur—Wadai frontier, and the Sudan Uganda 
boundary. 


Active reformers, however benevolent, must never 
be surprised to find themselves the objects of con- 
tumely and reproach. Kitchener’s procedure was 
not exempt from acrid criticism nor his person from 
attempted assassination. A network of designs 
against him was discovered by the police, who, how- 
ever, had difficulty in inducing him to take any sort 
of precautions for his safety until, in July 1912, an 
attempt to shoot him at Cairo Railway Station by a 
well-known seditionist, one Taher Arabi, was only 
frustrated by the cool courage of his devoted friend, - 
Major FitzGerald, who was acting as Military At- 
taché. Fourteen months later another plot was 
hatched in Kgypt against Kitchener’s life, intended 
to be put into effect at Venice on his return from 
leave in England. News of this design reached the 
Foreign Office, and messages were sent in all direc- 
tions to warn him of his danger; as usual, he had told 
no one of his precise movements, but by good luck 
the Vice-Consul at Leghorn ran him to earth at a 
villa near Pisa where he was studying garden orna- 
ments for the benefit of his own English home. 
Nothing, however, could induce him to forgo his 
annual visit to his old friend, Lady Layard, at Ven- 
ice, and the Italian police congratulated themselves 
heartily when the British traveller had left their 
shores. 

In one important respect Kitchener may well have 
been the object of Cromer’s envy. The agreement 


LXXXVIII HIS LIFE THREATENED 339 


of 1904 under which we had conceded to France a 
free hand in Morocco with reciprocity in Egypt had 
given an almost fraternal character to our relations 
with our Ally. Instead of the sharp corners which 
had formerly to be turned the British and French 
Consuls-General could now tread an easy path, un- 
disturbed either by the negotiations regarding the 
Darfur-Wadai frontiers, or by the questions con- 
stantly springing from the Capitulations and Mixed 
Tribunals, whose natural death both alike ardently 
desired. 


CHAPTER LXXxXIx 


In May 1912 Kitchener was summoned to attend an 
‘‘informal’’ conference at Malta, when the subject on 
the tapis was the naval control of the Mediterranean. 
The proposal was afoot to leave the Southern Sea to 
the care of the French, and to dedicate the British 
Navy to the North Sea, where the increase of the 
German Fleet portended danger. Kitchener, de- 
lighted to be the guest of the Governor, Sir Leslie 
Rundle, met in conclave the Prime Minister and the 
First Lord of the Admiralty and other officials. An 
energetic discussion lasted for some days and some 
surprise was expressed at the soldier’s knowledge of 
naval facts and figures. Kitchener quietly informed 
Mr. Churchill and Prince Louis of Battenberg that 
they could supply the force he deemed necessary for 
the Mediterranean without any reduction of what they 
required for the North Sea. Egypt was, of course, 
foremost in Kitchener’s mind when the policing of 
the Mediterranean was at issue, and he could not 
favour any diversion of our Fleet unless weighty con- 
ditions were attached. The contemplated action, he 
also urged, would have the undesirable effect of 
causing Hgypt to look to India instead of to England 

1 Reference home by telegram proved Kitchener’s figures to be correct. 


“It seems to me,” the Prime Minister remarked, “that Lord Kitchener is 
giving them the information we expected them to give us.” 
3 


cuapixxax MEDITERRANEAN FLEET 337 


for supplies no less than for reinforcements. An 
immediate danger of war with Germany must of 
course entail concentration of every available ship 
in British waters; but, short of such a contingency, 
an exodus of our ships from the Mediterranean 
would be a grave disadvantage to the country which, 
with its far-reaching interests, he represented at the 
Conference. The eventual decision was in favour of 
a very small number of powerful ships in the Med- 
iterranean, a battle squadron based on Gibraltar, de- 
fences against submarines, and a fort, with six big 
euns, to be built at Alexandria, together with some 
troops for defending the wireless station there. Ob- 
jections were raised later, in some quarters of Egypt, 
to the building of the fort and to the institution of a 
naval torpedo station near by; but the naval pro- 
gramme, though it could not be carried immediately 
to completion, was well-timed to meet troubles al- 
ready brewing in the near East, for within a few 
months of the Malta Conference war broke out in the 
Balkans. 

With her suzerain Power again in arms, Egypt 
was again in no easy place, and it was even suggested 
that to quiet any turbulent Moslem spirits she might, 
without discarding her neutrality, break off relations 
with the Allied Balkan States. The Foreign Office, 
however, insisted on unqualified neutrality, and was 
much gratified by Kitchener’s assurances that even 
if Turkey directly invited Egypt to declare herself 
no sort of response would be made. Egypt in fact 
displayed no emotion; she was not nearly so much 
affected as she had been by the Tripoli campaign; 
she bethought herself that the Balkans were a long 


way off, and she remembered that Allah was great. 
VOL. II Z 


338 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


Germany, her eye fixed on the Middle Hast and her 
hand ready to strike at the British Empire, had not 
been idle in Egypt. Her influence and interests in 
the country had steadily grown and, while her com- 
merce was the pretext for strengthening her foot- 
hold, she was secretly striving to suborn the natives + 
so that they might be her pawns when she set out her 
chess-board. But somehow she failed to ingratiate 
herself. She neither understood nor was understood 
by the Egyptian people, and although she prospered 
in business she made but little headway in popularity. 
Kitchener had an early encounter with his colleague, 
Prince Hatzfeldt, for whom personally he enter- 
tained some regard. Vacancies had occurred in the 
Khedivial Library and the Museum of Antiques, both 
of which the representative of Germany endeavoured 
to secure for his countrymen, although he was only 
entitled to one. The German ambassador in London 
made plaint that only two Germans were allowed to 
fill official appointments in Egypt, but was non- 
plussed by a list of twenty-three Teutonic tenants of 
office which Kitchener had sent home. It further 
transpired that the German Librarian-elect was one 
Dr. Priifer, who had been more than friendly with 
the Egyptian Nationalist party, and whose candida- 
ture could scarcely therefore be entertained. ‘‘I 
told the German Chargé d’Affaires,’’ Kitchener 
wrote, ‘‘that though, according to agreement, the 
Egyptian Government would appoint a German to 
the post, this did not constitute the appointment as 


1A Swiss resident in Cairo just then published a book of poems in 
German as an antidote to the German propaganda. The volume was 
dedicated to Kitchener, who in his acknowledgment expressed ‘‘the hope 
that all those connected with Egypt will work for the prosperity of the 
country and her inhabitants.’ It included an acrostic of which the first 
letters of each stanza formed Kitchener’s name. 


LXXXIX GERMANY AND EGYPT 339 


one to be made by the German Government; and al- 
though we are very glad of any assistance in finding 
the right man for it, when he declared, as he did, that 
Dr. Priifer was the only German in all Germany 
qualified for the post, I could not help mentioning 
that I thought it would be possible for the Egyptian 
Government to find unaided a suitable German else- 
where.’’ Germany was, however, able to render 
signal disservice to Great Britain and France by 
clinging, and inducing her Allies of the Triple Alli- 
ance to cling, to the Mixed Tribunals—a system of 
judicature the irritating defects of which were 
abundantly admitted, but which could not be termi- 
nated without the assent of all fourteen Powers con- 
cerned. She found further scope for her energies 
in connivance at gun-running on the Tripolitan coast, 
in proffering arms and munitions to the Senussi, and 
in bidding-up for the Mariut Railway. 

This line had been run by the Khedive ostensibly 
to develop his agricultural properties west of Alex- 
andria. It had been benevolently regarded by the 
Government as a toy likely to keep His Highness out 
of mischief, and he had even been treated to some 
second-hand railway material and sleepers, and 
an occasional gang of convicts, to help him in the 
construction. In 1912 stories were current to the 
effect that both railway and employees were being 
utilised for purposes alien to agriculture, and there 
was the damning fact that the line had been carried 
to a length of 144 miles—far to the west of its pro- 
moter’s millet-fields. Later there were persistent 
reports of intrigues and clandestine negotiations— 
even before the Italian war—with Turkish, Senussi, 


Arab, and other authorities; but, as the rumours 
VOL. II Z2 


340 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP, 


could not be substantiated, there was no ground for 
any serious protest. 

Karly in 1913, however—three months after peace 
was signed between the Turks and the Italians, and 
whilst fighting was still going on in Tripoli, Cyre- 
naica, and the Balkans—the Egyptian Government 
was startled to hear that the Khedive had not only 
sold the railway, but had sold it to a German bank. 
The latter part of the statement proved to be inac- 
curate; the Dresdner Bank had found a rival bidder 
in an Italian syndicate, and the Khedive, after some 
hesitation, signed a paper in favour of the Italians, 
giving them an option on the railway, with power to 
extend it to the Tripolitan frontier at Sollum. 

Kitchener at once repaired to the Palace, and with 
due deference informed the Khedive that by signing 
the paper he had seriously compromised himself; he 
had disposed of property which did not belong to 
him, and for this he would be held responsible by 
the Government of Egypt, who owned the land over 
which the line passed. Frightened by the prospect 
of exposure, though still in desperate need of the 
cash, the Khedive promised to get the paper can- 
celled, but was quite hurt when Kitchener refused to 
listen to his proposal that the Government should 
buy the railway. Ten days were spent in frantic 
endeavours to recover the paper; the head of the 
syndicate, seeing the dust that was being raised, 
handsomely returned the document; a naive explana- 
tion that the purchase was to prevent the Khedive 


1“My serious message,’ Kitchener wrote, ‘had an excellent effect. At 
first he received it with considerable nonchalance, but subsequent discus- 
sions with his Ministers have made him see that his position was really 
in danger. Many natives have expressed to me their satisfaction that the 
Khedive was not allowed to sell the railway to the Italians.” 


LXXXIX THE KHEDIVE 341 


from intriguing with Senussi against Italy was prof- 
fered and accepted; the arch-culprit bowed to a 
severe scolding and betook himself to other sources 
for raising the wind. His financial difficulties stim- 
ulated rather than restrained his political activities, 
which assumed their darker character after his long 
visit to Constantinople in 1913. He took impish de- 
light in trying to create friction between his own 
subjects and the British, and he would vent his spleen 
in intrigues against his own Government, showing 
pointed and petulant rudeness to members of it 
whom he specially disfavoured. 


IT let it be quietly known [Kitchener wrote at the end of 
1912] that in case of a change of Government, we might 
think of the Party of the People. They are chiefly landed 
proprietors and not friends of the Khedive. If he under- 
stands they may form a Ministry, we may hear little more 
about a new Cabinet. We should not desert the Prime 
Minister. 


The Khedive’s speculations, in which he deeply 
dipped himself in efforts to restore his shattered 
fortune, were as unhappy as they were unprofitable. 
Nor were they unvaried with positive peculation. 
Corresponding more or less to Church property in 
Great Britain, there are in Egypt large possessions 
enjoyed by different mosques, religious foundations 
and trusts. These endowments consist of lands and 
funds of many descriptions, and, beg constantly 
enriched by the bequests of devout Moslems, are of 
very considerable value. When the finances of 
Egypt were taken in hand by Europeans after 
Ismail’s disastrous reign, these properties or 
Wakfs,' being of a religious character, were exempt, 


1 More correctly, Aukaf. 


342 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


and their administration remained in religious 
Mohammedan hands. At one time they were admin- 
istered by a responsible Minister with the assistance 
of a selected Board; but the system fell into disuse, 
and administration by no one in particular was re- 
sulting in misapplications, malversations, and even 
misappropriations of funds, when the Khedive 
stepped in and, perceiving an excellent way of reim- 
bursing himself for some of his losses, assumed con- 
trol. At first his administration was marked with a 
sanctimonious show of rectitude, but stories were 
soon told which suggested that his stewardship might 
become a public scandal. Both Lord Cromer and 
Sir Eldon Gorst had expressed grave displeasure, 
but had not liked to interfere with funds of a purely 
religious character. Now, however, that the Moham- 
medan community itself was becoming seriously dis- 
turbed on the subject, and that it was becoming more 
and more evident that large sums were being 
diverted not only to the Khedive’s own private ac- 
count but to the dissemination of anti-British propa- 
ganda, Kitchener put his foot down. 

With the willing help of the Egyptian Ministers 
an inquiry was set on foot, which revealed that the 
accounts had been allowed to drift into a chaotic 
state, and that large sums had been paid to the eredit 
both of the Khedive himself and of doubtful Palace 
officials who offered no explanation of their dis- 
posal. It was calculated that the Khedive was draw- 
ing £80,000 annually from the Wakfs, and nearly half 
that sum from the sale of decorations. Although a 
decree had been issued by his father regulating the 
arrangements for the bestowal of decorations, Abbas 
Hilmi had paid little or no attention to it, and had 


LXXXIX THE WAKFS 343 


recouped himself for many of his speculative losses 
by selling Medjidiehs and Osmaniehs for large sums 
to people who had done little to deserve them. 

Kitchener’s protest against this double traffic was 
met at first by a scornful denial; the Khedive hinted 
that the Agency must have been misinformed by evil- 
minded and designing persons, but the list of deeds 
which the Agent had in his pocket was too long and 
too clearly made out to admit of disproof. The 
Khedive shifted his ground, acknowledged his error, 
and, with a beaming smile, again proposed the pur- 
chase by the Government of the Mariut Railway as 
the condition of his better behaviour. The condition 
was not rejected, but two days later His Highness 
went back on his promises, and announced his inten- 
tion of retaining in his own hands the administration 
of the Wakfs. This set a term to the patience of the 
Government, and a hint was conveyed to the Palace 
that the Turkish Grand Vizier would raise no objec- 
tion if the British Government saw fit to remove the 
Khedive from his high office. The threat brought 
him at last to his senses, and after a certain amount 
of equivocation he gave in. The Wakfs were there- 
fore removed from his control and placed under a 
respectable Moslem Minister and Council. His dis- 
tribution of decorations was guarded from further 
scandal, and a close watch was kept on His High- 
ness’s relations with the Turks and Nationalists. 
On the other hand, the Government, making the con- 
ditions depend largely on Abbas’s future good be- 
haviour, agreed to purchase the railway. 

This episode, which occurred in November 1913, 
somewhat cleared the air, and the Khedive appeared 
anxious to propitiate the Agency, but his agile mind 


344 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER CHAP. 


was still alert to raise money for himself and trouble 
for us. Before many weeks were over he was dis- 
covered to be in close and secret correspondence with 
the Senussi chieftains, endeavouring to negotiate 
peace between the Tripolitan Arabs and the Italians 
in return for a very large sum in cash. 

This was a scheme more praiseworthy than prac- 
ticable, and it was doomed to failure. The several 
missions were clumsily handled, and the emissaries 
returned empty-handed and in sore disgrace. When 
the Khedive’s representative informed El Said Idris, 
the cousin of the Grand Sheikh Ahmed-es-Senussi, 
that if he would work for peace with the Italians, 
the Khedive would support him and ensure his sup- 
planting his cousin as head of all the Senussiya, Idris 
flew into a passion and broke off all further dis- 
cussion. 

Closely interwoven with the Senussi negotiations 
was an ugly little chain of intrigue in which was in- 
volved the Egyptian representative of a Kuropean 
bank of pronounced political complexion; to give this 
nefarious scheme its quietus was Kitchener’s last 
action before leaving Cairo in June 1914. 


The remark is attributed to King Edward VIL. 
that the test of a good administrator lies in his 
capacity for keeping things quiet. Judged by this 
standard, the de facto ruler of Egypt took high 
honours in the school of statesmanship. His pres- 
ence served to keep that peace which meant so much 
for the prosperity of the country, and although he 
knew trouble was lurking not far below the surface, 
he could hope that by a long course of wise and just 
administration, by steady elimination of grievances 


LXXXIX LEAVES EGYPT 345 


and alleviation of burdens, and by a liberal and sus- 
tained support of native industry, disaffection would 
die down and sedition at last find nothing to feed 
upon. Time was needed, and during his time, at any 
rate, Kitchener was able and, as it would seem, easily 
able, to obviate any expression of anti-British feel- 
ing. And this sustained tranquillity was the greater 
proof of his influence because circumstances, external 
and internal, combined to favour the forces of dis- 
order.’ The two distracting wars in which Turkey 
was engaged, the perpetual straining at the leash on 
the part of politicians who panted to become legis- 
lators, and the ceaseless malfeasances of the Khe- 
dive, were superadded to the ordinary complex cares 
of administration. Over and above the responsi- 
bility of damping down these inflammable materials 
was the duty of devising and carrying out a bevy of 
constructive measures of legislation. Agriculture, 
sanitation, education, and judicature suggest rather 
than complete the chapter of subjects dealt with in , 
the course of an Administration to which Kitchener 
had always looked forward as a prize which might 
fall to him. Cotton-markets and savings-banks, 
school buildings and Press supervision, the increase 
of cattle at home and the control of native students 
abroad, the overhauling of cantonal justice and the 
heightening of the Assuan Dam, correspondence 
alike with the Coptic Archbishop of Sinai and the An- 
glican Bishop in Jerusalem,! were each and all of 


1In 1913 Bishop Gwynne was installed at Khartum as Suffragan to the 
Bishop in Jerusalem. This appointment had been for many years in 
Kitchener’s mind. ‘I must thank you at once,” he wrote to Bishop Blyth 
early in 1913, “for your letter on the subject of Church affairs in general 
and of the Bishopric question in particular. It is very good of you to have 
taken the trouble to have set the facts before me so clearly and fully, and I 
shall take careful note of your observations. I shall be very happy to see 


346 LIFE OF LORD KITCHENER cz. uxxxx 


absorbing interest to him, and received equally assid- 
uous attention. ‘Let me say,’’ wrote Lord Cromer, 
‘chow thoroughly sound I think all your Egyptian 
views are. May you goonand prosper. Itisa real 
consolation to me to think that, under your auspices, 
the work of my lifetime will not be thrown away; 
until your advent I confess that I began to fear that 
such would be the case.’’? Cromer’s great service in 
Egypt had been rewarded by an Harldom while he 
was still at the Agency, and the Prime Minister ad- 
vised the King that no lesser title should adorn his 
successor during his tenure of the office. The Birth- 
day Gazette of June 1914 announced that the Sover- 
eign had been pleased to confer on Viscount Kitch- 
ener the honour of an Earldom, and the telegram an- 
nouncing his new dignity reached him just as he was 
starting for England on his annual leave. How 
little did he think that he would see no more the land 
he knew and the people he loved, and had cared for, 
so well. 


Archdeacon Potter whenever he arrives, and I am sure a talk with him will 
be most useful.” 

Kitchener during the war kept up a correspondence with the Arch- 
bishop of Sinai, and in the New Year of 1916 was telegraphing: ‘Je prie 
Votre Béatitude de croire que je suis particuliérement touché de votre 
télégramme. . . . Je souhaite que la nouvelle année vous apporte le bon- 
heur, et la sante nécessaire 4 la continuation de votre belle cuyre.” 


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